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ABSTRACT 
 
The advent of ARTs has enabled many individuals to have children and build 
families. Although ARTs have from the start been designated to serve as alternative 
way for heterosexual infertile individuals and couples to have genetically related 
children, ARTs are nowadays widely used by gays and lesbians to have even 
genetically unrelated children and build their families. This study addresses the well-
being of children born as a result of ARTs and growing up in homosexual families in 
South Africa. South Africa has legalised homosexual unions, granting gays and 
lesbians several rights, including the right to marry, use ARTs to reproduce, and 
build families in which they raise their children. South Africa has also provided 
constitutional and statutory protection of children’s rights and has further required 
that the child’s best interests be considered as paramount in every matter 
concerning the child. Although ARTs may have allowed people to have children, they 
have proven to put the child’s interests at risk. ARTs are associated with several 
physical and psychological problems for resulting children. The legal protection 
provided for those children seems to be inadequate in respect of their best interests. 
Unlike Australian statutes that have provided strong protection for the child’s best 
interests, South African legislations regulating ARTs are far from protecting ART-
born children’s interests. The application of the child’s best interests criterion to ART 
procedures has revealed that in the USA and Australia efforts of the state, ART 
providers and parents have been centred on the transfer of the custody of the ART-
born child to the commissioning parent(s). Although in South Africa the application of 
the child’s best interests in the context of surrogacy procedures has revealed the 
protection of the child’s interests, it should be noted that that protection seems to 
focus on the child’s post-birth period. This situation leaves ART-born children without 
any protection, especially before their birth. In order to give effect to section 28 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 and protect ART-born children’s 
interests, I make certain proposals for law reform in the final chapter of this thesis.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
   
1.1 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
 
In 1978, Steptoe and Edwards made a revolutionary discovery in the field of human 
procreation, a discovery that made it possible to initiate a pregnancy in the absence 
of sexual intercourse by fertilising a woman’s egg in a test tube and transferring the 
embryo into the woman’s body, resulting in the live birth of a child. This achievement 
was years later subjected to developments and improvement and is now referred to 
as assisted reproductive technologies (“ARTs”).1 The discovery of Steptoe and 
Edwards was the starting point of many changes that have occurred in the family, 
procreation and states’ legislation throughout the world. 
 
Changes in the family have resulted in the decline of the nuclear family and the 
emergence of non-traditional families, which include single parent families and 
homosexual families.2 Sexual intercourse is no longer the only way for human beings 
to reproduce; infertile couples, single parent as well as gays and lesbians may now 
alternatively use ARTs to procreate and build their families. This situation forced 
states to take appropriate legislative measures to accommodate all these changes 
within their jurisdictions.    
 
Before the occurrence of all these changes, the nuclear family, which is the result of 
the union between a man and a woman, was the only form of the family that was 
accepted worldwide, and sexual intercourse was the only means for human beings 
to procreate and build families. The presence of a woman and a man was a 
requirement for the existence of the fundamental unit of the society which is the 
family. This requirement denotes the belief that both genders are equal and 
                                                          
1
  Carara and Filippi “Sex and reproduction: An evolving relationship” 2010 HRU 98. 
2
  Although families headed by two fathers or two mothers and families headed by a father and 
a mother are refered to respectively as both “same-sex families” or “same-gendered families” 
and “opposite-sex families”; and homosexual and heterosexual families I will refer to them in 
this study as homosexual and heterosexual families. 
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necessary for the existence of a family and stresses the crucial and equal 
contribution of a man and a woman to the institution of family.3 The harmony of 
heterosexual marriage partially depends on the fact that there is a difference of sex 
between a woman and a man.4 
 
Changes that occurred throughout the world did not spare South Africa. South Africa 
adopted its final Constitution,5 which contains a Bill of Rights that affords a wide 
range of rights to individuals. In 2006, South Africa passed the Civil Union Act 17 of 
2006, which extended marriage rights to homosexual couples and became the first 
country in Africa to legalise homosexual relationships.6 In terms of section 1 of the 
Civil Union Act, two persons who are both 18 years of age or older may engage 
themselves in a civil union, which is solemnised and registered by way of either a 
marriage or a civil partnership. The gender neutral formula used in this section would 
suggest the intention of the legislature to include homosexual individuals in the ambit 
of the Act. Section 13 of the Act makes it clear that those who enter into a civil union 
will be accorded the same rights as those who enter into a traditional marriage in 
terms of the Marriage Act 25 of 1961.  
 
It should be noted that homosexual relationships also benefit from constitutional 
protection. The South African Constitutional Court has in several cases interpreted 
section 9 of the Constitution to mean that homosexual relationships merit equal 
protection and respect. Section 9 can be interpreted to mean that homosexual 
couples can form long-lasting relationships and an environment where they can love, 
raise and care for children. 
 
In National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice,7 and Minister 
of Home Affairs v Fourie,8 the Constitutional Court reached the conclusion that like 
                                                          
3
  Wardle “Same-sex marriage and the limits of legal pluralism” in Eekelaar and Nhlapo (eds) 
The Changing Family: International Perspective on the Family and Family Law 392. 
4
  Joshua v Joshua 1961 (1) SA 455 (GW) (hereafter “the Joshua case”). 
5
  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter “the  Constitution”). 
6
 De Vos “A judicial revolution? The court led achievement of same-sex marriage in South 
Africa” 2008 ULR 162.  
7
  1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC), 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) paras [32]-[33]. 
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heterosexual couples, homosexual couples can establish a consortium omnis vitae 
and build families through which they can enjoy family life. It is important to note that, 
within the year following the passing of the Civil Union Act in parliament, 1070 
homosexual couples officialised their relationships in terms of the Act.9 The 
legalisation of homosexual relationships and its consequences in South Africa is the 
context in which this study takes place. 
 
Decades ago, homosexual individuals enjoyed their intimate relationships without 
having children. However, nowadays these individuals demonstrate the desire to 
parent children either through adoption or ARTs and hence build their own families.10 
Patterson and Tornello observed that some homosexual couples who identify 
themselves as such have demonstrated an increased desire to use ARTs and 
become parents.11 This would mean that ARTs are now an attractive option for gay 
and lesbian couples to reproduce and build new forms of families. This view is also 
shared by Robertson who, after observing homosexual families for a long time, 
concluded as follows: 
 
“Gay males expressed their desire to have their own children either as single parents 
or with a same-sex partner. To do so, they will have to find a woman who will bear 
the child for them. In case of lesbians, one woman will donate the egg which is 
fertilised with the sperm of one of the gay males and another woman will gestate”.12  
 
Assisted reproductive technologies, which were meant to be used in infertility 
treatment and were intended to enable infertile heterosexual couples to have 
children, are now intensively used by homosexual couples, irrespective of their 
fertility status, to have children and build non-traditional families. It is thus clear that 
with developments in the field of ARTs and the extension of the right of adoption to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
8
 Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie (Doctors for Life International, Amici Curiae; Lesbian and 
Gay Equality Project v Minister of Home Affairs 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC), 2006 (3) BCLR 255 
(CC) para [54]. 
9
 De Vos 2008 ULR 173 (quoting Judge et al “Introduction” in Judge et al (ed) To Have and 
Hold: The Making of Same-Sex Marriage in South Africa (2007) 14). 
10
  Lubbe “Mothers, fathers or parents: Same-gendered families in South Africa” 2007 SAJP 260. 
11
 Patterson and Tornello “Gay fathers’ pathways to parenthood: International perspectives” 
2010 JFR 104. 
12
 Robertson “Gay and lesbian access to assisted reproductive technology” 2005 CWRLR 350. 
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homosexual individuals, homosexual couples are now in a position to have children 
and raise them. The number of children born by means of ARTs is reported to 
increase on a daily basis worldwide. According to Galpern, in the last three decades 
ARTs have allowed the birth of more than three million babies in the world. Infertile 
women and men, single women and men, and lesbian, gay and transgender couples 
have hence been able to have genetically related children and build families of their 
own.13 
 
As a result, the number of children born by means of ARTs to homosexual couples is 
increasing and this raises the concern for the well-being of children born and growing 
up in families built through ARTs. Children born and growing up in these families 
experience particular hardships that have attracted the focus of researchers. 
Golombok for instance points out that, children born through ARTs may be brought 
up in new forms of families where they are not always genetically linked to their 
parents. Progress in medical technology has made it possible for children to grow up 
in families where they are genetically related to only one parent, or in some cases 
they have no genetic link with either parent. Parenthood in these families is not 
necessarily founded on the genetic link between parents and the children they raise; 
some children such as those genetically unrelated to either parent are in essence 
socially linked to the people who are raising them.14 
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
The growing number of same-sex marriages, coupled with the development of 
reproductive technologies, has resulted in the diversification of family types and a 
new conception of family.15 Family no longer consists of only a man and woman, but 
also of same-sex partners who through ARTs and adoption are able to have children 
                                                          
13
  Galpern “Assisted reproductive technologies: Overview and perspective using a reproductive 
justice framework” 2007 CFGS 1. 
14
  Golombok et al “Families created through surrogacy arrangements: Parent-child relationships 
in the first year of life” 2004 DP 400. 
15
 Vanfraussen, Kristofferssen and Brewaeys “An attempt to reconstruct children’s donor 
concept: A comparison between children and lesbian parents’ attitude towards donor 
anonymity” 2001 HR 20 40. 
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and raise them. Consequently a wider range of non-traditional families is now 
increasingly recognised.16  
 
In South Africa, a number of legal provisions allow gays and lesbians to become 
parents and raise children. For instance, in terms of the Civil Union Act, same-sex 
partners have the right to marry each other. Section 40 of the Children’s Act 38 of 
2005 recognises ARTs as a method of reproduction, and section 295 of the same 
Act requires the court to confirm surrogate motherhood agreements irrespective of 
the sexual orientation of the commissioning parents, provided that they comply with 
the terms of this section.  
 
Finally, the Constitution guarantees the rights of gays and lesbians to establish life 
partnerships, adopt children, keep the care for their own children after divorce 
proceedings and more recently, establish co-parenting.17 This would suggest that the 
right of gays and lesbians to parent is no longer questionable. Gays’ and lesbians’ 
right to parent was confirmed in a number of cases brought before the court. South 
African courts have in several cases ruled in favour of gays and lesbians in divorce 
cases. In April 1998, for instance, a lesbian mother was allowed to keep caring for 
her child that was removed by the Department of Social Services and placed in the 
care of the child’s grandparents.18 In November of the same year, a gay couple was 
also awarded care of a child that they had fostered since birth.19 More recently, in Ex 
parte WH, the court confirmed a surrogate motherhood agreement involving two 
male commissioning parents.20  
 
As a result many children are being raised in families where parents are 
homosexuals. However, the South African Constitution, among other legal texts in 
                                                          
16
 De Vaus Statistical Profiles 4. 
17
 Knoesen “Queering the vote” (3 March 2004) Mail and Guardian 15.  
18
 Powers “Lesbian mother wins custody of her child” (3 April1998) The Star 3.  
19
 Oliver “Tears as pair is given custody” (5 December 1998) Saturday Argus 3. 
20
 Ex Parte WH 2011 (6) SA 514 (GNP). 
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the country, also protects the rights of the child and requires that the child’s best 
interests be considered as paramount in every matter concerning him or her.21 
 
In short, on the one hand the Constitution allows gays and lesbians to marry, raise 
children and build families. On the other hand, the Constitution protects the rights of 
the child and states that in every matter concerning the child, his or her best interests 
must be considered as paramount. This situation raises a number of questions within 
the context of South African law.  
 
1.3 THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
In view of the fact that the children’s rights enshrined in the Constitution seem to be 
in opposition to the rights of parents, this study seeks to provide acceptable answers 
to the following questions: 
 
(a) Do ARTs serve the best interests of the South African child? 
 
(b) Does being born through ARTs and growing up in a homosexual family serve 
the best interests of the child in the South African legal context? 
(c) If the first two questions are answered in the negative, then there is a conflict 
of rights between homosexual parents and their children. The question then 
arises how this conflict of rights can be resolved. 
 
 
1.4 THE AIM AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
1.4.1 The aim of the study 
 
The debate over the suitability or not of the homosexual family as an environment for 
child development is inescapable when analysing post-modern families or families 
                                                          
21
 Section 28(2) of the Constitution states that: “[a] child’s best interests are of paramount 
importance in every matter concerning the child”. See also Clark “Custody: The best interests 
of the child” 1992 SALJ 394. 
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built through ARTs. This study aims at emphasising the debate by advocating a 
more objective approach to homosexual families. The study seeks to critically 
analyse the welfare of children born to homosexual people as a result of ARTs and 
growing up in homosexual families. 
 
The study aims to investigate whether the welfare of those children requires 
improvement, whether their best interests are put at risk and whether they face 
challenges as a result of being born through ARTs and growing up in homosexual 
families. If so the study aims to investigate ways of improving their welfare, ensuring 
that their best interests are not put at risk and analysing challenges faced by 
homosexual families with regard to children’s optimal development. In this the study 
seeks to ensure the effective protection of these children’s best interests and 
improve the chances of children growing up in homosexual families to develop 
appropriately. 
 
The study also seeks to stimulate more reflections on post-modern families with a 
particular focus on its suitability for the protection of children’s best interests. The 
study intends to fill the gaps left by previous studies and contribute to a better 
understanding of children’s experience in homosexual families. Finally the study 
highlights the role of a father and a mother in the optimal development of the child. 
 
1.4.2 The significance of the study 
 
It is important to discuss children’s well-being in homosexual families and to examine 
ways of further improving the conditions of children born to and growing up in those 
families. This study evaluates the strengths and the weaknesses of homosexual 
families in terms of the protection of the best interests of children growing up in 
homosexual families. To this end the study submits that the law can play an 
important role. The best interests of children born as a result of ARTs can be 
adequately protected, for example by applying the best interests of the child criterion 
to children before birth.  
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The study of the well-being of children in homosexual families is a significant 
exercise in that it provides an opportunity to critically analyse the opinion that has 
prevailed until now in the reviewed studies regarding the child’s well-being in 
homosexual families and to strive towards improving the way children are being 
raised in homosexual families. 
 
Further, the study is significant in that it analyses the role played by a father and a 
mother in the child’s development, and evaluates the contribution of each parent 
(mother and father) to the child’s well-being. Finally, the study is significant in that it 
seeks to find a solution to the conflict of rights that might exist between homosexual 
parents and their children. 
 
1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Legal research always has a pattern of performance commonly referred to as the 
research method. The research method can be understood “as the manner of 
proceeding adopted by researchers in their bid to gain systematic, reliable and valid 
knowledge about legal phenomena”.22 
 
This study is intended to be analytic. The study intends to analyse the experience of 
children born to homosexuals within the bonds of their homosexual relationships and 
apply the best interests of the child criterion to the situation of these children.  
 
To this end a literature study will be used as the research method. The techniques 
used include a legal analysis and a comparative approach. The comparative 
approach will consider the experience of children in two countries, namely the United 
States of America (USA) and Australia, because of the scarcity of the application of 
ARTs in South Africa. The USA and Australia have a long history of homosexuality, 
and ARTs have been used in these countries for many years. The number of 
children growing up in these countries is big and available data from the USA and 
                                                          
22
 Cranston “The rational study of laws: Social research and access to justice” in Zuckermann 
and Cranston (eds) Reform of Civil Procedure: Essays on “Access to Justice” 31-32. 
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Australia on homosexual families and the use of ARTs will therefore be used to 
understand the South African experience and find a way forward. A historical 
research component is also necessary for this study, in order to understand the 
evolution or changes relating to the family that occurred in different societies under 
examination. However, this will basically consist of a historical overview and not in 
depth legal-historical perspective. It is thus clear that the study uses various 
research methods in order to answer the abovementioned questions and solve the 
problems prevailing in South Africa.  
 
In this respect, textbooks, legislation, judicial decisions, journal articles, reports, 
theses and electronic data constitute relevant sources of information. 
 
1.6 OVERVIEW OF STUDY 
 
The achievement of the aim of this study requires a particular structure for the study. 
The study is divided into eight chapters. The first chapter introduces the study and 
sets the content and the structure of the research. The chapter starts with 
introductory remarks, highlights the problem tackled in the research. The chapter 
also sets out the aim and the significance of the study. The chapter further describes 
the methodology adopted in the research and in the last section, the overview of 
study. 
 
The second chapter is a survey of the homosexual family. The chapter will firstly 
define the concept “homosexual family” in the context of this study. Secondly, the 
chapter will analyse the functioning of this family, and thirdly the chapter will examine 
the experience of the child as a member of a homosexual family. The aim of this 
analysis is to provide a general understanding of homosexual family and some 
particulars thereof. This understanding is important in that it helps orientate the 
analysis of legislative measures related to homosexual families. There is no way to 
understand legislation that authorises homosexual people to build families if one 
does not know or understand what homosexual families are and what members of 
these families may experience as part of society. 
10 
 
In chapter three, the overview of ARTs is provided in the first section. The second 
section analyses how ARTs are used in South Africa. In a third section, physical, 
emotional and psychological effects that ARTs may have on children are analysed. 
The conclusions reached in this chapter have an important implication in the analysis 
of the approach that should be appropriate for the best interests of children in South 
Africa. 
 
The fourth chapter is an analysis of the international and South African constitutional 
perspectives on the family. The chapter aims at comparing how the family and family 
members are protected at international and domestic level. The conclusion on the 
analysis of the protection of the rights of parents on one side and the rights of the 
children on the other highlights the conflict that exists between the rights of parents 
and their children. The understanding of this conflict will help this study envisage an 
appropriate approach for the adequate protection of the child when attempting to 
solve this conflict. 
 
The fifth chapter is about the homosexual family and the child’s best interests in 
South Africa. This chapter discusses the emergence of homosexual families in South 
Africa, followed by an analysis of the legal recognition of homosexual families and 
the status of the children born and growing up in those families. Parental rights and 
responsibilities as well as the best interests of the child in homosexual families will 
also be discussed. It is important to note that in this chapter from time to time a 
comparison will be made between the position sustained under the apartheid regime 
and the position under the new constitutional regime. The chapter will analyse the 
ways in which the well-being of the child can be improved. 
 
The sixth chapter deals with homosexual families in the context of the USA. The 
chapter begins with an analysis of the legal position of homosexual families in the 
USA. The chapter will then analyse the effects of this legal position on the well-being 
of the child growing up in a homosexual family. The chapter will also analyse the 
right of homosexual couples to procreate and the implications of that right on 
children born from the use of ARTs. The aim of this chapter is to understand how 
11 
 
issues concerning children in general are handled and how the best interests of the 
child born as a result of ARTs are protected in particular. 
 
The seventh chapter analyses the homosexual family in the Australian context. To 
this end, the chapter will focus on the laws recognising homosexual families in 
Australia, those regulating access to ARTs, and those regulating parentage. This 
legal investigation is important in that it provides insights on how legislations have 
treated children born as a result of ARTs, and that in turn will inform how the 
situation of those children may be improved.  
 
The eighth chapter will end with the conclusion. In this chapter, answers to the 
following question will be provided: What is the South African approach to ARTs and 
to the families built as a result of the use of those procedures? It is followed by the 
comparative conclusions which highlight those areas where the best interests of the 
child suffer from poor protection. Lastly, concluding remarks are provided followed by 
proposals for law reform. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
HOMOSEXUAL FAMILIES 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In many societies worldwide, homosexual families are a relatively new reality. In 
western societies, for instance, it is only recently that the meaning of family was 
expanded to include a vast array of familial groups in which children are born and 
being raised. In addition to nuclear families, many other forms of families are 
nowadays encountered, including a “patchwork” or “blended” family where after 
divorce one of the parents found a partner who had children out of a former 
relationship and together they built a new family, and families consisting of two 
mothers or two fathers.23 The last two categories of families are referred to in this 
study as homosexual families or gay and lesbian families. 
 
In Africa in general, some countries have opposed this view of the family. However, 
in South Africa, the wave of changes that came from western societies influenced 
the conception of the family and caused homosexual families to be viewed as part of 
the society. 
 
This chapter will provide an overview of homosexual families. The chapter is divided 
into five sections followed by an interim conclusion. The first section defines 
homosexual families. The second section discusses the decline of the nuclear family 
and the emergence of other forms of families, including lesbian and gay families 
(homosexual families). This section will also focus particularly on the emergence of 
homosexual families. While the third section is about the description of homosexual 
families, the fourth examines the functioning of homosexual families, and the fifth 
section is devoted to children as members of homosexual families. 
 
  
                                                          
23
 Bos, Van Balen and Van den Boom “Lesbian families and family functioning: an overview” 
2005 PEC 263. 
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2.2 DEFINITION OF HOMOSEXUAL FAMILIES 
 
Heterosexual family has undergone many changes in its structure and function which 
has contributed to its decline.24 A good understanding of the former requires one to 
know what the latter are. Therefore, it is important to define the heterosexual or 
natural or traditional or nuclear family before attempting to give any meaning to 
homosexual families.  
 
It is also important to bear in mind that homosexual families are the result of changes 
that the society has undergone and the advent of ARTs. In the first paragraph of this 
section the nuclear family will be defined and the second paragraph will define 
homosexual families. 
 
2.2.1 Definition of the family 
 
Writers have defined the family or heterosexual family in diverse ways. According to 
Fineman “the family is an institution of horizontal intimacy, based on the romantic 
sexual affiliation between a woman and a man”.25 This definition stresses two 
important dimensions of the family: firstly, the horizontal intimacy between two 
persons, and secondly, the horizontal intimacy must be based on the sexual 
affiliation of two persons of opposite sex. This would suggest that, for a family to 
come into existence, two persons (a man and a woman) must engage themselves in 
a romantic relationship, be it marriage or not. There must be interdependency 
between the two people who enter this romantic relationship. 
 
Although this definition emphasises the presence of a man and a woman for the 
family to come into existence, it lacks another dimension of family which is very 
important for this study. Fineman’s definition fails to include children as members of 
the family. It is worth keeping in mind that children are the main focus of the study. 
For the purpose of this study, this definition is narrow and exclusive: Narrow because 
                                                          
24
  For more details on the heterosexual family decline, see para 2.3 below. 
25
  Fineman “The neutered mother” 1992 UMLR 663. 
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it does not take into consideration all dimensions of the family and exclusive because 
it excludes children as members of the family. 
 
Moosavi proposes another definition of the family that goes beyond the definition of 
Fineman. He adds two new important dimensions, namely the social acceptance of 
the relationship and the presence of children. There is even a third dimension which 
is the durability of the relationship. In Moosavi’s words: 
 
“A family is a unit that comprises a relationship more or less durable, confirmed by 
the society between two people of different gender who form a common life, who 
have children and who raise them. This type of family has become a global 
phenomenon that is found in all types of societies”.26 
 
According to Sheikh, “the family is a social and a key institution”. As a key institution, 
the family allocates responsibilities to individuals in order to protect societal structure 
and stabilise social life. Family as a social institution is the place where three 
categories of relations interact: “parent-child, blood and marriage”.27 Therefore the 
term family covers a wide range of organisations, forms and responsibilities which 
may change from one country to another and may even change inside the same 
society, and which may be based on social classes, cultural influences and income 
levels.28 
 
Popenoe has proposed another definition of the family. According to him, family “is a 
relatively small group of kin (or people in a kin like relationship) consisting of at least 
one adult and one dependent person”.29 What Popenoe is proposing here is similar 
to a single mother or single father family where there is at least one dependent child. 
Single mother and single father families emerged because of the changes that have 
stricken society particularly in industrialised countries. It is clear that this definition 
                                                          
26
  Moosavi “The comparison of family functioning, marital adjustment and intimacy in middle 
aged and young spouses” 2012 IRJABS 2015. 
27
  Sheikh Family Sociology 9. 
28
 Moosavi 2012 IRJABS 2015. 
29
 Popenoe “American family decline 1961-190: A review and appraisal” 1993 JMF 529. 
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includes children as part of the family. However, it is characterised by the absence of 
either a father or a mother who are very important for the nuclear family to be 
complete. 
 
Macklin defines the non-traditional family as opposite to the traditional family. 
According to him, non-traditional family is defined as “all living patterns other than 
legal, lifelong, sexually exclusive marriage between a man and a woman, with 
children, where the male is the primary provider and ultimate authority”.30  
 
A closer look at this definition reveals a number of realities. Firstly, in Macklin’s 
opinion, nuclear family is composed of a man, a woman and children. Secondly, the 
man is united to the woman through the legal and long-lasting relationship of 
marriage; thirdly the marriage must be the only institution in which sexual activities 
are tolerated; and fourthly, the man is the provider and the ultimate authority of the 
family.31 Although the authority of the man in the nuclear family can be questioned 
today, this definition seems to be consistent with the requirements of the nuclear 
family in traditional societies.  
 
Based on what is discussed above, and for the purpose of this study, family or 
nuclear family or traditional family should be understood as a unit composed of a 
father, a mother and their children. This unit is a result of a relationship between a 
woman and a man. It is important to note that the above realities are characteristics 
of the nuclear family which is the basic and fundamental unit of society. As will be 
seen in the discussion that follows, this form of family was valued and viewed as of 
great benefit to a stable and productive society. This would suggest that the stability 
and productivity of society are associated with the benefit that the nuclear family 
brings it.  
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In this regard, Fineman is of the view that the protection of family and its values 
shapes the policy and politics of society.32 Rogers also stresses the importance of 
the family in the society. He admits that the family is a “social building block”. He 
goes on to argue that the collapse of this building block causes society to collapse 
with it and that puts the well-being of children under threat.33 However, with the 
changes that happened in society and the development of new methods of 
reproduction, other forms of families have emerged, including homosexual families.  
 
With the emergence of homosexual families, the definition of the family discussed in 
this section was challenged. It was criticised and viewed as exclusive as it excluded 
homosexual couples and their children. There was therefore a need for an inclusive 
definition of the family that could take into account lesbians and gays who are raising 
children.  
 
In order to include gay and lesbian families in the definition of family, Macklin 
conceived the family as similar to the “open marriage”. According to him, “open 
marriage” is a lifestyle that is characterised by the mutual decision of a couple to 
allow one or both partners to have openly acknowledged, independent sexual 
relationships with many partners who keep their own residences.34 Macklin observed 
that in the “open family” some features are emphasised. These include flexible roles 
played by men and women of all ages, clear communication characterised by 
negotiations and consensual decisions, open expression of emotion, and mutual 
respect.35  
  
For the purpose of including homosexual families in the definition of family, Fineman 
proposed a definition of family entrenched in the vertical relationship between 
caretaker and dependent, as opposed to a family definition rooted in the horizontal 
relationship between a man and a woman.36 In this definition of family, the caretaker 
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and the dependent may be of the same-sex and the dependent might be a sexual 
partner of the caretaker.  
 
Demo and Allen note that homosexual families are part of the wide family landscape. 
Within this landscape, homosexual individuals are interacting as siblings, parents, 
stepparents, partners and extended and chosen kin.37 This explanation accounts for 
why many lesbians and gays have been described to be living simultaneously in two 
worlds, their heterosexual family where they come from and the lesbian and gay 
family they have created as mature partners through ARTs. They hence build an 
extended family environment that may be called a mixed or gay-straight or “dual” 
orientation family. Within these families, lesbians and gay men have relationships 
with other members of their family of origin, including brothers, sisters, parents, 
grandparents, and grandchildren.38  
 
Remarkably, defining homosexual families is problematic and controversial. While 
Demo and Allen maintain that families, in which lesbian and gay individuals are 
members, and where other family members are heterosexual, should not be defined 
as homosexual families,39 Patterson is of the view that homosexual families are 
families that include at least one lesbian or gay partner.40 This definition appears to 
be incomplete as it does not mention the presence of children as members of the 
family. 
 
According to Rogers, homosexual families are new family units consisting of mother-
and-mother with children or father-and-father with children.41 In Demo and Allen’s 
words: 
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“Lesbian and gay families are defined by the presence of two or more people who 
share the same-sex orientation (couple) or by the presence of a least one lesbian or 
one gay rearing a child”.42  
 
In other words, lesbian and gay families are defined by the intimate interaction of two 
or more people who share same-sex orientation or by the enduring involvement of at 
least one lesbian or gay adult in the rearing of children. The problem with this 
definition is that a child may have more than two parents of the same sex who are 
involved in his or her rearing. The absence of at least one opposite sex parent might 
affect the psychological development of the child. This will become clear further 
down. 
 
A homosexual family is also defined as “a family circle with a gay couple, who live 
together with adopted or biological children from prior heterosexual relationships, 
and/or where children either live in or visit the household”.43 The fact the parent-child 
relationship was established before the couple relationship makes these families to 
be similar to heterosexual stepfamilies.  
 
Not undermining the value of these definitions, it is worth noting that for the purpose 
of this study, homosexual families should be understood as families in which two 
men or two women are raising children that are born in the context of their 
homosexual relationship. In other words, in homosexual families, two men or women 
are rearing children who are born not from their previous heterosexual marriage, but 
are born while they are in homosexual relationship. This means in the context of this 
study, children reared in homosexual families are born as a result of homosexual 
relationships. This definition limits the number of the parents of the same sex at two 
and insists on the fact that the child reared in this family must not be adopted or born 
from the previous heterosexual marriage; rather the child must be born through 
assisted reproductive technologies. In view of the fact that the study analyses the 
welfare of children born through ARTs and growing up in homosexual families, 
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having two parents of the same sex and being born as aresult of ARTs are the two 
important aspects of homosexual families in the context of this study. 
 
It is important to bear in mind, as already stated, that homosexual families resulted 
from changes that occurred within the society in general and to the nuclear family in 
particular. The discussion of these changes is the subject of the next section. 
 
2.3 SOCIAL CHANGES AND THE DECLINE OF THE NUCLEAR FAMILY 
 
Society throughout the world has undergone profound changes. Sodomy was for 
instance decriminalised in the USA; a gay bishop was consecrated in an Episcopal 
church; in many states in the USA equal rights for same-sex couples are judicially 
protected; and Canada and many other countries, including South Africa, legally 
recognise homosexual marriages. These changes are seen as contributing to the 
decline of the nuclear family and the emergence of “the post-modern family”.44  
 
The decline of the nuclear family was commented on by a number of researchers 
including Popenoe. Popenoe mentioned changes that have happened in the 
structure and functions of the family in the USA. He highlighted the seriousness of 
these changes as they affect the nuclear family. In his words: 
 
“There has been a striking decline in family structure and functions in American 
society, particularly since 1960. Recent family decline is ‘more serious’ than any 
decline in the past, because what is breaking up is the nuclear family, the 
fundamental unit stripped of relations that is left with two essential functions that 
cannot be performed elsewhere: Child-rearing and the provision of its members 
affection and companionship”.45 
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Bengtson also admits that the family has undergone many changes. He observes 
that these changes have extended family bonds beyond the limits of the nuclear 
family. He states:  
 
“Over the century, there have been significant changes in the family’s structure and 
functions. Prominent among them has been the extension of family bonds, affection 
and or the creation of kin like relationship”.46  
 
In other words, the creation of relationships between man and man or woman and 
woman, the legal recognition and the social acceptance of these relationships in 
some countries, and the rights afforded to two attracted men or women have pushed 
the conception of the family beyond the limits of what was conceived until then as 
family in many societies. 
 
According to Bengtson, all these social changes are the result of, among other 
factors, industrialisation and modernisation, which have direct or indirect effects on 
the family. In his view, urbanisation, increased individualism, and secularism have 
transformed the family from a social institution based on law and customs to one 
based on companionship and love. He argues that forms and meanings of families 
are changing and expanding beyond the nuclear family structure to include a variety 
of kin and non kin relationships.47 
 
Burgess also comments on the changes undergone by society. He starts his 
comment by defining the family, considering it in the context of evolution, and then 
concludes that changes caused the family to transit from an institution to a 
companionship.  
 
The changes of both the structure and function of the family as discussed above 
have resulted in the emergence of new forms of families, including homosexual 
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families. Burgess shares this view and asserts that diverse forms of families have 
emerged from social changes.48  
 
Popenoe explains how these changes have resulted in the emergence of 
homosexual families. According to him, all the social changes undergone by society 
all over the world have resulted in states being forced to pass social rules that justify 
the search of individual rather than collective interests. This, coupled with the 
availability of alternate social groups for the satisfaction of basic needs, has resulted 
in the weakening of the institution of the family as an agent of socialisation and a 
source of nurturance for family members.49  
 
Based on the comments of the abovementioned researchers, one can argue that 
today’s society is becoming more and more individualised; legislation in many 
countries tends to legitimate individual rather than collective interests. 
Industrialisation, capitalism and ARTs are the major causes of these changes. All 
these changes have altered the structure and the function of the nuclear family as 
discussed above and from those changes emerged other forms of families, including 
homosexual families. 
 
For Stacey, it is the modern industrial society that caused the decline of the nuclear 
family. In Stacey’s words: 
 
“If what we mean by ‘family’ is the nuclear family form of dad, mom and their 
biological or adopted children, this form of family rose and fell with modern industrial 
society. In the last few decades, with the shift to a post-industrial domestic economy 
within a capitalist system and the advent of new reproductive technologies, ‘the 
modern family system’ has been replaced by the post-modern family condition, a 
pluralistic, fluid, and contested domain in which diverse family patterns, values, and 
practices contend for legitimacy and resources” 50. 
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It follows from all these comments that social changes have resulted in the alteration 
and decline of the nuclear family, which is the product of the institution of marriage 
between a man and a woman. The nuclear family is now challenged by other forms 
of families that are termed differently as post-modern families, companionship or 
simply homosexual families.  
 
However, according to Sorokin, once a society ceases to honour the institution of 
marriage as described above, it will also cease to survive. For him marriage and 
parenting are the fulfilment of life meaning for both individuals and society. He 
argues that enjoying marital union in its infinite richness; parents freely fulfil many 
other paramount tasks. They maintain the procreation of the human race. Through 
their progeny they determine the hereditary and acquired characteristics of future 
generations. Through their marriage, they preserve themselves, their ancestors and 
particular groups in the society through the transmission of their names and values, 
traditions and ways of life to their children and generations to come.51 
 
The nuclear family has declined and homosexual families have emerged. 
Homosexual families have certain characteristics that need to be discussed for a 
better understanding of these families. The next section is devoted to the discussion 
of those characteristics.  
 
2.4 CHARACTERISTICS OF HOMOSEXUAL FAMILIES 
 
Many characteristics seem to be common to homosexual families: these include, 
amongst other things, the absence of a father or a mother, domestic violence, 
parents’ mental and health problems and a particular mode of reproduction. 
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2.4.1 The absence of a father or mother 
 
Baetens and Brewaeys define lesbian families as families in which there is no father, 
and in which, if there are children, these children are raised by two mothers. 
According to them in lesbian families a father has been excluded from the begining, 
and children are raised by two mothers.52 In these families, one mother is the 
biological or birth mother of the children they are rearing and the other is the social 
or non-birth mother. The social mother is the intimate partner of the biological 
mother. In most cases, the biological mother provides for the family whereas the 
social mother is a helper; she looks after children while the biological mother is busy 
in paid work. Most of the time, the social mother is involved in the children’s 
discipline but sometimes she also spends time in paid work.53 Although this is the 
scenario scetched by Golombok, one should keep in mind that in some cases the 
child might have no biological link with either of the mothers, and the “division of 
labour” in the household may be quite different. 
 
Similarly, in gay families there is no mother. Children live with two fathers who are 
their parents; one of the two fathers has biological ties with the children and his 
partner is in charge of the discipline of children and other domestic tasks.54 Once 
again, although this is the scenario scetched by Golombok, one should keep in mind that in 
some cases, it can happen that neither of the fathers has biological ties with the children and 
both parents are equally involved in the care of their children. 
 
In short, there is no father or mother respectively in lesbian and gay men families. 
This is one of the major characteristics of homosexual families.  
 
  
                                                          
52
 Baetens and Brewaeys “Lesbian couples requesting donor insemination: An update of the 
knowledge with regard to lesbian mother families” 2001 HRU 512. 
53
 Golombok et al “Family with children conceived by donor insemination: A follow up at age 
twelve” 2002 CD 952. 
54
  Golombok 2002 CD 953.  
24 
 
2.4.2 Domestic violence 
 
Different terms have been used to describe the violence that happens between 
homosexual partners. These include same-sex interpersonal violence (SSIPV), 
interpersonal violence (IPV), et cetera. All these terms describe acts of physical, 
emotional and sexual abuse as well as the verbal aggression that occur between two 
homosexual intimate partners.55 
 
Many cases of domestic violence have been reported in lesbian and gay families. 
According to Lockhart et al, 90% of lesbians surveyed in their study have been 
victims of one or more acts of verbal aggression from their intimate partners during 
the year prior to their study, with 31% reporting one or more incidents of physical 
abuse.56 
 
In another survey of 1099 lesbians conducted in 1991, Lie and Gentlewarrier found 
that more than half of lesbians reported that they have been physically, emotionally, 
and psychologically abused by their female lover or partner.57 Island and Lettelier 
concluded that domestic violence within gay households was very high. They 
admitted that the occurrence of domestic violence among gay men is nearly double 
what it is in the heterosexual population.58 
 
In relatively recent studies, cases of violence among gays and lesbians were also 
reported. In 2008, Lisa Eaton et al reported that in a sample of 226 lesbians, 40% 
frequently experienced interpersonal violence perpetrated by their partners. The acts 
of violence ranged from verbal harassment (50%) to physical violence (39%) and 
threats of physical violence (33%).59 In another study undertaken in 2010, 
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Stephenson, Khosropour and Sullivan analysed the rate of gay partners 
experiencing and perpetrating violence; they reported that in a sample of young gay 
men 11.8% of respondents reported physical violence from another male partner 
while around 4% experienced coerced sex. They also reported that 7% of 
respondents perpetrated physical violence while less than 1% of respondents 
perpetrated sexual violence. They concluded that their results demonstrated high 
levels of interpersonal violence among gay men and bisexuals.60 In 2011 similar 
findings were reported. The National Violence Against Women (NVAW) survey found 
that 21.5% of gay men and 35.4% of lesbians had experienced physical abuse from 
their partners in their life time. Another survey of 3000 gay men found that gay men 
experienced physical and sexual abuse of 22% and 5.1% respectively.61 
 
Few studies were conducted in South Africa on violence that happens in 
heterosexual families. In 2001, for example, Technikon South Africa conducted a 
study amongst its employees regarding attitudes and responses to intimate assault 
and domestic abuses. The study revealed that only 17% to 19% of female 
respondents admitted to have been pushed while 15% had been threatened with 
injury. Eleven percent of male respondents indicated that they had pushed their 
wives less than 6 times and 9% had threatened to hurt them.62 In a more recent 
study, Shai and Sikweyiya indicated that 24% of adult women have experienced 
sexual or physical intimate violence in their life time and 31% in their most recent 
marriage and cohabitating relationships.63 
 
All these studies clearly indicate that violence often occur more among lesbians and 
gay men than in heterosexual families and this sometimes tends to shorten the life 
span of their relationships.  
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Homosexual partners cannot naturally reproduce. Their children come into the world 
by the means of different techniques.  
 
2.4.3 Particular mode of reproduction 
 
It is a biological reality that same-sex couples cannot conceive together. For this 
reason their children arrive by a multiplicity of routes. In many cases, children living 
with lesbian and gay couples are biological offspring of one member of the couple, 
whether by an earlier marriage or relationship, by arrangement with a surrogate birth 
mother or by arrangement with a known or unknown donor (in the case of 
lesbians).64 While gay men are often interested to know the surrogate mother, 
lesbian mothers can choose to receive gametes from known or unknown donors for 
them to be inseminated and become pregnant.65 
 
This would suggest that although children can arrive in homosexual families from 
former heterosexual relationships and adoption, homosexuals predominantly use 
donor insemination and surrogacy arrangements as routes to become parents. 
Patterson has added two other routes to the list. According to her, apart from donor 
insemination, adoption and surrogacy arrangements as discussed above, foster care 
and co-parenting are also routes for homosexual couples to become parents.66 As it 
will become clear later in this thesis, laws on adoption by gays and lesbians vary 
from one country to another. While some countries or states in the same country 
allow gays and lesbians to adopt unrelated or related children, other countries deny 
gays and lesbians the right to adopt at all, or allow them to adopt only unrelated 
children.67 
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Lesbian and gay couples prefer donor insemination with known and/or unknown 
sperm donors or arrangements with a birth mother for several reasons. The 
predominant reasons for this preference are: first, for the majority of homosexual 
couples, sexual intercourse with the opposite sex partner is an unacceptable 
solution. They consider this method harmful to their relationship because they 
assume that it lacks respect for the couple’s identity.68  
 
Secondly, lesbians prefer donor insemination because they can chose between a 
known or unknown sperm donor. Some lesbians choose a known sperm donor 
because they admit that their children need a father, a male role model, someone 
who will father their children. They also choose a known sperm donor because they 
recognise that each child has the right to know his or her genetic origins.69 Other 
lesbians prefer an unknown sperm donor. They argue that using sperm from an 
unknown donor will ensure that their relationship and the family are not subjected to 
any interference from a third party.70 They also argue that their children do not need 
a father or a male role model. In these circumstances, the unknown donor is 
informed from the beginning by the clinic or the sperm bank that he will have no 
relationship with the child born with his genetic material.71  
 
Homosexual families are also characterised by parents’ health and psychological 
problems. 
 
2.4.4 Health and psychological problems 
 
A number of health and psychological problems have been reported amongst gays 
and lesbians. Several studies conducted in different countries at various periods 
have revealed that the lifestyle of gays and lesbians is dominated by some problems 
related to their mental health and behaviours. 
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In the USA, Thomas et al conducted a study on a probability sample of 288 gay men 
in 2004, and concluded that the rates of depression are high in gay men.72 Three 
years earlier, another study was conducted in the USA. The study focused on 
lesbian health and behaviours and found that there was a general elevation of the 
risk of anxiety, substance abuse and suicidal thoughts and plans among lesbians.73 
In 1999, Herell et al reported that “having same-sex sexual partners was associated 
with thoughts about death and suicidal attempts.”74  
 
In 1989, a survey of 3400 gay men in Chicago revealed a higher prevalence of 
alcohol problems as well as marijuana and cocaine abuse amongst gays and 
lesbians than in the general population.75 More than 68% of lesbians in a study 
conducted in 1994 by Bradford et al reported having mental health problems 
including long-term depression and sadness, constant anxiety, fear and other mental 
health concerns.76 The largest study conducted in the Netherlands was an 
epidemiological study that commenced in 2001. The study found that gay men and 
lesbians had more mental and physical health problems than the general 
population.77  
 
Fethers et al conducted a large study in Australia in the 1990’s and reported that 
lesbians and bisexual women had a history of drug use.78 Wardle reported that 
homosexual behaviour amongst male youths is associated with suicidal attempts, 
prostitution, running away from home, substance abuse, HIV infection, highly 
promiscuous behaviour with multiple sex partners, and premature sexual activity.79 In 
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South Africa, a more recent study indicated that the sexual violence that lesbian 
women experience is associated with the higher risk they have for contracting 
sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV.80 Müller reported in his study that 13% 
of South African men who have sex with men and 10% of women who have sex with 
women are diagnosed as HIV positive.81  
  
Dora Wynchank, borrowing from American studies, indicated the increasing toll of 
stress-related psychiatric disorders, including anxiety, mood and substance use 
disorders in lesbian, gay and bisexual populations.82 Drawing on Isaacs and 
McKendrick, McCormick describes South African homosexuality as characterised by 
crisis. McCormick goes on to argue that the fact that homosexuality was declared as 
a crime resulted in gay men (as well as lesbian women) remaining in the closet and 
displaying self-hatred and self-destructive behaviours, which manifested with 
promiscuity and ultimately leads to feelings of defilement and incompletness.83 
According to McCormick, being in the closet is associated with behaviours such as 
crisis, cruising, camping, objection, neurosis, filth, denial internalised homophobia.84 
Some of these behaviours can lead to depression and thoughts of suicide. These 
psychological problems are in most cases the result of a lack of acceptance of 
homosexual individuals in a society dominated by the heteronomativity. The lack of 
acceptance is often manifested in a homophobic climate that prevailed in most of 
societies. In South Africa for instance, more recent studies indicate that there are 
homophobic hate crimes perpetrated against gays and lesbians in different areas of 
the country. Kerry reported in his study that in a tavern in Germiston, a young black 
gay man was assaulted on 7 October 2007 by a group of patrons. He was punched, 
kicked and hit over the head.85 In another study, Naidoo and Kerels reported that 
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92% of lesbian women in their sample had been victims of verbal abuse, 5.5% had 
been robbed, 91% sexually assaulted and 32% raped at some point.86 
 
It is interesting to note that with the legalisation of homosexual relationships in South 
Africa, people are becoming more tolerant than before and a slight change in their 
behaviours against homosexual individuals had been observed. Van Zyl for instance 
observed that the attitude of people towards gays and lesbians in city centres like 
Cape Town was more positive and affirming compared to the attitude in the rural 
areas.87 Bett Pacey also confirms the acceptance of the “moffee” (A derogatory 
Afrikaans term for a gay man) in Cape Town.88 
 
These studies indicate the acceptance of the gay and lesbian community, which 
resulted in the increase of self-esteem among gays and lesbians and a slight 
decrease of psychological problems, including depression and suicidal thoughts. 
 
After discussing how homosexual families have emerged, defining and 
characterising them, it is now important to have a look at how they function. 
 
2.5 THE FUNCTIONING OF HOMOSEXUAL FAMILIES 
 
Before discussing how homosexual families function, one would find it interesting to 
understand what family functioning is, which factors can influence family functioning 
and what the relationship is between family functioning and the well-being of family 
members. 
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2.5.1 The definition of family functioning 
 
Silburn et al have drawn the definition of family functioning from the value that is 
given to the family. According to them family is considered the centre of its members’ 
well-being. They point out that family functioning is about how family members 
interact, relate, and maintain relationships. It is also about how family members 
make decisions and solve their problems.89 In other words, the well-being of all 
family members is dependent on the way they are interrelated within the family. 
What is happening within the family and how the family functions can be positive or 
negative factors in building children’s resilience and reducing their present and future 
risks associated with adversities and disadvantages. Therefore, family environments 
where children are cared for can enable children to learn and succeed. On the 
contrary, dysfunctional family environments can harm many aspects of children’s 
development and their positive transition into adulthood.90 
 
2.5.2 The importance of family functioning 
 
Family is responsible for the support, protection and guidance of its members. How 
family goes about supporting, protecting, guiding, nurturing and socialising its 
members in general and children in particular, is a very important aspect of the 
family environment. Family functioning influences the physical, social and emotional 
well-being of children.91  
 
According to L’Abate, individual behaviour is strongly influenced by family 
functioning. He points out that dysfunctional individuals generally grow up in 
dysfunctional families.92 Zubrick et al, share this view and emphasise that good 
outcomes for children are generally dependent on good family functioning. Children 
living in families that function well tend to benefit from having positive role models for 
building relationships and an environment that promotes the development of high 
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self-esteem and other qualities for children.93 It is therefore important to understand 
how a family functions in order to study children’s behaviour and experience within a 
family. 
 
The level of optimal family functioning can be affected by changes in the family 
circumstances, the interaction between parental employments or economic 
circumstances and family life, as well as external stressors that may affect the home 
environment. Specific relationships between family members in general and the 
relationship between parents and children can also affect the functioning of the 
family.94  
 
It is important to be reminded that a child’s development and psychological well-
being depend on how the family functions and in particular on the parent-child 
relationship.95 How then do homosexual families function? The answer to this 
question is provided in the discussion that follows. 
 
2.5.3 Lesbian and gay family functioning 
 
In general, lesbian and gay families comprise respectively two mothers and children; 
or two fathers and children. The discussion of how these families function will revolve 
around parenting in these families, the parent-child relationship and the family 
structure. 
 
2.5.3.1 Parenting behaviours in lesbian and gay families 
 
It appears important to be reminded that the manner in which family members 
interrelate is very important for their well-being. Parental behaviour in families is a 
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predictor of the well-being of children growing up in these families. In this section, the 
division of labour within lesbian and gay families and child-rearing is discussed.  
 
2.5.3.1.1 The division of labour in lesbian and gay families 
 
The division of labour within lesbian and gay families is about how lesbian mothers 
and gay fathers share their responsibilities regarding paid employment and unpaid 
family labour. Unpaid family labour refers to household work and child care.96 
According to several researchers, lesbian mothers and gay fathers tend to share 
equally their responsibilities within their respective families.97 
 
Patterson et al reports that among lesbian couples with children, the two mothers are 
likely to equally share responsibilities for both paid employment and unpaid family 
labour.98 At this point Patterson is in contradiction with Golombok and Brewaeys et 
al, who are of the view that the biological mother spends more time in paid work 
while the social mother looks after children.99 This study is analysing the division of 
labour within lesbian and gay families with regard to child care and household 
tasks.100  
 
2.5.3.1.2  The division of labour with regard to child care 
 
Within lesbian and gay families, two mothers or two fathers have to look after their 
children, and do domestic or household tasks. There is a controversy over the 
division of child care in lesbian and gay families.  
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Some researchers, including Bell and Weinberg, are of the view that most lesbians 
and gays equally share their child care tasks.101 Kurdek supports this view and 
reports egalitarian division of labour among lesbian and gay couples.102 Gartel et al 
have also reported similar findings.103 This would suggest that each mother and each 
father respectively in lesbian and gay families contributes equally towards child care. 
According to Stacey and Biblarz, lesbian co-parents may enjoy parental compatibility 
and achieve particularly high quality parenting skills. Studies suggest that two 
women co-parenting may create a synergic configuration that brings more 
egalitarian, more well-matched shared responsibilities and time spent with children, 
greater understanding of children and closeness, as well as communication between 
parents and children.104 Similarily, these authors are in contradiction with Golombok 
and Breweays et al.105 
 
An equal division of labour was also observed among gay male couples. Biblarz and 
Stacey observe that gay male couples share parenting more equally and with fewer 
polarisations in levels and types of interactions than heterosexual couples, but to a 
lesser extent than female parents.106  
 
However, other researchers are of the view that there is an inequality or asymmetry 
when it comes to child care in lesbian and gay families. Johnson and O’Connor for 
instance reported that birth mothers have more child care tasks than non-birth 
mothers in lesbian families. According to them, birth mothers spend more time in 
child care activities than non-birth mothers.107  
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Patterson supports this view and points out that, non-birth mothers spend more time 
in paid employment. Consequently, they have less time to spend on child care.108 
The inequality in the division of child care tasks was also reported in the study 
conducted by Brewaeys et al. According to them birth mothers spend more time in 
paid employment outside the home while non-birth mothers are more involved in 
practical child care activities. Non-birth mothers help their partners in disciplining 
their children.109 In another study conducted by Boyce and Sireci, the authors report 
that in lesbian families, child care tasks are divided among birth and non-birth 
mothers with the birth mothers performing more child care than the non-birth 
mothers.110 They further report that birth mothers want to do more child care.111 Birth 
mothers also report to be less satisfied with non-birth mothers’ involvement in their 
child’s life.112 
 
It is clear from the views expressed above that there is an asymmetry in the division 
of labour regarding child care. Birth mothers are generally more involved in child 
care than non-birth mothers. What then are the causes of this asymmetry? 
Researchers have identified factors that may influence the division of labour in 
lesbian and gay families and hence cause the asymmetry.  
 
The fact that birth mothers are more involved in child care than non-birth mothers 
seems to be dependent on a number of factors, including biology or genetic ties and 
the time spent with the child. Parental roles in caring for children in lesbian families 
are influenced by the fact that birth mothers are strongly connected to their children 
due to pregnancy and breastfeeding. The fact that the birth mother was pregnant 
with her child for 9 months and the fact that she is the one breastfeeding the child 
establishes strong biological bonds between the mother and the child and make her 
to feel more responsible for child care than her partner. What role can pregnancy 
and breastfeeding play in the division of labour in lesbian families? 
 
                                                          
108
  Patterson 1995 DP 116. 
109
  Brewaeys et al 1997 HR 1356. 
110
  Boyce and Sireci “Who is mummy tonight? Lesbian parenting issues” 2002 JH 7. 
111
  Boyce and Sireci 2002 JH 7. 
112
  Boyce and Sireci 2002 JH 9. 
36 
 
Some researchers point out that the pregnancy bonds the birth mother to her child. 
In fact, pregnancy is one of the strongest bonds between mother and child. De Jong-
Pleij et al for instance reported that bonding during pregnancy seems to be a good 
predictor of the mother-child relationship and for this reason is considered a critical 
factor in the process of caring for the child.113 This view was confirmed by Lucassen 
et al, who reported that sensitive parenting has its origin in pregnancy. They refer to 
sensitivity as the ability to perceive and interpret accurately the signals implicit in the 
child’s behaviour and to respond promptly and adequately.114 The sensitivity 
developed by the birth mother vis-à-vis her child had been found to be caused by a 
hormone (oxytocin) secreted during the pregnancy. In this regard, Johnson reported 
in his study that the levels of oxytocin across the pregnancy facilitate the postnatal 
maternal behaviours and emotional bond between mother and infant by reducing 
anxiety and improving response to stressors.115 This would suggest that the birth 
mother feels more connected than any other person to the child she carried for nine 
months in her womb and to whom she gave birth. This special connection to the 
child causes her to feel more responsible for the child. It can then be argued that the 
responsibilities of the birth mother in respect of her child flow from the fact that by 
being pregnant with the child, she is before birth and after birth accountable for the 
nutrition, life and good health of the child. Her decisions, attitudes and behaviours 
indirectly and directly affect the child prenatally and postnatally. Research suggests 
that birth mothers tend to perform more child care regardless of working hours.116 
This is a consequence of their feeling of being bonded to their child by the fact of the 
pregnancy. Among lesbians, the fact that birth mothers are performing more child 
care tasks was significantly associated with the feeling that biology makes the 
difference.117  
 
Another aspect of biology that influences the division of the child care tasks is 
breastfeeding. For some lesbian mothers, breastfeeding clearly determines their 
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roles. Birth mothers experience breastfeeding as a special connection with the child. 
For them breastfeeding creates a unique and primary bond between mother and 
child. Breastfeeding allows birth mothers to spend long hours attached to the 
child.118 As a result the birth mother will feel connected to and responsible for the 
feeding of the child.  
 
It is evident that performing more child care tasks is a result of the biological tie 
between the mother and the child, which may consequently be determinant of 
parental roles in lesbian families. Goldberg and Jenkins point out that, in contrast to 
this view, other researchers believe that biology or a genetic tie is not a determining 
factor in parenting roles; it is rather the time spent with the child that creates 
closeness with the child and therefore influences the parental roles in lesbian and 
gay families.119  
 
Emphasising the importance of the time spent with the child, Goldberg and Jenkins 
argue that women who spend more time with their children construe their greater 
responsiveness to their children’s cues as “biological” in nature. By this fact they 
then conclude that biology does in fact influence parental roles.120 
 
In 1999 Gartell et al conducted a study on lesbian families and found that 50% of 
lesbians in their sample believed that the time spent with the child is the most 
important factor that affects the mother-child attachment.121 In another study 
Goldberg and Jenkins admitted that being a birth mother or performing more child 
care does not in itself make any difference; it is the behaviour of the mother toward 
her child that creates a bond between mother and child. In their words: 
 
“[A]lthough biological mothers tended to perform more child care … and … tended to 
view their role as more primary, neither performing more child care nor being the 
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biological mother did by themselves create a motherhood hierarchy ... [I]t is 
behaviour that is important in determining motherhood (if you act like a mother, you 
are a mother).”122  
 
In other words, this view predicts that in order to be a mother, one does not need to 
give birth to a child. Rather, one needs only to behave like a mother. In short, 
behaviour creates motherhood. 
 
Despite this controversy over the important factors in the determination of parenting 
roles, it is important to note that the fact of giving birth to a child and breastfeeding 
him or her creates an asymmetry in lesbian families. The biological asymmetry 
created by pregnancy and breastfeeding is a source of emotional problems among 
lesbian couples. In fact, being a birth mother and breastfeeding the child sometimes 
creates a feeling of jealousy and exclusion for non-birth mothers. In order to 
counterbalance this biological asymmetry and therefore mitigate the feeling of 
jealousy and exclusion, non-birth mothers have developed strategies to resist the 
social norm of primary and secondary caregiver that are created by the factors 
discussed above.  
 
Some lesbian couples often arrive at an agreement even before the artificial 
insemination on who is going to be the birth mother and by doing so they create and 
clarify their parenting roles out of conscious preference. Other lesbian couples admit 
that the fact of birthing a child automatically designates the birth mother as the 
primary caregiver,123 and they establish a set of roles that benefit the child. In their 
division of household tasks and child care for instance, they decide that it is the non-
birth mother who will be in charge of preparing the child for bed and putting him or 
her to bed, who will be responsible for bathing the child or changing the diaper 
during the night, or who will be in charge picking up/dropping off of the child.124 
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In some lesbian families, birth mothers were partially breastfeeding the child, 
allowing non-birth mothers to fulfil the complementary role of bottle feeding the baby. 
According to Goldberg and Jenkins, this combination of feeding has helped to tone 
down the feeling of jealousy and exclusion created by breastfeeding.125 
 
All these activities were seen as a means for non-birth mothers to create their own 
connection to the child. They created motherhood through their behaviours. Through 
the strategies discussed above, non-birth mothers were affirming and asserting their 
maternal identity and promoting their parenting roles. They were also 
counterbalancing the exclusive breastfeeding relationship and the bond created by 
the fact of carrying the child during nine months in the womb.126  
 
It should be noted that non-birth mothers’ efforts to maintain equality extended 
beyond child care. Non-birth mothers are more concerned and interested in 
counterbalancing birth mothers’ contribution in the household. For instance, when 
birth mothers are breastfeeding, non-birth mothers attended to household tasks 
including cooking, laundry and cleaning. Sometimes non-birth mothers reduced the 
hours they spend in paid employment for them to spend more time caring for 
children, and hence counterbalanced their partner’s contribution.127 However, it is 
necessary to note that the quality of the time spent with the child makes a difference 
in the strength of the bond created between mother and child. The birth mother who 
is breastfeeding her own child, a child that she was pregnant with and gave birth to, 
will consider the time she is breastfeeding her child to be more important than the 
time she spends to do any other activity and this may give a special meaning to the 
bond created between her and the child, resulting in a special emotional connection 
between them. 
 
It is important to note that there are very few scholarly texts on homosexual families 
in South Africa. As a result many aspects of homosexual familes such as the division 
of labour, child-rearing and the experiences of children in these families are not 
                                                          
125
 Goldberg and Jenkins 2007 JSPR 309. 
126
 Goldberg and Jenkins 2007 JSPR 308-9. 
127
  Goldberg and Jenkins 2007 JSPR 309. 
40 
 
explored. One of the rare studies conducted on gay parenting behaviours in South 
Africa indicated that gay fathers are egalitarian in fulfilling their parenting tasks. 
Using their strength, mutual support and their availability they share equally their 
parenting tasks. In the words of Jacques Rothman: 
 
“Associated with their gender role orientation, gay fathers displayed an affinity for a 
more androgynous and egalitarian approach to the parenting practices. As such, they 
eradicated the so-called gender hierarchies and binary categories which dictated 
what masculinity or femininity entailed, and what the exclusive tasks of fathers and 
mothers should be. They opted for the negotiation of the allocation of household 
tasks for the couples, based on their strengths and mutual support, rather than the 
gender of the individual…”128 
 
This would suggest that since there is no father and mother in a gay family, the 
division of labour is negotiated based on the strengths, mutual support, and 
availability of partners and not on their gender. 
 
2.5.3.1.3 Division of labour with regard to house work 
 
The division of labour in gay and lesbian families seems to be influenced by a 
number of factors, including the discrepancies in the parents’ resources and the 
desire to counterbalance the other partner’s contribution. 
 
The difference in the resources of the two parents is an important factor that 
influences the division of labour in lesbian and gay families. According to Patterson 
and her colleagues, the partner who earns more money should do less unpaid family 
work.129 This would suggest that the income determines which of the two mothers 
will do more house work. 
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Research suggests that it is expected from a partner who is often available at home 
to fulfil more household tasks.130 The demands in household work and the availability 
of the partner due to the fact that she spends less time in paid employment, 
determines the level of her participation in household tasks.  
 
Lesbian and gay families function in a way that is different from heterosexual 
families. How lesbian and gay families function can determine how well children are 
growing up in these families. Therefore it is important to analyse how lesbian and 
gay parents rear their children. 
 
In South Africa, the division of labour with regard to the household work is also 
egalitaritarian as indicated by Rothman.131  
 
2.5.3.2  Child-rearing 
 
2.5.3.2.1 General focus on child-rearing 
 
According to the literature on child-rearing, warmth, responsiveness and control are 
the three dimensions that need to be discussed. Warmth refers to the parents’ 
emotional expression of love and empathy and their creation of a warm and 
accepting atmosphere.132 Warmth is an important factor in determining a child’s 
outcomes. A warm family environment helps children develop to their full potential. 
Are lesbian and gay men families creating a warm atmosphere? The answer to this 
question will be provided further down. 
 
Responsiveness can be defined as the sensitivity of the parents to the needs and 
feelings of their children and their adequate reaction in this respect.133 In parent-child 
relationships, parents must be sensitive to the needs of their children. A mother, for 
instance, must be able to understand the child’s language. This means that the 
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mother must be able to discern when the child is sick, in need of food or needs a 
diaper change. This ability is reported to be dependent on hormonal factors. In fact, 
women experience a high level of secretion of the hormone peptide oxcytocin. This 
hormone has the ability to strongly attach the mothers to their children. As a result 
mothers’ sensitivity to the actions of their children is so high that they are able to 
understand the meaning of every cry, word and gesture of their children. For this 
reason, they are in the best position to provide the physical and emotional care that 
is necessary for their children.134  
 
This would suggest that the sensitivity of a mother to the cries or feelings of her child 
is innate. It is not acquired by any means. In other words, a mother who gives birth 
will by this very natural circumstance be sensitive to her child’s feelings and 
consequently react adequately. There is a biological (hormonal) bond that ties the 
mother to the child and makes possible this sensitivity.135  
 
A closer look at the definition of this responsiveness reveals that this aspect of child-
rearing has two dimensions, namely sensitivity to the needs and feelings of the baby 
and an adequate reaction. This would suggest that in order to be responsive, a 
parent must be able to show sensitivity and react according to the need of the child. 
Responsiveness is an important factor for child development. For the purpose of this 
study, responsiveness should be understood as the ability to identify the child’s need 
and bring a proper satisfaction to that need at the right time. Children’s development 
is dependent on a warm environment and responsiveness from their parents. 
However, too much warmth and responsiveness may negatively affect the child’s 
development. A balance is therefore needed; this is done through the control of the 
child.136 
 
Rollins and Thomas define parental control as the behaviour of the parents towards 
their child with the intent of directing the child’s behaviour in a manner desirable to 
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parents.137 According to Rollins and Thomas, parental control can be coercive or 
demanding. Coercive control refers to the use of external pressure on their child in 
order to obtain from them the conformity with their desires. Coercive control is 
therefore the use of physical punishment, deprivation of privileges and also threats. 
Demanding control refers to the parents’ capacity to supervise and monitor their 
children. In this regard, parents must set rules and standards but at the same time 
they must encourage children’s independence and individuality.138 The goal of 
demanding control is to obtain children’s compliance to parents’ desires by using 
inductive discipline which refers to parents’ dialogue with children, raising and 
pointing to the consequences of the children’s behaviours for themselves and for 
others.139 
 
Studies on parental behaviour have indicated that parental support and demanding 
control are associated with positive development of children whereas coercive 
control is associated with children’s social incompetency and behavioural 
problems.140 
 
It is worth noting that child-rearing is not only about warmth, responsiveness and 
control, it is also about supporting children. One of the functions of parents is to 
support their children in their choices and decisions. However, children should not be 
supported in all their choices and decisions; parental support in their children’s 
decisions and choices should be provided only for decisions and choices that are in 
the children’s best interests. Based on the dimensions of support and control, two 
parenting styles have been identified. These inter alia include authoritarian parenting 
and neglect parenting. Authoritarian parenting consists of high control and low 
support and neglect parenting consists of low support and low control.141 In addition 
to these extreme parenting styles, I envisage a more nuanced parenting style which 
would strive to create a balance between demanding control and support. This will 
help the parents not to be too authoritarian, they will punish only when necessary 
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and for the best interests of the child. The effect of the punishment will not be to 
destroy the child; rather, it will tend to redress the child and build him or her. It will 
also assist parents not to neglect their children; parents will support their children in 
the choices and decisions that can help their children develop to their full potential. 
As a result there will be cooperation and collaboration between parents and children, 
depending on the age of children. 
 
Authoritarian parenting and neglect parenting are reported to have an impact on 
children’s outcomes. However, in my view the nuanced parenting style is the most 
effective parenting style. In fact, in view of the fact that the control that parents 
exercise and support that they provide to their children is exclusively for their best 
interests, this style will certainly be assosciated will positive social and cognitive 
development of children. This style will in my view reduce the chances for children to 
be rebellious, and will cause parents to be more concerned by the best interests of 
their children.  
 
Furthermore, with regard to parental control, it has been emphasised that 
relationships between parental discipline (firm control or strictness) and positive 
outcomes are dependent on the quality of the parent-child relationship. Firm control 
associated with verbal cooperation often results in positive child outcomes. If 
children perceive parents’ rules as legitimate, and if parents have respect for 
children’s individuality, children’s outcomes will be likely to be positive.142  
 
Having said this, it is now important to turn to the analysis of how children are reared 
in lesbian and gay families.  
 
2.5.3.2.2  Child-rearing in lesbian and gay families 
 
Most studies that analysed child-rearing in lesbian and gay families were 
comparative studies. Researchers compared lesbians and gay men to single 
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parents, divorced parents and in a few cases to heterosexual parents with high 
levels of conflict.143 
 
In line with the three dimensions of child-rearing discussed above, MacCandish 
simply reports that both birth and non-birth mothers developed a strong attachment 
to the child. Other studies indicate that non-birth mothers in lesbian families 
demonstrated a higher quality of parent-child interaction and parenting awareness 
skills. In addition, most studies observed that the two-mother family experiences high 
levels of synchronicity in parenting.144 Bos et al also reports that lesbian birth 
mothers are significantly more emotionally involved in child-rearing than 
heterosexual fathers.145  
 
Lesbian families had been described as a warm environment. In fact, Brewaeys et al 
reported in their study conducted in 1997 that children in lesbian families grew up in 
a warm and secure environment in the first year of their lives.146  
 
It is not clear whether lesbians and gay men used authoritarian or neglect parenting 
styles. However, it can be argued that due to the fact that lesbians and gays become 
parents through ARTs, their parenting styles might be influenced by the value they 
place on their children. They might tend to be over-protective and therefore low in 
control and high in support. This issue will be discussed further down but at this 
stage of the study, it is important to note that children growing up in lesbian and gay 
families might receive high support and low control from their parents. 
 
Little has been said on child-rearing in gay men’s families. However, Bigner and 
Jacobsen observed that there were responsiveness and warmth in these families. 
According to them, gay fathers’ families were better off than heterosexual families. 
Their parenting behaviours were characterised by greater warmth and 
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responsiveness, and they were reported to be more cooperative with their 
children.147  
 
Unfortunately, the study of Bigner and Jacobsen does not give further details on how 
warm and responsive gay parents are. It is not clear how attachment and 
responsiveness are developed between gay fathers and their children since their 
nature cannot allow them to give birth or to breastfead, which as discussed above 
creates a natural bond between a mother and her child and thus provides an 
adequate explanation for her responsiveness to her child. However, it can be argued 
that the time gay fathers spend with their children can result in a bond that may 
explain their acquired responsiveness.   
 
Another aspect of family functioning is the parent-child relationship. The quality of 
the parent-child relationship is a determinant of the child’s development. 
 
2.5.3.3 Parent-child relationships  
 
The way in which parents and children interact within the family is an important 
aspect of family functioning. Children’s behavioural problems can be explained by 
examining the parent-child relationship. It is generally agreed that loyalty is the most 
important element in the parent-child relationship.148   
 
Child loyalty can be vertical or horizontal. Vertical loyalty refers to the relationship 
between parents and their children. The child is born to the parents, for this reason 
the child owes loyalty to the parents, and in return, the parents owe care and 
affection to the child. Horizontal loyalty refers to the relationship between the child 
and the other family members.149 
 
                                                          
147
  Bigner and Jacobson “Parenting behaviors of homosexual and heterosexual fathers” 1989 JH 
173. 
148
  Nagy, Grunebaum and Urich “Contextual family therapy” in Gurman and Kniskern (eds) 
Handbook of Family Therapy 212. 
149
  Van As and Janssens 2002 IJCFW 44. 
47 
 
The satisfaction of the mutual parent-child relationships is dependent upon the ability 
of the parents and children to fulfil their own needs and to consider the needs of 
others. They must be able to give care and gratitude. The parent-child relationship is 
not always symmetrical; it is thought to be sometimes asymmetrical. Because of age 
and development parents are more capable of giving than their young children.150 
 
In lesbian and gay families, parent-child relationships have simply been described as 
good, even better than in heterosexual families. Vanfraussen et al for instance 
reported in their study that the parent-child relationships experienced by social 
mothers are comparable to that of biological mothers.151 Other studies indicate that 
gay fathers were found to be more responsive and child-oriented than heterosexual 
fathers.152 
 
The last aspect of family functioning that is discussed in this study is the family 
structure. Child development to its full potential is considered dependent on the 
structure of the family.153 
 
2.5.3.4 Family structure 
 
There is a debate over the influence of the structure of the family on the well-being of 
the child. On the one hand, some researchers point out that family structure matters 
for the child and that the family structure that helps children the most is the family 
headed by two biological parents in a low conflict marriage.154 On the other hand, 
another researcher observes that family structure is not important; it is rather the 
quality of parenting that is determinant in the well-being of the child.155 
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Nevertheless, Van As and Janssens commented on the functioning of the family and 
claimed the following: 
 
“The function of the family is to support, regulate, nurture and socialise its members. 
Family members have always to find some balance between dependency and 
relatedness on the one hand, and autonomy and individuation on the other hand. To 
function adequately, families need structure and hierarchy. Family structure has to do 
with the organisation of the family, and is described with the concept of family sub-
systems and boundaries”.156 
 
This would suggest that the organisation of family members and the interaction 
within the family is crucial for the functioning of the family and therefore an important 
factor in studying children’s behaviour. 
 
According to Van As and Janssens, family structure is about the family organisation 
and is described in terms of the concepts of family subsystems and boundaries. 
Family subsystems refer to various subgroups within the family. Each subsystem 
serves a specific function in the family. While the subsystem of parents serves the 
function of marital intimacy, support, parental tasks and responsibilities, the 
subsystem of siblings serves the function of the first peers for the child. Boundaries 
in the family refer to the rules that define who participates in which subsystem, who 
is in charge of children, and who takes decisions in child-rearing issues.157 
 
The proper functioning of the family requires the boundaries to be strong, clear and 
permeable. Rigid and impermeable boundaries will result in a lack of contact and 
communication between members of various subsystems. Similarly, when the 
boundaries are not clear, members of various subsystems will not adequately carry 
out their tasks.158 In other words, good family functioning will depend on the quality 
of contact and communication between members of different subsystems within the 
family. Shankoff and Phillips maintain that the relationships that children have with 
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other family members are important factors that influence the child’s healthy 
development and psychological well-being.159 Therefore, the lack of vertical and 
horizontal loyalty will result in the entire family not functioning properly. As a result, 
the child’s well-being will be negatively affected. 
 
There is an ongoing debate over the potential ability of lesbian and gay family 
structures to assure proper child development and hence contribute to the child’s 
well-being. On the one hand proponents of homosexual marriage assume that 
lesbian and gay families are as good as heterosexual families and constitute a good, 
even a better environment for the child’s development. They confirm that there is no 
difference between a child growing up in a homosexual family and a child growing up 
in a heterosexual family.160 On the other hand, opponents of homosexual marriages 
are of the view that lesbian families cannot constitute a good environment for proper 
child development. They point out that growing up in lesbian or gay families puts 
children in danger.161  
 
As already stated above, this study will bring a contribution in order to further this 
debate. The discussion of children’s experience within homosexual families is one 
step in this process. 
 
2.6 CHILDREN IN HOMOSEXUAL FAMILIES 
 
Homosexual families have particular characteristics. Some homosexual families are 
headed by one, two, three or even four parents. In these families sometimes there is 
no man among the parents, sometimes no woman. Some families comprise more 
than one household. Often there is a biological parent who is not member of the 
family at all. Usually there is at least one parent who has no biological tie with the 
children. In some instances children are related to neither of the parents.162 
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This section discusses the experience of children growing up in homosexual families. 
A particular focus is given to child development within the environment of 
homosexual families. The section therefore examines the development of the child 
within his or her family as well as outside the family. 
 
2.6.1 Experience of the child within his or her family 
 
In general, children within homosexual family environments often experience 
homophobic attacks on their gay and lesbian parents from heterosexual parents or 
stepparents. Homophobic behaviours include rejection and unpleasant comments. 
Sometimes, heterosexual parents rely on religion to limit the contact between 
children and their homosexual parents or to challenge the custody of those children 
by homosexual parents.163  
 
This section has a particular interest in analysing some aspects of child 
development, including the gender identity and psychological development of the 
child growing up in a homosexual family. This analysis will help understand how 
children have been developing in lesbian and gay families. 
 
2.6.1.1 Children’s gender identity development 
 
Fairtlough defines gender identity as “a set of norms regarding the behaviour and 
attitude of what is masculine and what is feminine”.164 A number of studies have 
found that children growing up in lesbian and gay families were confused about their 
gender identity.  
 
Sarantakos reported in his study that children growing up in homosexual families 
were characterised by a gender identity disorder.165 Girls growing up in two fathers’ 
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family tended to behave like boys. As Sarantakos pointed out, they were reported 
having “boyish” attitudes and behaviours. Similarly boys raised by lesbian mothers 
were more “effeminate” in their behaviour and mannerism than boys of heterosexual 
parents, and displayed a greater attraction for sport, games, toys, and activities 
usually chosen by girls. They were also reported to cry more than the boys of 
heterosexual couples when put under the same stressful circumstances.166  
 
This finding is consistent with the finding in a study conducted by Stacey and Biblarz. 
They reported that children growing up in families headed by lesbian and gay 
parents, in particular girls are more likely to depart from traditional gender roles by 
showing more interest in both masculine and feminine activities.167  
 
This confusion was further confirmed in another study. Bailey et al points out that 
male child of homosexual couples were generally described by teachers as more 
expressive, more effeminate and more confused about their gender than children of 
heterosexual couples.168 
 
To summarise, although there is a tendency to ignore the experience of children 
growing up in homosexual families with regard to their gender identity, the above 
studies reveal that children, irrespective of their gender, will behave like their 
parents. They will do what they see their parents doing; they will speak like their 
parents speak, and they will behave like them. This is an unescapable reality. 
According to these studies, a boy raised by two mothers will speak, walk and behave 
like them. The two mothers will be the only life models for that boy. Whatever they 
do, he will also do. The same applies to the girl who grows up in a two-father family. 
Obviously, if she has no contact with a woman, she will behave like her fathers.   
 
Some studies suggest that children raised in homosexual families had a tendency to 
become gay and lesbian or bisexual. Stacey and Biblarz for instance reported that 
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children who grow up in lesbian and gay families are more likely to experience 
homosexual behaviours.169 Bailey et al also found that some boys raised by 
homosexual parents were gay or bisexual.170  
 
Likewise, Baurmind noted that there would be no way for children’s own sexual 
identities to remain uninfluenced by the sexual identities of their parents.171 In their 
longitudinal study comparing children of heterosexual mothers with those of lesbian 
mothers when children were ten years of age and again in adulthood (at twenty-four 
years of age), Golombok and Tasker found a higher rate of homosexual attraction in 
children growing up with homosexual parents than those in heterosexual families. As 
they pointed out, thirty-six per cent of children raised by lesbian mothers reported 
homosexual behaviour compared to only twenty per cent of those raised by 
heterosexual mothers.172 Of these twenty per cent of children of heterosexual 
mothers, none of them had experienced a homosexual relationship whereas sixty 
seven per cent of children of lesbian mothers had experienced such a relationship.173  
 
The results of the study of Bailey and colleagues indicated that nine per cent of the 
sons were bisexual, somewhat higher than the two-to-five per cent rate of male 
homosexuals thought to exist in the general population.174 Thus, available studies 
have provided the evidence that children (particularly girls) raised by lesbian mothers 
and gay fathers are more likely to experience homoerotic attraction or engage in 
homosexual behaviours. Lesbian mothers tend to have a feminising effect on their 
sons and gay fathers a masculinising effect on their daughters.175 According to 
Stacey and Biblarz, such gender non-conformity behaviour in childhood strongly 
predicts homosexuality in adulthood.176 
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Another set of researchers argue that children’s sexual orientation is rather 
influenced by factors other than the parents’ sexual orientation. According to 
Steinberg, from a theoretical perspective, aspects of parenting that are conceived to 
be important for the psychological adjustment of adolescents include parental 
warmth in combination with appropriate control and autonomy.177 Bailey and 
colleagues pointed out that a complex interaction between biological, psychological 
and social factors is involved in the determination of the child’s sexual orientation. 
For instance, biological studies indicated that genetic factors play a part in 
determining sexual orientation.178  
 
The parental hormonal environment is also thought to play an important role in the 
development of sexual orientation. Gonadal hormones appear to influence sex-role 
and sex-difference in brain morphology.179 Brewaeys et al reported that, with regard 
to the emotional behavioural adjustment, there was no ground for supporting any 
effect of the father’s presence in the emotional development of the child. According 
to them, the claim that the father’s absence would increase the child’s emotional 
problems lacks any foundation. They argue the role of parents is a minor one in the 
acquisition of the child’s sex-typed behaviour.180   
 
For Maccoby, learning about gender roles is a complex process in which children 
actively socialise themselves as male or female by observing many men, boys, 
women and girls.181 According to Wardle, children learn about appropriate gender 
role behaviour by observing and internalising the behaviours of their parents. 
Children learn to be adult by observing or watching adults.182 Biermat observed that 
culture plays a role in the child’s acquisition of gender identity. Children are 
bombarded with sex-appropriate behavioural cues via the media. This culminates in 
adolescence with the peers’ pressure for the conformity to gender roles and identity 
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standards based largely on stereotypes.183 Bailey and colleagues concluded in their 
study that the sexual orientation of an adult has little influence on that of children.184 
 
Parental behaviours, in particular the expression of affection between lesbian 
partners, was held to influence children’s sexual orientation. Golombok and Tasker 
found that children’s sexual orientation and their lesbian mothers’ openness in 
showing physical affection to their partners were correlated.185  
 
To summarise, on the one hand researchers argue that the sexual orientation of the 
parents is the most important factor in the determination of the sexual orientation of 
their children. On the other hand, scholars maintain that external factors and 
biological factors are responsible for the sexual orientation of children growing up in 
homosexual families. However, it is interesting to note that before children start 
being influenced by the social factors such as media, as Biermat pointed out, and the 
observation of men and women in society, as Maccoby emphasised, children’s first 
contacts are their parents and their first observation starts with them. 
 
In short there are various points of view on the issue of the influence of parental 
behaviours on children’s gender identity and sexual orientation. While some argue 
that parents play a determinant role in their children’s gender identity, others 
maintain that biological, social and media factors are determinant factors rather than 
parents.    
 
2.6.1.2 Children psychological and emotional development 
 
The family environment in which children are growing up may influence their 
psychological and emotional behaviours. It is important to emphasise that most of 
the problems experienced by children in homosexual families are amplified by the 
absence of either a mother or a father. The role played by a father or a mother in a 
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child’s psychological development cannot be overestimated. While Park et al confirm 
that the role of a father is important in a girl’s psychological development in reducing 
internalising behaviours;186 Lamb and Lewis maintain that mothers and fathers have 
a different influence on their children’s development.187 Psychological problems 
experienced by children born from ARTs growing up in homosexual families include 
a lack of happiness, life satisfaction and psychological adjustment.188 Bullying and 
teasing,189 and peer rejection190 were also reported. According to East, Jackson and 
O’ Brien, children in lesbian families were more likely to become delinquent.191 
 
The reasons behind children’s experiences in lesbian and gay families are diverse 
and controversial. On the one hand researchers point out that child development 
depends on the role played by a mother and a father in the life of their children. 
According to Park et al a father figure has a positive effect on a girl’s psychological 
development; it reduces internalising behaviours such as depression and self-
destructive behaviours.192 
 
In the words of Lamb and Lewis: 
 
“Whatever the difference between maternal and paternal behavioural styles, there is 
impressive evidence that mothers and fathers may have a different effect on child 
development”.193  
 
They further stress that children learn from their fathers how to manage their 
emotions. The child’s development of an appropriate cognitive representational 
model of relations is dependent on the father-child relationship. Fathers play 
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important roles in the lives of their children, including being their advisor, social guide 
and rule provider as well as the provider of social opportunities for the child.194  
 
In short, these different views converge in one direction and confirm that parents 
have an important role to play in the physical, psychological and gender identity 
development of their children. The child’s development in all the aspects discussed 
above seems to depend on how parents are involved in the lives of their children.  
 
On the other hand, researchers are of the view that the role played by parents in 
their children’s development is a minor one. Researchers have pointed out that 
“[s]tructural variables such as the gender composition of families and the division of 
parental performances are less important than process variables such as the quality 
of the relationships and the quality of the care given to children”.195 
 
In short, all these studies point to the fact that parents’ sexual orientation is not 
responsible for the child’s development of physical, emotional, or psychological 
behaviours. Factors such as biology, culture and social environment are the most 
important in this process.196  
 
Family studies literature indicate that it is the family process (such as the quality of 
parenting and relationships within the family) that contribute to the determination of 
the child’s well-being and outcomes rather than the family structure per se such as 
the number, gender, sexuality and co-habitant status of parents. The research also 
indicated that parenting practices and children’s outcomes in families parented by 
lesbian and gay parents are likely to be at least as favourable as those of families of 
heterosexual parents, despite the reality that considerable legal discrimination and 
inequality remain significant challenges for these families.197 According to Robinson, 
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children’s development is more influenced by relationships and interactions within 
the family than its structural form.198  
 
It is important to note that children experience developmental problems in the family 
environment as well as outside that environment. 
 
2.6.2  Children’s experience outside the family environment 
 
The analysis of children’s experience outside the family environment will focus on 
children’s outcomes and experience at school as well as their experience in the 
social environment. 
 
2.6.2.1 Children’s experience at school 
 
According to Rivers et al, children of lesbian parents were found to be less likely to 
draw on school support through school teachers, nurses and counsellors.199 With 
regard to educational achievement, Sarantakos found the following: In languages, 
children of homosexual couples scored low compared to children of married 
heterosexual couples: 5.5 against 7.7. In mathematics, children of homosexual 
couples scored lower than children of heterosexual couples: 5.5 against 7.9. In social 
studies, children of homosexual couples tend to perform slightly better than children 
of heterosexual couples. As far as sociability is concerned, children of homosexual 
couples scored 5 against 7.5 for children of married heterosexual couples.200  
 
Furthermore, at school, children of homosexual couples are reported to be timid, 
they are not interested to work in teams or to talk about family life, holidays and 
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school activities in general. They feel uncomfortable when having to work with 
children of heterosexual couples. They are characterised as loners and introverts.201  
 
2.6.2.2 Children’s experience in the social environment 
 
In their social environment, children of homosexual couples were often isolated, 
while other children enjoyed playing in team sports. They were sometimes ridiculed 
by other children for personal habits or beliefs or for the sexual preferences of their 
parents. In certain cases, children of homosexual couples were called sissies, 
lesbians or gays or asked to tell “what their parents do at home, where they slept 
and so forth”.202  
 
Such incidents were some of the reasons why children were moved to other schools 
or even why parents moved away from the neighbourhood. Parents and teachers 
also reported that comments such as “the pervs are coming, don’t mix with sissies; 
or sisterhood is filthy” made by some pupils were not uncommon.203 
 
The study of Sarantakos also found that children of homosexual couples usually find 
it difficult to socialise with their peers as boys or girls. In many cases children of 
homosexual couples were harassed or ridiculed by their peers for having 
homosexual parents, for being “queers” and even refered to as homosexuals 
themselves.204 This view was confirmed in a study conducted in South Africa. 
Carrien Lubbe described children growing up in homosexual families as being 
fearfull to communicate their family structure to friends.205 These children live with 
this feeling because of homophobic attacks that can follow the disclosure of the 
homosexual structure or nature of their families. 
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Other studies confirmed that children of homosexual parents were often the target of 
harassment.206 Vanfraussen et al concluded that for some peers it is hard to 
understand that someone has two mothers without having a father somewhere. 
Compared with children from heterosexual families, children from homosexual 
families are not more likely to be teased but they are more prone to family-related 
teasing incidents.207 Teachers also indicated that children from lesbian families 
experienced more attention problems compared to children from heterosexual 
households.208  
 
Bullying and teasing are part of the experience of children growing up in homosexual 
families. In Australia, Ray and Gregory reported that even though having lesbian 
parents was seen as “cool” by teenagers, 44% of the grade 3 to 6 children (aged 8-
12 years) in their sample experienced teasing, bullying or derogatory language in 
relation to their family, and in grade 7 to 10 (aged 12-16 years) 45% had been 
bullied. Such behaviour ranged from verbal abuse, teasing and joking to physical 
and sexual violence.209 
 
Examples of the homophobic and stigmatising behaviour experienced by Australian 
children growing up in families headed by lesbian mothers involve peers, teachers 
and school principals. Research indicated that such experience have made it harder 
or more anxiety provoking for some children to talk about their families with their 
peers or at school, that some are more reluctant to have children to their home to 
visit, and that they, like their parents, develop a range of strategies to prevent being 
stigmatised, discriminated against, or treated poorly.210   
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Children living with lesbian and gay parents frequently report concerns about peer 
rejection and often consider keeping their parents’ sexuality secret.211 According to 
Bozett, a research conducted with adult offspring of gay men revealed that they had 
fear that their peers would assume that they were themselves gay or lesbian and 
react negatively.212 
 
2.7 INTERIM CONCLUSION  
 
The overview of homosexual families has revealed that society throughout the world 
has undergone various changes that have resulted in a decline of the nuclear family 
and the emergence of other forms of family including lesbian and gay families. 
Assisted reproductive technologies are one of the methods for gay and lesbian to 
have children and build families. 
 
The absence of a father or a mother and therefore the non-existence of a biological 
link between one or both of the parents and the children they raise, associated with 
domestic violence, parents’ health and psychological problems as well as the use of 
ARTs, are the common characteristics of homosexual families. 
 
Efforts have been made to paint homosexual families as similar to the nuclear family. 
Homosexual families were described as a good or even better environment for child-
rearing compared to the nuclear family. The functioning of these families, which is 
one of the very important factors for children’s development, has been described as 
not distinguishable from the one in the nuclear family. Parents in homosexual 
families were purposely described as having good parental behaviours, good 
relationships with their children and the entire unit was painted as a warm 
environment where children can properly develop to their full potential.  
 
In my view this finding did not seriously consider some important traits characterising 
homosexual individuals and their families. These include the asymmetry observed 
                                                          
211
  Tasker “Lesbian mothers, gay fathers and their children: A review” 2005 JDBP 224. 
212
  Bozett 1989 JH 138. 
61 
 
especially in the lesbian division of parental responsibilities which has an impact on 
the parent-child relationship, which in turn impacts on the child’s psychological and 
emotional development. The feeling of jealousy of the non-birth mother resulting 
from the fact that she did not bear the child in her womb and is not breasfeading may 
have a negative impact not only on the relationship between the non-birth mother 
and her partner, but also and importantly between her and the child. Gay fathers 
were portrayed as being even better than heterosexual fathers in respect of their 
child care responsibilities. Additionally, despite their risk of being overprotective 
because of the value they give to their children and hence being low in control and 
support, homosexual parents were presented as having better parenting behaviours 
than heterosexual parents. 
 
Family structure was also held purposely to have no impact on the child’s 
development despite the fact that the father and the mother have unique roles they 
play in the psychological, emotional and even gender identity development of their 
children. Additionally, in spite of many challenges, including gender identity disorder, 
homophobic behaviours, rejection from peers, bullying and teasing children growing 
up in homosexual families face, they are painted as being psychologically and 
emotionally as well adjusted as children growing up in the nuclear family.    
 
Although homosexual families are painted as similar to the nuclear family, there are 
some indications that children growing up in these families might be at risk of not 
developing to their full potential, and that their best interests might suffer from poor 
protection. The fact that these children are born and can only be born as a result of 
ARTs might be one of the reasons for the risk to which they are exposed and the 
reason for the inadequate protection of their interests. It is therefore important to 
analyse whether ARTs may have adverse effects on children resulting from its 
various procedures. This is the purpose of the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE EFFECTS OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES ON CHILDREN 
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Children born as a result of ARTs can be born to heterosexual and homosexual 
individuals and couples. Irrespective of the family type into which they are born, they 
all experience the same physical adverse effects due to their mode of birth or 
conception. However, psychological adverse effects might to some extent differ 
based on the type of family in which these children will grow up. It is important to 
note that psychological effects of ARTs on children might be worsened in some 
countries by the legislation regulating ARTs within the jurisdictions of those 
countries. 
 
This chapter will analyse the potential effects that ARTs may have on resulting 
children. The chapter begins with a brief overview of ARTs before discussing the 
ARTs in South Africa. The chapter will then discuss the effects of those procedures 
on children. 
 
3.2  ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES – A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
 
Assisted reproductive technologies have enabled millions of people in the world who 
otherwise would not have been able to do so, to have children. Assisted reproductive 
technologies were from the start meant to initiate pregnancy without sexual 
intercourse, and allow infertile heterosexual couples to have children. In this regard, 
Golombok, MacCallum and Rutter noted that donor insemination, which is one of the 
variances of ARTs, has been successfully used as an alternative for couples with an 
infertile male partner to have children.213  
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It was not conceivable for a woman to fall pregnant without sexual intercourse with a 
man until 1978 when Steptoe and Edwards made possible the fertilisation of an egg 
in a test tube and the transfer of the embryo into a woman’s body in order to initiate 
pregnancy in the absence of sexual intercourse. 1978 marked the dawn of a new era 
in medical technology. The achievement of Steptoe and Edwards opened the way to 
a new technology of reproduction, which has a range of techniques and is referred to 
as ARTs.214   
 
Assisted reproductive technologies are therefore the use of non-coital technologies 
to conceive and initiate pregnancy.215 They consist of an array of techniques 
enabling people to reproduce without engaging in sexual activity at all. Some 
techniques are used to initiate pregnancy and others more specifically used to 
increase the possibility of pregnancy and/or to test for the presence of certain genes, 
so that prospective parents can choose which embryo to implant after in vitro 
fertilisation.216  
 
There are three principal ways of initiating pregnancy: Alternative insemination, the 
prescription of fertility-enhancing drugs, and in vitro fertilisation. Alternative 
insemination (AI) is also known as artificial insemination. It refers to several 
procedures, all of which involve inserting sperm into a woman’s body. The sperm is 
placed in the woman’s vagina, cervix or fallopian tubes.217 
 
Fertility enhancing drugs, as suggested by their name, are drugs that can be taken 
orally or through injection. The most common drug used is Clomiphene Citrate 
(brand name Clomid or Serophene), which is taken through the mouth to enable 
women who are not ovulating or are ovulating irregularly to produce one or more 
mature eggs. Gonadotropins are the drugs that can be taken through injection. They 
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have the ability of stimulating the ovary for the production of more follicles in one 
cycle.218 
 
Although there are many techniques used in ARTs, in vitro fertilisation and related 
procedures (gamete intra fallopian transfer (GIFT) and zygote intra fallopian transfer 
(ZIFT)) are the most invasive ARTs used. GIFT and ZIFT are variations of in vitro 
fertilisation (IVF).219 Sperm donation, donation of eggs and embryo donation also fall 
under GIFT and ZIFT.220 
 
Surrogacy, a procedure in which a woman is recruited for the purpose of bearing and 
giving birth to a child that she agrees to hand over to individuals or couples she 
contracted with,221 is also a variety of ARTs. Golombok et al have described two 
types of surrogacy: Partial or genetic surrogacy, in which the surrogate mother and 
the commissioning father are the genetic parents of the child; and full surrogacy or 
non-genetic surrogacy, in which the commissioning parents (mother and father), or 
only one of them, are the genetic parents of the child.222 In other words, in genetic 
surrogacy the surrogate mother is inseminated with the sperm of the commissioning 
father. This would suggest that her egg was used in the procedures through which 
she will become pregnant. However, in non-genetic surrogacy, the egg and the 
sperm respectively of the commissioning mother and father or a donor are used and 
the embryo is transferred in the surrogate mother’s womb. 
 
It is worth noting that with partial surrogacy conception happens through artificial 
insemination, and in the case of full surrogacy conception is achieved through IVF. 
Artificial insemination, fertility enhancing drugs, in vitro fertilisation and its related 
procedures, as well as surrogacy as described above are not the only ARTs that are 
used to treat infertility, genetic screening techniques also form part of ARTs.223  
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In summary, ARTs include the fairly simple procedure of artificial insemination, the 
use of an artificial instrument to inject sperm into the uterus of a woman who will 
carry and eventually give birth to the child.224 It also includes more complex 
procedures which manipulate both eggs and sperm outside of a woman’s body 
before inserting them, or the resulting zygotes or embryos, into her fallopian tubes or 
cervix respectively.225 
 
As a result, children who are born through ARTs are born to parents who sometimes 
do not share all the traditional factors of marriage, genetics, gestation, and intended 
parenthood. In the case of homosexual marriage, the intended parents can be two 
mothers or two fathers, who may or may not include a genetic parent, a gestational 
mother or both.226 
 
3.3  ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Pretoria and Cape Town were the first cities that welcomed the first two tertiary ART 
institutions in South Africa. The first “test tube” babies were born in 1984. Different 
forms of ART services are provided in the country. These include public services 
with units based in academic-centres, private services with units based in their 
private offices headed by independent specialists using corporate pathology 
laboratories, and services provided in larger established ART associates, which 
consist of clinical and laboratory ART specialists.227 
 
In South Africa, the number of providers of ARTs is limited compared to the huge 
number of people who may be in need of ART services. This raises concerns over 
the adequacy of the services provided. Huyser and Boyd express this issue in the 
following terms: 
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“It is questionable if the current (approximately) 28 national ART service providers 
are providing an adequate reproductive health service within a nation of 52 million 
people with a variety of cultures and languages”228 
 
In other words, the limited number of ART service providers is an important factor to 
be taken into account when evaluating the quality of the service provided. It is 
important to note that all ART services pursue one ultimate goal, which is the 
achievement of one live and healthy baby.229  
 
Huyser and Boyd are also of the view that the adequacy of ART interventions is 
dependent on many other factors such as the diagnostic tests and screening 
policies, the preparation methods, as well as the equipment or materials to be used. 
These factors can compromise the purpose of ARTs.230 In view of the fact in Sub-
Saharan Africa in general and in South Africa in particular, the prevalence of HIV is 
very high; all patients who request ART services must undergo several blood tests, 
including screening for blood borne viruses (BBV), and bacteriological cultures and 
sensitivity tests for diagnostic purposes. All patients must further receive an 
appropriate treatment against prophylactic or empiric microbes.231 Given the cost of 
all these treatments, Huyser and Boyd maintain that the likelihood of achieving a 
healthy and live child is very limited. They also maintain that the South African 
structure of ART services (private versus public/tertiary) will have an impact on the 
quality of services provided.232 This is a serious alert when analysing the effects of 
ARTs on resulting children. 
 
There are four national tertiary ART units in South Africa situated in three cities. Two 
units are situated in Cape Town (Groote Schuur and Tygerberg). There is one unit in 
Bloemfontein (Femspes Group) and one in Pretoria (Steve Biko Academic 
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Hospital).233 Two out of four tertiary ART units situated in Cape Town, and one out of 
four in Pretoria are entirely dependent on public funding.234 
 
Assisted reproductive technologies services are very expensive in South Africa and 
the cost of these services is a very important factor that determines access to ARTs 
for all South Africans in need of overcoming sterility. The cost of ART services may 
vary from private to public units. Total cost estimations including medications, 
ultrasound scans and laboratory fees were obtained for a standard IUI, IVF and ICSI 
procedure. In the private sector, from 2012 to 2013 IVF procedures costs augmented 
from R25 000 to R50 000. There was similar increase for the ICSI procedures. The 
average costs (± standard deviation) per procedure in the private sector are: (i) IUI: 
R6 083 ± R 2.371, (ii) IVF: R36 368 ± R6 237 and (iii) ICSI: R38 611 ± R7 204. The 
cost for an IUI procedure can vary depending on the number of inseminations.235 
When people have to rely on insurance or other sources of finances, referred to here 
as general “out-of-pocket” costs, costs for a standard IVF cycle are R1 500 
(subsidised in the public sector) and R7 000 (within the private sector) in South 
Africa.236 
 
The high cost of ARTs is in part dependent on the fact that not all of the laboratory 
equipment is manufactured in South Africa; they are imported from diverse foreign 
countries. The maintenance of these imported equipments is not only expensive but 
also indispensable for the success of ARTs interventions.237  
 
The cost of ARTs is one of the major barriers encountered by people in need of 
infertility treatment or ARTs. As stated above, the cost of ARTs is either not 
adequately or not covered at all by private health insurance. Access in the public 
health sector is limited to very few institutions, and patients usually have to 
contribute to the costs. Out-of-pocket payment for a standard IVF cycle with standard 
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ovarian stimulation ranges from approximately R10 000 (subsidised care in the 
public sector) to R35 000 (private sector care).238 
 
Additionally, geographical barriers to ARTs keep many people from accessing ART 
services. South Africa has a limited number of ART units, which are only located in a 
few cities. Other barriers encountered include a lack of knowledge that prevails 
among individuals in need of ARTs services, their religious beliefs, and their lack of 
trust in assisted reproductive procedures.239 
 
This situation has resulted in only few babies born prior to 2011. According to a 
study undertaken in 2011, a total of 4 512 aspirations and 3 872 embryo transfers 
were conducted during the year 2009, which resulted in 1 303 clinical pregnancies. 
The clinical pregnancy rate (CPR) per aspiration and per embryo transfer was 28.9% 
and 33.6%, respectively.240 
 
3.4 GAY AND LESBIAN REPRODUCTION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
3.4.1  Gay reproduction: Surrogacy 
 
Many parents have a dream that they unfortunately cannot fulfil naturally because of 
their infertility. Many infertile heterosexual couples are nowadays using the services 
of a surrogate mother as their only means of making their dream a reality.241  
 
The dissociation of sexuality and procreation and the reproductive self-determination 
right have made surrogacy a means for gay men to reproduce and build families of 
their own. Surrogate motherhood in South Africa is regulated in chapter 19 of the 
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Children’s Act, the first legislation to legally recognise surrogacy as a form of 
ARTs.242 
 
Surrogacy has been established and accepted in the South African legal system. It 
involves one woman (the surrogate mother) carrying a child for another person or 
persons (the commissioning person or couple), based on a mutual agreement 
requiring the child to be handed over to the commissioning person or couple 
following birth.243  
 
According to the Children’s Act, a surrogate mother is an adult woman who enters a 
surrogate motherhood agreement with the commissioning parent.244 The Children’s 
Act also defines the surrogate motherhood agreement. In terms of the Children’s Act, 
a surrogate motherhood agreement is: 
 
“an agreement between a surrogate mother and a commissioning parent in which it is 
agreed that the surrogate mother will be artificially fertilised for the purpose of bearing 
a child for the commissioning parent and in which the surrogate mother undertakes to 
hand over such a child to the commissioning parent upon its birth, or within a 
reasonable time thereafter, with the intention that the child concerned becomes the 
legitimate child of the commissioning parent.”245 
 
In other words, a surrogate motherhood agreement, also referred to as a 
preconception agreement, more commonly known as a surrogate motherhood 
contract, is a contract in terms of which a gestational woman agrees to become 
pregnant and bear a child, relinquish all legal rights to and obligations in terms of the 
child, and deliver the child to an individual or couple.246 
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Two types of surrogacy can be distinguished: 
 
(1) Partial surrogacy, where the surrogate mother is impregnanted using 
her own egg. The conceived child is intended to be relinquished and to 
be raised by other persons such as the biological father and his spouse 
or partner, either male or female. The child may be conceived via 
artificial insemination using fresh or frozen sperm which is performed at 
the fertility clinic. Sperm from the male partner of the commissioning 
couple may be used. It is important to note that in partial surrogacy, the 
surrogate mother is also the genetic or biological mother of the 
resulting child, as her own egg was fertilised.247 
(2) Gestational surrogacy or full surrogacy takes place where an already 
fertilised embryo from the biological parents or donors is transferred to 
the womb of the surrogate mother for its development to a child. It is 
worth noting that in the case of gestational surrogacy, the genetic 
material (gametes) are provided by the intended parents or donors and 
the surrogate mother is merely the host mother, she is merely offering 
her gestational function to an embryo which has been transferred.248 
However, in the context of South Africa, it is a legal requirement that 
the commissioning parents give their gametes for the surrogacy to be 
valid. 
 
Although in the case of gestational surrogacy the surrogate mother must go through 
a number of medical tests and preparation, in the context of South African law, she 
does not receive any payment either before, during or after the pregnancy. However, 
her medical costs are paid by the intended parents.249 The medical costs include: 
compensation for expenses that relate directly to the artificial fertilisation and 
pregnancy of the surrogate mother, the birth of the child and the confirmation of the 
surrogate motherhood; the loss of earnings suffered by the surrogate mother as a 
result of the surrogate motherhood agreement; or the insurance to cover the 
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surrogate mother for anything that may lead tp death or disability brought about by 
the pregnancy.250 
 
Therefore, commercial surrogacy is not allowed in South Africa.  
 
The tests that the gestational surrogate mother must go through include the 
following: 
 Hysteroscopy/HCG – this procedure determines whether the fallopian tubes 
are clear and the size and shape of the uterus; 
 Infectious disease test, to ensure that there are no contagious diseases 
present; 
 A mock cycle, to see how the uterine lining will react to hormone 
replacements (estrogen); 
 A pap smear to check for a healthy uterus; 
 A physical examination, to determine whether there are any physiological 
impediments that would hinder the surrogate in carrying the baby; 
 A trial transfer, to check the length of the uterus to find out how far to insert 
the catheter, which will be loaded with embryos; and 
 Psychological testing, to check motivations, attitudes, and commitment.251 
 
Sections 292, 294 and 295 of the Children’s Act regulate the validity of the surrogate 
motherhood agreement. Section 292(1) provides that no surrogate motherhood is 
valid unless (a) the agreement is in writing and is signed by all the parties thereto; (b) 
the agreement is entered into in the Republic; (c) at least one of the commissioning 
parents, or where the commissioning parent is a single person, that person, is at the 
time of entering into the agreement domiciled in the Republic; (d) the surrogate 
mother and her husband or partner, if any, are at the time of entering into the 
agreement domiciled in the Republic; and (e) the agreement is confirmed by the 
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High Court within whose area of jurisdiction the commissioning parent or parents are 
domiciled or habitually resident. In addition, the Children Act stipulates that 
 
“[n]o surrogate motherhood agreement is valid unless the conception of the child 
contemplated in the agreement is to be effected by the use of the gametes of both 
commissioning parents or, if that is not possible due to biological, medical or other 
valid reasons, the gamete of at least one of the commissioning parents or, where the 
commissioning parent is a single person, the gamete of that person”.252 
 
The Children’s Act further provides that “[a] court may not confirm a surrogate 
motherhood agreement unless … the commissioning parent or parents … 
understand and accept the legal consequences of the agreement and their rights 
and obligations in terms thereof.”253 
 
It is important to note that the best interests of a child to be born as a result of a 
surrogate motherhood agreement are one of the important conditions for the validity 
of that agreement. In terms of section 295 of Children’s Act, the surrogate 
motherhood agreement includes adequate provisions for the contract, care, 
upbringing and general welfare of the child that is to be born in a stable home 
environment, including the child’s position in the event of the death of the 
commissioning parents or one of them, or their divorce or separation before the birth 
of the child.254 Section 295 futher provides that, in general, having regard to the 
personal circumstances and family situations of all the parties concerned, but above 
all the interests of the child to be born, the agreement should be comfirmed.255 
 
A closer look at these provisions reveals however that the drafters of the Children’s 
Act were concerned with the interests of the child to be born through a surrogate 
motherhood agreement at the time of the birth of the child. This is made clear when 
they provided in section 295(d) that the child has to be born into a stable 
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environment. They also took into account the fact that there should be alternative 
solutions to keep the child in a stable home environment in the event that the 
commissioning parents die or divorce or separate from one another before the birth 
of the child. The protection of the interests of the child to be born through a surrogate 
motherhood agreement is also made clear by the provision in section 295(e) that the 
agreement should be confirmed with due regard of the interests of the child to be 
born. 
 
It is clear from the discussion above that the Children’s Act ensures some protection 
of the interests of the child to be born through a surrogate motherhood agreement. 
However it is important to note that this protection is focused on the child’s post-birth 
period rather than while he or she is still in the mother’s womb.  
 
The surrogate motherhood agreement can be terminated according to the conditions 
prescribed in the Children’s Act. In the terms of the Act: 
 
“(1) A surrogate mother who is also a genetic parent of the child concerned, 
may at any time prior to the lapse of a period of sixty days after the 
birth of the child, terminate the surrogate motherhood agreement by 
filing written notice with the court. 
(2) The court must terminate the confirmation of the agreement … upon 
finding, after notice to the parties to the agreement and a hearing, that 
the surrogate mother has voluntarily terminated the agreement and that 
she understands the effects of the termination, and the court may issue 
any appropriate order if it is in the best interest of the child. 
(3) The surrogate mother incurs no liability to the commissioning parents 
for exercising her rights of termination in terms of this section, except 
for compensation for any payments made by the commissioning 
parents...”256  
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In Mahlobogwane’s view, the Children’s Act gives the power to the surrogate mother 
in partial surrogacy to terminate the surrogate motherhood contract within a 
prescribed period, but there is no provision in the Act that gives similar power to 
surrogate mother in full surrogacy. In Mahlobogwane’s words: 
 
“There appears to be a distinction between a surrogate mother who is a genetic 
parent and the one with no genetic relationship as far as termination of the 
agreement is concerned. The Children’s Act presumes that the contracting couples 
are the legal parents but give the surrogate a period of time to change her mind. The 
court is empowered under this statute to give protection to the surrogate mother with 
genetic relationship to terminate the agreement ‘prior to the lapse of a period of sixty 
days after the birth of the child’, but there is no corresponding provision for the 
termination of the agreement to a surrogate mother with no genetic connection”.257 
 
Although up to date no fertility clinics in South Africa have made use of partial 
surrogacy, it should be noted that this power given to the partial surrogate mother 
can be the cause of conflict.  
 
The surrogate motherhood agreement confirmation was at issue in Ex Parte WH and 
others.258 In this case a male same-sex couple domiciled in South Africa approached 
the court to seek the approval of their surrogate motherhood agreement contracted 
with a surrogate mother.259 In terms of this agreement, the egg that had to be used 
for the fertilisation would not come from the surrogate mother and the identity of the 
sperm donor was not indicated.260 However, the parties agreed that the 
commissioning parents would pay to the surrogate mother the following amounts of 
money: 
 
(a) R 20.000 for health insurance; 
(b) R 6.000 for life insurance; and 
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(c) R 20.000 for various expenditure, including transport, maternity, clothes etc. 
 
After considering all the information brought before the court, the court concluded 
that the parties made out a proper case for the relief they sought before the court, 
that the parties concluded the surrogate motherhood agreement for altruistic rather 
than commercial reasons, and that the payments were in line with the legislation. 
The court thus confirmed the agreement.261 
 
This judgment was subjected to quite a bit of criticism. In her criticism, Carnelly 
focuses on two issues, namely the genetic link and the issue of payment. Drawing on 
section 294, which requires the commissioning parents or at least one of them to be 
the sperm donor, and section 301, which describes the types of payment the 
surrogate mother may receive from the commissioning parents, she concluded that 
the judgment in this case is inaquate. Carnelly argues firstly that the fact that the 
judgment does not identify the donors of the sperm and eggs might be inconsistent 
with the Childrenʼs Act. Secondly, Carnelly argues that the payment of various 
expenditures by the commissioning parents is not covered by section 301 of the 
Childrenʼs Act. These amounts might amount to payment for the surrogate services 
rendered by the surrogate mother and hence make the agreement commercial.262 
 
Pillay and Zaal are of the view that the judgment in this case reveals a favour that 
the court did to gay commissioning parents. According to them there is no valid 
explanation for the court to use less than a strict application of chapter 19 of the 
Children’s Act, after noting that details provided before the court in respect of 
expenses in implementing the surrogate agreement were unsufficient. They thus 
concluded that the court has encouraged commercial surrogacy in contravention of 
the Children’s Act.263 
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Louw concluded that the judgment in this case displays a lack of appreciation for the 
importance of certain crucial aspects relating to the surrogate mother agreement and 
its confirmation. She further recommended the reconsideration of the prohibition of 
altruist surrogacy in South Africa.264 
 
It is clear from the discussion of this case and the criticisms thereof that commercial 
surrogacy is not legally allowed and the genetic link is an important factor in the 
confirmation of the surrogate motherhood agreement.  
 
Unlike gay men, who reproduce by means of a valid agreement with a surrogate 
mother, lesbians do not need such a contract for their reproduction. 
 
3.4.2   Lesbian reproduction: Artificial Insemination by donor (AID) and 
  in Vitro Fertilisation (IVF) 
 
Artificial insemination using donor semen (AID) is a process whereby semen is 
placed into a woman’s vagina or uterus for the purpose of conception. The semen is 
obtained from a donor that is someone other than the woman’s partner. AID is most 
likely to be used with infertile couples where the male is azoospermic (absence of 
sperm in the ejaculate) or oliogospemic (insufficient sperm in the ejaculate to lead to 
conception).265 
 
In South Africa, an AID service was started in 1979 in the Infertility Clinic at Groote 
Schuur Hospital, Cape Town in response to repeated requests by patients, doctors 
and social workers.266  
 
AID and IVF are helping families to have children that they could not otherwise have. 
These techniques are also used by lesbians to have children and build families of 
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their own. Lesbians have the choice to be inseminated with gametes from known or 
unknown donors. The status of the donor as known or unknown can have legal 
consequences that will be discussed in the next section. The technique of in vitro 
fertilisation via oocyte donation separates the genetic and biological aspects of 
parentage on the one hand from the social aspects on the other hand. This in turn 
creates legal problems because it upsets the stability and certainty normally 
associated with family relationships, including the certainty in relation to the status of 
the IVF child. It is possible in such a conception for two women to claim motherhood 
of the child. Which of them is the real mother, the ovum mother or the womb 
mother?267  
 
3.5 THE EFFECTS OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES ON 
 CHILDREN 
 
It has been demonstrated in a number of studies that using ARTs is associated with 
numerous health problems for the child, and this raises concerns for the welfare of 
children born through ARTs.268 As Robertson points out: 
 
“Concerns about the welfare of offspring resulting from ARTs cover a wide range of 
procedures and potential risks. In addition to physical risks from the techniques 
themselves, they include the risk of providing ART services to persons who could 
transmit infectious or genetic disease to offspring, such as persons with HIV or 
carriers of cystic fibrosis. Risks to offspring from inadequate parenting may arise if 
ARTs are provided to persons with mental illness or serious disability. Questions of 
offspring welfare also arise from the use of ARTs in novel family settings, such as 
surrogacy, the posthumous use of gametes and embryos, or with single parents or a 
same sex couples. Finally, both physical and psychological risks may result from 
alteration or manipulation of genes, gametes, and embryos.”269 
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This would suggest that ARTs are not risk free. In fact, the use of ARTs may enable 
an infertile person or one who carries genes for serious disease to reproduce, but in 
doing so they risk having a child with diminished welfare.270 
 
Assisted reproductive technologies may result in many adverse physical effects on 
resulting children. However, for the purpose of this study, physical effects of ARTs 
will be classified into two categories, namely effects inherent to the technique itself 
and effects resulting from modifying, selecting, or manipulating gametes and 
embryos.271 It should be noted that in addition to the physical effects, children born 
as a result of the use of ARTs are also exposed to psychological effects which may 
be worsened by the legislation of some countries as stated in the introduction of this 
chapter. 
 
3.5.1  Effects inherent to the technique itself  
 
IVF and ICSI are the basic ART procedures that have been generally thought to be 
safe for both mother and children. IVF involves the hyper stimulation of the ovaries 
and retrieval of eggs. These procedures are reported to have many risks not only for 
the child, but also for the mother. For instance, it has been shown that although the 
incidence of ovarian hyper stimulation syndrome and other untoward effects have 
remained low, the incidence of morbidity and mortality has been shown to be very 
high for women who have undergone these procedures. Some studies suggest that 
women whose ovaries had been stimulated to produce multiple eggs had a higher 
rate of ovarian cancer.272 The physical effects of ARTs, which are inherent to the 
technique, include perinatal and neonatal mortality, multiple pregnancies or 
gestations, and birth defects. 
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Galpern has observed that IVF can impact infant health in the form of low birth 
weight, premature birth, and high rates of Caesarean deliveries, infant death, and 
congenital disability. Regarding congenital disability and illness, it has been proven 
that IVF could result in a 25 to 60% higher incidence of congenital disabilities and 
illness compared to 1 to 3% in the general population. IVF has also been linked to 
cancer in children. For example, a study of IVF children in the Netherlands has found 
a much higher than expected occurrence of retinoblastoma or eye cancer. This 
emphasises the concerns about the child’s well-being.273  
 
3.5.1.1  Perinatal and neonatal mortality 
 
Perinatal mortality is defined as stillbirth of a child of at least 20 weeks gestation and 
neonatal mortality as death of any child up to twenty eight days following birth.274 It is 
argued that the causes of perinatal mortality are multiple pregnancies and preterm 
delivery. A small percentage is due to severe birth defects.275 
 
3.5.1.1.1 Multiple pregnancies 
 
Multiple pregnancies are the carriage of more than one child during pregnancy and is 
the most important factor contributing to children’s adverse outcomes from ARTs. 
The most serious health problem posed by ARTs is the high rate of multiple 
gestations. One-third of IVF procedures lead to multiple births. In addition, ovulation 
induction or enhancement followed by intrauterine insemination also leads to a high 
rate of multiple births. While the rate of triplets has been reduced, the rate of twins 
has increased or remained steady. Multiple births pose significantly higher risks of 
children’s and to some extent mothers’ morbidity.276  
 
Twins and triplets are reported to stand a much higher risk of being born injured as a 
result of multiple gestations. They have more birth defects, more neurological 
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problems, and create more stress for parents and other siblings.277 Multiple births put 
a higher burden on the healthcare system, and also raise economic and other 
costs.278 Assisted reproductive technologies can increase the rate of multiple 
pregnancies for the two following reasons: 
 
 Fertility-enhancing drugs can increase the number of follicles that mature and 
release an egg per cycle. 
 The transfer of more than one embryo to the uterus following IVF or ICSI is 
common, and results in multiple pregnancies if more than one embryo 
implants successfully.279 
 
In their study Fasouliotis and Schenker found that multiple pregnancies occurred in 6 
to 8 percent of clomiphene cycles and 15 to 53 per cent of gonadotrophins cycles.280 
It has been demonstrated that many risks for children are associated with multiple 
pregnancies, including pregnancy complications on the one hand, and prematurity 
and low birth weight on the other hand. 
 
It is important to note that these two risks increase the rate of infant morbidity. 
Neonatal outcomes include respiratory distress, the need for intensive monitoring 
and support, difficulties feeding and an increased risk of infection. In Australia, 63 
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percent of twins and 96 percent of triplets are delivered preterm.281 Children born as 
a result of in vitro fertilisation have also been reported to present a high rate of 
respiratory and diarrhoea illness, and a high rate of longer-term neurological 
problems especially cerebral palsy.282 
 
3.5.1.1.2 Pre-term delivery 
 
Several studies have revealed that children born through ARTs are in most of the 
cases born before their time is due. In other words, those children are mostly born 
before nine months gestation. Koivurora et al reported that in vitro fertilisation 
singletons had a higher rate of prematurity and low birth weight.283 In Australia, 14 
percent of singleton in vitro fertilisation pregnancies are delivered prematurely 
compared with 8 percent of the general population.284 
 
3.5.1.1.3 Birth defects and genetic disorders 
 
In Australia, the overall rate of severe birth defects such as a hole in the heart, 
cerebral palsy, or chromosomal abnormalities such as Down’s syndrome are 2 to 3 
percent, and rates of minor defects such as cleft palate, dislocated hip, and clubfoot 
are also 2 to 3 percent.285 
 
The causes of birth defects include genetic and chromosomal abnormalities and 
maternal conditions such as rubella, smoking, diabetes, very poor nutrition and drug 
or alcohol intake. It is suggested that since 60 percent of birth defects have an 
unknown cause, it is possible that the technology itself may be the cause.286 
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After reviewing 26 studies comparing birth defects in children following ARTs with 
those of naturally conceived children, Kurinczuk et al reported in 2004 that ARTs are 
associated with an increase of birth defects in Australia.287  
 
It is argued for example that ovulation stimulating drugs could be responsible for 
these defects. These drugs could mature inappropriate eggs, and the culture 
medium for the embryo prior to the transfer to the uterus may alter the gene function 
and lead to new chromosomal abnormalities.288 
 
Studies of children born as a result of IVF or ICSI have revealed that there may be a 
high incidence of certain rare birth defects and lower birth weight among hildren. For 
example, one study reported that singletons conceived using ARTs were at an 
increased risk of low birth weight, while another study suggested an increased risk of 
neurological problems, especially cerebral palsy.289   
 
ICSI, which now occurs in almost half of IVF treatments in the USA, has been 
reported to have a higher risk of sex chromosome and imprinting disorders.290 
 
In South Africa, a more recent study indicated that assisted reproductive 
technologies can increase the risk of being born with birth defects from 3% to 5% 
when a child is naturally conceived to 30% to 40% when a child is a result of the use 
of ARTs. The most important birth defects resulting from the use of ARTs are 
cardiovascular, musculoskeletal, urogenital and gastrointestinal.291 According to this 
study, even singleton pregnancies are also at high risk, probably because of 
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subfertility and aspects of the ART process.292 This excess risk is so serious that it 
requires particular attention when using ART procedures. 
 
3.5.2   Effects resulting from modifying, selecting, or manipulating  
  gametes and embryos 
 
The modification, selection and manipulation of gametes and embryos often involve 
the use of genetic knowledge to choose the genes or genomes of children. 
Robertson distinguishes four uses of genetic knowledge, namely the screening of 
prospective offspring for susceptibility or late-onset medical conditions; screening for 
gender and other non-medical characteristics involving selecting or choosing certain 
aspects of the genetic makeup of children by excluding negative aspects; 
reproductive cloning; and positive genetic alteration of offspring genomes, which 
involve positive selection or alteration of genes of offspring.293  
 
Most uses of genomic knowledge in reproduction will involve preimplantation 
screening or screening before birth to prevent the birth of children with genetic 
disease or predisposition to disease. The presence of family diseases in some 
groups of the population is often considered as the reason for screening.294 A history 
of family or autosomal diseases, such as cystic fibrosis, sickle cell anemia, and Tay 
Sachs,295 also constitutes a justification for screening. Through screening, carriers of 
autosomal mutations may also learn whether their reproductive partners are also 
carriers. If so, they can decide to risk having children with disease, adopt, be without 
children, use donor gametes, or conceive and screen at the embryonic or fetal stage, 
and then decide not to start or not to continue a pregnancy.296 Embryo or prenatal 
screening might also occur when the determination of dominant or X linked diseases, 
such as Huntington’s disease, hemophilia, or Duchenne’s muscular dystrophy is 
needed.297 
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Although these procedures seem to benefit parents in their endeavour to ensure a 
healthy child, they have a serious negative impact on resulting children. The first 
negative impact is the fact that these procedures seem to send the message that the 
life of children is not desired and valued or that it would be better for them that they 
had not been born.298 
 
The manipulation of embryos and gametes also involve non-medical selection, such 
as “for gender, sexual orientation, hearing, perfect pitch, hair or eye color, 
intelligence, size, strength, memory, beauty, or other traits, which parents might find 
desirable”.299 Screening of embryos to determine sex is more accurate than sperm 
separation, but requires an expensive and intrusive cycle of IVF and the willingness 
to discard embryos.300 
 
Wertz distinguishes two different groups of people who request for preimplantation 
genetic diagnosis for non-medical gender selection. The first group consists of 
persons who wish their first born child to be of a particular sex. According to Wertz 
most of people prefer their first born child to be male because their culture values 
males more than females.301 In the second group there are people who already have 
a child of one gender and wish to have a child of the opposite gender. In many 
cases, the requests are made by people who already have two or more children of 
the same gender, with no greater preference for males than for females.302 
 
The risks of IVF and ICSI which arise from the manipulation of gametes, embryos, 
and the conditions of conception and implantation, are inevitable when attempting to 
enable infertile couples to conceive or become pregnant. Additionally, there is 
another set of risks that originates from manipulations done to determine the quality 
or make-up of gametes or embryos, or to modify, transfer, or remove genetic 
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material.303 Preimplantation genetic diagnosis to screen embryos, for example, 
carries some risk that embryo biopsies might affect the physical well-being of 
resulting children.304 Similarly, flow cytometry to select male or female bearing sperm 
for preconception sex selection subjects sperm to a fluorescent dye and laser energy 
with still unknown effects on sperm, embryos, and offspring.305 
 
Children born through assisted reproductive technologies are not the only children to 
experience health problems. There is evidence that children conceived naturally can 
also experience such problems. However, it is important to note that in most cases, 
health problems experienced by children conceived naturally have their origin in the 
parents’ genetic or health state, and almost all these problems, if detected early, can 
be successfully managed. Generally, if one of the parents, in particular the pregnant 
mother, is infected by a virus, there is a chance that the virus will be transmitted to 
the child who is conceived while the mother is infected. A more recent study reported 
in this regard that a number of viruses responsible for various health problems can 
be transmitted from an infected mother to the foestus she is bearing. In fact, Seopela 
reported that the cytomegalo virus, the genital herpes simplex virus, and the rubella 
virus can be transmitted transplacently or during the passage of the newborn through 
the birth canal by contact with genital lesion.306 The cytomegalo virus is responsible 
for sensorineural hearing loss and mental retardartion,307 the genital herpes simplex 
virus causes microcephaly and hepatosplenomegaly,308 and the rubella virus is 
responsible for severe birth defects, known as the rubella syndrome. Its congenital 
and late manifestations include sensorineural deafness, cardiac defects, ophthalmic 
defects, rethinopathy and cataracts, central nervous system defects, mental 
retardation, and microcephally.309 All these infections are manageable during 
pregnancy.310  
 
                                                          
303
 Robertson 2004 AJLM 12. 
304
  Robertson 2004 AJLM 12 
305
   Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority “Sex selection: Options for regulation” (2003), 
available at http://www.hfea.gov.uk/AboutHFEA/Consultations (date of use 26 March 2015). 
306
  Seopela “Congenital and neonatal infections” 2015 OGF 27-29.  
307
  Seopela 2015 OGF 28. 
308
  Seopela 2015 OGF 28. 
309
  Seopela 2015 OGF 29. 
310
  Seopela 2015 OGF 28. 
86 
 
It should be noted that in addition to the physical effects of ARTs on children, most 
children born as a result of the use of these procedures are also exposed to 
psychological effects. 
 
3.5.3 Psychological effects of assisted reproductive technologies on children 
 
In ARTs, the act of becoming parent is founded upon the assumption that freezing, 
mass storage, experimentation upon, quality control, and destruction of particular 
parents’ offspring is a legitimate technological extension of natural methods of 
reproduction. This removes reproduction from the realm of the private and the 
intimate and sets it in a context of third party oversight and control.311 ARTs have 
made it possible for a man to become a father to a live-born child even decades after 
his death.312 All these facts, coupled with the secrecy that surrounds ARTs, can 
cause serious psychological harm to the resulting children. 
 
It is suggested that there is a possibility for a person to be harmed by the manner of 
his or her conception as far as it relates to the question of origins.313 Many children 
born as a result of ARTs do not know that they are donor conceived children. Those 
who know are not aware of the potential significance of it. Research on the 
behaviour of these children is often biased because of the fact that third parties such 
as teachers are often engaged by researchers to report on children’s behaviour, but 
since the former are kept in as much ignorance as the latter, one should not expect 
them to know what signs of distress or psychological dislocation to look at.314  
 
In South Africa, for instance, although the gamete donors are the genitors of the 
child resulting from the use of their gametes, they are legally excluded from the list of 
family members where the child resulting from their genetic materials is going to 
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grow up. In this way children born from ARTs cannot establish a genetic link, or trace 
their origins, especially when they are conceived from unknown gamete donors.  
 
It is important to note that the children’s ignorance of their origins is an obstacle to 
drawing conclusions about the real impact of those abnormal origins on the 
children’s psychological and emotional development.315 Children born of ARTs who 
are now adults expressed their concern for the lack of fundamental information about 
their parentage, ancestry, and medical inheritance, which could result in a situation 
where those children could marry their own siblings or could have siblings they 
would never know because of the deliberate actions of their biological parents.316 
 
Secrecy and anonymity of the donor have ruled ARTs for decades but recently the 
need to ensure the best interests of the child has brought to attention the need of 
knowing the identity of the donor for social or medical reasons.317 
 
The knowledge of genetic origins contains two parts: the first is the secrecy issue 
which touches on the question whether the person is informed that he or she was 
conceived by means of donor material. The second part is donor anonymity that 
concerns the release of the identity of the donor to the offspring.318 
 
The secrecy issue revolves around two questions. The first is whether it is necessary 
to inform an ART-born child that he or she was born as a result of ART procedures. 
The second question is whether that information would be in the best interests of the 
child.  
 
With regard to the first question, it is the practice in many countries in the world not 
to disclose the methods of conception to the ARTs-born child. A few reasons are 
given in support of this practice. These include the following: the nondisclosure may 
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be perceived as a way of ensuring that, firstly, the non-genetic parent feels 
connected to the child; secondly, the child develops a strong bond with the genetic 
parent; thirdly, the appearance of a “normal” family is maintained; fourthly, there is as 
little disruption of the child’s stability as possible; and finally, the genetic parent’s 
infertility (a condition that may still carry a negative stigma in some societies) is able 
to remain undisclosed. Another reason is that the “nondisclosure model” favours the 
interests of the would-be parents, the child’s need for stability and normality, and the 
privacy rights of the sperm donor.319 
 
Some studies have revealed the reasons why intended parents support non-
disclosure. These include the following: Some intended parents indicate that their 
views were ambivalent, dominated by a focus both on their own role as parents and 
their desire to act in their children’s best interests.320 For other parents the main 
reason why mothers were against disclosure or unsure about telling the truth was 
because they wished to protect their children and were concerned that other family 
members might perceive the child in a different light if the child’s real genetic 
parentage was extensively known.321 They insist that the truth may at times damage 
complex kinship relationships, and parents are often afraid of the consequences of 
such knowledge in the interests of the family.322 The interests of truth may have to be 
sacrificed, at times, for family stability and security in the interests of the child. Legal 
truth (founded exclusively on genetic testing) can cut through and disrupt these 
relationships.323 
 
In addition, some scholars are of the view that the openness could have negative 
impacts on the child, parents and the family as a whole. According to Turkmendag et 
al, for example, parents may be of the view that nondisclosure is the wisest way to 
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protect the child, themselves, and the wider family.324 As a result, they tell their child 
that they were assisted in the conception process rather than disclose the child’s 
genetic parents.325 This is another approach to secrecy – revealing the child’s 
method of conception to ARTs-born children, but not revealing the identity of the 
gamete donors. 
 
However, Kirkman reminds us that donor-conceived people still exist within a culture 
that “valorises genes” and that they “may feel cheated of their heritage and suffer a 
crisis of identity”.326 McNair, learning from adopted children’s experience, argued that 
calls from adoptive adults, in addition to a growing realisation of the negative psycho-
social consequences of secrecy, led to the encouragement of openness from an 
early age. Social change in the adoption movement has progressed even further with 
the development of “open” adoption, which encourages birth mothers to have some 
role in the selection of the adoptive parents and to maintain contact with their child. 
According to McNair, advocates of this approach find that it helps adoptive children 
to have a more fully formed identity.327 
 
In contrast, others suggest that openness can lead to confusion for children if there 
are conflicting parental values, and this could create identity conflict.328 Although the 
debate continues, open adoption is now a key element of public adoption policy.329 
 
In short, the second group of authors is of the view that it is important to reveal to 
ART-born children how they were conceived and born. The secrecy around the 
identity of the donor is the other issue that needs to be discussed. 
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Regarding the second question, it is important to note that the anonymity of the 
donor is a common principle in ART procedures. Turner and Coyle have noted that 
secrecy has been advocated within the ART field since it began and non-disclosure 
remains the policy in many countries, to the extent that some countries including 
Denmark, Norway, Spain and France have legislated to ensure secrecy of donor 
identity.330 
 
Arguments supporting secrecy largely revolve around protection of the privacy of the 
non-biological father regarding his infertility. Others have claimed that disclosure to 
the child would damage the child’s identity and relationships with her or his family, 
although the opposite has been found to be the case.331 The fear that donors would 
not donate if they could be traced by offspring is among factors that exercise 
pressure to maintain such policies.332 
 
Most parents support secrecy around the identity of the donor who is the biological 
parent of the child. The tradition of secrecy embedded into ART policy has been 
upheld by many parents of donor-conceived children. The reasons for secrecy given 
by the DI parents in the European longitudinal study were most commonly to protect 
the child. They were concerned that the children would be distressed if they found 
out that they were donor-conveived, and that telling them would negatively influence 
their relationship with their non-biological fathers.333 Other reasons were to prevent 
people outside the family from knowing the truth. Several parents believed there was 
no need to disclose to their children.334 
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Other parents, however, wanted to reveal the identity of the donors to their ARTs-
born children. A study on a predominantly Australian sample of donor families, for 
example, revealed that a majority of parents would like to tell their children, but were 
constrained by not knowing how or when to do so.335  
 
Golombok reported in her European longitudinal study that 8.6% of DI children, 50% 
of IVF children, and 95% of adoptive children had been told, and more single 
mothers intend to disclose to their children the identity of the donors of the genetic 
materials that have contributed to their existence.336 In another study, MacCallum 
reported that parents of children born of surrogacy are also more open, with one 
study showing that 100% planned to tell their children before the age of five.337  
 
The anonymity of the donor or the non-disclosure of the donor’s identity may have 
consequences or implications for the child’s identity and for family relationships. 
Some of these relate to the fact of having a donor father (or mother) and most relate 
to the impact of delayed discovery of donor status.338 
 
With regard to the implications of the donor’s anonymity, some donor-conceived 
persons describe feeling that their conception was impersonal, and that their donor is 
a deliberate stranger who has chosen to avoid a parenting responsibility. Feeling like 
a “freak” or the “product of an experiment” is described. Others feel incomplete or 
that they don’t completely belong. These sentiments suggest that identity is related 
to genetic inheritance in some way.339 Kirkman found that genes were significant to 
many donor-conceived adults and that they had a “severe disruption and fractured 
sense of identity” as a result of not being able to know.340  
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Regarding family relationships, consequences of secrecy for some donor-conceived 
persons include feeling that their parents had been dishonest, which can lead to 
mistrust and hostility towards their parents.341 This can result in reduced self-esteem 
and difficulty in forming trusting relationships.342 Longer-term consequences of being 
unable to know the identity of their donor involved concerns that they could 
inadvertently form an intimate relationship with a sibling or other close relative.343 
 
Some countries, including South Africa, Australia and Sweden have fixed the age at 
which children born of ARTs can find out the identity of their genitor. In these three 
countries the age is fixed at 18. Children who knew earlier that they can obtain their 
donor’s identity were overwhelmingly curious about their donor.344 Most commonly 
they were interested to know what they were like as a person, whether their 
appearance was similar to theirs and whether they would be able to meet them. All 
but one adolescent wanted a photograph. Therefore, knowing the donor as a person 
was important to these children. However, while they reported that the donor could 
be important in their lives, none regarded him as a parent.345 
 
Victoria was the first state in Australia to establish a donor registry. In 1988, Victoria 
led the way in establishing a donor registry, enabling release of the donor’s identity 
to the child on request from the age of 18, but only if the donor consented to the 
release of that information. The law has now been amended so that any child born 
as a result of a donor treatment procedure since 1998 will automatically be able to 
access identifying information about the donor when they turn 18. Before a child 
turns 18, his or her parents can apply for identifying information about the donor, 
which can be provided with his consent.346 
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With regard to the time and how parents should inform their children about their 
genitors, MacNair suggests that parents need more information and assistance 
regarding why, when and how to inform their children of their donor status. Perhaps, 
most importantly, they need to understand that it is preferable to be honest with their 
children. This will lead to effective parent-child relationships, alongside knowledge of 
genetic heritage, and the potential for a future relationship with the donor if desired 
by child and donor.347 
 
Regarding waiting for the child to reach 18 before accessing the information about 
his or her genitor, the American Academy of Pediatrics argues that it almost seems 
perverse for the law to insist on an irrebuttable presumption that children should not 
have access to identifying information about their parents until they turn 18. It also 
seems to be entirely at odds with the Academy’s observation that “as children move 
into adolescence and adulthood, adoptive children may wish to seek out more 
information about their biological families.”348 
 
Because of the secrecy that surrounds ART procedures; many children born from 
donated sperm and eggs are not informed of their biological heritage.349 This lack of 
information results in several psychological impacts on the resulting child as 
demonstrated above. However, it is important to note that even those children who 
have the opportunity to have this information are still exposed to similar 
psychological effects.The parents to whom the custody of a child was given after 
birth (intended parents) may encourage their child born from ARTs not to disclose 
the information to the public. This might result in the child feeling as if he or she is 
harbouring a family secret or that he or she has something to be ashamed of.350 For 
the same reasons, the child may feel anger toward his or her gamete donor. This 
finding was confirmed in a study where a donor conceived child, now fifty-six years 
old, stated as follows: 
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“It is infuriating that most [sperm] banks remained wedded to the idea that sperm 
donation should be anonymous... They want to protect the donor as if he is a victim 
of some sort. But why should the medical professional have the power to deny 
someone their [sic] full genetic history? It’s not fair to allow a child to be deluded 
about who they [sic] are”.351 
 
This would suggest that keeping genetic origins secret may have negative emotional 
effects on the resulting child. 
 
In another study, it is reported that once the child receives the information about his 
or her donor conceived status, he or she may be led to go on a search of his or her 
donor. This can result in a devastating situation if, once found, the donor refuses to 
engage in a relationship with the child born with his or her genetic materials.352 
 
The birth defects discussed above also have psychological implications on children 
born through ARTs. Adashi et al reported in their research that disabled children 
born as a result of ARTs find it difficult to understand why they, and not their siblings, 
are affected, and may become jealous, angry or depressed.353 
 
The psychological effects of ARTs on children may, in some countries, be worsened 
by legislation, particularly legislation dealing with parentage and inheritance. In these 
countries, notably the United States of America, Australia, and South Africa, a 
gamete donor is not viewed as a legal parent of a child born using his or her genetic 
material. Therefore a child born to a single parent or to a homosexual couple in a 
union that is not recognised as a marriage is regarded to have only one parent. 
Having one legal parent in turn results in being able to inherit intestate only from that 
parent. In addition, a child who finds himself or herself in this situation will lose not 
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only financial, psychological or emotional support from the donor, but he or she will 
also lose his or her blood line. This will in turn result in the child losing his or her 
genetic origins. This may cause an identity crisis for such a child.354 
 
3.6 INTERIM CONCLUSION 
 
Assisted reproductive technologies have been viewed throughout the world as an 
appropriate remedy to the problem of infertility. Through ART procedures a number 
of individuals and couples, including gay and lesbian couples, can now have children 
that they could otherwise not have. This number is deemed to increase every year 
as ARTs are developing and becoming accessible to many individuals and couples. 
 
The use of ARTS in South Africa raises concern about the quality of the service that 
is provided. The limited number of ART units and service providers cannot allow the 
multitude of individuals and couples to be adequately taken care of. The necessity of 
various blood and other tests for every person in need of ART services makes it 
harder for the services providers to provide a service of required quality. The 
inadequate geographical distribution of ART units in the country, the cost of the 
service, and the poor or absent insurance coverage of these services, as well as the 
lack of information, are the major factors that limit access to ART services in South 
Africa. 
 
While gay couples and individuals may use the surrogate motherhood agreement to 
contract with a surrogate mother and have children, lesbians may choose from a 
fresh or frozen gamete from a known or unknown donor to be artificially inseminated 
and reproduce.      
 
However, many studies have shown that ARTs are not risk free for children resulting 
from the use of the ARTs. Physical, emotional and psychological harm may befall 
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children born as a result of artificial insemination and related techniques. The harm 
that ARTs cause to the resulting children can range from harm due to the techniques 
themselves including multiple gestation, birth defects and perinatal as well as 
neonatal mortality, to lack of happiness and psychological disorders. 
 
In view of all the physical, psychological and emotional harm imposed on children 
born as a result of the use of ARTs in general and those growing up in homosexual 
families in particular, the question that may arise is: Is it necessary to expose the 
child to all these risks in the sole intention to satisfy the parents’ desire to have 
children? In other words, are all these procedures in the best interests of the child?  
 
The harm caused by ARTs to the resulting offspring is so serious that it should be 
taken into consideration by the makers and in any application of the best interests of 
the child which will be discussed in length in the next chapters.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
INTERNATIONAL AND SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES 
 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The family is an important institution that has received international and domestic 
protection. A number of international instruments provide particular protection to the 
family compared to the way South African Constitution treats this institution. 
 
This chapter analyses international and domestic protection of the family. To this end 
the chapter discusses the protection of the family and its major components at 
international and domestic levels. The chapter begins with the international 
protection of the family. The definition and meaning of the family is provided in the 
first section while the second analyses the international law provisions relevant to the 
protection of the major components of the family, namely the parents and their 
children. The family protection will then be analysed in the context of the South 
African Constitution and legislation. The constitutional provisions relevant to the 
protection of the family and its components will also be discussed. 
 
4.2  INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE PROTECTION OF THE 
 FAMILY 
 
4.2.1  Introduction 
 
International law places a high premium on family’s values and parental interests. 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for instance, recognises the 
family as “the natural and fundamental group unit” of society and proclaims that it 
must, as such, be protected by society and the state.355 The Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights356 similarly considers the family as the natural and 
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fundamental group unit of society. The Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(“Convention”) mandates respect for the rights and duties of parents or legal 
guardians “to provide direction to the child in the exercise of his or her right in a 
manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child.”357 It is important to note 
that the preamble of the Convention on the Rights of the Child proclaims that:  
  
“the family, as the fundamental group of society and the natural environment for the 
growth and well-being of all its members and particularly children, should be afforded 
the necessary protection and assistance so that it can fully assume its responsibilities 
within the community”, and recognises “that the child, for the full and harmonious 
development of his or her personality, should grow up in a family environment, in an 
atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding.”358  
 
This would suggest that international law is protective of the family and its values. 
The child as a member of this institution receives particular protection and the 
development of his or her personality is a major concern for international law. The 
preamble emphasises the role that the family environment must play in the child’s 
development and describes that environment as a place where happiness, love and 
understanding must reign.  
 
4.2.2 International law provisions relevant to the protection of the family  
 
The protection of the family is here analysed through the rights granted by 
international instruments to two categories of family members. The rights of parents 
will be analysed before analysing children’s rights. 
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4.2.2.1  International protection of the rights of parents  
 
Although international law may provide many rights to individuals who may become 
parents if they so wish, this section focuses only on the right to marry and found a 
family as these rights directly involve children and are hence relevant for the purpose 
of this study. 
 
4.2.2.1.1 The right to marry and found a family 
 
A number of international instruments, including the United Nations Declaration of 
Human Rights,359 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,360 and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights,361 protect the right of 
every mature person to marry and found a family. Article 16 of the United Nations 
Declaration of Human Rights for instance states that “[m]en and women of full age, 
without any limitation due to the race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry 
and found a family.”362 
 
It is clear from this statement that no mature person irrespective of his or her sex, 
race, and country of origin or religious beliefs should be prohibited from marrying and 
founding a family. It is important to note that family can be built using various 
methods, including reproduction and adoption. However, not all mature people who 
can marry if willing are naturally able to reproduce and found a family. Some who are 
infertile can either adopt children or use ARTs to build their families. In this context, 
the right to found a family can be enjoyed by people who are married to one another 
and who engage in sexual activities as well as individuals who have chosen not to 
engage in sexual activities or who for some reasons, despite engaging in sexual 
activities, can still not reproduce due to their infertility status. 
 
For the purpose of this study the right to found a family of individuals who can 
reproduce through sexual intercourse are referred to as “sexual and reproductive 
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rights”, and the right to found a family of individuals who cannot reproduce naturally 
are referred to as “reproductive rights”. There are different views on the scope of 
these rights. Cook, for instance, is of the view that the right to found a family 
encompasses the right to abort a non-desired child in order to protect the existing 
child. In Cook’s words: 
  
“The right to found a family incorporates the right to maximise the survival prospects 
of a conceived or existing child through birth spacing by contraception or abortion. 
This right complements the right of a woman herself to survive pregnancy, for 
instance by delaying a first pregnancy...”363  
 
This would suggest that the right to found a family requires the prospective parents 
to do their best to secure the life of the conceived baby if any or child who is already 
born to them. They can do so by observing birth spacing, by using contraception 
methods or by aborting an unwanted pregnancy. In other words, the survival of an 
existing child may require the passing of a certain period of time before having the 
next child, or the termination of the unwanted pregnancy. This in turn would suggest 
that the right to found a family is so broad that it encompasses the stopping of the life 
of a child in gestation provided that this is done in order to protect the existing child. 
As it will become clear further down, it can be argued that this view of the right to 
found a family undermines the interests of the unborn child. 
 
With regard to the right to found a family for individuals who engage in sexual 
activities (sexual and reproductive rights), it is important to note that these rights 
were for the first time officially recognised in 1994 at the International Conference on 
Population and Development in Cairo.364 Those rights are now considered human 
rights for all people, and include universal access to reproductive health.365 Sexual 
and reproductive rights can be defined as follows: 
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“The right for everyone to make a decision about their sexual and reproductive 
health, including the choice to marry and determine the number, timing and spacing 
of their children; to sexual and reproductive security free from coercion and violence, 
to be informed and have access to safe and legal family planning services and to 
have access to health care services enabling women to go safely through pregnancy 
and child birth.”366 
 
To summarise, every adult mature person has the right to marry and found his or her 
family. A person can exercise that right in engaging in sexual activities in or outside 
the marriage environment or by having recourse to ARTs. This right is held to be free 
from any limitation due to the race, country of origin or religious beliefs. 
 
4.2.2.2  International protection of the rights of children 
 
Various children’s rights are protected under different international instruments. For 
the purpose of this study, only those rights applicable which are applicable to this 
study will be discussed. These include the right to life and the right to be free from 
violence, abuse and neglect.  The best interests of the child will also be discussed 
under this section. 
 
4.2.2.2.1  The child’s right to life 
 
The right to life is protected in many international instruments, including the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In terms of this convention, 
everyone has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law, and no 
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life.367 
 
The right to life is a very important right for all human beings. In view of this it 
appears reasonable to ask whether the right to life as defined in this instrument as 
well as in other international instruments can be extended to unborn children. This is 
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a very critical question in the context of this study because the victim of all the 
assisted reproductive adverse effects described in the previous chapter is the unborn 
child. It is common for the unborn child victim not to survive due to all the 
manipulations that are done on him or her and most of those who survive are born 
with several health challenges and birth defects.368 
 
The answer to the question of whether international instruments protect the right to 
life of an unborn child requires an analysis of the international provision defining the 
child. The Convention on the Rights of the Child states as follows: 
 
“A child is every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the laws 
applicable to the child, majority is attained early”.369  
 
A close look at this provision reveals that the ground for the definition of the child is 
his or her majority. In this context a child is every human being who is not yet mature 
according to the laws applicable to the child’s maturity. 
 
This provision also reveals that children who have attained the age of maturity or 
eighteen years of age are excluded from the definition of “child” for the purpose of 
the Convention. This would suggest that all other human beings who are younger 
than eighteen are included in the definition of “child” for the purpose of the 
Convention. However, this does not yet mean that the unborn child is included in this 
definition.  
 
An analysis of other provisions of the Convention appears to bring more light on this 
issue. Article 6 of the Convention states that states parties recognise that every child 
has the inherent right to life,370 and that states parties shall ensure to the maximum 
possible the survival and development of the child.371 It can be argued that the 
survival and development of the child in this provision refer to the born child who 
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must develop as well as the unborn child who must survive and be born. Another 
view is that the intention of the drafters of the Convention was limited to born 
children, but when one looks at the preamble of the Convention, there is a possibility 
of confirming that the Convention protects the child’s right to life before and after its 
birth. In paragraph 9 of its preamble the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
quotes the 1959 Declaration on the Rights of the Child, which clearly and explicitly 
states as follows? 
 
“Whereas the child, by reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs special 
safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection, before as well as after 
birth, [and] whereas the need for such special safeguards has been…recognised in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the statutes of specialised 
agencies and international organisations concerned with the welfare of children…, 
the General Assembly…calls upon…national Governments to recognize these rights 
and strive for their observance by legislative and other measures progressively 
taken…”372 
 
The preamble to the Convention on the Rights of the Child also states that: 
  
“[A]s indicated in the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, ‘the child, by reason of his 
physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including 
appropriate legal protection, before as well as after birth”. 
 
In another international instrument, special protection is granted to pregnant women. 
According to the provisions of the Geneva Conventions (Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War), people to be considered subjects of particular protection 
include expectant mothers;373 they are also included among the people who must be 
transferred to hospitals and other safe zones.374 Pregnant women were also counted 
among people who must benefit from essentials: food, clothing and tonics.375 
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These provisions tend to protect not only the woman who has in her womb an 
unborn child but most importantly that child. If the intention was not to protect the 
unborn child in the womb of her mother, there would be no reasonable ground for 
giving preferable or special treatment to pregnant women in the time of war. They 
could be treated as all other civilians. This view seems to be supported by Schabas 
who maintains that the provision that prohibits the execution of pregnant women was 
added out of the consideration of the interest of the unborn child.376  
 
To summarise, although in some international instruments the right to life of an 
unborn child is not explicitly addressed, I do agree with Flood, who concluded his 
article on the survey of international instruments with regard to the rights of the 
unborn child by stating the following:  
 
“This essay has argued that existing human rights and humanitarian legal 
instruments and high-level intergovernmental declarations provide important 
recognition of the right to life of an unborn child and a degree of protection to that 
child. They add up to a decided preference for life, even in provisions where unborn 
children are not mentioned directly but are inevitably among the beneficiaries. These 
children may be silent and unnamed, but they are there”.377  
 
International law is undoubtedly interested in protecting the potential life of a child 
while still in the womb of its mother. It can therefore be argued from the discussion 
above that the definition of the child in international instruments includes the born 
child as well as the unborn child. 
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4.2.2.2.2  The right to be free from violence 
 
The child’s right to be free from violence is protected in a number of international 
instruments, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 19 of the 
Convention reads as follows: 
 
“(1) States Parties shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative, 
social and educational measures to protect the child from all forms of 
physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent 
treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in 
the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any other person who has the 
care of the child;  
(2) Such protective measures should, as appropriate, include effective 
procedures for the establishment of social programmes to provide 
necessary support for the child and for those who have the care of the 
child, as well as for other forms of prevention and for identification, 
reporting, referral, investigation, treatment and follow-up of instances of 
child maltreatment described heretofore, and, as appropriate, for 
judicial involvement.” 
 
According to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, violence can be understood 
as follows: 
 
“All forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent 
treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse” as listed in article 19, 
paragraph 1, of the Convention”.378  
 
It is important to note that the violence as defined above can have several 
consequences for children who are submitted to it: 
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“(a) The short- and long-term health consequences of violence against children 
and child maltreatment include: fatal injury; non-fatal injury (possibly 
leading to disability); physical health problems (including failure to thrive, 
later lung, heart and liver disease and sexually transmitted infections); 
cognitive impairment (including impaired school and work performance); 
psychological and emotional consequences (such as feelings of rejection 
and abandonment, impaired attachment, trauma, fear, anxiety, insecurity 
and shattered self-esteem); mental health problems (such as anxiety and 
depressive disorders, hallucinations, memory disturbances and suicide 
attempts); and health-risk behaviours (such as substance abuse and early 
initiation of sexual behaviour);  
(b)  Developmental and behavioural consequences (such as school non-
attendance and aggressive, antisocial, self-destructive and interpersonal 
destructive behaviours) can lead, inter alia, to deterioration of 
relationships, exclusion from school and coming into conflict with the law). 
There is evidence that exposure to violence increases a child’s risk of 
further victimisation and an accumulation of violent experiences, including 
later intimate partner violence;  
(c)  The impact on children, in particular adolescents, of high-handed or ‘zero 
tolerance’ State policies in response to child violence is highly destructive 
as it is a punitive approach victimising children by reacting to violence with 
more violence. Such policies are often shaped by public concerns over 
citizens’ security and by the high profile given to these issues by mass 
media. State policies on public security must carefully consider the root 
causes of children’s offences in order to provide a way out of a vicious 
circle of retaliating violence.”379 
 
However, for the purpose of this study, I am interested only in the first group of 
consequences, because some of them are the result of violence imposed to a child 
born as a result of ARTs. As stated in chapter three, ART procedures impose 
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violence on the resulting child who may be born with physical health problems or 
birth defects.380 
 
4.2.2.2.3 The right to preserve his or her identity 
 
International law protects the child’s right to preserve his or her identity. The 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, for instance, contains provisions that protect 
such right.381 The inclusion of this right was intended to act as a safeguard to 
preserve the personal, legal and family identity of children throughout the world. It 
requires states not only to refrain from unlawful interference with a child’s identity, 
but also to take active measures to ensure the effective enjoyment of a child’s right 
to preserve his or her identity.382 The Committee on the Rights of the Child stressed 
that birth recognition is one of the measures to secure the child’s right to identity.383 It 
also stated that states must not only create but also maintain records critical to 
establishing a child’s identity.384 Under article 8 of the Convention, the definition of 
the right to identity expressly includes family relations.385 It is important to note that a 
person’s identity that extends to his or her genetic identity and family relations in this 
context refers to the genetic link with the genitor. This link is however lost for most 
children born as a result of ARTs to homosexual people. 
 
4.2.2.2.4 The child’s right to know his or her genetic origins 
 
 
The identity of the child’s genitors is referred to under this section as the child’s 
genetic origins. With regard to the child’s right to know his or her origins, Tobin is of 
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the view that international law supports the view that children should know their 
parents.386 Article 7 of the Convention indeed provides children with the right to know 
their parents. It is clear from this right that the Convention does not refer to parents 
who are raising the child concerned if they are not the genitors of the child, obviously 
the child will know them. The provision of the Convention providing the child with the 
right to know his or her parents refers to the biological parents or the child’s genitors. 
In this regard, I agree with Tobin who points out that article 7 of the Convention 
should be interpreted as creating a presumption that children should be provided 
with access to information about their biological parents.387 It is therefore in line with 
the Convention that children born as a result of ARTs be given an opportunity to 
know their genitors. However, as Tobin maintains, this right is not absolute and must 
be balanced against a biological parent’s right to privacy. It also remains subject to 
the overriding caveat that the release of identifying information must not be contrary 
to the child’s best interests.388  
 
4.2.2.2.5  The child’s best interests 
 
International law instruments have provisions relating to the best interests of the 
child and oblige states that have ratified them to adhere to the best interests 
standard in every matter where children are involved.389 The best interests standard 
has been described in the provisions of various international and regional 
instruments. Article 3(1) of the Convention describes the best interests of the child as 
a basic consideration and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
(1990) (hereafter “the African Children’s Charter”), a regional instrument and 
therefore applicable only to South Africa in this study, phrases it in even stronger 
terms in article 4(1) because it is not merely termed a basic consideration, but the 
basic consideration.390 
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The best interests of the child criterion is part of a comprehensive child protection. It 
broadly describes the well-being of the child, which must be determinied by a variety 
of individual circumstances such as the child's age, the level of maturity of the child, 
the presence or absence of parents, the child environment and the child's 
experience.391 In the process of determining the best interests of the child, the 
welfare of the child must be the primary consideration, be it in actions affecting 
children in general or those affecting a specific group of children.392 The principle of 
the best interests of the child was originally devised to guide judges’ decisions in 
custody disputes as a result of divorce or petitions for adoption. This principle was 
primarily meant to ensure that measures were put in place to allow for proper 
consideration of the well-being of children when making decisions that affect them.393 
It can accordingly be argued that the well-being of the child is a central factor when 
deciding what is in the best interests of the child in divorce or adoption procedures, 
as well as in every other matter involving the child. 
 
It is important to note that children have needs and rights in addition to those of 
adults. Therefore, in the process of determining what is in the best interests of the 
child care must be taken to ensure that specific needs, capacities and rights of 
children of all ages and backgrounds are perceived, understood and attended to.394 
In this process specific attention should be given to specific situations. In other 
words, when deciding what is in the best interests of a child with a disability, specific 
attention should be given to the fact that the child has a physical or mental handicap. 
This would suggest that the application of the best interests of the child will vary with 
the situation of the child concerned. What is in the best interests of child A, might not 
necessarily be in the best interests of child B as the two children have different 
situations. This would further suggest that in the case of ART-conceived or ART-born 
children, if their welfare is the primary consideration in the decision of bringing them 
into this world; their welfare must respectively be protected while in utero and in the 
post-natal period. Such protection would in my view prevent those children from 
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being born with the health problems described above.395 The best interests of the 
child would further mean that the environment in which the child will live after birth 
must promote the well-being of ART-born children. 
 
All the international and regional instruments discussed above impose negative and 
positive obligations respectively on states parties to take appropriate measures for 
the realisations of the rights therein protected and to refrain from violating or 
restricting these rights. In fact, in terms of the General Comment 19, states parties 
must ensure the protection of the family provided under article 23. To this end, states 
parties must adopt legislative, administrative and other measures.396 In response to 
its international obligations, South Africa has adopted measures for the realisation of 
some of these rights. Further, the interpretation of the rights protected in South 
African legal instruments, particularly the Constitution, has been inspired by 
international instruments. South Africa has for instance adopted the minimum core 
principle (which is inspired from the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights) in the realisation of the right to health.  
 
The South African Constitution also has its own perspective on the family and its 
members. The analysis of that perspective is the object of the next section.  
 
4.3  THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE TO FAMILY 
 AND  FAMILY MEMBERS 
 
4.3.1  Constitutional protection of the family 
 
Although South Africa has ratified most of international law instruments which protect 
the family and its values, the family appears to be under-protected in the South 
African Constitution. The South African Constitution does not protect the family as 
the basic unit of society and does not consider the right to marry or to establish a 
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family life as a fundamental right worthy of constitutional protection.397 According to 
the Constitutional Court this omission is to be understood in the context of South 
Africa’s multi-culturalism. The court held as follows in this regard:  
 
“The absence of marriage and family rights in many African and Asian countries 
reflects the multi-cultural and multi-faith character of such societies. Families are 
constituted, function and are dissolved in such a variety of ways, and the possible 
outcomes of constitutionalising family rights are so uncertain, that constitution-
makers appear frequently to prefer not to regard the right to marry or to pursue family 
life as a fundamental right that is appropriate for definition in constitutionalised terms. 
International experience accordingly suggests that a wide range of options on the 
subject would have been compatible with CP [constitutional principle] ll. On the one 
hand, the provisions of the NT [new text] would clearly prohibit any arbitrary State 
interference with the right to marry or to establish and raise a family. NT 7(1) 
enshrines the values of human dignity, equality and freedom, while NT 10 states that 
everyone has the right to have their dignity respected and protected”.398  
 
Although the right to family life is not protected through express constitutional 
provisions that would meet international obligations to protect the rights of every one 
to marry and found a family, the Constitutional Court considered other constitutional 
safeguards. The Constitutional Court explained its stance on this issue in Dawood, 
Shalabi and Thomas v Minister of Home Affairs.399 In this case the court clarified the 
significance of marriage and family for people in South Africa and emphasised the 
relevance of the value of dignity in the interpretation of constitutional rights, as well 
as the importance of the right to dignity as protected in section 10 of the Constitution. 
The court further explained the importance of the right to dignity in matters involving 
marriage and family. The court held that prohibiting a marriage relationship or the 
raising of a family would “[i]mpair(s) the ability of the individual to achieve personal 
fulfilment in an aspect of life that is of central significance”.400  
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It is important to note that it is through the constitutional recognition of the right to 
dignity that the value of human dignity is safeguarded and promoted. In 
Makwanyane,401 the court explained the importance of the right to human dignity 
together with the right to life. In this case the court held as follows:  
 
“The rights to life and dignity are the most important of all human rights, and the 
source of all other personal rights in the Bill of Rights. By committing ourselves to a 
society founded on the recognition of human rights we are required to value these 
two rights above all others”. 
 
This would suggest that if the rights to life and dignity are not valued in a society, 
there is no way for individuals in that society to enjoy all other rights they might have. 
It is in this context that marriage and family benefit from constitutional safeguards 
through the protection of the right to dignity, which is central to the enjoyment of all 
other rights, enshrined in the Bill of Rights.   
 
The absence of express family protection was the subject of denouncement in a 
number of in South African documents, including the Green Paper on Families.402 
The Green Paper reports the following: 
 
“Over the years, it became apparent to policy-makers, academics, civil society actors 
and concerned citizens that there was no policy framework that specifically 
addressed the family in South Africa. Given the history of the country and the nature 
of its political economy, as well as the multiplicity of social ills from the past, which 
continued to confront the country, the absence of a policy framework in this area was 
identified as a critical policy shortcoming that needed to be urgently addressed. On 
the other hand, it is evident that the detrimental effects of the policies of colonial 
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apartheid on the family, for example, land dispossessions, and the migrant labour 
and homeland systems, have a connection with contemporary South Africa”.403 
 
The Green Paper also reports the following: 
 
“The family continues to remain an auxiliary or, at times, an unintended target of 
policies in other spheres of government, such as, among others, education, health, 
human settlements, water and sanitation. As a result, it is quite difficult to determine 
the manner in which various government policies promote family life and strengthen 
families. Crucially, the role of safety-net played by the family continues to be eroded 
17 years after apartheid, with the result that the country is still being confronted by a 
host of challenges which are in themselves direct offshoots of disintegrating 
families”.404 
 
However, it can be argued that in contemporary South Africa, family is honoured 
through marriage as marriage is honoured and protected through the protection of 
the right to dignity as discussed above and in other legislation as well. With regard to 
marriage, the Green Paper reports the following: 
 
“Marriage in South Africa is honoured by the country’s Constitution. The Constitution 
also prohibits marriage discrimination based on sexual orientation. Marriage is also 
safeguarded by legislation, such as the Marriage Act of 1961 (Act no. 25), the 
Customary Marriage Act of 1998 (Act no. 120), and the Civil Union Act of 2006 (Act 
no.17). These laws allow for the legal standing of marriages and civil partnerships 
between persons, regardless of their sexual  orientation or gender. Broadly, family 
law supplements the roles of this legislation. It covers substantive and procedural 
family law rules and norms. These are important in the protection and preservation of 
families, because they deal with different aspects of the law that have a bearing on 
family life. Family law governs domestic or family-related issues that pertain to 
marriage or a legal status similar to marriage, the dissolution of marriage, and 
aspects relating to children and death.”405 
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In short, international and domestic law protects families and the stability of the 
entire nation depends on that protection. As already said, ARTs have made it 
possible for children to arrive in different family structures.406 Irrespective of the 
family structure, every ARTs-born child must have his or her best interests 
considered as paramount in every matter concerning him or her. The discussion in 
the next section aims at analysing whether the best interests of ARTs-born children 
are considered as paramount. This is done through the analysis of constitutional 
provisions relevant to family members’ protection. 
 
4.3.2 Constitutional provisions relevant to the protection of family members 
 
The Constitution does not expressly protect the family, as stated above. There is no 
express provision in the Constitution that can directly be viewed as relevant to the 
protection of the family or family life. However, under some provisions, the 
Constitution explicitly protects the rights of individuals who can be viewed as family 
members even though it is not clearly indicated that this protection is in the context 
of the family. Individuals who can be prospective parents and children have their 
rights protected in the Constitution. This section discusses some of those rights. 
 
4.3.2.1  Provisions relevant to the protection of prospective parents 
 
Many mature people who may one day decide to become parents have many of their 
rights enshrined in the Constitution. For the purpose of this study, only reproductive 
rights will be discussed.  
 
4.3.2.1.1 Reproductive rights 
 
As already stated above, every mature person has the right to marry and found a 
family.407 This right implies the possibility to procreate and live together. In this 
regard, General Comment 19 requires that family planning policies that a state party 
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adopts should not be compulsory or discriminatory.408 The right to procreate which is 
the implication of the international right to marry and found a family is referred to 
here as reproductive rights. This right encompasses the use of ARTs for people who 
cannot for some reason naturally reproduce. 
 
A number of constitutional rights pertaining to specifically women may be grouped 
together as female reproductive rights. These include the right to life;409 the right to 
privacy;410 the right to bodily and psychological integrity which includes the right to 
make decisions concerning reproduction;411 the right to equality;412 the right to 
dignity;413 the right to have access to health care services, including reproductive 
health care;414 and the right of to be informed.415 The preamble of the Choice on 
Termination of Pregnancy Act416 recognises that all these rights are important 
elements in the promotion of reproductive rights.  
 
The analysis of reproductive rights will therefore consist in a brief discussion of all 
the rights enumerated above and also their possible limitation in terms of section 36 
of the Constitution. The analysis of the reproductive rights is important to the extent 
that it opens a way for the discussion of the relationship between the best interests 
of the child and the interests of other family members.417 
 
a The right to life 
 
Section 11 of the Constitution provides that everyone has the right to life. The right to 
life was at issue in S v Makwanyane,418 where O’Regan J maintained that the right to 
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life goes beyond mere existence; it includes the right to live as human being, to be 
part of a broader community, and to share in the presence of humanity.419  
 
According to O’Sullivan, there is a link between the Constitution and the Choice Act. 
Sullivan asserts that section 11 of the Constitution is promoted by the Choice Act to 
the extent that its less restrictive provisions provide women with access to 
reproductive health care services that will prevent or reduce the majority of deaths 
associated with illegal and unsafe termination of pregnancies.420 This would suggest 
that under the Choice Act, women must access the reproductive health services in 
order to avoid unsafe abortions and hence reduce to the minimum the rate of 
woman’s death as a result of unsafe termination of pregnancies. In order words, the 
Choice Act promotes a women’s right to life as enshrined in section 11 of the 
Constitution. 
 
b The right to have access to health care services 
 
In terms of section 27 of the Constitution, everyone has the right to have access to 
health care services, including reproductive health care,421 and the state must take 
reasonable legislative and other measures within its available resources to achieve 
the progressive realisation of each of this right.422 According to O’Sullivan, 
reproductive health implies that people have the ability to engage in safe sexual 
relationships and that women can safely progress through their pregnancies. In this 
regard, access to safe termination services contributes to reproductive rights through 
the reduction of maternal morbidity and mortality.423 The right to have access to 
health care services was at issue in Soobramoney v Minister of Health.424 In respect 
of the right to have access to health care services, the court held that the obligation 
that section 27 of the Constitution imposes on the state are dependent on available 
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resources that the state can allocate to such purposes.425 This would suggest that 
the availability of state resources can enhance or limit woman’s access to health 
care. The right to have access to health care services was also at issue in Minister of 
Health v Treatment Action Campaign.426 In this case the Constitutional Court noted 
that the right to have access to health care services includes at least the minimum 
decensies of life, consistent with human didnity, and as such no one should be 
condemned to a life below the basic level of dignified human existence.427 It is 
important to note that this applies to children born or to be born as a result of the use 
of ARTs. The realisation of this right requires the State to take appropriate 
legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial and other measures.428 
 
c The right to have access to information 
 
The South African Constitution protects the right of every individual to have access 
to information. In terms of section 32(1) of the Constitution, everyone has the right of 
access to any information held by the state,429 and any information that is held by 
another person and that is required for the exercise or protection of any right.430 With 
regard to reproductive rights, information is crucial. O’Sullivan submits that women’s 
exercise of their right to reproductive decision making is dependent on the 
information they have concerning reproductive health. O’Sullivan goes on to say that 
if a woman lacks such important information, she will be limited in the exercise of the 
control she has over her body.431 This would suggest that information concerning 
reproductive health must be provided to every woman to help her make the right 
decision regarding reproduction and hence properly exercise control over her body. 
It is in this respect that the Choice Act imposes an obligation on medical practioners 
to provide reproductive services to all women. In terms of section 6 of the Choice 
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Act, medical practioners and midwives must provide women with information 
concerning their rights in relation to the Act.432  
 
Naturally speaking, women play an important role in the reproduction of humankind. 
In many patriarchal societies, there is a tendency to use women merely as 
reproductive machines. It is therefore important to protect women against this 
treatment. In this regard, Pickles emphasises that women need to be provided with 
information in order to have such protection without which they may be reduced to 
inferior standard citizens merely filling the role of reproducing human beings in 
society.433  
 
d The right to equality 
 
The right to equality is set out in section 9 of the Constitution. In terms of this section 
everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of 
the law.434 The Constitution further states that the right to equality includes the full 
and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the achievement of 
equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons or 
categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.435 The 
state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or 
more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or 
social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, 
culture, language and birth.436 No person may unfairly discriminate directly or 
indirectly on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation 
must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination.437  
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In Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie, Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v Minister of 
Home Affairs meaning was given to this right.438 In this case, the court held that the 
right to equality is the right to be different and requires equal concern and respect 
across those differences.439 In its narrow sense, equality maintains that differences 
are not the ground for excluding, marginalising or stigmatising other people.440  
 
With regard to the right of equality, Birembaum contends that the fact that a woman 
is the only person who can fall pregnant in a society has consequences attached to 
it. In the case of gender discrimination, rules that apply neutrally or equally without 
taking into consideration the fact of falling pregnant and all consequences attached 
to it would discriminate against women when the Bill of Rights is interpreted under a 
substantive perspective.441 As far as reproductive rights are concerned, the 
substantive approach of equality establishes a relationship between the 
discrimination against women and their reproductive role in the family.442 In 
O’Sullivan’s opinion, the fact that section 9(3) considers pregnancy as one of 
prohibited grounds for discrimination puts pregnant women in the group of 
disadvantaged individuals.443 O’Sullivan further maintains that under the substantive 
equality approach, the state is under an obligation to provide the necessary 
resources to allow individuals to enjoy their rights.444 In this regard, Ngwena points 
out that public hospitals are required to provide free termination of pregnancy 
services.445 
 
e The right to bodily and psychological integrity 
 
According to section 12(2) of the Constitution, everyone has the right to bodily and 
psychological integrity, which includes the right to make decisions concerning 
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reproduction,446 and the right to security in and control over their body,447 and not to 
be subjected to medical or scientific experiments without their informed consent.448 
These rights were at issue in Christian Lawyers Association of South Africa v The 
Minister of Heath (Reproductive Health Alliance as Amicus Curiae),449 where the 
court stated that section 12(2) provides women with the constitutional right to 
terminate pregnancy. This section also entrenches freedom of choice, which is 
reinforced by the rights to life, dignity, privacy, and access to reproductive health 
care.450 It is also submitted that section 12(2) directly confronts the fact that women 
do not enjoy security in and control over their bodies, taking into account the high 
rates of sexual violence against women, and that the circumstances in which women 
become pregnant are often beyond their control.451 In this regard O’Sullivan 
contends that the Choice Acts plays the role of promoting a woman’s right to 
freedom and security of her body by affording her the right to choose to terminate 
her pregnancy safely. The woman concerned is in the best position to make that 
decision; only her consent is needed in terms of the Act.452   
 
f Pregnant children’s rights 
 
The rights contained in section 12(2) of the Constitution are held to be afforded to 
children as they are included in “everyone”. This would suggest that a pregnant child 
also has the constitutional right to bodily and psychological integrity, which includes 
the right to terminate her pregnancy. This was the position of the court in Christian 
Lawyers Association of South Africa v The Minister of Heath (Reproductive Health 
Alliance as Amicus Curiae),453 where the court held that the constitutional rights 
afforded in terms of section 12(2) (a) and (b) are afforded to “everyone”, including 
girls under the age of eighteen, and that the Choice Act allows a woman with the 
capacity to give informed consent to terminate her pregnancy.454 The right to 
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terminate a pregnancy stems from fundamental constitutional rights; it would be 
irrational to limit the exercise of that right based on the woman’s age.455 
 
g The right to privacy 
 
Section 14 of the Constitution provides that everyone has the right to privacy, which 
includes the right not to have the privacy of their communications infringed.456 
Meaning was given to privacy in Bernstein v Bester.457 In this case the court held 
that the right to privacy constitutes the protection of a person’s inner sanctum (family 
life, sexual preference and home environment) from erosion by the exercise of 
conflicting rights of the community.458 The court further held that privacy is based on 
the notion of what is necessary to have one’s own autonomous identity.459 Some 
authors, including O’Sullivam and McQuoid-Mason have attempted to give their 
understanding of the right to privacy. McQuoid-Mason, for instance, is of the view 
that the right to privacy is a substantive right which permits individuals to make 
decisions about their lives without state interference and empowers them to exercise 
control over procreation, contraception and child-rearing.460 For O’Sullivan, privacy is 
the right to be left alone.461 O’Sullivan is of the view that the right to privacy should 
be used in conjunction with equality rights, since relying on privacy rights in isolation 
introduces a number of negative aspects.462 In this regard she argues that it is easier 
to justify limiting a woman’s access to termination of pregnancy services on the 
grounds that the termination of pregnancy is considered to fall within the woman’s 
private sphere, thus removing a duty on the state to provide public funding or to 
intervene and protect women.463 
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h The right to dignity 
 
In terms of the section 10 of the Constitution, everyone has inherent dignity and the 
right to have their dignity respected and protected.464 The right to dignity has been a 
concern in a number of cases decided in South Africa. In each case, the court tried 
to explain the content of the right to dignity. In S v Makwanyane,465 for instance, the 
court described the right to dignity together with the right to life as the most important 
human rights. The court further held that entrenching a right to personal dignity is an 
acknowledgement that human beings are entitled to be treated as worthy of respect 
and concern.466  
 
The right to dignity was also at issue in the National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian 
Equality v Minister of Justice.467 In this case the court held that honouring someone’s 
dignity requires at the very least to acknowledge the value and worth of all 
individuals as members of society.468 The views of authors, including O’Sullivan and 
Woolman are important for this discussion. O’Sullivan points out that “denying a 
woman the freedom to make and act upon a decision concerning reproduction treats 
her as a means to an end and strips her of her dignity.469 Woolman goes even 
deeper and explains what should be done in order to ensure that a woman is not 
treated as a means to an end. According to Woolman, in terms of being an individual 
as an end in herself, women should not be treated as mere instrumental objects of 
the will of others. Dignity taken under this perspective sets a standard below which 
ethical and legal behaviour may not fall.470 Woolman observes that in Christian 
Lawyers Association of South Africa v The Minister of Heath (Reproductive Health 
Alliance as Amicus Curiae),471 and Christian Lawyers Association of South Africa v 
The Minister of Health,472 the court expressly recognised that the right to dignity 
summarises two definitions especially relevant to women in relation to reproductive 
                                                          
464
  Section 10 of the Constitution. 
465
  1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) 
466
  1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) 507 A-B. 
467
  1991 (1) SA 6 (CC) 
468
  1991 (1) SA 6 (CC) 28 D-E. 
469
  O’Sullivan in Woolman et al (eds) 37-23. 
470
  Woolman “Dignity” in Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional Law 36-9. 
471
  2005 (1) SA 509 (T). 
472
  1998 (4) SA 113 (T). 
123 
 
rights: “equal concern and equal respect” and “self-affectualisation”.473 According to 
Woolman “equal concern and equal respect” is primarily a negative option not to 
treat another merely as a means, but rather to recognise the moral autonomy that 
another person has.474 According to this approach dignity is a formal entitlement to 
equal concern and respect.475 With regard to self-affectualisation, women are entitled 
to respect since they hold the capacity to create meaning for them and pursue their 
own ends.476 
 
Reproductive rights were at issue in AB Surrogacy Advisory Group v Minister of 
Social Development (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae).477 In this case the first 
applicant was an infertile mother who desperately wanted to have a child using 
ARTs. It was established that with both her egg and her husband’s sperm, they failed 
to have a child after undergoing many IVF procedures. She divorced her husband 
and after that she underwent fourteen IVF cycles. She used eggs and sperm from 
unknown donors for fourteen of these proceedings, without any success. She then 
decided to try to use a surrogate mother for the purpose of carrying and giving birth 
to a child for her. Through the services of an organisation called “Baby 2 Mom”, she 
contacted a surrogate mother who agreed to act as a surrogate mother. However, 
she was advised by the Surrogacy Advisory Group that her plans would not work as 
section 294 of the Children’s Act does not allow a single person who is infertile in the 
sense that he or she cannot contribute his or her own gamete to use surrogacy as a 
means to have a child. She then decided to challenge the constitutional validity of 
the provisions of section 294 of the Children’s Act on the grounds that the genetic 
link requirement violates her rights to equality, dignity, reproductive health care, 
autonomy and privacy.  
 
At issue in the case is the constitutionality of section 294 of Children’s Act, which 
provides that “[n]o surrogate motherhood agreement is valid unless the conception of 
the child contemplated in the agreement is to be effected by the use of the gametes 
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of both commissioning parents or, if that is not possible due to biological, medical or 
other valid reasons, the gamete of at least one of the commissioning parents or, 
where the commissioning parent is a single person, the gamete of that person.” 
 
In support of her claim, the first applicant submitted that, although it is accepted that 
most people would prefer to use their own gametes in order to establish a genetic 
link with a child, there is no justification for the limitation of these rights on this basis 
and for the enforcement of such a preference on everyone in the context of 
surrogacy, especially where such a limitation does not exists in the context of IVF.478 
 
The court was of the view that no strong evidence was provided to support the 
allegation that the genetic link between a child and the commissioning single parent 
or its lack would have any effect on the best interests of the child in the context of 
surrogacy. In the words of the judge: 
 
“The court observed that it was not persuaded that the respondent has placed any 
persuasive and credible data before the court to show that the presence or absence 
of a genetic link between a parent and child in the context of surrogacy appears to 
have an adverse effect on the child’s psychological well-being”.479 
 
The court held that the purpose of regulating surrogacy in legislation was to allow 
commissioning parents, including a single parent, to have a child. This is also the 
purpose of the legislation in the IVF context. Requiring that a genetic link should 
exist between the parent(s) and the child in the context of surrogacy, while such a 
requirement is not set in the context of IVF, defeats the purpose and in the absence 
of a legitimate governmental purpose should be struck down.480 
 
The court then held that section 294 of Children’s Act is inconsistent with the 
Constitution. In this case, the court took into account the child’s psychological well-
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being, the state interests in regulating ARTs and the right of the commissioning 
parents to have a child, in order to determine whether the challenged section of the 
Children’s Act was consistent with the Constitution. The court found that it was in the 
interests of the commissioning parents that the state should make it possible for 
them to have a child through ARTs; the state has interests in regulating surrogacy 
and the use of IVF to make ART services available to those who for some reasons 
cannot reproduce naturally. Lastly it is in the best interests of the child that the 
means used to bring them into the world should not in the context of this case have 
adverse effects on their psychological well-being. 
 
The court concluded that the presence or absence of a genetic link between the 
parent(s) and child did not have adverse effects on resulting children, that it was only 
through surrogacy that the commissioning parents could have their child, and that it 
was this end that was the purpose for the state to regulate surrogacy. 
 
This case is one of leading examples of the way South African courts approach 
ARTs and interpret reproductive rights. From the reasoning of the court, it can be 
argued that through its decision the court seems to support the view that the judiciary 
and the legislature as well as the executive’s efforts in respect of ARTs should be to 
make sure that every person enjoys his or her reproductive rights to have a child. In 
addition, the court seems not to consider the child’s right to know his or her origins 
protected in international law,481 as being in the best interests of the child. 
 
It is important to note that not only women have their reproductive rights protected; 
Men also have reproductive rights and can claim it when they feel that those rights 
are not protected. Single men, gay couples, and men in heterosexual relationships 
cannot be denied their right to reproduce even in the case they must use assisted 
reproduction. The question that arises is what can be the scope of the reproductive 
rights? 
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4.3.2.1.2  The scope of the reproductive rights  
 
It is widely accepted that the right to have or not to have children is an important 
personal liberty. As a result, the state cannot restrict decisions about reproduction 
except in cases which could lead to serious harm. In this regard Robertson maintains 
that even persons with severe mental illness or retardation are protected against 
compulsory sterilisation or contraception.482 In South Africa, personal liberty is 
protected under the right to equality483 enshrined in the Bill of Rights. In terms of the 
Bill of Rights, equality is viewed as including the full and equal enjoyment of all rights 
and freedoms.484 To protect the right to equality, the Bill of Rights clearly states that 
the state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or 
more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or 
social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, 
culture, language and birth.485 It is this personal liberty that is referred to in this study 
as the parental procreative right. As discussed above,486 the procreative right is a 
right that is constitutionally protected. In terms of the South African Constitution, 
everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity, which includes the right 
to make decisions regarding reproduction. This would suggest that in South Africa, 
every mature person has the right to decide whether or not to reproduce or have 
children.  
 
However, the South African Constitution neither contains a provision that recognises 
the family as the basic unit of society nor does it provide that people have the right to 
freely marry and build families.487 A number of people in the world, including in South 
Africa, have used their right to procreate. These include infertile people, gay men 
and lesbian women who are not able to or choose not to reproduce naturally. They 
therefore have used ARTs to overcome infertility or achieve other reproductive goals. 
The right to procreate can be interpreted to include the use of ARTs and other 
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related procedures for the purposes of having children. The Children’s Act 
recognises ARTs as one of the means to reproduce.488 Proponents of the unlimited 
right to procreate, including Robertson, are of the view that this interest should 
presumptively be protected against limitation.489 In other words, no one should suffer 
any limitation of his or her right to procreate.  
 
However, the use of ARTs is associated with many risks, as was already indicated in 
chapter three.490 In addition, Robertson reports that the parents’ strong desire to 
reproduce sometimes causes them to decide to have children through ARTs even 
though they are informed that the resulting child will be born with physical defects or 
many other health challenges. They do so simply because ARTs are the only means 
for them to have children. In the words of Robertson:  
  
“People who reproduce have a strong interest in having healthy children, as do the 
ART providers who help make such births possible. In some cases, however, it may 
not be possible to guarantee a safe outcome. The techniques necessary to 
reproduce may carry inherent risks of physical defects or the social situation of the 
users may be less than ideal. In those situations, there may be no practical way to 
eliminate the risks of an unfavourable outcome and still enable the child to be born. 
The parents, however, may still wish to reproduce because it is the only way for them 
to have genetically related offspring whom they will rear or provide for” 491 
 
This situation where parents are allowed to bring into this world children who will 
suffer from congenital diseases because they are ARTs-born children, and because 
having to resort to ARTs is the only way for these parents to have genetically related 
children, raises the question whether such decision could be regarded as part of 
their procreative liberty. In other words, does the procreative right enshrined in the 
South African Constitution encompass the decision to bring forth children who will 
possibly have health problems or physical defects?  
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A second and similar question arises with the practice of genetic selection of 
offspring.492 Genetic selection refers to a situation where the prospective parents 
request that the future child should (or should not) have certain genetic 
characteristics.493 Genetic selection commonly arises in two situations. The first is 
when genetic tests are carried out during the pregnancy, with the assumption, or 
expectation, that certain genetic disorders (for example, Tay Sachs, Cystic Fibrosis, 
and sometimes also Down Syndrome) would lead to abortion.494 The second type of 
genetic selection takes place even before pregnancy, and it necessarily includes 
ART. In this scenario, the intended parents resort to IVF for reasons of either 
physical or social infertility (gay, lesbian, or single-parent) and subsequently use the 
technique of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) to screen for certain genetic 
characteristics. In this way, the intended parents (and doctors) can choose which 
embryos will be implanted in the womb.495 Historically, this screening was developed 
to address parental (as well as medical and societal) concerns, and was used to test 
for major genetic disorders and disabilities. PGD technology is increasingly used, 
however, for other reasons. These include sex selection (mainly on the basis of son 
preference) as well as attempts to create a child whose genetic tissue composition 
matches the one of an existing sick sibling for the purpose of being a cell donor 
(“tissue-matching sibling” or “saviour sibling”) and, presumably, also to answer 
parental requests for other traits that the future child will have (for example, height, 
hair colour or athletic potential).496  
 
The genetic selection of offspring raises the question whether this practice can be 
regarded as part of the parental procreative liberty and both situations (the choice to 
bring forth children knowing that they are likely to suffer from congenital diseases 
and the genetic selection of offspring) also raise the question to what extent these 
choices can conflict with the rights of the children, once born. 
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It is important to note that the two abovementioned scenarios give rise to two 
different questions that can be reformulated as follows: 
 
(a) Are the choice to bring forth children with the knowledge of their high 
probability of being born with some health problems and the selection of 
offspring within the parental right of reproduction?; and  
(b) If so, to what extent can these choices conflict with the rights of the ARTs-
born child? 
 
A better approach to the first question requires that the two aspects of the choice 
(choice to have children with physical defects and choice to proceed to the genetic 
selection of offspring) be addressed separately. 
 
With regard to the first aspect of the first question, it is important to remember that 
procreative or reproductive rights are ordinarily the rights against the state limiting or 
restricting an individual’s reproductive choices or efforts to obtain reproductive 
services from a willing provider. These rights do not impose on the state the 
obligation to provide the services or resources needed, nor do they obligate private 
individuals to provide access to services or resources that the provider chooses not 
to provide. Like all rights, they are not absolute, and can be restricted or limited for a 
good cause.497 Put differently, decisions regarding matters affecting family life such 
as whether or not to have children, with whom to have them and when and how to 
have them are considered as personal matters. This is so because such issues are 
intricately connected to human emotions and human nature. Therefore, these issues 
are considered as “private matters” that only the individuals involved may decide on 
freely and without any undue interference.498 The answer to this complex question 
requires the distinction between the interest that parents may have in choosing to 
use ARTs and bring forth a child even though there is a risk that the child may be 
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sick or disabled and their interest to choose a child with particular characteristics or 
sex. 
 
With regard to the first aspect of this question, Robertson suggests that procreative 
rights should give access to ARTs only if the procreative need is implicated.499 This 
would suggest that the parents who request to undergo ART procedures and run the 
risk of reproducinge a child with health problems must do so only if it is their only 
way of having children. In other words, if there is a reasonable need to have a 
genetically related child, then the prospective parents can use their procreative right 
and undergo ART procedures to have the child they need. In this regard, Robertson 
asks whether parents who are willing to use ARTs that risk leading to children with a 
greatly reduced quality of life are pursuing reproductive needs as commonly valued 
and understood, thus qualifying them for the special protection usually accorded to 
reproductive choice. Alternatively, a relevant question would be whether the 
contested use makes sense as a way to resolve an individual’s goals of producing 
viable genetically related offspring in the next generation.500  
 
Robertson further suggests that a relevant factor in assessing the reproductive 
interest of persons seeking to use ARTs that risk adverse effects on offspring welfare 
is whether they are committed to the well-being of the resulting child, and will rear 
and care for the resulting children just as parents who reproduce coitally do.501 In this 
regard, it can be argued that not all ARTs-born children are genetically linked to their 
parents; there are scenarios where the ARTs-born child is a result of donated 
gametes fertilised in a test tube and the embryo implanted in the womb of a woman 
who is not the mother who will rear the child. However, Robertson concludes that 
choosing to use ARTs and having children who are likely to be sick or disabled falls 
within the parental procreative liberty.502 This confirms that if the choice of parents to 
use ARTs in order to have a genetically related child can sometimes result in a child 
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with disability, that choice falls within their parental right of reproduction because 
parents commit themselves to rear and provide for such child. 
 
Mills shares this view. She observes that much of the discussion around 
reproductive liberty emphasises the importance of defending the free choice of 
parents against state coercion. This emphasis construes reproductive liberty as a 
negative freedom, wherein what is at issue is the non-impedance of or absence of 
interference in parental choice.503 She suggests that reproductive freedom can also 
be understood as a form of positive freedom, that is the freedom to “make oneself” 
according to various ethical and aesthetic principles or values. She goes on 
suggesting that reproductive liberty understood as negative freedom is inseparable 
from such a positive freedom.504 She then argues that attempts to place limitations 
on procreative liberty have to establish that reproductive technologies would cause a 
sufficiently high degree of harm to warrant impinging on the rights of parents to 
choose according to their own interests and values.505 Mills concludes as follows: 
 
“Recent changes in reproductive practices are such a problematisation of liberty; as 
individuals strive to enact self-formative ethical practices by shaping their lives in 
accordance with closely held values and principles, they illuminate the ways in which 
this dimension of being has presented itself to be thought. In doing so, they brought 
into contestation the nature and limits of freedom. Indeed, this contestation or 
‘agonism’ can be seen as an essential aspect of reproductive liberty as new practices 
such as the deliberate selection of traits in children, including deafness and disability, 
test the limits of parental freedom and responsibility”.506  
 
This would suggest that the ARTs-born child is a result of the exercise of parental 
rights which as such should not be limited. The view that the choice of using ARTs 
and reproducing a child with health problems falls within the parental procreative 
liberty, was subjected to criticism and rejection. Dillard rejects the view that 
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procreative liberty encompasses the choice of having a disabled child. He starts his 
argument by alleging that to procreate without restriction assumes a moral and legal 
interest to procreate freely, without being subject to law and without regard for 
others.507 He then suggests that the better approach to the procreative right is to 
determine what the procreative right consists of in the first place, rather than rushing 
to find a compelling state interest to justify derogating from the right, getting mired in 
the science and economics of sustainability, or relying exclusively on moral 
obligations owed to politically impotent future generations.508 Dillard views 
procreation in isolation, an act requiring its own justification and protection. Dillard 
argues that an act of procreation refers to any voluntary act taken by an individual 
that a proximate cause of the conception of a future person or persons, with such 
person or persons eventually being born.509 According to him individual persons 
engaging in sexual intercourse that results in the birth of a child, regardless of intent, 
will have procreated. A couple that enters into a surrogacy contract and bears no 
biological relationship to the resulting child, but whose acts might be considered the 
proximate cause of its conception and birth has arguably procreated. The relevant 
consideration is whether a person or persons have voluntarily acted to cause the 
creation of another being, and those actions have resulted in the birth of a child.510 In 
the words of Dillard  
 
“Despite the common assumption that there exists a vague, personal and broad (if 
not unlimited) procreative right, encompassing in its scope various distinct 
behaviours, that which can legally and morally be regarded as the valuable and 
protected procreative behavior is much more narrow. This is consistent with any 
theory of rights and of the public good, for the law must always define and balance 
behaviours to avoid conflicts. The right to procreate, correctly defined, is a right at 
least to replace oneself, and at most to procreate up to a point that optimizes the 
public good…. This satiable and narrow right is not arbitrary, but reflects specific 
competing rights and duties – especially the rights of prospective children – that both 
qualify and justify the right. While commentators, courts and even the U.S. Congress 
have in the abstract inflated the right as limitless in scope and even inviolable, in 
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those instances where the right has been tested in conflicts with other rights, it is 
invariably limited. This is consistent with the normative relation between law and 
procreation, and with intuitive limits on the right based on the limited intrinsic value of 
procreating, its interpersonal nature, and the specific competing rights and duties at 
issue – those of the prospective children and those of society.”511  
 
This means that the procreative right is not unlimited, and thus choosing to have 
children with congenital sicknesses or disabilities does not fall within the parental 
procreative right not only because this choice is in conflict with the rights of the child, 
but also because the resulting child is not procreated up to a point that optimises the 
public good. Steinbock also rejected the view that parents can choose a child even if 
the child will suffer from genetic diseases. According to him:  
 
“It is wrong to have children who cannot have minimally decent lives, although 
reasonable people can disagree about what constitutes a decent minimum. 
Furthermore, such judgments should be based on a realistic assessment of the facts, 
not stereotypical thinking. In particular, it is important to remember that people can 
have lives that are well worth living, despite disabling conditions or poverty. 
Nevertheless, there are times when procreation is wrong, even though no one is 
harmed or wronged by birth. To explain these cases, we need to supplement a 
morality of person-affecting reasons with a comparative impersonal principle: the 
principle of substitution.…. The morality of procreation, and the obligation to avoid 
procreation, is based in part on an objective assessment of the likely quality of the 
future child’s life, but also on the reasons, intentions and attitudes of those who would 
have children”.512 
 
This would suggest that deliberately choosing to have a child who will not have a 
decent life is not a choice that should be encouraged.  
 
With regard to the second aspect of the first question (genetic selection of offspring), 
it is important to note that opinions are also divergent. Opponents of the genetic 
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selection of offspring argue that this practice is beyond the parental right of 
reproduction. Some reasons were offered in support of this opinion. Davis, for 
instance, raises the concern of the commodification of the child as a result of the 
gamete manipulation. He also argues that such selection views the child as a means 
to an end, in contravention with the notion of inherent dignity and worth of the human 
person in himself or herself.513 According to Dolev and Shkedi, the selection of 
offspring can cause a possible destruction of the pre-embryo.514 For Thomas, 
selection creates a “situation in which babies have become consumer products, 
accessories to our lifestyle”.515 According to the Council of Europe, children have 
“rights-in-trust” that require the protection of adults (parents and others) for the 
child’s exercise of them later, in adulthood.516 The Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine allows only the performing of predictive genetic tests for medical 
purposes. This means that the predictive genetic test must be done only to detect a 
genetic disposition or susceptibility to a disease for health purposes and for some 
forms of treatment,517 but that predictive genetic tests that are done with the purpose 
of selecting a preferred sex for a child is prohibited.518 According to Mills the fact 
itself of causing the existence of a human being, is one of the most responsible 
actions in the range of human life. To undertake this responsibility, to bestow a life 
which may be either a curse or a blessing unless the being on whom it is to be 
bestowed will have at least the ordinary chances of a desirable existence, is a crime 
against that being.519 Martín argues that even if one were to accept that procreative 
liberty is a fundamental moral or legal right, no compelling reasons have been 
provided for believing that sex selection falls within the scope of procreative liberty. 
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Sex selection should be prohibited because it causes harm to the resulting child.520 
In short these scholars are of the view that the genetic selection of offspring is not 
part of the procreative right of the parents because of the above reasons. 
 
Another group of scholars argue that the practice is part of the parental right to 
reproduce. In support of this view, Robertson argues that if parents will not 
reproduce unless they can use sex selection, then the activity is constitutive of 
procreative liberty and therefore deserves a strong presumption against interference. 
Thus, for procreative liberty to implicate sex selection, the preference for a child of a 
particular sex cannot be simply a mere preference. It needs to be a necessary 
condition of a decision to have a child at all.521 Sparrow is also of the view that even 
if sex selection is intended to choose better genes for the future child, and despite 
the fact that it is admitted that a “best child” does not exist, parents still have “some” 
reason to choose genes that would be likely to increase the welfare of their 
children.522 
 
In short, according to the above opinions, prospective parents may use sex selection 
for the purpose of having a desired child; this choice falls within their procreative 
liberty because not only is it their preference and their only way of reproducing, but 
also because it increases the welfare of the resulting child.  
 
This discussion is intended to provide at least in part an answer to the question 
whether ARTs could serve the best interests of the child. Another part of the answer 
will be provided in the discussion related to the second question, which is to what 
extent ARTs contravene the rights of the child. 
 
With regard to this question, Blyth has noted that the key argument of the opponents 
of ARTs is that ART techniques are a form of child abuse. This argument has often 
been tied with the issue of the physical and mental risks that the procedures create. 
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The risks may be the result of the genetic selection of offspring and the gamete 
donor anonymity.523 Many scholars have commented in length on the child abuse 
issue. Marquardt, for instance, is of the view that the revolutions that have occurred 
in family structures and in the notion of who might be a parent, revolutions that owe 
at least a partial debt to ARTs, have created great uncertainties and vulnerabilities 
for ARTs-born children.524 The shifting boundaries from “natural parent” to “legal 
parent”; the possible separation between genetic, gestational and legal mother; the 
potential for nuclear families with a child created by three genetic contributors (that 
is, ooplasm transfer 3),525 or with more than two legal parents (so to formally include 
sperm and egg donors); and other such phenomena are arguably so detrimental to 
the child’s welfare that they reach the level of child abuse.526 The institution of 
parenthood is “core to children’s very survival” and its shattering shifts the very 
institution of parenthood so that its focus is now far more concerned with adults’ 
rights to children rather than “children’s needs for their mother and father”.527 
Scholars thus suggest that the creation of ART families should be prohibited on the 
basis of the child’s right to be protected from abuse.528 Beyond that, some have 
made an explicit comparison between the arguable harms to ARTs-born children and 
the practice of the “slave trade”,529 with others emphasising that ARTs should be 
seen as an “aggravated offense”, whereby the parents, as perpetrators, promote 
“their own interests at the cost of their children”.530 
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In short, these scholars suggest that because of the harm caused by ARTs to the 
resulting children, ARTs should be prohibited and regarded as child abuse. In 
response to this argument, Sabatello argued as follows: 
 
“Unless there is a clear indication in a given case for probable abuse by a parent 
(such as history of child abuse, addictive behaviour, and so on), a general argument 
that ARTs constitutes a form of child abuse should be rejected.”531  
 
The Committee on the Rights of the Child also supports this view. According to the 
Committee, ARTs are not listed among the practices that the Committee generally 
considers as violence against children, including physical and mental neglect.532 This 
would suggest that ARTs are not to be viewed as harming children and hence should 
be considered as part of the parental right to procreate. It should be noted that this 
view undermines the harm suffered by ARTs-born children and does not consider 
the child welfare as important for the child born as a result of the use of ARTs. 
 
It is clear that reproductive rights are very complex and seem to give a woman too 
much power on her reproduction by deciding whether or not to keep her pregnancy. 
Reproductive rights further give parents the right to bring about children who might 
suffer from several health problems. To some extent these rights appear to 
undermine the best interests of the child to be born. This raises the question of 
whether these rights can be limited in terms of section 36 of the Constitution. 
 
4.3.2.1.3 Limitation of reproductive rights 
 
Before analysing the limitation of reproductive rights it is important to briefly discuss 
how a fundamental constitutional right can be limited. 
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a Limitation of constitutional rights: General background 
 
According to section 8(1) of the Constitution, The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and 
binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of the state. In terms 
of section 36(1) the rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of 
general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an 
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking 
into account all relevant factors, including: 
 
(a) The nature of the right; 
 
(b) The importance of the purpose of the limitation;  
(c) The nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) The relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) Less restrictive means to achieve the purpose 
 
It appears from the provision of section 36 that two stages are required in the 
analysis of a constitutional right limitation. First there must a law or an action that is 
alleged to infringe the right enshrined in the Constitution. If it is established that the 
law or action infringes the right in question then the second stage is relevant. The 
second stage consists of analysing whether the infringement can be justifiable as a 
permissible limitation of the right. If it is established that the limitation is justifiable, it 
is important to also establish that the limitation is reasonable in an open and 
democratic society. In respect of the establishment of the reasonableness of the 
limitation, the court held in S v Meaker533 that it is not necessarily required that vast 
amounts of sources be provided to substantiate an argument brought before a court. 
A “common sense analysis” of the purpose and need for legislation and of the “social 
and economic” setting that gives rise to the legislation would be sufficient. In Phillips 
v Director of Public Prosecutions534 the requirement of reasonableness was held to 
mean that a law or action limiting a right must have a reasonable goal and also that 
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the means for achieving that goal must be reasonable. In S v Makwanyane535 the 
court gave more light on this issue. The court held as follows: 
 
“The limitation of constitutional rights for a purpose that is reasonable and necessary 
in a democratic society involves the weighing up of competing values and ultimately 
an assessment based on proportionality... The fact that different rights have different 
implications for democracy and, in the case of our Constitution, for “an open and 
democratic society based on freedom and equality”, means that there is no absolute 
standard which can be laid down for determining reasonableness and necessity. 
Principles can be established, but the application of those principles to particular 
circumstances can only be done on a case-by-case basis. This is inherent in the 
requirement of proportionality which calls for the balancing of different interests. In 
the balancing process the relevant considerations will include the nature of the right 
that is limited and its importance to an open and democratic society based on 
freedom and equality; the purpose for which the right is limited and the importance of 
that purpose to such a society; the extent of the limitation, its efficacy and, particularly 
where the limitation has to be necessary, whether the desired ends could reasonably 
be achieved through other means less damaging to the right in question”.  
 
In other cases, the court used a similar explanation. For instance in S v 
Manamela,536 the Court explained that in the test of reasonableness, the court does 
not have to adhere mechanically to a list of factors; rather it has to engage in a 
balancing exercise and arrive at a global judgment on proportionality. In Christian 
Education South Africa v Minister of Education,537 the court held in respect of 
reasonableness that as a general rule, the seriousness of the impact of the 
legislation on the alleged infringed right will determine how persuasive or compelling 
the justification of the infringement must be. In this process the question to be 
answered is one of degree, to be assessed in the concrete and legislative and social 
setting of the measure, paying due regard to the means which are realistically 
available in the country but without losing sight of the ultimate values to be protected. 
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This would suggest that the requirement of the reasonableness of the measure or 
law limiting the right needs to be seriously engaged with. It is not about merely going 
through a list of factors, rather it is about balancing those factors with regard to their 
proportionality in order to reach an acceptable judgment. In the process it is 
important to assess the impact of the law or the measure on the society in general 
taking into account the available means for the realisation of the right and not 
undermining the values to be protected. This being said the question is what law can 
limit the reproductive rights in terms of section 36 of the Constitution. 
 
b The Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996 and the limitation of 
reproductive rights. 
 
It is submitted that the Choice Act may at the same time promote and limit female 
reproductive rights, and that in the process of limiting reproductive rights, “foetal 
interests” in continued existence are the principal factor that is taken into account.538 
I mentioned in the first chapter of this thesis539 that there is a possible conflict of 
rights between children and their parents that can arise from the fact that parents 
who are using ARTs to reproduce are not doing so in the best interests of the child. I 
further mentioned that for the purpose of this study, that conflict must be resolved. In 
this regard, it is important to understand the context in which the conflict is 
happening and can be resolved. The discussion of the termination of pregnancy 
explains clearly the context in which parents exercise their right to reproduce by 
consenting to the termination of their pregnancy under certain circumstances. The 
discussion also makes clear how the Choice Act may in some circumstances limit 
the right of the mother to protect the rights of the child. The Choice Act therefore 
plays the role of enlighting this conflict in order to make clear the need of a balance 
of rights between parents and children which is viewed as a solution to that conflict. 
The discussion of the Choice Act is therefore important for the best understanding of 
the conflict of rights and the resolution thereof. Before engaging in an analysis of the 
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limitation of reproductive rights, it is important to understand what foetal interests 
are. 
 
It should be reminded that South African common law and constitutional law afford 
legal subjectivity at birth and requires that the child must be separated from the 
mother’s body and must survive independently of the mother after birth to be a legal 
subject.540 In other words, in terms of South African Law, a foetus or a viable unborn 
child is not viewed as a legal subject. 
 
It is submitted that although an unborn child does not have a legal subjectivity in 
South African law, it at least has benefits of continued existence up to live birth. 
Those benefits in continued existence are referred to as foetal interests. This term is 
preferred to foetal rights because foetal rights implies that the foetus is a beneficiary 
of constitutional rights, which is not the case as it is clear in South African common 
and constitutional law.541 Foetal interests were at issue in Christian Lawyers 
Association of South Africa v The Minister of Health542 when the Choice Act was 
under the scrutiny of the Constitution. In this case the complainant asked the court to 
declare unconstitutional the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act in light of 
section 11 of the Constitution. In terms of section 11 of the constitution, everyone 
has the right to life. The complainant argued that the Choice Act, which allows a 
woman to terminate her pregnancy, violated the right to life of the unborn child. 
 
An exception was raised on the grounds that there is no cause of action, since a 
foetus is not a bearer of constitutional rights in terms of section 11 of the 
Constitution, and that the relevant section does not preclude the termination of a 
pregnancy in the circumstances contemplated by the Choice Act.  
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The court held that it was concerned with determining whether the word “everyone” 
included a foetus.543 In other words, the question before the court was whether a 
foetus is bearer of constitutional rights. In this respect, the court held that there are 
no express legal provisions affording a foetus legal personality or protection.544 The 
court further observed that in terms of section 12(2) of the Constitution everyone has 
the right to make decisions concerning reproduction, and the court found that 
nowhere in the Constitution is it provided that this right is qualified in order to protect 
a foetus.545 The court concluded in this regard that this consideration does not 
restrict the state from enacting legislation that limits the terminations of 
pregnancies.546 The court went on to argue that the drafters of the Constitution did 
not intend to protect a foetus; if that was their intention section 28 would clearly be 
stated in the way that clearly includes the rights of the foetus.547 The court then 
determined that age begins at birth and therefore excluded the foetus from the 
provisions of section 28 because a foetus is not a child of any age. The court stated 
that if section 28 does not include the foetus in the ambit of its protection, it would be 
hard to say that other provisions of the Bill of Rights, including section 11, were 
intended to protect a foetus.548 The court further held that if section 11 were to be 
interpreted as affording constitutional protection to a foetus, far-reaching inconsistent 
consequences would ensue.549 These would include the fact that the foetus would 
enjoy the same protection as the pregnant woman, and this would result in 
termination of pregnancies being constitutionally prohibited even when the 
pregnancy poses serious threats to the woman’s life or where there is a likelihood 
that the foetus will suffer from serious mental or physical defects after birth, or when 
the pregnancy is the result of rape or incest.550 The court then held that the drafters 
of the Constitution could not have contemplated such far-reaching results without 
expressing themselves in no uncertain terms.551 The court concluded that the 
Constitution is primarily based on egality, and that transformation of society has to 
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be founded on the constitutional meaning of egality. Therefore, discrimination on the 
grounds of race, gender, class and other grounds of inequality have to be eliminated. 
Similarly as in the case a quo, the court is required to consider women’s 
constitutional rights. The High Court Court then declared the Choice on Termination 
of Pregnancy Act constitutional.552 
 
It is clear that the court reached this conclusion based on the reasoning that the 
foetus is not the bearer of rights and therefore cannot benefit from constitutional 
protection. However, seven years later, in Christian Lawyers Association of South 
Africa v The Minister of Heath (Reproductive Health Alliance as Amicus Curiae),553 
the court found that the right to terminate the pregnancy is not an absolute right, 
since the state considers prenatal life an important value in society. In other words, 
reproductive rights in general and the right to terminate a pregnancy in particular can 
be limited in terms of section 36 of the Constitution.  
 
In view of the fact that prenatal life is an important value in South African society, the 
court emphasised that the state has to play an important role in the protection of 
prenatal life by regulating and limiting women’s access to termination-of-pregnancy 
services.554 However, the court held that because the right itself is derived from the 
Constitution, the regulation thereof by the state may amount to the denial of that 
right. Similarly, any limitation of this right constitutes a limitation of a woman’s 
fundamental rights and is therefore valid only to the extent that such limitation is 
justifiable,555 in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality 
and freedom.556 
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As stated above, a law of general application can limit a right enshrined in the Bill of 
Rights.557 The question that arises here is whether the Choice Act is a law of general 
application. Van der Vyver pointed out that a law of general application reflects a 
broad definition of law, including limitations sanctioned by statutory provisions and 
common law.558 Of course, the Choice Act complies with this definition of the law of 
general application. It was also indicated that the law of general application must 
infringe on the right enshrined in the constitution. In this respect it is important to see 
if any provision of the Choice on Termination Act infringes on the reproductive rights 
in general and the right to make decision on reproduction in particular. The relevant 
provisions of the Choice on Termination Act in this regard can be found in section 2, 
which sets out the circumstances and conditions that allow for the termination of the 
pregnancy. In terms of section 2 of the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act, a 
pregnancy may be terminated upon the request of a woman during the first twelve 
weeks of gestation;559 from the thirteenth week up to and including the twentieth 
week of gestation a pregnancy may be terminated only when a woman has 
consulted a medical practitioner and that medical practitioner is of the opinion that 
the continued pregnancy would pose a risk that the foetus would suffer from severe 
physical or mental abnormity that the pregnancy is a result of rape or incest, or that 
the continued pregnancy will severely affect a woman’s social or economic 
circumstances;560 a pregnancy that has reached the twenty first week of gestation 
may be terminated if a medical practitioner, after consulting with another medical 
practitioner or alternatively a qualified and registered midwife is of the opinion that 
the continued pregnancy will endanger woman’s life, will result in severe 
malformation of the foetus, or will pose a risk of injury to the foetus.561 
 
A close and thorough look at these provisions reveals two things; first although it is 
permitted for a woman to terminate a pregnancy in respect of the exercise of her 
reproductive rights, a pregnancy may not be terminated in all circumstances. Second 
some conditions must be met for the termination of the pregnancy to take place. 
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With regard to the circumstances under which a pregnancy may be terminated, it is 
clearly provided in section 2 of the Choice Act that in any circumstances that do not 
fall within the ambit of section 2, no pregnancy may be terminated. One may think 
about circumstances in which the continued pregnancy beyond the twentieth week of 
gestation does not pose any risks such as endangering a woman’s life, causing 
severe malformation of the foetus, or posing a risk of injury to the foetus. In those 
circumstances a woman, even though she wishes to terminate her pregnancy, will be 
prohibited by the law to do so. 
 
As far as the conditions under which a pregnancy may be terminated are concerned, 
it is important to note that in spite of her desire to terminate her pregnancy, a woman 
is required to comply with compelling conditions. For a pregnancy that is up to twelve 
weeks, it is required that the woman must give her informed consent,562 and that 
consent will be enough for the termination of her pregnancy.563 However, her 
consent alone is not sufficient when the pregnancy reaches thirteen to twenty weeks 
of gestation. At this stage the law requires that the woman consults a medical 
practitioner who must give his or her opinion regarding the termination of the 
pregnancy.564 The termination will take place only if the medical practitioner is 
convinced that the continued pregnancy would pose a risk of injury to the woman’s 
physical or mental health, there is a substantial risk that the foetus would suffer from 
a severe physical or mental abnormality, resulted from rape or incest, or would 
significantly affect the woman’s social or economic circumstances.565  
 
The conditions become even more stringent when the pregnancy reaches twenty 
one weeks. At this stage, not only is the consent of the woman not enough; the 
opinion of one medical practitioner will not suffice to decide about the termination of 
the pregnancy. The medical practitioner is required by the Choice Act to consult with 
a second medical practitioner or a registered midwife before making any decision as 
whether to proceed or not with the termination of the pregnancy. It should be noted 
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that the decision will be dependent on the risks to which the woman or the foetus are 
exposed if the pregnancy were allowed to continue.566 Again here the termination will 
take place only if the medical practitioner is, after consultation with another medical 
practitioner or a registered midwife, of the opinion that the continued pregnancy 
would endanger the woman’s life, result in a severe malformation of the foetus, or 
pose a risk of injury to the foetus.567  
 
From the discussion above it is clear that the reproductive rights of a woman, in 
particular her right to terminate her pregnancy is progressively limited by the age and 
the circumstances of her pregnancy. She can enjoy her right to terminate her 
pregnancy only in conditions and circumstances contained in the Choice Act. In this 
sense, the Choice Act limits the reproductive rights enshrined in the Constitution. 
 
Since it is established that there is a limitation of reproductive rights, it is important to 
ask whether this limitation is reasonable. In this respect, it must be demonstrated 
that the Choice Act has a reasonable goal in limiting a woman’s reproductive rights 
and the means to achieve that goal must also be reasonable. In other words, the 
requirement of reasonableness implies that we proceed to the weighing up of values 
or an assessment based on proportionality. This means that we need to proceed to a 
balancing of the different interests at issue. In the process we must take into account 
some factors, such as the nature of the right that is limited and its importance in a 
democratic society based on freedom and equality; the purpose of the limitation, its 
efficacy and particularly where the limitation is necessary, whether the desired ends 
can be reasonably achieved through other means less demanding to the right in 
question.568   
 
In short this would suggest that the interests of the woman to terminate her 
pregnancy and the interests for the unborn child to reach live birth must be balanced. 
In this balancing process we need to identify the nature of right that is limited; the 
importance of the purpose of the limitation; the nature and extent of the limitation; the 
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relation between the limitation and its purpose; and whether the end can be achieved 
through less restrictive means. It is therefore important to proceed to the balancing 
exercise for the case at hand. 
 
The nature of the right that is limited 
 
The Choice Act limits reproductive rights in general and the woman’s right to 
terminate her pregnancy in particular. The limitation here is relevant in the 
circumstances and conditions that fall outside the scope of the provisions of section 
2 of the Choice Act. The right to terminate a pregnancy is a very important right that 
is included in the right to make decisions concerning reproduction enshrined in 
section 12(2) of the Bill of Rights. Currie and De Waal point out that the inclusion of 
this right in the Bill of Rights serves as recognition that the power to make decisions 
about reproduction is a crucial aspect of control over one’s body.569 This 
constitutional right is reinforced by various other rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights, 
including the right to inherent dignity and to have one’s dignity respected and 
protected, the right to privacy, and the right to have access to reproductive health 
care.570 A strong basis for the right to the termination of pregnancy is provided by the 
cumulative effect of the specific provision in section 12(2)(a) as reinforced by other 
constitutional rights.571 
 
With regard to the nature of this right, it is clear from a proper reading of section 
12(2) that what this right entails is decisions concerning reproduction.572 This right 
imposes a duty on the state to make available termination of pregnancy services. 
This right helps save a woman’s life and protects a woman from health problems 
when the pregnancy is associated with some risks for her and for the foetus. 
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The importance of the purpose of the limitation 
 
The purpose of the limitation of the right to terminate a pregnancy is to save the life 
of the unborn child where the pregnancy does not in any way constitute a threat to 
the life and health of the woman or child. The question that may arise here is 
whether society has any interests in protecting the interests of unborn children. 
Based on the analysis of a number of authors, it can be argued that society has an 
interest in protecting the interests of unborn children.  
 
It is necessary to keep in mind that state interests in the unborn child were at issue in 
Christian Lawyers Association of South Africa v The Minister of Health,573 as 
discussed above. In respect of the court’s decision in this case that a foetus was not 
a bearer of constitutional rights, Meyerson pointed out that, although a foetus is not a 
bearer of constitutional rights, there are foetal interests that may have to be taken 
into account, in this way ensuring the continued existence of the unborn child.574 
Meyerson went on to say that if the state did not have interests in protecting unborn 
children, it would pass laws permitting late terminations of pregnancies for any 
reason whatsoever right up to the moment of birth.575 The state would also permit 
the creation of embryos for research purposes and authorise experimentation on 
them long past the point at which it is generally believed that such experimentation is 
acceptable.576 Women could be paid to terminate their pregnancies in order to 
ensure a ready supply of cadaver foetal brain tissue, which is valuable in the 
treatment of disease.577 The court’s “rights bearer approach” in the case of 
termination of pregnancy was challenged and an alternative approach is suggested 
by Dworkin. With regard to the arguments about termination of the pregnancy, 
Dworkin suggests that the reasoning should not revolve around the argument that 
the foetus should not be protected because it is not a bearer of constitutional rights, 
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but rather around the argument that some value of life and the potential for human 
life should be attached to the foetus.578  
 
In this regard O’Sullivan observes that the interests of the state in potential life 
derives from the state’s interests in protecting the sanctity of human life, therefore 
justifying the regulation of termination laws on grounds that are independent of the 
rights-bearing capacity of the foetus itself.579 Finally the life of an unborn child was 
held to be an important value in society, and that value is so important that it is 
deemed to limit a woman’s access to termination of pregnancy services.580 
 
Less restrictive means to achieve the purpose 
 
In this process the end is to have the unborn child born alive in the circumstances 
and conditions where the continuation of the pregnancy would cause no harm to the 
mother or child. The question that arises here is whether this end can reasonably be 
reached through for instance other means that are less demanding for the right to 
terminate a pregnancy. In other words is there a way to allow a pregnant woman to 
terminate her pregnancy and still have the aborted child being born alive? 
Unfortunately in this case there is no way that such thing can happen; the only way 
to have the child born alive is to allow the continuation of the pregnancy to a live 
birth. 
 
The justification of the limitation 
 
The last stage in the process is to assess whether the limitation is justifiable in an 
open and democratic society. In other words, the question is whether allowing an 
unborn child to be born alive to the detriment of its mother’s right to terminate her 
pregnancy can be justifiable in South Africa.  
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The limitation of the woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy and other rights 
afforded to women can be justified in terms of the constitutional values enshrined in 
sections 1, 7(2), 36(1) and 39(1) and (2) of the Constitution. Human dignity, the 
achievement of equality, and the advancement of rights and freedoms are viewed in 
the Constitution as some of the specific values that the Republic of South Africa is 
founded on. Further, the Bill of Rights affirms the democratic values of human 
dignity, equality and freedom, and thus any limitations of rights contained in the Bill 
of Rights must be reasonable and justifiable in the light of the founding values. 
These founding values also play a central role when interpreting the Bill of Rights 
and legislation, or when developing the common and customary law.581 According to 
Meyerson, even if no human rights are protected prior to birth, it is necessary to 
consider whether or not the value of human dignity might function as a constitutional 
limitation on the legislation that governs the termination of pregnancies.582  
 
In this regard Woolman emphasises that the value of dignity can be invoked in three 
types of cases: where the value of dignity guides the interpretation of the right and by 
doing so shapes the ambit of the right; where the value of dignity can be used to 
justify the limitation of a right; and where the value of dignity can be used in cases 
where the Bill of Rights does not directly apply to the circumstances and, in this 
case, the value of dignity will inform the development of the common law or the 
interpretation of the statute.583 For Meyerson a foetus is not merely tissue, 
comparable to something like an appendix; it is rather a living organism, whose 
destruction is not a morally unimportant matter. Meyerson maintains that whoever 
proceeds to the destruction of the foetus should regret proceeding to such an 
immoral act.584 Meyerson goes on to say that in the process of the termination of a 
pregnancy, it is the value of human dignity that is under threat, because it is hard to 
deny that the destruction of foetal life, although it violates no constitutionally 
protected subject’s right to life, undermines human dignity.585 
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The decision taken by a woman to exercise her right to terminate her pregnancy is in 
opposition to the foetal interests to continued existence, since a successful 
termination terminates a foetal life.586 Even though a foetus is not a bearer of 
constitutional rights, as potential human being, a foetus is vested with intrinsic worth 
and finds worthiness in the constitutional value of dignity. This value of dignity is a 
reasonable ground for the state to limit female reproductive rights in terms of the 
Choice Act.  
 
From the above discussion, it can be argued that the limitation of the right to 
terminate a pregnancy is justifiable in an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom.  
 
4.3.2.2  Constitutional provisions relevant to the protection of the child 
 
4.3.2.2.1 General 
 
A number of constitutional provisions are relevant for the protection of the child. 
However, for the purpose of this study a particular focus is put on a few provisions, 
including sections 11, 12, and 28 of the Constitution. In terms of section 11, 
everyone has the right to life.587 Section 12 of the Constitution provides that 
everyone has the right to freedom and security of the person, which includes the 
right to be free from all forms of violence from either public or private sources.588 The 
Constitution is silent with regard to the meaning of violence in this section. However, 
the meaning of violence can be found in the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(Convention) which South Africa has ratified. In terms of article 19 paragraph 1 of the 
Convention violence includes all forms of physical and mental violence, injury, 
abuse, neglect, maltreatment or exploitation including sexual abuse. Although the 
Children’s Act does not clearly define violence, it nevertheless defines some of the 
behaviours listed in the Convention as constituting violence. The Children’s Act 
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provides that abuse in relation to a child means all forms of harm or ill-treatment 
deliberately inflicted on a child and includes: 
 
(a) Assaulting a child or inflicting any other form of deliberate injury to a child; 
(b) Sexually abusing a child or allowing a child to be sexually abused; 
(c) Bullying by another child; 
(d) A labour practice that exploits a child; or 
(e) Exposing or subjecting a child to behavior that may harm the child 
psychologically or emotionally.589 
 
In the context of the Children’s Act, it can thus be argued that child violence means 
in part the abuse of the child which in turn means all forms of harm and ill-treatement 
deliberately inflicted on a child. As it is clearly discussed above,590 children born as a 
result of ARTs are exposed to some forms of harm before and after their birth. 
 
In terms of section 28 of the Constitution, a child’s best interests are of paramount 
importance in any matter concerning the child.591 Although the child’s best interests 
are introduced in the Constitution, the Constitution does not say much about them 
apart from insisting that they must be of paramount importance in every matter 
concerning the child. It is therefore important to understand the possible meaning of 
the best interests of the child, how the Constitutional Court has interpreted the best 
interests of the child and what the possible application of the best interests of the 
child criterion can be. 
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4.3.2.2.2  Possible meaning of the child’s best interests 
 
The best understanding of the best interests of the child requires the analysis of how 
the best interests of the child has been used in matters that concerned children in 
South Africa. It is also important to the end of understanding the child’s best interests 
to analyse how different writers have analysed this concept. A child’s best interests 
may play various roles in the matters that involve the child. Bonthuys, relying on the 
findings of Friedman and Pantazis, states that the best interests of the child may be 
used firstly as an aid to interpret the other rights in section 28 of the Constitution, 
secondly to determine the scope of other fundamental rights and thirdly as a 
fundamental right in itself.592 For the court, the best interests of the child can be used 
as a constitutional value, similar to the values of dignity, equality and freedom in 
section 7(1) of the Bill of Rights or as a rule of law, similar to the provisions relating 
to compensation for the expropriation of property (s 25(3)) and the rights of arrested 
and detained persons to be brought before a court (s 35(1)(d)) It is also possible that 
the best interests principle may be used as a “general guideline” with a meaning and 
content identical to that in common law.593 
 
Friedman and Pantazis, analysing section 28(2) of the Constitution, pointed out that 
section 28(2) appears to be aimed at addressing the defencelessness of children, 
and ensuring that their rights do not frequently have to give way to the rights of 
others. According to them, section 28(2) implies that in every matter where a child’s 
rights are (substantially) involved, those interests must be considered.594 
 
Heaton has also commented on what should be understood by the best interests of 
the child and has suggested a particular approach towards the concept of the best 
interests of the child. To this end, Heaton identifies some problems inherent to the 
concept of the best interests of the child. Heaton points out that the child’s best 
interests have a potential conflict. She argues that the best interests of the child can 
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in several cases conflict with the interests of other people involved including parents, 
the state or society.595 She further observes that the concept “best interests of the 
child” does not and cannot have a fixed meaning and content that are valid for all 
communities and in all circumstances. This would suggest the fact that the child’s 
best interests cannot have a comprehensive definition and is therefore 
indeterminate. However, Heaton maintains the indeterminacy of the best interests of 
the child does not preclude its application.596 
 
With regard to the application of the best interests of the child, Heaton suggests that 
the approach towards this concept should always be flexible. She further asserts that 
the best interests of the child should not be defined in an exhaustive way. According 
to her the best interests of the child should be used as a tool that can help reach a 
decision in a particular case.597 This would suggest that what is deemed in the best 
interests of the child in case A is not necessarily in the best interests of the child in 
case B. It is therefore clear that in Heaton’s opinion, the meaning and the content of 
the best interests of the child may vary with the case under examination. In respect 
of the fact that the determination of the best interests of the child should vary with the 
case, Heaton suggests that an individualised, contextualised and child-centred 
approach to the best interests of the child should be followed. However, she 
emphasises that in approaching the best interests of the child in such a way, the 
interests of other people involved should not necessarily give way to the child’s 
interests. In Heaton’s words: 
 
“In view of the wording of section 28(2) of the Constitution and the pronouncements 
of the Constitutional Court, one can conclude that it is no longer acceptable 
uncritically to apply general rules, presumptions or preferences, unquestioningly to 
rely on social theories and norms or historical, political or economic factors, to invoke 
the cultural and religious values of only one segment of the South African society, or 
to use personal prejudice or opinion when applying the concept of ‘the best interests 
of the child’. What is required is an individualised and contextualised evaluation of 
the position of each child from the point of view of how each factor affects the child. 
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All factors that are shown to be relevant because they have, or could have, a 
negative or positive impact on the individual child should be taken into account in a 
contextualised, child-centred way “without unduly obliterating other valuable and 
constitutionally-protected interests”.598 
 
It is clear from the above discussion that the child’s best interests enshrined in the 
Bill of Rights can be interpreted in various ways. For the purpose of this thesis, it is 
important to note that the child’s best interests are a criterion or a standard that 
needs to be applied to all matters involving the child. It is therefore interesting to 
analyse how the Constitutional Court has interpreted the child’s best interests.  
 
The constitutional protection of the best interests of the child is the result of the 
country’s obligation to give effect to ratified international instruments. In order to give 
effect to section 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child discussed above,599 
two Acts were passed in South Africa, namely the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996 and the Children’s Act. 
   
In terms of section 28(2) of the Constitution, a child’s best interests are of paramount 
importance in all matters concerning the child. The Children’s Act gives effect to 
section 28(2) of the Constitution and this is made clear in the objectives of the Act. In 
fact, according to section 2 of the Act, the objectives of the Act are: 
 
(a) To promote the preservation and strengthening of families; 
(b) To give effect to the following constitutional rights of children: 
(i) Family care or parental care or appropriate care when removed 
from the family environment; 
(ii) Social services; 
(iii) Protection from maltreatment, neglect, abuse and degradation; 
and  
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(iv) That the best interests of the child are of paramount importance 
in every matter concerning the child 
(c) To give effect to the Republic’s obligations concerning the well-being of 
children in terms of international instruments binding on the Republic; 
(d) To make provision for structures, services and means for promoting and 
monitoring the sound physical, psychological, intellectual, emotional and 
social development of children; 
(e) To strengthen and develop community structures which can assist in 
providing care and protection for children; 
(f) To protect children from discrimination, exploitation and any other 
physical, emotional or moral harm or hazards; 
(g) To provide care and protection to children who are in need of care and 
protection; 
(h) To recognise the special needs that children with disabilities may have; 
and 
(i) Generally, to promote, the protection, development and well-being of 
children. 
 
The Children’s Act also provides a list of factors that must be taken into account 
when a provision of the Act requires the best interests of the child. Section 7(1) of 
Children’s Act reads as follows: 
 
Whenever a provision of this Act requires the best interests of the child standard to 
be applied, the following factors must be taken into consideration where relevant, 
namely: 
 
(a) The nature of the personal relationship between- 
(i) The child and the parents, or any specific parent; and 
(ii) The child and any other care-giver or person relevant in those 
circumstances, 
(b) The attitude of the parents, or any specific parent, towards- 
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(i) The child; and  
(ii) The exercise of parental responsibilities and rights in respect of the 
child; 
(c) The capacity of the parents, or any specific parent or of any other care-
giver or person; to provide for the needs of child, including emotional 
and intellectual needs. 
(d) The likely effects on the child of any change in the child’s 
circumstances, including the likely effect on the child of any separation 
from  
(i) Both or either of the parents; or 
(ii) Any brother or sister or other child, or any other care-giver or a 
person with whom the child has been living; 
(e) The practical difficulty and expense of a child having contact with the 
parents, or any specific parent, and whether that difficulty or expense 
will substantially affect the child’s rights to maintain personal relations 
and direct contact with parents, or any specific parent on regular basis. 
(f) The need for the child- 
(i) To remain in the care of his or her parents, family and extended 
family; and 
(ii) To maintain connection with his or her parents, family, extended 
family, culture or tradition; 
(g) The child’s 
(i) age, maturity and stage of development; 
(ii) gender; 
(iii) background, and 
(iv) any other relevant characteristics of the child. 
(h) The child’s physical and emotional security and his or her intellectual, 
emotional and cultural development; 
(i) Any disability that a child may have 
(j) Any chronic illness from which the child may suffer; 
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(k) The need for the child to be brought up within stable environment and, 
where this is not possible, in an environment resembling as closely as 
possible to a caring family; 
(l) The need to protect the child from any physical or psychological harm 
that may be caused by 
(i) Subjecting the child to maltreatment, abuse, neglect, exploitation or 
degradation or exposing the child to violence or exploitation or other 
harmful behaviour; or  
(ii) Exposing the child to maltreatment, abuse, degradation, ill 
treatment, violence or harmful behaviour towards another person; 
(m)  Any violence involving the child or family member of child; and  
(n) Which action or decision would avoid or minimise further legal or 
administrative proceedings in relation to the child. 
 
Section 28(2) of the Constitution has been interpreted in various ways by 
researchers and the Constitutional Court. Bonthuys, for example, provides a survey 
of the South African courts’ application of the best interests of the child. According to 
her, there is confusion and disagreement in courts about the best interests of the 
child. Courts, including the Constitutional Court, are not certain whether the best 
interests of the child is a rule, a right or a principle. She argues that the best interests 
of the child is more often used to articulate parental rights and interests or to cover 
up the fact that the fundamental constitutional rights of the child have not received 
proper consideration. She suggests that the best interests of the child principle 
should not be used to mediate the rights of other family members, but to compel the 
full and proper consideration of the constitutional rights of children alongside the 
rights of other family members.600  
 
For Davel, the best interests of the child is both a right, a specific children’s right 
protected in the Constitution, and a standard against which conduct must be 
measured. As a right, the best interests of the child is not an absolute right. It is 
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limited by the Constitution and has to be demarcated from the rights of others. As a 
standard, the best interests necessitates full knowledge of all the facts and the 
circumstances of the case.601 
 
The Constitutional Court has in some cases given guidance on the application of the 
best interests of the child. In S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae),602 for 
instance, the court provided clear guidance on how to apply the paramountcy 
principle. The court confirmed that the best interests principle can be limited and 
cannot assume dominance over other people’s constitutional rights.603 The court 
stated that “s 28(2), read with s 28(1), establishes a set of children’s rights that 
courts are obliged to enforce”.604 The court added that statutes must be interpreted 
and common law developed in a manner which favours protecting and advancing the 
interests of children, and that the courts must function in a manner which at all times 
shows due respect for children’s rights.605  
 
In another case, Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen,606 the court contended that the lesbian 
lifestyle was not in the best interests of the child and subjected the contact of a 
lesbian mother with her children to a number of conditions. In that case, a lesbian 
mother approached the court to obtain contact rights to her son and daughter after 
being separated from them. On behalf of the court, Flemming DJP held that the 
mother may have the freedom of choosing her sexual orientation and enjoy her 
lifestyle, but that the children’s best interests could be put at risk if children were to 
be exposed to their mother’s lesbian relationship. 
 
In the efforts of protecting the best interests of the children and at the same time the 
right of the mother to contact to her children, Flemming afforded the mother contact 
rights to her children but subjected that contact to a number of conditions, including 
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the exclusion of the mother’s lesbian partner fom her bedroom when children spend 
time with their mother. The mother was further ordered not to allow the children to 
access lesbian videos or photographs or any other items confirming homosexuality.  
 
This case highlights the conflict of rights that may arise between parents and their 
children. The court’s decision in this case connotes the view that living in a home 
headed by two mothers without a father, even for a very short time, would have 
adverse effects on children’s development and would not be in their best interests. 
 
In a similar case, the court reached a different decision and contended that regarding 
a homosexual lifestyle as abnormal would violate homosexual individuals’ right to 
equality. In V v V,607 homosexual parents arranged to have joint care of their children 
for approximately two years prior to their divorce. Upon the divorce, the father asked 
for care of children, and that the mother would have supervisory contact that she 
could exercise only in the father’s home. 
 
The court examined the goodness and fitness of the woman and found that she was 
a good and fit mother and held that it would not be fair to her and her children to 
force her to have contact with the children in her ex-husband’s home. On behalf of 
the Court, Foxcroft J held that describing homosexuality as abnormal violates the 
equality clause and that considering a lesbian home as less suitable than any other 
home was not justifiable. Foxcroft further held that Flemming’s order preventing 
lesbian couple from living a normal life by sharing a bedroom, showing love for one 
another and using personal and communal items in their home in the presence of 
their children was manifestely inconsistent with the Constitution. 
 
The court’s decision in this case connotes the view that it is in the best interests of 
the child to be under the care of his or her father and mother even if one of the 
parents is homosexual. This is made clear in the court’s maintaining of joint care 
after divorce against the wishes of the father. Unlike the decision in the Van Rooyen 
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case, the court’s decision in V v V connotes the view that the lesbian lifestyle should 
not give way to the child’s best interests. This case once again stresses the conflict 
that may exist between the interests of parents and their children. 
 
In Minister for Welfare and Population Development v Fitzpatrick,608 Goldstone J 
held as follows: 
 
“Section 28(2) requires that best interests have paramount importance in every 
matter concerning the child. The plain meaning of the words clearly indicates that the 
reach of s 28(2) cannot be limited to the rights enumerated in s 28(1) and s 28(2) 
must be interpreted to extend beyond those provisions. It creates a right that is 
independent of those specified in s 28(1).”609 
 
From the different views expressed above it seems that the best interests of the child 
enshrined in international and domestic instruments are a right to which children are 
entitled, and a principle or standard or criterion that must be considered in all matters 
concerning the child. The best interests of the child criterion do not assume the 
dominance or the neglect of other persons involved in the case where these interests 
apply. This would suggest that these interests are limited and not absolute. Although 
the interpretation of these interests must be done in a manner that protects the rights 
of children, this must be done in respect of the circumstances of the particular case.  
 
4.4 INTERIM CONCLUSION 
 
Although the family is an important institution and the fundamental unit of every 
society in the world, it has not received the same protection at international and 
domestic level. 
 
International law provides specific protection to the family and family members. 
Various international instruments clearly emphasise the value accorded to the family. 
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Most of international instruments contain a clear recognition of the family as the 
natural and fundamental unit of society. Several provisions of those instruments also 
clearly afford protection to individual members of the family. While some of those 
provisions protect the rights of individuals who wish to become parents, including the 
right to marry and found a family; other relate to the protection of children, including 
their right to life and to be free from violence as well as the child’s best interests. 
 
The South African perspective to the family is peculiar. The South African 
Constitution neither expressly recognises the family as a fundamental unit of the 
society, nor does it contain any provision protecting family life. The Constitutional 
Court justifies this lack of a constitutional protection of the family on the ground that 
South Africa is multicultural society. However, the court has emphasised the 
significance of marriage for South African people. This would suggest that the family 
and the family life are safeguarded through the protection afforded to marriage in 
South Africa. 
 
Although the South African Constitution does not expressly protect the family and 
family life, several constitutional provisions seem to protect the rights of family 
members. For instance, the reproductive rights of every mature person are 
guaranteed in the Constitution. This group of rights relates to people who can 
become parents. The South African Constitution also protects several rights afforded 
to children. These include the child’s right to life, the right to be free from all forms of 
violence and their best interests. 
 
It appears that the parents’ reproductive rights could sometimes be in opposition with 
the best interests of the child. This fact explains the state interest in limiting a 
woman’s reproductive rights through the regulation of the right to terminate her 
pregnancy. A foetal interest to a continued life was brought to the fore in the process 
of balancing different interests in presence, namely the interests of the woman in 
terminating her pregnancy, the state interests in protecting the value of the dignity of 
the unborn child, and the foetal interests to a continued life. The engangement in 
such a process demonstrates the way the court has applied the child’s best interests 
in the matter concerning a mother’s decision to terminate her pregnancy. This would 
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suggest that best interests of the child criterion can also be applied to the child born 
or to be born as a result of the use of ARTs. The question that might arise is how the 
best interests can be used to regulate ARTs? The next three chapters will attempt to 
provide an answer to this pertinent question, with reference to the legal positions in 
South Africa, the USA, and Australia.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
HOMOSEXUAL FAMILIES IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
5.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Homosexuality is a reality in South Africa. It was reported that sangomas610 engage 
in sexual relationships with other women. This reality is known as ancestral 
marriages in which sangomas have secret homosexual relationships with ancestral 
wives. The secrecy around this phenomenon is so deep that many believed that 
homosexuality did not exist in South Africa.611 Homosexuality or having sexual 
relations with a partner of the same sex was regarded as a non-procreative sex 
activity, and punished as a criminal offence under the apartheid regime.612 As 
Thoreson pointed out, under the apartheid law, although homosexual practices were 
prohibited, people could nevertheless be branded homosexuals. In the words of 
Thoreson: 
 
“While homosexual acts in private [were], in effect, of no legal consequence, the 
behaviours associated with homosexual practices, such as sodomy, ‘unnatural’ 
sexual acts including masturbation, and acts designed to promote ‘homosexual 
behaviour’ [were] proscribed. It was legal to be labelled as homosexual, but illegal to 
engage in homosexual practices”.613   
 
The advent of the South African democratic Constitution has provoked many socio-
political changes, which include the legal recognition of homosexual families. Some 
of those changes are discussed in this chapter. The chapter begins with a discussion 
of the emergence of homosexual families before analysing the legal recognition of 
those families and the model for their recognition. Procreation within those families 
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and the status of the child born and growing up in those families will be analysed as 
well. The chapter will also discuss parental responsibilities and rights and the best 
interests of the child in those families. In the different parts of the discussion, the 
chapter will have a look at what happened under the apartheid regime and what is 
happening under the democratic constitutional dispensation. 
 
5.2 THE EMERGENCE OF HOMOSEXUAL FAMILIES 
 
Homosexual families emerged from homosexual marriage, adoption and procreation. 
Homosexual individuals, single or married, can adopt children or procreate in the 
context of their homosexual lifestyle and build their families as it was stated in 
previous chapters.614  
 
While homosexual reproduction in South Africa will be discussed later in this chapter, 
it is important to consider how marriage was conceived in South Africa and how from 
this conception emerged homosexual marriage and families. 
 
5.2.1 The concept of marriage in South Africa 
 
A good understanding of marriage as it stands in South Africa today requires a look 
at how marriage was conceived under the apartheid regime and how it evolved and 
underwent changes to become what it is today under the democratic constitutional 
dispensation. 
 
5.2.1.1 The concept of marriage under the apartheid regime   
 
To a substantial extent, the concept of marriage as it existed under the apartheid 
regime reflected the position in canon law and Roman-Dutch law.615 Canon law had 
many sources including the Bible, the writings of the church fathers, Justinian’s 
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codification of the Corpus Iuris, the canons of the church councils and the decretals 
of the popes.616 According to the church, marriage was highly valued by God; 
therefore the Lord Jesus Christ raised marriage to the rank of a sacrament.617 
Marriage as conceived by the church was possible only between baptised persons. 
This would suggest that people engaged in the sacrament of marriage must be 
Christians. A sacrament can be understood as an outward sign instituted by Christ to 
give grace. The outward sign here means the mutual external manifestation of 
internal consent by the two parties to the marriage contract. The contract of marriage 
was thus a sacrament,618 a status instituted by God himself. Robinson pointed out 
that marriage status connoted a natural relationship whose ends and essential 
properties were determined by natural law. These ends and properties could not be 
changed by human legislation, either civil or ecclesiastical, or by the consent of the 
parties involved. The most important goal of marriage as instituted by God was 
procreation and the rearing of children.619 
 
Marriage as conceived under the apartheid regime was hence a divine institution, a 
contract between baptised persons with the ultimate goal of procreation. The 
apartheid regime’s definition of marriage seems to be borrowed from the Bible. 
According to the Bible, marriage is a relationship between one man and one 
woman.620  
 
Marriage under the apartheid regime can therefore be characterised as heterosexual 
and monogamous. In other words, the union between one man and one woman was 
the only accepted and legally protected form of marriage. The other characteristic 
that can be drawn from the conception of marriage as discussed above is its 
procreative goal. To procreate and rear children were thus seen as the primary 
purpose of marriage. This would suggest that if people enter into a relationship that 
has not as its purpose the procreation and rearing of children, that relationship could 
not be considered a marriage. 
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The conception of marriage as heterosexual and monogamous for the purpose of 
procreation and the rearing of children as it existed in Roman-Dutch Law was 
received into South African apartheid law. In addition to Roman-Dutch texts, which 
contained the definition of marriage as a union between one man and one woman, 
South African courts also often referred to the English Court decision in Hyde v Hyde 
and Woodmansee,621 where the court held that marriage as understood in 
Christendom, may be defined as the voluntary union for life of one man and one 
woman to the exclusion of all others. The marriage law of that period was prescribed 
in the Political Ordinance of 1580 and the perpetual Edict of 154. Both these 
instruments reflected the philosophies of the reformation and to some extent 
secularised marriage law.622 
 
As a consequence of this conception of marriage, homosexual practices were 
proscribed and punished. In fact, sexual acts between adults, whether homosexual 
or heterosexual, were criminalised if not directed towards procreation. These include 
male-female sodomy, bestiality and male to male intercourse which were viewed as 
“crimes against nature”. These crimes were punishable by the death penalty.623  
 
In Cameron’s opinion, the conception of crimes against nature was narrow.624 
Crimes against nature were so narrowly conceived that even masturbation, whether 
solitary or assisted, could fall under it. Masturbation was thus considered a 
“punishable misuse of the organs of procreation”.625 This view was confirmed in 
1967, when a two-judge court in the Eastern Cape held that mutual masturbation 
between two men is criminal as an “unnatural offence”.626 
 
To summarise, under the apartheid regime, marriage was regarded as having been 
instituted by God, it was heterosexual and monogamous, and all sexual acts within 
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marriage were primarily directed at procreation and child-rearing. Any other sexual 
activity that was not directed towards procreation was criminalised. It is in this 
context that the Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957 rendered it a criminal offence for 
any male person to commit any act calculated to stimulate sexual passion or give 
sexual gratification with another male person at a party.627 The penalty prescribed for 
this criminal offence was a maximum fine of R4000 or two years’ imprisonment.628 A 
party is defined in this Act as any occasion where more than two persons are 
present.629 
 
It is worth noting that although the heterosexual and monogamous form of marriage 
was open to all population groups irrespective of race, nationality or religion, the law 
was, however, out of step with the fundamental views held by some groups from 
different cultural and religious backgrounds. Customary, Muslim and Hindu marriage, 
for instance, were neither recognised nor protected at that period.630 
 
It is important to understand that marriage as conceived under the apartheid regime 
was associated with legal rights and obligations; it was regarded as the foundation of 
society, a fixed traditional structure essential for the raising of children and a healthy 
family. In spite of this uniquely privileged status that marriage has in fact enjoyed 
under the apartheid regime, the institution of marriage underwent significant changes 
in the post-apartheid period.631 
 
5.2.1.2 The concept of marriage under the constitutional dispensation 
 
The democratic constitutional dispensation that came into force in 1994 radically 
departed from the apartheid regime era where Christianity and the world-view of the 
Afrikaners prevailed.632 It also impacted on legal development in South Africa. The 
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golden rule of the new constitutional dispensation is constituted by the equal 
protection and non-discrimination provisions within the Constitution.633  
 
In 1996, the South African government approved the new Constitution. In addition to 
ending de jure apartheid, it was the first constitution in the world to protect the rights 
of homosexual individuals. Legislators made history by writing sexual orientation into 
the national non-discrimination clause, guaranteeing gay rights in the supreme law of 
the land.634 With the new constitutional dispensation, South Africa became “an open 
democratic society” as it was stated in S v Solberg,635 where the Court held as 
follows: 
 
“South Africa is an open and democratic society with a non-sectarian state that 
guarantees freedom of worship; it is respectful of, and accommodatory towards, 
rather than hostile to or walled-off from, religion; acknowledges the multi-faith and 
multi-belief nature of the country; does not favour one religious creed or doctrinal 
truth above another; accepts the intensely personal nature of individual conscience 
and affirms the intrinsically voluntary and non-coerced character of belief; respects 
the rights of non-believers; and does not impose orthodoxies of thought or require 
conformity of conduct in terms of any particular world-view. The Constitution, then, is 
very much about the acknowledgement by the State of different belief systems and 
their accommodation within a non-hierarchical framework of equality and non-
discrimination.” 
 
This would suggest that the new constitutional dispensation brought changes in the 
sense of recognising the rights of those who were marginalised under the apartheid 
regime. Those changes also affected the institution of marriage. The Recognition of 
Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 and the recognition of homosexual 
relationships in the Civil Union Act are the proof of a change that was brought about 
in public policy on the essential values of the common law description of marriage, 
namely the exclusive nature of the marriage relationship and sex.636 All the changes 
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that occurred to the institution of marriage are the result of a homosexual liberation 
movement for the recognition of the rights of homosexual people in South Africa 
which started under apartheid regime. 
 
5.3 THE HOMOSEXUAL LIBERATION STRUGGLE 
 
The homosexual liberation struggle refers to gay and lesbian movements that led to 
the recognition of the rights of homosexual individuals in South Africa. As already 
stated above, these movements started during the apartheid era, but did not have 
significant results. However, under the democratic Constitution, gays and lesbians 
obtained the recognition of their rights essentially through litigation and legislation. 
 
5.3.1 The homosexual liberation struggle under the apartheid regime 
 
Under the apartheid regime, and prior to the late 1980s, there was little indication of 
a gay rights struggle in South Africa. Some intermittent mobilisation occurred, but it 
was limited in both scope and effect, and the tendency was to group people of the 
same race.637 The apartheid regime period can be characterised by two major 
historical indicators that motivated the homosexual struggle in the context of South 
Africa.638  
 
The first indicator is “the Raid in the Forest”, which took place in a suburb in the 
north of Johannesburg. The raid took place in 1966, when the police raided and 
arrested nine men for “masquerading as women”. This Raid was followed by a 
persistent parliamentary threat to extend anti-homosexual legislation.639 In opposition 
to this threat, the Homosexual Law Reform Movement emerged in 1968. The sole 
aim of the movement was to prevent a proposed antigay Bill from becoming law.640 
The movement actually protested a proposed change to the apartheid government’s 
Immorality Act 5 of 1927, which pursued the criminalisation of homosexuality, 
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making it an offence punishable by compulsory imprisonment of up to three years.641 
Members of the movement were gay professionals, led by a well-known gay 
advocate, whose task was to raise the funds needed to retain a firm of attorneys to 
prepare evidence and lead the case against the proposed anti-homosexual 
discrimination.642 To the satisfaction of the movement, the proposed legislation was 
dropped, and that served at least temporarily to stimulate into activity the gay 
subculture in South Africa. However, the movement did not attempt to link up with 
the broader opposition to apartheid.643 In other words, the gay movement did not 
expand its struggle to opposing the injustice and discrimination that prevailed under 
the apartheid era, rather the movement focused only on fighting for the recognition of 
gay and lesbian rights. 
 
The second indicator is “South Africa’s Stonewall”. This occurred when 
Johannesburg police raided New Mandy’s bars in the late 1970s.644 In fact, 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s a gay subculture bloomed in the form of supper 
clubs, bars, gay-owned businesses and a gay newspaper such as EXIT, which 
devoted itself to club reviews.645 The raid of New Mandy’s bars led patrons of those 
bars who were homosexuals to fight back and request their civil rights to be 
protected.646 
 
The homosexual liberation struggle under the apartheid regime was also 
characterised by the formation of gay and lesbian organisations in some areas of 
South Africa. These include the rich history of “moffee” in the coloured communities 
of the Western Cape.647 Homosexual behaviours became more evident in other 
subcultures as well. Lesbian sangomas are one of the examples. Also, much 
attention was focused on male homosexual activity that occurred in South Africa’s 
mining communities. The 1990s also saw an emerging gay scene in the townships 
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that is said to have its roots in the generalised youth rebellion of 1976 and the mid-
1980s.648 
 
The apartheid government was hostile to any form of homosexuality. The situation of 
severe repression of homosexual conduct that prevailed during the apartheid period 
led homosexual people to organise themselves and fight for their rights. It is in this 
context that some gay and lesbians organisations were formed throughout the 
country. The first national gay organisation in South Africa was formed in 1982 in 
Johannesburg: the Gay Association of South Africa (GASA). Although few black gay 
men were members of GASA, the primary purpose of GASA was to be a social 
meeting platform for white, middle-class gay men. Its mission was apolitical. GASA 
was committed to avoid politics, and to provide a non-militant, non-political answer to 
gay needs.649 The focus of GASA thus seemed to be on white gays’ interests only. 
GASA’s sole focus on white gays’ interests became a fact in 1986, when GASA 
failed to support one of its few black members, Simon Nkoli, who was being put on 
trial for treason because of his role in the anti-apartheid struggle. This GASA racial 
behaviour not only caused it to be disrespected by gays and lesbians in South Africa 
committed to the anti-apartheid struggle, but the issue also captured the attention of 
the international gay community.650 In 1986 and 1987, GASA’s racism became the 
central point of discussion at annual meetings of the International Lesbian and Gay 
Alliance (ILGA).651 In 1986, ILGA’s membership envisaged to expel GASA as a racist 
organisation. This intention forced Kevan Botha, the national Secretary of GASA, to 
appear at the meeting in Copenhagen to defend his organisation. In his defence, he 
justified GASA’s failure to support Nkoli by the apolitical nature of GASA. He argued 
as follows:  
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“GASA is a support organisation without political aspirations; and because of GASA’s 
‘non-political, non-militant, non-sectarian’ nature we cannot begin to enter any debate 
on political structures or ideologies, neither in our own country’s nor in any others”.652 
 
Botha went on to deny GASA’s racism and its failure to engage in the opposition of 
apartheid discrimination, stated that GASA opposed the policy of apartheid, and 
mentioned various ways in which the organisation served and involved gay South 
Africans of all races. He also reprimanded ILGA for singling out South Africa when 
so few gay liberation organisations or movements in the world, including ILGA, were 
racially representative.653 
 
The defence of Botha at the ILGA conference provoked many reactions from black 
gay men within the organisation. The year following Botha’s defence, Siphiwe 
Machela, a black gay man from South Africa, appeared before ILGA and criticised 
the international body for remaining unsupportive of the anti-apartheid struggle in 
South Africa. He characterised the gay community in South Africa as deeply divided 
into two camps: a white camp interested in gay social activities only, and a black 
camp which puts its weight behind all movements that are truly committed to the 
liberation of all South Africans. On that occasion, he challenged Botha’s speech to 
ILGA the previous year as inaccurate and misleading, and concluded that GASA 
does not represent the entire gay movement in South Africa. He declared that his 
organisation was not part of GASA and could not be represented by GASA without a 
proper mandate. This resulted in the official expulsion of GASA from the International 
Gay and Lesbian Alliance in 1987.654 
 
From that time on, all gay and lesbian organisations existing in South Africa linked 
their struggle to the political and social context that was prevailing in South Africa. In 
1988, another organisation, with predominantly black members, the Gays and 
Lesbians of the Witwatersrand (GLOW), was formed under the leadership of Simon 
Nkoli. GLOW became an advocate of gay people’s political demands, and its 
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predominantly black membership not only attested to the fact that homosexuality 
was not simply a white issue, but also linked the gay struggle to the broader anti-
apartheid struggle.655 
 
Nkoli’s work began to legitimise gay rights in the African community and among 
future African policymakers. Nkoli was found guilty in the Delmas Treason trial of 
1986, and he was imprisoned for four years with future African National Congress 
(ANC) leaders. His detention as an anti-apartheid activist who was homosexual was 
highly publicised and this influenced political leaders to begin to change social 
attitudes regarding the position of gays and lesbians in South African society. This 
also caused Nkoli to become well-known.656 In this regard, Edwin Cameron, judge of 
the Constitutional Court, described Nkoli as the first openly gay anti-apartheid 
activist. With a racial heritage shared by those who suffered most under apartheid, 
he successfully linked the gay and lesbian rights struggle with the struggle against 
racism in South Africa.657 At that period, many ANC members who had been exiled 
during the apartheid regime and educated in Western European nations with 
democratic constitutions and national gay rights movements, returned to South 
Africa from their exile and their opinions were converted toward viewing sexual 
orientation as an issue of equality. At the same time, another influential organisation, 
the Organization of Lesbian and Gay Activists (OLGA) came into existence in Cape 
Town. OLGA’s members were predominantly middle-class white intellectuals, many 
of whom had unblemished anti-apartheid credentials. OLGA’s membership was 
disappointed with the apolitical stance of GASA and committed itself to opposing 
state repression broadly and to a close alliance with the United Democratic Front 
(UDF), an umbrella opposition organisation aligned to the ANC.658  
 
The year 1990 marked a turning point in South Africa’s gay rights movement. The 
lifting of the ban on the ANC, the release of former president Nelson Mandela from 
prison, and the beginning of negotiations for a transfer of power from the National 
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Party to a Government of National Unity are the important events that characterised 
that year. Gay activists began to lobby the ANC to recognise gay and lesbian rights 
in South Africa. However, there was opposition within the ANC, much of which took 
the form of characterising gays as a fringe group, or gay issues as marginal to the 
overall struggle for national liberation. Ruth Mompati, an ANC executive committee 
member, for example, regarded homosexuality as abnormal, and gays as a wealthy 
and privileged group not in need of rights. This internal opposition was balanced by 
the return of many leaders from exile in Western Europe and North America with a 
greater awareness of and sensitivity to the issue of gay liberation; and was also 
countered by groups such as GLOW who opposed the argument that gay liberation 
should not be linked to the national liberation.659 In this regard Patrick Noome stated 
the following:  
 
“In South Africa, gay liberation is charged with distracting from the struggle for a 
democratic non-racial future. The same charge used to be levelled at the women’s 
movement. Both have subsequently proved that our struggle against oppression can 
enhance, not divide the offensive. GLOW, like the women’s movement, believes that 
none will be free until all are free”.660 
 
In 1992, the ANC formally recognised gay rights and agreed to include in its Bill of 
Rights a prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The 
Democratic Party and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) followed suit. The following 
year, multiparty negotiations began for the purpose of drafting an interim Constitution 
(Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993).661 
 
In summary, during the apartheid era, a few organisations were formed to fight for 
gay rights recognition in South Africa. Some of those organisations had an apolitical 
nature and others a racial nature. Because they had the view that the struggle had to 
be linked to the liberation of not only gay and lesbians, but the liberation of the entire 
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nation from the discrimination and injustice of the apartheid regime, the existing 
organisations started fighting towards ending the apartheid regime. Although their 
struggle did not make significant changes towards the recognition of homosexual 
rights in South Africa, it nevertheless laid the foundation for what was materialised 
with the advent of the democracy in South Africa. 
 
5.3.2 The homosexual liberation struggle under the new constitutional 
 dispensation 
 
There is a third indicator in the homosexual liberation struggle: the adoption of the 
new Constitution, the first in Africa to recognise homosexuals’ rights. One of the 
victories of gay activists, it is argued, was the insertion of sexual orientation in the 
interim Constitution as protected ground for non-discrimination.662 This victory urged 
forty three gay and lesbian organisations countrywide to come together and form the 
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality (NCGLE) in 1994. NCGLE was 
determined to lead a campaign against gay discrimination in South Africa. To this 
end, the coalition hired a full-time lobbyist to act on its behalf, and drew upon the 
legal experience and credentials of white attorneys and activists and upon the 
experience and anti-apartheid credentials of many black activists to formulate and 
implement an impressive lobbying campaign. Their campaign was ultimately 
successful, and South Africa’s final Constitution, now considered one of the most 
progressive in the world, includes an equality clause that specifically prohibits unfair 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.663 The equality clause protects South 
Africans from unfair discrimination, and reads as follows: 
 
“The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one 
or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or 
social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, 
culture, language, and birth”.664  
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In short, the post-apartheid era is essentially characterised by the coming into force 
of the democratic Constitution and the coalition of all existing homosexual 
organisations with the sole purpose of fighting and ending the apartheid regime’s 
discrimination. It can be argued that this process culminated in the insertion of the 
equality clause in the Constitution. Gay activists used the equality clause in the 
judicial process to have their rights (including their right to marry and build families) 
recognised in South Africa. The judicial process that led to the recognition of gay 
rights is discussed in the next section. 
 
5.4 THE LEGAL RECOGNITION OF HOMOSEXUAL MARRIAGE AND 
 FAMILIES IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
The institution of marriage holds particular importance for many societies, including 
South Africa. Pierre De Vos, describing marriage, points out that marriage is of the 
utmost importance to South African people. In his words: 
 
“The institution of marriage remains of pivotal importance to most South Africans. 
This is because marriage remains the focal point for the legal protection and 
regulation of the interests of individuals who are engaged in intimate relations. 
Marriage is the only legal institution that comprehensively safeguards the rights of 
individuals involved in intimate relationships. It is also one of the most powerful 
symbols of societal acceptance and belonging in many parts of the world, including in 
multi-ethnic, culturally diverse South Africa.”665  
 
The legal position of the government towards marriage was not the same under the 
apartheid regime and in the post-apartheid era.  
 
5.4.1 The legal position during the apartheid era 
 
The apartheid government protected only marriage between one man and one 
woman as it was discussed in the previous section. All other forms of intimate 
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relationships, including homosexual relationships, were of no legal effect.666 Given 
the particular importance of marriage in South Africa, individuals in South Africa who 
experienced sexual desire for members of their own sex and who formed 
relationships based at least in part on such desire, increasingly requested the legal 
and social recognition of their relationships. Given that those individuals were also 
raising children, they also demanded the social and legal recognition of their parental 
roles.667 
 
This would suggest that people engaged in homosexual relationships would like 
society to recognise and treat them like married people and families. However, this 
was far from being the intention of the apartheid regime. The apartheid social and 
legal system did not protect minority sexual inclinations, that is, sexual preferences 
of gays, lesbians and transsexuals.668 Although homosexuality was becoming more 
visible in the big cities of the country, it was severely repressed under the apartheid 
regime. In fact, as Santos points out, the apartheid regime viewed homosexuality as 
a danger and imposed an intensive repression of the practice. In the words of 
Santos: 
 
“The emergence of a growing gay sub-culture in big South-African cities, associated 
with the increasing visibility of places frequented by homosexuals, blew the whistle 
and caught the attention of the National Party, whose high command saw 
homosexuality as a threat to South African civilisation. To make sure the country 
would not have the same destiny as Rome or Esparta, the falls of which were 
intimately associated with the dissemination of homosexuality, in 1968 the party 
imposed a major repression of homosexuality”.669 
 
The major repression of homosexuality was done through a legislative and judicial 
process. With regard to the legislative process, several apartheid statutes 
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criminalised homosexuality. Homosexual conduct formed the basis of a variety of 
criminal offences. The early Roman criminal law expressly prohibited “unnatural 
practices” between men and in the Roman-Dutch common law a large number of 
sexual acts between adults, whether between men or between a man and a woman, 
were criminal, if not directed towards procreation.670 A category of “unnatural 
offences” was created with the sole purpose of criminalising homosexuality and was 
often used to punish homosexual conduct which did not involve sodomy.671 In its 
agenda to impose repression on homosexuality, the apartheid government proposed 
an act amending the Immorality Act in 1968. The Immorality Amendment Act 57 of 
1969 increased the regulation of sex between men in several ways, while also 
adjusting sexual offences by men with girls, via amendments to the Immorality 
Act.672 In an attempt to oppose medical developments permitting sex change 
operations, the legislature amended the Births, Marriages and Deaths Registration 
Act  81 of 1963 in 1974 by inserting section 7B into the Act. This section allowed the 
alteration, in the birth register, of the description of the sex of a person who had 
undergone a change of sex. This Act was replaced by the Births and Deaths 
Registration Act 51 of 1992. However, it is important to note that even while section 
7B was still in force; it had no effect on the marriage of a person who had undergone 
sexual reassignment surgery.673 This would suggest that a person who had 
undergone sexual reassignment or sex change surgery was considered a man or a 
woman if he or she was a man or a woman respectively before surgery. 
Consequently, a man who had undergone the surgery and became a woman is 
regarded by law as a man and could in no circumstances marry another man. The 
repression against homosexuality continued with the amendment of the existent 
statutes. In 1988 Parliament extended the existing prohibition on “immoral or 
indecent” acts between men and boys under 19 to those between women and girls 
under 19.674 It is important to note that the most important amendment relating to sex 
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between men became section 20A of the Immorality Act.675 This section stated as 
follows: 
 
“1. A male person who commits with another male person at a party an act which is 
calculated to stimulate sexual passion or to give sexual gratification shall be guilty of 
an offence; 
2. For the purposes of subsection (1) ‘a party’ means any occasion where more than 
two persons are present. […]” 
 
The sentence for individuals involved in same-sex relationships was made clear in 
the law. People found guilty of homosexual relationships could face punishment by 
being locked up for two years in prison.676 
 
Another tool used in the repression imposed on homosexuality under the apartheid 
regime was the judicial process. It is clear from a number of court decisions that 
homosexuality during the apartheid regime was a criminal offence. In S v V,677 for 
example, the court held that mutual masturbation between two men is criminal as an 
“unnatural offence”. In another case, W v W,678 the court refused to entertain a 
divorce action where one of the parties to the marriage was a transsexual. With 
reference to the English case of Corbett v Corbett,679 the court held that a person 
who had undergone a sex change operation did not change her biological sex, and 
could not, therefore, marry someone of her original sex (irrespective of her physical 
appearance or gender role in society).680 Similarly, in Simms v Simms, 681 the court 
confirmed that a person who had undergone a sexual reassignment remains the 
same person irrespective of the sex change. In this case, the husband sought to 
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have his marriage annulled on the ground that his wife, who had undergone sexual 
reassignment surgery prior to the marriage, was at all times male. The court 
declared the marriage null and void. 
 
In summary, in terms of the recognition of homosexual relationships, the apartheid 
era was characterised by: 
 
 The denial of protection for gays and lesbians; 
 The non-recognition and disrespect of homosexual relationships;  
 The criminalisation and severe punishment of homosexual conduct or behaviour 
or acts;682 and 
 The monogamous and heterosexual nature of marriage.683 
 
In the late 1980s, a vibrant movement within and outside of South Africa that was 
opposing apartheid sexual regulations grew visible by targeting the leading 
organisations in the struggle, the ANC in exile and the United Democratic Front 
(UDF) inside the country. As a result amongst others of the participation of these 
parties in the constitution-writing process, sexual minorities were included in chapter 
two of the Constitution.684 This inclusion is the starting point for the legal recognition 
of homosexual rights in the post-apartheid era. 
 
5.4.2 The recognition of homosexual relationships in the post-apartheid era 
 
The post-apartheid era is mainly characterised by the adoption of the democratic 
Constitution of 1996, which is the starting point of the new constitutional dispensation 
in South Africa. The South African Constitution has received international praise for 
explicitly prohibiting any discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and the 
provision related to this prohibition has formed the basis for strategic litigation by the 
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organised lesbian and gay movement.685 The legislative prohibitions and exclusions 
of homosexual relationships which were characterised by the criminalisation of 
sodomy; the exclusion of lesbian and gay partners from their partners’ medical aid 
benefits; their exclusion from the immigration benefits extended to foreign spouses of 
South African citizens, from partners’ pension and insurance benefits, and from 
receiving compensation from the Road Accident Fund for the death of their partners; 
and the inability of gay and lesbian couples jointly to adopt children or to be each 
other’s intestate heirs, were gradually challenged before the court and found 
inconsistent with the Constitution. The judicial process culminated in a successful 
constitutional challenge to the common-law definition of marriage and the provisions 
of the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 which excluded homosexual couples from 
marrying.686 
 
As already stated above, the South African Constitution was a starting point for these 
changes.687 According to Nielsen and Van Heerden, the advent of democracy in 
South Africa marked a new era. In their words: 
 
“With the introduction of a constitutional democracy in 1994, South Africa entered a 
new era characterised by values, such as respect for the dignity and privacy of all its 
citizens, a principled commitment to equality, recognition of the diversity of different 
groups in our heterogeneous society and, last but not least, a particular emphasis on 
the most vulnerable groups in society within the ambit of constitutional protection; 
South Africa became the first country ever to include sexual orientation in its anti-
discriminatory provisions”.688  
 
This would suggest that the Constitution extended its protection to all South Africans 
by introducing provisions explicitly aimed at prohibiting any form of discrimination. In 
this regard, unfair discrimination based on marital status and sexual orientation was 
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also prohibited. These provisions have led to the legal rights of lesbians and gay 
men becoming the subject of considerable judicial, political and legislative activity.689 
 
South Africa legalised homosexual marriages by way of the Civil Union Act 17 of 
2006.690 When the Civil Union Act was adopted, it was received as a relatively clear 
victory for the lesbian and gay community as a whole. Same-sex relationships were 
incorporated into a structure which is marriage-like.691 The incorporation of 
homosexual relationships in the Civil Union Act is the result of constitutional 
prohibition of any discrimination based on the ground of sexual orientation. 
 
According to Jivan, legal issues relating to sexual orientation have arisen in two 
contexts: first the prohibition of discrimination, primarily to ensure that individual 
lesbians and gay men are not discriminated against; and second the recognition of 
homosexual relationships, and the extension to homosexual partners of the benefits 
and rights that are accorded to heterosexual partners.692  
 
With regard to the prohibition of discrimination, several judicial decisions dealing with 
legal challenges against allegedly discriminatory laws have clarified the legal position 
of lesbians and gay men and have served as a focus for the political debate about 
homosexuality and, in some instances, have provided a framework for legislative 
reforms. These reforms have evidenced a move away from “condemnation” towards 
homosexuality to “compassion and recognition”.693  
 
In a series of cases, the Constitutional Court of South Africa progressively dealt with 
unfair discrimination based on sexual orientation and recognised the rights of 
homosexual persons, including their right to marry. The first case in which the court 
dealt with the issue of discrimination based on sexual orientation was National 
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Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice.694 In this case, the court 
overturned the sodomy law in South Africa. The case dealt with the confirmation of 
an order made by the Witwatersrand Local Division, as it was then called. The 
Witwatersrand Local Division had granted an order declaring unconstitutional and 
invalid the common-law offence of sodomy and certain statutory provisions which 
prohibited and criminalised sexual conduct between consenting male adults.695  
 
Commenting on equality, Ackermann J emphasised that it is the impact of the 
discrimination on the complainant or the members of the affected group that is the 
determining factor.696 He continued by saying that the desire for equality does not 
consist in the elimination of all differences but requires an understanding of “the 
other” in society. Discriminatory prohibitions on sexual relations between men 
reinforce existing societal prejudices and increase the negative effects of such 
prejudices.697 Ackermann J, commenting on the purpose of the sodomy offence, held 
the following: 
 
“The sole purpose and existence of the offence of sodomy was to criminalise a 
particular form of gay expression which failed to conform to the moral or religious 
views of a section of society. The objective of the common-law offence of sodomy 
was not dictated by the punishing of ‘male rape’. The fact that the ambit of the 
offence was wide enough to include ‘male rape’ was mere coincidental. The core of 
the offence was to punish sexual expression between gay men.698 
 
Ackermann J further held that gay men were a permanent minority in society and 
had in the past suffered from patterns of disadvantage, and that the consequences 
of the disadvantage were severe, affecting the dignity, personhood and identity of 
gay men at a deep level.699 
 
                                                          
694
 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC), 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) (“the first National Coalition case”). 
695
 De Ru “Historical perspective on the recognition of same-sex unions in South Africa” 2013 
Fundamina 234. 
696
 First National Coalition case para [19]. 
697
 First National Coalition case paras [22] and [23]. 
698
 First National Coalition case para [69]. 
699
 First National Coalition case para [26]. 
185 
 
Although the right to equality was the primary basis on which the case was argued, 
Ackermann J held that the criminalisation of sodomy also infringed the right to dignity 
enshrined in section 10 of the Constitution, and the right to privacy protected by 
section 14 of the Constitution. With regard to the right of dignity, he stated that the 
common-law prohibition on sodomy criminalised all sexual intercourse between men 
regardless of the circumstances surrounding the relationship, thus punishing a form 
of sexual conduct the broader society identified with homosexuality.700 He went on to 
explain as follows: 
 
“The existence of a law which criminalises a form of sexual expression for gay men 
degraded and devalued gay men in our broader society and constituted an invasion 
of their dignity and thus infringed section 10 of the Constitution”.701  
 
With regard to the right to privacy, Ackermann J further held that the criminalisation 
of sodomy infringed the right to privacy enshrined in section 14 of the Constitution. 
He stated the following:  
 
“Privacy recognises that we all have the right to a sphere of private intimacy and 
autonomy which allows us to establish and nurture human relationships without 
interference from the outside community. The way in which we give expression to our 
sexuality is at the core of this area of private intimacy. If in expressing our sexuality, 
we act consensually and without harming one another, invasion of that will be a 
breach of our privacy‟.702 
 
By this statement, Ackermann is clearly showing the intention of homosexual people 
to have their sexuality equally respected even though it is different from 
heterosexuality. 
 
The theme of equality as including respect for difference was also endorsed by 
Sachs J, who wrote a concurring judgment. Sachs J stressed that equality should not 
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be confused with uniformity. On the contrary, equality means equal concern and 
respect across difference.703 He added that the success of the constitutional 
endeavour will depend on how successfully South Africans are able to reconcile 
sameness and difference.704 Both Ackermann J and Sachs J affirmed that the laws 
governing sodomy violated not only the right to equality, but also the rights to privacy 
and dignity.705 Therefore, the court concluded that the common-law offence of 
sodomy was unconstitutional because it violated the rights to equality, dignity and 
privacy.706 The limitations on these rights were not justifiable in terms of section 36 of 
the Constitution. The court held that the enforcement of the private moral views of a 
section of the community, which are based to a large extent on nothing more than 
prejudice, cannot qualify as such a legitimate purpose.707 
 
Another step in the judicial process to end discrimination based on sexual orientation 
was the prohibition of discrimination in employment. Discrimination in employment 
was raised in Langemaat v Minister of Safety and Security.708 This case involved a 
lesbian police captain who sought to have her partner included in her medical aid 
scheme, which allowed only the legal spouse, widow or widower and the child of a 
member of the police force to be registered as the member’s dependant. The court 
clarified the meaning of dependant and held that a dependant is someone who relies 
upon another for maintenance.709 On behalf of the court Roux J held that the 
knowledge and experience of many homosexual couples who have lived together for 
years should not be ignored. He pointed out that the scheme’s rules and regulations 
excluded many de facto dependants of members of the police force from the benefit 
of their carer’s medical Aid. This amounted to discrimination against the dependants, 
as well as members of the police force who would have to find alternative means to 
pay for the medical care of their dependants.710 He then declared the position 
unconstitutional and ordered the chairperson of the police medical scheme to 
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reconsider the application for registration of the applicant’s lesbian partner as her 
dependant.711  
 
Another aspect of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation was raised in 
Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa.712 In this case Judge Kathleen 
Satchwell challenged provisions of the Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of 
Employment Act 88 of 1989 and the corresponding regulations that prevented her 
homosexual partner from receiving the equivalent pension and other benefits 
regarding transport, travelling and subsistence provided to spouses of judges. 
Satchwell argued that the provisions constituted unfair discrimination on the basis of 
marital status and sexual orientation. The court, after applying the Harksen test to 
the facts in this case, found that the denial of benefits to same-sex partners while 
affording them to married judges is a differentiation on the ground of sexual 
orientation which is a listed ground in section 9 of the Constitution. That denial was 
held accordingly to amount to discrimination, which is presumed in terms of section 
9(5) to be unfair unless the contrary is shown.713 
 
The court declared that the omission from regulations 9(2)(b) and 9(3)(a) of the 
Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act 88 of 1989 after the word 
“spouse” of the words “or partner in a permanent same-sex partnership in which the 
partners have undertaken reciprocal duties of support” is inconsistent with the 
Constitution.714 The court further held that Regulations 9(2)(b) and 9(3)(a) of the 
Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act are to be read as though 
the following words appear therein after the word “spouse”: “or partner in a 
permanent same-sex partnership in which the partners have undertaken reciprocal 
duties of support”.715 
 
                                                          
711
  Langemaat case 317H. 
712
 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC). 
713
  Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa (1) SA BCLR 39 (CC), 2000 (2) SA 1 
(CC) para [21] (hereafter “the Satchwell case”). 
714
  Satchwell case para [37]. 
715
  Satchwell case para [37]. 
188 
 
It is clear from the court’s order in this case that the rights of heterosexual married 
partners were extended to homosexual partners. This was an important progress in 
the struggle for the recognition of homosexual individuals’rights. 
 
In a number of cases, provisions of the Aliens Control Act 96 of 1991 were 
challenged with regard to the meaning of family. In National Coalition for Gay and 
Lesbian Equality v Mininster of Home Affairs,716 the Constitutional Court overturned 
the provisions of the Aliens Control Act 96 of 1991, which restricted immigration 
benefits (including the right to accord residency to a foreign partner) to “spouses” 
while denying it to same-sex partners.717 The court held: 
 
“This denial reinforced harmful stereotypes of gays and lesbians, invading their 
constitutional right to dignity by conveying a message that same-sex relationships 
lacked the same validity as heterosexual ones. The denial also discriminated against 
gays and lesbians on the grounds of sexual orientation and marital status.”718 
 
The relationship between family and marriage, and the extent to which gay and 
lesbian couples can be considered as constituting family, were also brought before 
the court because here also homosexual people felt discriminated against. In this 
regard, the court concluded that the values of family life that are protected by section 
25(5) of Aliens Control Act are equally to be found in homosexual relationships. In 
short the court held that gays and lesbians are able to establish a consortium omnis 
vitae and are capable of establishing a family and benefiting from family life.719 The 
focus by the court on this aspect of consortium was subjected to criticism. According 
to Jivan, it sends out a strong message that only those relationships that are 
sufficiently similar to marriage will qualify for recognition.720 In De Vos’s opinion, the 
court seems to support a rather narrow conception of which intimate relations should 
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qualify for protection, even while it professes to endorse a more open-ended view 
and claims that is broadening access to “the family”.721  
 
A further step along the road towards formal recognition of homosexual relationships 
was taken in Du Toit v Minister of Welfare and Population Development.722 In this 
case, the Constitutional Court declared the unconstitutionality of certain provisions of 
the Child Care Act 74 of 1983,723 and the Guardianship Act 192 of 1993.724 This case 
involved a lesbian couple that jointly wanted to adopt two children. However, they 
were denied the right to adopt because in terms of the Child Care Act, only married 
couples could jointly adopt children. As a consequence of that law, only one lesbian 
could adopt a child. They subsequently challenged the constitutionality of the 
relevant provisions on the ground that the absence in the Child Care Act of a 
provision that grants homosexual life partners the right to jointly adopt violates 
homosexual life partners’ right to equality and their right to dignity, and does not give 
paramountcy to the best interests of the child.725 The court found that the impugned 
sections unjustifiably limited the right not to be unfairly discriminated against on the 
ground of sexual orientation, and the right to dignity. It further found that the situation 
in which only one partner to the homosexual union has a legal relationship with the 
adopted child was manifestly not in the best interests of those children whose rights 
their care-givers sought to enforce and protect.726 The court read words into the Act 
to bring homosexual life partners within the ambit of the sections. As a result of this 
decision, homosexual life partners may jointly adopt children. One homosexual life 
partner may furthermore adopt the other’s child without the legal rights and 
obligations between the parent and the child being terminated. In both instances, 
homosexual life partners are the child’s joint guardians after the adoption.727 
 
It can be argued that in this case the court confirmed that not only the rights of 
adoption are secured for homosexual couples, but also their relationships are 
                                                          
721
 De Vos 2004 SAJHR 179. 
722
 2002 (10) BCLR 1006 (CC), 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC) (hereafter “the Du Toit case”). 
723
 Section 17(a), 17(c) and 20(1) of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983.  
724
 Section 1(2) of the Guardianship Act 192 of 1993. 
725
 Du Toit case para [7]. See also Jivan 2007 LDD 34. 
726
 Du Toit case para [17]. 
727
 Du Toit case para [17]. 
190 
 
recognised even though the judgment does not explicitly “legalise” these 
relationships.728  
 
Discrimination against homosexual couples on the ground of their sexual orientation 
was also challenged in Du Plessis v Road Accident Fund.729 In this case, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal extended the common law dependant’s action to the 
surviving partner in a same-sex permanent life partnership, similar to a marriage, in 
circumstances where the deceased had contractually undertaken a duty of support 
towards the survivor. The case involves two homosexual partners, the appellant and 
the deceased, who had lived together for approximately eleven years until the 
deceased was killed in a motor vehicle accident. Their relationship was in all 
respects similar to a marriage. Five years into the relationship, the appellant was 
medically boarded. From then on, the deceased contributed towards the appellant’s 
financial support and undertook to continue doing so for as long as the appellant 
needed it. After the deceased’s death, which was largely attributable to the 
negligence of the driver of a vehicle insured by the Road Accident Fund, the 
appellant instituted a dependant’s claim for loss of support against the Fund. He also 
sought to recover the deceased’s burial expenses.  
 
In a unanimous judgment, the Supreme Court of Appeal found that the appellant was 
entitled to compensation for the loss of the deceased’s financial support and the 
court concluded that the action in this case “would be an incremental step to ensure 
that the common law accords with the dynamic and evolving fabric of our society as 
reflected in the Constitution, recent legislation and judicial pronouncements”.730 
 
This decision represents an important advance towards recognising and protecting 
persons involved in homosexual partnerships in that it developed the common law 
dependant’s action to accord with the realities of modern family life and social 
conditions.731  
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The right to marry of homosexual people was addressed in two different cases 
decided on the same day, 1 December 2005: Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie and 
Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v Minister of Home Affairs.732  
 
According to Goldblatt, 1 December 2005 was a proud day for South Africa as it 
joined the ranks of a handful of countries that provide full legal recognition to 
homosexual partnerships. On this date, the Constitutional Court was asked by a 
lesbian couple (Fourie and Bonthuys) to address their exclusion from the common 
law deﬁnition of marriage, which says that marriage is “a union of one man with one 
woman, to the exclusion, while it lasts, of all others”.733 On the same date, the court 
was asked, in a separate case brought by the Lesbian and Gay Equality Project, 
which is an organisation established to litigate and promote the rights of gays and 
lesbians in South Africa (together with a number of same sex couples), to remedy 
the problematic marriage formula in the Marriage Act that refers to a person taking 
another person as his or her “lawful wife” (or husband).734 In a majority judgement, 
the court found that the common law and the formula in the Marriage Act were 
inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid to the extent that they prevent 
homosexual couples from enjoying the status and beneﬁts coupled with 
responsibilities accorded to heterosexual couples.735 The basis of the court’s 
decision was primarily the right to equality enshrined in South Africa’s Bill of Rights 
that affords “equal protection and beneﬁt of the law” and includes a prohibition 
against unfair discrimination on the basis of a set of listed grounds including sexual 
orientation.736 The Constitution, in this regard, requires that the common law and 
legislation be developed in accordance with the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill 
of Rights.737  
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With regard to the right to marry, the Constitutional Court confirmed that the right to 
marry is an inalienable right that belongs to all who live in South Africa, black or 
white, gay or straight; and that gay men and lesbians can only be afﬁrmed as full and 
equal members of our society if this right is also fully extended to them.738 The 
majority of the court held that it would be important ﬁrst to afford Parliament the 
opportunity to cure the unconstitutionality of the existing law.739 In response to the 
aforementioned decision, the Cabinet approved the ﬁrst draft of the Civil Union 
Bill.740 
 
The cases discussed above paved the way for the Constitutional court’s affirmation 
of the rights of gays and lesbians to the same benefits as married heterosexuals in 
the Fourie case. This means that South African family law, which still locates 
marriage at its centre, is now inclusive of same-sex partners for all purposes.741 
 
In summary, in the gradual process of legally recognising homosexual relations, it 
can be argued that the post-apartheid Constitution began with the legal protection of 
“sexual orientation'” as a form of identity. In the great movement towards gay and 
lesbian equality, the early battles, be it decriminalisation or protection from 
discrimination, concerned matters that involved individual rights. Thereafter, a new 
generation of disputes emerged which concerned relationships rather than 
individuals and now, with the passing of the Civil Union Act, a new distinct status has 
been conferred upon gays and lesbians.742  
 
According to De Vos and Barnard, the Constitutional Court has constantly 
highlighted the clear signiﬁcance of the concepts of human dignity, equality and 
freedom for the court’s equality jurisprudence on homosexual relationships. It has 
also developed a detailed set of assumptions that must guide any such enquiry. In 
the process of setting out these assumptions, it has rejected many of the 
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standardised and hackneyed assumptions made about gay men and lesbians and 
their intimate relationships.743 
 
The Constitutional Court thus concluded that the family life of gay men and lesbians 
is in all signiﬁcant respects indistinguishable from that of heterosexual spouses and 
in human terms as important. Failure to recognise the relationships of homosexual 
couples amounts to sending the message that “gays and lesbians lack the inherent 
humanity to have their families and family lives in such homosexual relationships 
respected or protected. It serves in addition to perpetuate and reinforce existing 
prejudices and stereotypes. The impact constitutes a crass, blunt, cruel and serious 
invasion of their dignity.”744 
 
In addition to the judicial recognition of homosexual rights, there is also statutory 
recognition of homosexual relationships and family in South Africa. In fact, several 
statutes have included homosexual partners within many of their provisions. It is not 
possible to discuss all of them in this study; however, reference will be made to few 
of these statutes.  
 
Certain statutes, including the Maintenance Act 99 of 1998, the Domestic Violence 
Act 116 of 1998 and the Rental Act 50 of 1999, grant to heterosexual and 
homosexual life partners the same protection that spouses enjoy. In addition, like 
their counterpart heterosexual life partners, homosexual life partners now have the 
same benefits as spouses in terms of the rules of medical schemes and job-related 
benefit schemes. In respect of medical schemes, the Medical Schemes Act 131 of 
1998 states that a scheme may not be registered if its rules unfairly discriminate 
against anyone on the ground of, inter alia, sexual orientation.745  
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With the passing of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 5 of 2001, the definition of 
spouse was extended to include homosexual partners in the Transfer Duty Act 45 of 
1955 and the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962.746 In terms of the Employment Equity Act 
55 of 1998, family responsibility is the responsibility of employees in relation to their 
spouse or partner, their dependent children or other members of their immediate 
family who need their care and support.747 According to the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act 75 of 1997, an employee must be given three days paid leave in the 
event of the death of the employee’s spouse or life partner.748 
  
It can be argued that the major victory in the process of recognising homosexual 
marriage and family was obtained through the Fourie case, which resulted in the 
drafting and passing of the Civil Union Act. This victory is discussed in the next 
section.  
 
5.5 MODELS OF RECOGNITION OF HOMOSEXUAL RELATIONSHIPS AND 
 ISSUES RAISED BY THE LEGAL RECOGNITION OF HOMOSEXUAL 
 RELATIONSHIPS 
 
This section briefly discusses the status given to homosexual relationships in the 
Civil Union Act and the issues that this legal recognition has raised. 
 
5.5.1 Models of recognition of homosexual relationships 
 
In December 2005 South Africa became the fifth nation to legalise homosexual 
marriage. In a revolutionary decision, the Constitutional Court ruled that the law 
limiting marriage to heterosexual couples was unconstitutional and gave the 
parliament one year to amend the country’s marriage laws accordingly.749 It was by 
means of the Civil Union Act that South Africa legalized the formalisation of 
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homosexual relationships.750 The purpose of the Civil Union Act was to extend 
marriage rights to homosexual couples who were until then denied the right to 
marry.751 The Act recognises two different models of homosexual relationships, civil 
unions and life partnerships.  
 
5.5.1.1 Civil unions 
 
Section 1 of the Civil Union Act provides a comprehensive definition of a civil union. 
According to this section, a civil union is: 
 
“the voluntary union of two persons who are both 18 years or older, which is 
solemnised and registered by way of either a marriage or a civil partnership, in 
accordance with the procedures prescribed in this Act, to the exclusion, while it lasts, 
of all others.”752  
 
Heaton is of the view that the definition of the civil union applies to heterosexual and 
homosexual couples. In her words: 
 
“However, in the light of the use of the word ‘persons’ without any qualification 
regarding the persons’ sex in the definition of ‘Civil Union’ in s 1 of the Act, it is clear 
that the legislator had persons of either sex in mind. If the legislator intended to limit 
civil unions to same-sex couples, the Act would have had to expressly include in this 
definition of ‘civil union’, like in the definition of ‘civil partnership’ as the voluntary 
union of two adult persons of the same-se sex that is solemnized and regarded in 
accordance with the procedures prescribed in the Act to the exclusion, while it lasts, 
of all others”.753 
 
It is therefore clear that the fact that the Act refers to “two persons” without any 
further specification, would suggest that two persons, irrespective of their race, 
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culture, or sexual orientation can be united in a civil union, provided that they are 18 
years or older. Therefore, a homosexual couple in which partners are 18 years or 
older can enter into a civil union. This applies also to heterosexual couples.  
 
Section 2 of the Civil Union Act gives the objectives of the Act. In terms of this 
section the objectives of the Civil Union Act are the following: 
 
(a) to regulate the solemnisation and registration of civil unions, by way of either a 
 marriage or a civil partnership; and 
(b) to provide for the legal consequences of the solemnisation and registration of 
civil unions.754 
 
The objectives of the Civil Union Act reveal two important characteristics of a civil 
union, which are the solemnisation and the registration of civil unions to which legal 
consequences are conferred. It is important to briefly comment on these 
characteristics. 
 
With regard to the solemnisation of civil unions, it should be noted that the 
prospective civil partners must first enter into a contract or engagement to marry 
each other. The engagement is followed by a promise to enter into a civil union on a 
determinable date. In terms of section 4(1) and 4(2), it is the marriage officer who will 
solemnise the civil union in the light of the requirements set out in the Act. These 
requirements include that only religious organisations approved by the Minister of 
Home Affairs can solemnise civil unions.755 In this regard a person from a religious 
organisation will be designated as a marriage officer for the purposes of solemnising 
civil unions in accordance with the provisions of the Act and further in accordance 
with the rites of that specific religious institution only after his or her application was 
received and approved by the Minister of Home Affairs.756 Section 6 of the Civil 
Union Act reads as follows: 
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“A marriage officer, other than a marriage officer referred to in section 5, may in 
writing inform the Minister that he or she objects on the ground of conscience, 
religion and belief to solemnising a civil union between persons of the same sex, 
whereupon that marriage officer shall not be compelled to solemnise such civil 
union”. 
 
According to this section, a marriage officer is not compelled to solemnise a same-
sex civil union if he or she objects on the ground of conscience, religion or belief. 
There is no such provision for a heterosexual couple who would like to enter into civil 
union. This would suggest that the Act allows discrimination against homosexual 
persons on the ground of their sexual orientation. 
 
The solemnisation of civil unions is somehow similar to the solemnisation of civil 
marriage in terms of the Marriage Act. No solemnisation of a civil union will take 
place before the prospective civil union partners are properly identified. In this 
regard, they must provide the marriage officer with their identity documents or 
identity affidavits.757 Where one of the partners does not have an identity document, 
it is suggested that he or she may alternatively submit an identity affidavit.758 It is 
recommended that the parties and at least two competent witnesses be personally 
present during the civil union ceremony.759 At the beginning of the ceremony, it is 
important for the marriage officer to know how the civil union he or she is 
solemnising is going to be known. In this regard, he or she must ask the parties 
whether their civil union is going to be known as a marriage or a civil partnership.760 
The civil union partners have to answer to that question by choosing either marriage 
or civil partnership. Once they give their answer to the prescribed question, the 
marriage officer will declare them lawfully joined in a marriage or civil partnership.761 
It is important to note that it is when this declaration is made by the marriage officer 
that the civil union is legally recognised. 
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It should be noted that civil unions are registered by way of the registration certificate 
issued by the marriage officer. The registration certificate will be the poof of the 
existence of the civil union between the civil union partners. In fact, prior to the 
solemnisation of the civil union, each prospective civil union partner must in writing 
declare his or her willingness to enter into a civil union with the other partner. They 
will then both sign the prescribed document in the presence of two witnesses.762 The 
marriage officer and the two witnesses must sign the written declarations to certify 
that it was made in their presence. After the civil union is solemnised, the marriage 
officer will issue the civil union partners with a registration certificate stating that they 
have entered into either a marriage or a civil partnership depending on the decision 
they made as to the term they wish their union to be known by.763  
 
It is noteworthy that the ceremony of solemnisation and registration of a civil union 
can take place on any day of the week. However, a marriage officer is not obliged to 
solemnise a civil union between 08h00 and 16h00.764 The solemnisation may take 
place in a public or private dwelling house with open doors or on any premises used 
for such purposes by the marriage officer. A civil union may also be solemnised 
elsewhere if one or either of the parties is incapable of being present at the 
abovementioned places due to serious, longstanding illness or serious bodily 
injury.765 
 
Since a civil union has a beginning, it can also have an end. The circumstances that 
can end a civil union can be the death of one or both civil partners or their divorce. 
There is not much to say in the case of the end of a civil union by death. In this case, 
the surviving partner will be free from the civil union and can even enter another civil 
union like in the case of heterosexual marriage. However, in the case that the civil 
union ends in divorce, the Divorce Act 70 of 1979, which regulates divorce and its 
consequences, will apply mutatis mutandis to a civil union concluded under the Civil 
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Union Act. In terms of section 3 of the Divorce Act read together with section 13 of 
the Civil Union Act, there are two major causes of divorce, namely: 
 
1) The irretrievable breakdown of the civil union as contemplated in section 4 of 
the Divorce Act;  
2) The mental illness or the continuous unconsciousness of a partner to a civil 
union, as contemplated in section 5 of the Divorce Act. 
 
The content of these causes are beyond the scope of this study and will not be 
discussed. However, it is important to note that once the divorce has been declared, 
the patrimonial consequences of the civil union will be regulated by the matrimonial 
property regime the partners chose upon entering into the civil union.766  
 
Another model of recognition of homosexual relationships is the life partnership. This 
model is reserved to cohabiting homosexual couples. 
 
5.5.1.2  Life partnerships 
 
The term “life partnership” can be used in a wide or a narrow sense. In a wide sense, 
a life partnership includes both of the following relationships: 
 
(a) The relationship between two people, regardless of their sex, who live 
together in a permanent union analogous to marriage without ever having 
gone through a marriage ceremony although they are not prevented by the 
law from validly marrying one another in terms of civil or customary law or 
entering into a civil union with one another; and  
(b) The relationship between two people who live together after having entered a 
marriage that is not regarded as valid by South African law or between two 
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people who live together because they are prohibited from marrying one 
another.767 
 
In the narrow sense, a life partnership means a permanent life relationship, 
analogous to marriage, comprising two persons who, even though they are legally 
competent to marry one another, live together without: 
 
(a) having ever attempted to marry one another in terms of the Marriage Act, the 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act or the Civil Union Act; 
(b) having ever attempted to enter into a civil partnership with one another in 
terms of the Civil Union Act; or 
(c) having entered into a purely religious marriage with one another.768 
 
For the purpose of this study, a life partnership is understood in its narrow sense as 
an arrangement where two people live together in a relationship similar to a marriage 
which produces a sense of responsibility and commitment and creates dependence 
between the parties.769 According to Heaton, various terms are used to describe 
these relationships, including de facto marriage, common-law marriage and domestic 
partnership.770 In general, the legal consequences of a legally recognised marriage 
will not apply to life partners. However, some Acts confer spousal benefits on life 
partners. Further, some courts have extended additional spousal benefits to life 
partners.771 In the case of homosexual life partners, the extension of these benefits 
was the result of constitutitonal jurisprudence in family law, and the transformation of 
the concept “family law” and what it encompases.772  
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Life partnerships can be characterised by the absence of marriage engagement and 
the presence of dependence between the life partners. The absence of marriage 
engagement is significant in understanding the unwillingness of the courts to entend 
spousal benefits to heterosexual life partners. Volks v Robinson773 is an important 
decision in this regard. This case involves sixteen years of a heterosexual 
permanent life partnership between Mrs Ethel Robinson and Mr Richards Gordon 
Volks. During this period the cohabitant couple lived together on a continuous basis 
in a flat in Cape Town. They jointly occupied that flat until the death of Mr Volks in 
2001. During his lifetime, Mr Volks was depositing into Mrs Robinson’s account an 
amount of R5000 on a monthly basis for covering the household’s necessities; he 
also provided petrol and paid for her car’s maintainance. In his will, Mr Volks 
bequeathed certain assets to Mrs Robinson but she submitted a claim for 
maintenance against the estate with the executor of the estate appointed in terms of 
the will. The claim was lodged in terms of section 2(1) of the Maintenance of 
Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990. The executor of the estate refused Robinson’s 
claim on the basis that she was not a “spouse” of the deceased for purposes of the 
Act. Mrs Robinson then sought an order declaring that the exclusion of the survivor 
of a domestic partnership from the provisions of the Act was unconstitutional and 
invalid in that it discriminated unfairly against her on the ground of marital status and 
infringed her right to dignity. 
 
The court held that section 2(1) of the Act, read together with section 1, is 
unconstitutional in that it violates the right to equality in terms of section 9 of the 
1996 Constitution and specifically discriminates unfairly on the basis of marital 
status. The court then ordered that section 1 of the Act be amended to include 
persons involved in domestic partnerships. In a majority judgment by Skweyiya J, the 
Constitutional Court found that section 2(1) of the Act was a mere extension of the 
reciprocal duty of support between living married persons to the estate of a 
deceased spouse.774 This extension should be viewed as a qualification of the right 
to freedom of testation. However, because no reciprocal duty exists between living 
unmarried persons, the court held that it would be unfair to impose such duty on the 
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estate of the deceased. The court explained that there is a fundamental difference 
between Mrs Robinson’s relationship to the deceased and a marriage relationship in 
relation to maintenance. This difference is that people in marriage are obliged to 
maintain each other by operation of law and without further agreement or formalities. 
People in the class of relationships to which she belongs are not in that position.775  
 
It is clear from this judgment that Mrs Robinson could not qualify as a surviving 
spouse in terms of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act simply because she 
was never married to Mr Volks. She was engaged to Mr Volks in a relationship that 
was different to marriage. 
 
The emphasis on the difference between marriage and domestic life partnership 
would suggest that marriage bestows on married people rights from which people 
who are not married cannot benefit. This would further suggest that marriage is a 
relationship that is legally protected and valued as it is mentioned in the majority 
judgment by Ngcobo J. 
 
In his judgment, Ngcobo J argued that section 15(3)(a)(i) of the Constitution 
recognises the institution of marriage and that the recognition is consistent with the 
obligations imposed on our country by certain international and regional human 
rights instruments such as the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights of 
1981, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1949.776 Ngcobo further argued that 
because of this recognition of the institution of marriage as well as other obligations 
on our country to protect this institution, the law may distinguish between married 
people and unmarried people and also afford protection to married people which it 
does not afford to unmarried people. He then held that the discrimination in casu was 
not unfair.777 
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Like Skweyiya J, Ngcobo J emphasised the difference that exists between marriage 
and life partnership and stressed that the law is expected to protect heterosexual 
couples who desire the consequences ascribed to this type of relationships. He 
further argued that those couples desiring to benefit from marriage rights should 
clearly signify their acceptance by entering into marriage.778 This would suggest that 
marriage is an option open to every mature couple that seeks the protection that the 
law offers to this institution. Consequently, those couples that chose not to enter into 
marriage cannot claim rights that marriage grants to married people. 
 
Life partners may use contracts to regulate the legal consequences of their 
relationship and to create some financial security between the partners themselves 
and third parties.779 In this regard, life partners may, for example, purchase assets 
jointly, or jointly enter into lease agreements and credit agreements. The terms and 
conditions of each agreement will determine each partner’s individual rights and 
obligations.780 
 
Life partner contracts and contracts can be used by life partners in order to regulate 
their relationships. According to Heaton, homosexual (and opposite-sex) life partners 
may enter into a life partnership contract (also known as a cohabitation or domestic 
partnership contract) to determine the rights and duties of each partner during the 
subsistence of the life partnership and to regulate the financial and proprietary 
consequences upon termination of the life partnership.781  
 
A life partnership contract may contain any provision which is not impossible, against 
the law or immoral.782 In that regard, the life partners may for example look after one 
other, agree on the occupation and ownership of the common home, the procedure 
for the division of household goods after the termination of the life partnership, deal 
with the ownership of assets owned before the inception of the life partnership and 
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during its subsistence, agree on liability for households necessaries during the 
subsistence of the life partnership and after its termination.783  
 
Life partners may also expressly or tacitly enter into a universal partnership contract. 
The partners’ conduct is determinant for the existence of a tacit agreement. This 
means that the factual situation and the objectives of the parties are considered, 
taking into account the circumstances and facts of each case.784 For example, to 
provide for the livelihood and comfort of the parties and their children, including the 
proper education of those children, has been regarded as compliance with the 
making-a-profit object and therefore as being sufficient for partnership purposes.785 
For a universal life partnership to come into existence, the following requirements 
must be complied with: 
 
(a) Each party must contribute to the enterprise by bringing something (money, 
labour or skill) into the partnership or undertake to bring something into it in 
future; 
(b) The aim of the partnership must be to make a profit;  
(c) The partnership must operate for the parties’ joint benefit; and 
(d) The contract between the parties must be legitimate.786 
 
Their dependence is important when proving the existence of the tacit life partners’ 
universal partnership contract.787 This view was further made clear in V v De Wet,788 
where the court held that a universal partnership can be formed between people who 
live together as husband and wife. In this case, a woman who was not married and a 
married man cohabited for three weeks during which, in addition to her job in the 
man’s painting and decorating business, she also performed all the household duties 
relating to the couple’s two children. It is clear from the court’s decision in this case 
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that, for the establishment of a universal life partnership, the key factor is 
interdependence as opposed to the duration of the cohabitation. 
 
Some essential criteria exist for life partnerships to come into existence and to confer 
entitlements to certain spousal benefits on the parties. These include the community 
of life and the intention of the parties to create a permanent homosexual life 
partnership. 
 
With regard to the community of life, also referred to as the consortium omnis vitae, 
some judicial decisions have described what should be viewed as community of life. 
In Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs,789 for example, the court held that only a civil 
marriage (and now also a civil union) creates a physical, moral and spiritual 
community of life under South African common law, which includes reciprocal 
obligations of cohabitation, fidelity and sexual intercourse.790  
 
In Grobbelaar v Havenga,791 the court held that companionship, love, affection, 
comfort, mutual services, and sexual intercourse all belong to the married state. 
Taken together, they make up the consortium.792 In Peter v Minister of Law and 
Order,793 the court concluded that consortium is termed as an umbrella word for all 
the legal rights of one spouse to the company, affection, services and support of the 
other.794 The consortium omnis vitae can also be understood as 
 
“an abstraction comprising the totality of a number of rights, duties and advantages 
accruing to spouses of a marriage . . . These embrace intangibles, such as loyalty 
and sympathetic care and affection, concern, as well as the more material needs of 
life, such as physical care, financial support, the rendering of services in the running 
of the common household or in support-generating business”795 
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South Africa is a society with pluralism and diversity of family. Given that pluralism 
and diversity, the court held in the second National Coalition case that gay men and 
lesbian women have the ability to establish a consortium omnis vitae.796 
 
It is worth noting that the court specified in the Dawood case that only civil marriage 
(and now civil union) can create a community of life.797 In the Peter case, the court 
used the word “spouse”, which refers to people engaged in marriage and in the 
second National Coalition case; the court recognised the ability of gay and lesbian 
persons to establish a community of life.798 This clearly shows that heterosexual as 
well as homosexual partners can form a community of life. Once it is proven that 
there is consortium omnis vitae, certain rights associated with marriage can be 
extended to homosexual couples.  
 
The question that arises at this stage is whether the rights associated with marriage 
will be extended to all homosexual couples, including those in life partnerships. This 
question is unfortunately answered in the negative because, as argued above, the 
legal consequences that extend to civil union partners do not automatically apply to 
life partners.799 This constitutes an issue raised by the legal recognition of 
homosexual relationships under the Civil Union Act that will be discussed later in this 
chapter. 
 
A permanent life partnership exists if the parties can prove that they had the intention 
to cohabit permanently at the beginning of the relationship.800 This intention must be 
opposed to the parties’ intention to cohabit only temporarily.801 If homosexual 
partners in a permanent life partnership have undertaken reciprocal duties of 
support, rights associated with heterosexual life partnerships will also apply to them. 
                                                          
796
 Second National Coalition case para [53]. 
797
 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC) para [33]. 
798
 1990 (4) SA 6 (E) at 9G-H. 
799
 Life partners have to use contracts in order to regulate the legal consequences of their 
relationships. 
800
 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) para [86]. 
801
 Bodley and Cameron“Establishing the existence of a same-sex life partnership for the 
purposes of intestate succession‟ 2008 SALJ 261. 
207 
 
This issue was made clear in Gory v Kolver No (Stark and Others intervening).802 
This case concerns the constitional validity of section 1(1) of the Intestate 
Succession Act 81 of 1987 to the extent that it confers rights of intestate succession 
on heterosexual spouses but not on permanent same-sex life partners, as well as 
the appropriate remedy in the event the Constitutional Court confrms the order of the 
constitutional invalidity made by the Pretoria High Court, as it was known then. 
 
This case involves Mr Henry Harrison Books (the deacesed), who was at the time of 
his death in a permanent same-sex life partnership with Mr Mark Gory. When Mr 
Books died intestate, his parents nominated Mr Daniel Kolver to be appointed by the 
Master of the High Court of Pretoria as the executor of Books’ estate, and claimed to 
be entitled to Booksʼ assets as his intestate heirs. This nomination resulted in a 
dispute with Mr Gory as to who the lawful intestate heir is. The dispute was brought 
to the Pretoria High Court.803  
 
On behalf of the court, Hartzenberg J found that the omission after the word 
“spouse” wherever it appears in section 1(1) of the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 
1987 of the words “or partner in a permanent same-sex life partnership in which 
partners have undertaken reciprocal duties of support” is inconsistent with the 
constitution. The judge ordered that this defect be cured through the reading in of the 
words “or partner in a permanent same-sex life partnership in which partners have 
undertaken reciprocal duties of support” after the word “spouse” wherever it appears 
in section 1(1) of the Intestate Succession Act.804 This decision was disputed in an 
appeal to the Constitutional Court. 
 
Erilda Starke and her three sisters applied to intervene, arguing that reading in is not 
the appropriate remedy, and that any order by the court should apply only to the 
estates of people who die after the order is handed down. Their late brother’s alleged 
same-sex partner Bobby Lee Bell (another of Books' same-sex permanent life 
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partners) also applied to intervene should the sistersʼ application be granted. He 
submitted that the High Court’s order should be confirmed.805 
 
These applications to intervene were granted on the ground that the intervening 
parties have direct and substantial interests in the confirmation application, and it is 
in the interests of justice to allow the intervention.806 
 
On behalf of the court Van Heerden AJ upheld the High Court’s finding regarding the 
constitutional invalidity of section 1(1) of the Intestate Succession Act and ordered 
that, with effect from 24 April 1994, section 1(1) of the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 
1987 is to be read as through the words “or partner in a permanent same-sex life 
partnership in which partners have undertaken reciprocal duties of support” 
appeared after the word “spouse” wherever the latter word appears in section 1(1) of 
the Intestate Succession Act.807 
 
It is clear from this case that denying same-sex life partners the right to inherit the 
estate of the other partner who died intestate is inconsistent with the constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa. The judgment in this case also displays the intention of 
the South African Constitutional Court to emphasise the legal recognition of 
homosexual relationships in South Africa, 
 
Like the civil union, the life partnership can also be terminated. The partnership can 
be terminated by agreement between the partners, a court order, or the death of one 
of the partners.808 It is important to note that each life partner can terminate the life 
partnership on any ground and at any time.809 The consequences of the termination 
of a life partnership can be determined without court intervention. This can be done 
by means of the agreement. However, in case of necessity, issues relating to for 
instance the post-separation maintenance, the exercising of parental responsibilities 
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and rights, and which of the partners will continue to occupy the joint home can be 
referred to court. It should be noted that partnership debts still outstanding after the 
breakdown of the partnership can be claimed from the former partners individually.810 
 
The legal recognition of homosexual relationships raised a number of issues that 
need to be discussed for the purposes of this study. 
 
5.5.2  Issues raised by the legal recognition of homosexual relationships 
 
The adoption of the Civil Union Act by South Africa’s parliament in 2006 was a way 
of extending marriage rights to homosexual relationships. The adoption of the Act 
was viewed as the victory of a long legal and political struggle for the emancipation 
of gay men and lesbians in South Africa.811 However, the legal recognition of 
homosexual relationships through the Civil Union Act seems to have failed to 
emancipate homosexual relationships. It raises a number of issues, including the 
issue related to the emancipation of homosexual rights, and the issue related to the 
solemnisation of marriage.  
 
5.5.2.1  The issue related to the emancipation of homosexual rights 
 
This issue is inspired by the reflections of De Vos on the effect of the legalisation of 
homosexual relationships by means of the Civil Union Act. De Vos is of the view that 
although the legalisation of homosexual relationships through the Civil Union Act 
was intended to extend marriage rights to all gay and lesbian couples in South 
Africa, the adoption of the Act through which homosexual relationships were legally 
recognised did not emancipate the rights of gays and lesbians in South Africa. De 
Vos pointed out as follows: 
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“It might be tempting to assume that the inclusion of ‘sexual orientation’ in the non-
discrimination clauses of the 1993 and 1996 Constitutions created the conditions that 
logically and inevitably led to the Constitutional Court’s same-sex marriage judgment 
in Fourie and the adoption of the legislation that extended full marriage rights to 
same-sex couples. This achievement, in turn, could then also be viewed as 
confirming the final and triumphant emancipation of those individuals who experience 
same-sex sexual desire and are emotionally attracted to members of the same sex. 
However, a more critical look at the political and legal struggles that led to the 
adoption of this Act suggests that the process was far from inevitable. It is also not 
clear whether these struggles have led or will lead to the full emancipation of 
individuals whose sexual orientation does not conform to the existing heterosexual 
norm”.812 
 
In other words, the adoption of the Civil Union Act should not be regarded as the 
culmination of a struggle that restored full citizenship to all gay men and lesbians in 
South Africa. In this regard De Vos maintains the following: 
 
“The legal recognition of same-sex marriage might well provide legal protection and 
social affirmation to same-sex couples whose relationships mirror those of the 
idealised heterosexual marriage, but it ignores the lived reality of many individuals 
who are not in a position to ‘choose’ to legalise their relationships through marriage. 
A mere extension of marriage rights to some same-sex couples will also not lead to a 
necessary and fundamental re-imagining of the nature of the legal regulation of 
intimate relations in our society. Moreover, I argue that such a development will leave 
unaffected many other aspects of the concept of marriage that are highly 
problematic, not only for individuals who experience same-sex sexual desire, but also 
for society as a whole”.813 
 
I agree with De Vos that many different kinds of intimate relationships are not 
sufficiently protected or regulated by the law, because they do not conform 
sufficiently to the idealised heterosexual norm. Examples include where a male or 
female same-sex couple decide to beget and raise children together as a family; or 
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where more than two individuals in an intimate relationship with the others decide to 
beget and raise children; or where a man has a rural wife but cohabits with a woman 
in an urban area in a long term relationship; or where a mother and a grandmother 
jointly raise the mother’s children.814 
 
This would suggest that the Civil Union Act protects only homosexual relations that 
reflect heterosexual marriage. Reference is made here to homosexual civil unions. 
The partners in homosexual civil unions can have their relationships solemnised and 
registered in terms of the Civil Union Act. Rights granted to heterosexual married 
couples are extended to civil union partners, with the exception of the right to marry 
under the Marriage Act. However, the civil union is just one of the models for the 
recognition of homosexual relationships under the Civil Union Act. The other model 
is the life partnership which, as discussed above, is neither solemnised nor 
registered. For the life partners to regulate the legal consequences of their 
relationships, they must enter into a contract. Life partnerships are one kind of 
homosexual intimate relationship that is not adequately protected by the law 
because they do not conform to the idealised norm. Although life partners are 
engaged in homosexual relationships like civil partners, they are not afforded the 
same rights extended to civil partners under the Civil Union Act. They therefore 
constitute a category of gay men and lesbians who have not been fully emancipated 
by the adoption of the Civil Union Act in South Africa.  
 
After analysing different forms of marriages existing in South Africa, Bonthuys points 
out that there is inequality between marriages in South African. She further confirms 
that racial, religious and cultural dimensions contribute to the differential status 
afforded to the various legal forms of marriage, and to the spouses who marry in 
terms of these laws.815 Bonthuys argues that only civil marriages have full 
recognition; customary marriages which can be polygamous, although now fully 
recognised, have a lower legal and social status than civil marriages. Muslim and 
Hindu marriages are not recognised at all, but spouses often also marry each other 
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in terms of the civil law in order to ensure legal consequences for their 
relationships.816 This undoubtedly shows that not all South African marriages have 
the same legal protection. 
 
According to Bonthuys, by merely broadening the categories of people who can get 
married, the Civil Union Act has failed to question or address the inequitable features 
of the institution of marriage, but in fact strengthens its position as the template and 
ideal towards which all other relationships should aspire. In addition, because of the 
various forms of marriage in South Africa, it retains and reinforces a particular legal 
and cultural version of marriage at the expense of others.817 Bonthuys goes on 
arguing as follows: 
 
“The value given to civil marriage reaffirms the paramount status of civil marriage, by 
implying that this form of marriage is the template to which all hitherto excluded 
relationships must conform in order to receive social and legal recognition. It also 
implies that only civil marriage – and not other forms of marriage – can expand to 
incorporate same-sex couples. This, in turn, implies that customary and Muslim 
family norms are static, inﬂexible and incapable of accommodating change. This 
point is practically illustrated by the fact that neither the Law Reform Commission, nor 
the Department of Home Affairs’ hearings preceding the Act, even considered 
whether to change the Recognition of Customary Marriage Act to accommodate 
same-sex couples”.818 
 
It can be argued from the opinion of Bonthuys that the Civil Union Act has reinforced 
the primacy of marriage, excluded other forms of marriage from the benefits of 
marriage and had made marriage exclusive to heterosexual couples. This amounts 
first to the categorisation of relationships that can be viewed as marriage and 
second, the categorisation of forms of marriages that can benefit from the rights of 
marriage. In support of these views, Bonthuys has confirmed the following:  
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“The particular way in which the Civil Union Act has permitted lesbian and gay 
couples to conclude civil partnerships not only reinforces the primacy of civil 
marriage, but also has consequences for other forms of marriage. I argue that, by 
simply equating same-sex relationships with civil marriage, the Civil Union Act has 
foreclosed several more radical possibilities which have existed, and still exist, in 
African communities. Furthermore, the Act is premised on a particular form of global 
gay identity which does not accord with the identities of many African people who 
have same-sex relations”.819 
 
In short, the Civil Union Act has allowed only certain homosexual couples access to 
the marriage-like institution of civil unions. By doing so the legislation has inevitably 
excluded other same-sex and opposite-sex couples from the benefits it bestows.820 
This categorisation cannot fulfil the objective of extending marriage rights to all 
homosexual relationships and that amounts to a failure to emancipate all gay men 
and lesbians trough the Civil Union Act. 
 
5.5.2.2   The issue related to the solemnisation of marriage 
 
De Vos comments at length on the solemnisation of marriages in South Africa and 
has pointed out that the civil union marriage regime remains problematic in at least 
one important technical sense relating to the solemnisation of marriages in terms of 
the Act.821 De Vos compares the solemnisation of marriages under Marriage Act and 
under the Civil Union Act and noted that in terms of the Marriage Act and the Civil 
Union Act, several people can be appointed in order to solemnise marriage. These 
include religious officials, public servants designated to fulfil this task, certain civil 
servants like magistrates and commissioners who are by reason of their office 
automatically deemed to be marriage officers, state officials and diplomatic officers 
who may be appointed as marriage officers by the relevant Minister.822 
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However, De Vos identifies what he calls anomalies in the Civil Union Act, which are 
actually the issues being discussed in this section. First, he points out that becoming 
a marriage officer to conduct marriages in terms of the Civil Union Act is more 
cumbersome than becoming a marriage officer in terms of the Marriage Act.823 De 
Vos compares the way marriage officers are appointed under Marriage Act and Civil 
Union Act and notes that it is easier under Marriage Act to be appointed a marriage 
officer than under Civil Union Act. In this regard De Vos argues as follows: 
 
“The Civil Union Act distinguishes between religious marriage officers and 
nonreligious marriage officers in the same way that the Marriage Act does. However, 
in respect of religious marriage officers the Act requires first, that a religious 
denomination or organisation must apply for approval to conduct civil unions. Once 
the religious organisation has been approved, an official from the organisation may 
apply to be appointed as a marriage officer. Individuals who belong to a specific 
religious order cannot apply individually to become religious marriage officers… In 
the case of civil union marriages, both the institution and the individual religious 
official must apply, while in the case of marriage in terms of the traditional Marriage 
Act, one application suffices”.824  
 
This makes it difficult for religious officials who are willing to solemnise homosexual 
civil partnerships to be appointed in order to fulfil this task. 
 
The second anomaly is that the Civil Union Act allows the marriage officers 
representing the state to refuse to conclude a civil union marriage “on the ground of 
conscience, religion and belief”.825 In fact, under the Civil Union Act civil servants can 
be designated marriage officers to conduct civil union marriages in their capacity as 
civil servants. In terms of the Civil Union Act any marriage officer designated as such 
in terms of the original Marriage Act would also automatically become a marriage 
officer for the purposes of the Civil Union Act.826 However, in terms of section 6 of 
the Civil Union Act, these marriage officers can refuse to conclude a civil union 
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marriage on the ground of conscience, religion and belief. According to De Vos this 
right to refuse to solemnise a marriage is not provided for in the Marriage Act dealing 
with traditional heterosexual marriages. This means, for example, that a devoutly 
Christian civil servant may not object to marry a heterosexual couple in terms of the 
Marriage Act who are atheist or Muslim and a racist marriage officer may not object 
to marrying an interracial couple when a heterosexual couple chooses to marry in 
terms of the traditional Marriage Act. Civil servants may therefore only object to 
conduct marriages under the Civil Union Act and, moreover, only to same-sex 
marriages under this Act.827 With regard to the real ground upon which these officers 
object to conduct homosexual marriages, De Vos argues as follows: 
 
“The only ground upon which they can object is therefore the sexual orientation of the 
couple. This provision thus clearly endorses sexual orientation discrimination by state 
officials and will most probably be struck down by the Constitutional Court if 
challenged. But apart from the legal problem with this provision, it also represents a 
potential practical problem for same-sex couples who wish to tie the knot. This is 
because it may make it more difficult for especially less wealthy and less educated 
same-sex couples who live in small towns in South Africa to get married. Such a 
couple would typically go to the local magistrate’s court where the local magistrate 
would act as the state’s designated marriage officer. When such a magistrate then 
refuses to marry a couple, they might not pursue the matter out of ignorance or a lack 
of resources”.828 
 
In summary, by making it difficult for religious officials to be appointed as marriage 
officers and by allowing civil servants to object to conducting homosexual marriages, 
the Civil Union Act once more discriminates against homosexual couples on the 
ground of their sexual orientation. It is important to note that these issues can have 
some impact on children who grow up in homosexual families. Children in 
homosexual life partnerships for example can lose their rights to inheritance or 
maintenance upon the life partnership breakdown. 
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5.6 THE LEGAL STATUS OF A CHILD BORN TO HOMOSEXUAL PERSONS 
 AS A RESULT OF ARTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
In South Africa, many homosexual people, single, cohabiting, and married, have 
used ARTs to have children and build families of their own. It is important to anlyse 
the status of the child resulting from ARTs, the acquisition of parental responsibilities 
and rights in the families formed of ARTs, and the best interests of such children. 
 
As previously indicated, in South Africa homosexual relationships are recognised as 
either as civil unions or life partnerships.829 Under the Children’s Act, the legal status 
of a child depends on the question whether the child was born to married or 
unmarried parents. The legal status of children born from civil unions and life 
partnerships respectively will be discussed in this section 
 
5.6.1 The legal status of children born of assisted reproductive technologies 
 to civil union partners 
 
From the discussion of the civil union above,830 it can be concluded that homosexual 
couples can marry under Civil Union Act and therefore a child born by means of 
ARTs to homosexual civil union partners is regarded as a child born to married 
parents. 
 
5.6.2  The legal status of a child born of assisted reproductive technologies to 
 life partners 
 
According to Heaton, homosexual couples who engage themselves in life 
partnerships are not married. They have decided to live in a marriage-like 
relationship. Simply put, they have decided to cohabit.831 Consequently, if a child is 
born to them as a result of ARTs, the child will be regarded as a child born to 
unmarried parents. 
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In summary, a child born to a homosexual couple engaged in a civil union is 
regarded as born to married parents while a child born to a homosexual couple 
engaged in life partnerships will be regarded as a child born to unmarried parents. 
Consequently, it is clear that the law treats a child born to civil union partners and a 
child born to life partners differently, even though the circumstance of the birth is the 
same. How parentage is established in these families and how parental 
responsibilities and rights are acquired will be discussed in the next section. 
 
5.7 PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND RIGHTS IN HOMOSEXUAL 
 FAMILIES 
 
Parental responsibilities and rights consist of the responsibility and the right to care 
for the child, to maintain contact with the child, to act as the guardian of the child; 
and to contribute to the maintenance of the child.832 
 
Children arrive in homosexual families through adoption and ARTs. In addition, some 
of them are from previous heterosexual relationships. Parental responsibilities and 
rights under this section will not be discussed for all these children. The section 
focuses only on the acquisition of parental responsibilities and rights for children 
born to lesbians and gay men as a result of ARTs in the context of South African law. 
Since homosexual families were categorised into civil unions and life partnerships, 
the discussion will be done in the context of these two models. 
 
5.7.1 Parental responsibilities and rights in civil unions 
 
5.7.1.1  The acquisition of parental responsibilities and rights by gay men in 
  civil unions 
 
As already said above,833 children may arrive in gay men’s families by means of 
surrogate motherhood, which is described as a situation in which the surrogate 
mother undertakes to be artificially fertilised for the purposes of bearing a child for 
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the commissioning parents and handing over that child to the commissioning parents 
upon the birth or within a reasonable time thereafter so that the child will become the 
commissioning parents’ child as if he or she were born from the commissioning 
parents.  
 
Both the terms “surrogate mother” and “commissioning parents” are defined in the 
Children’s Act. In terms of section 1(1) a surrogate mother is an adult woman who 
enters into a surrogate motherhood agreement with the commissioning parent; and a 
commissioning parent is a person who enters into a surrogate mother agreement 
with a surrogate mother. The scenario for gay civil union partners to have a child 
through surrogacy can be described as follows: The gay civil union partners must 
consent to have a child together. After all the legal requirements discussed above834 
are met, a surrogate mother will be chosen. One of the civil union partners will give 
his gametes that will be used to fertilise either the egg of the surrogate mother, in 
which case she will be the birth and biological mother of the child, or a donated egg. 
In this latter case she will be just the birth mother. Section 297(1) of the Children’s 
Act establishes parentage in the case of surrogate motherhood agreements and 
confers the parental responsibilities and rights to the commissioning parent or 
parents. 
 
In terms of this section: 
 
“The effect of a valid surrogate motherhood agreement is that- 
(a) any child born of a surrogate mother in accordance with the agreement is for 
all purposes the child of the commissioning parent or parents from the 
moment of the birth of the child concerned; 
(b) the surrogate mother is obliged to hand the child over to the commissioning 
parent or parents as soon as is reasonably possible after birth; 
(c)  the surrogate mother or her husband, partner or relatives has no rights of 
parenthood or care of the child; 
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(d) the surrogate mother or her husband, partner or relatives have no right of 
contact with the child unless provided for in the agreement between parties…” 
 
It is clear from the provisions of this section that gay civil union partners are the 
parents of the child born by the surrogate mother, though she may be the biological 
mother of the child.  
 
5.7.1.2 Acquisition of parental responsibilities and rights by lesbians in civil  
  unions 
 
In the case of lesbian civil union partners, the following scenarios are possible: One 
lesbian can give an egg that will be fertilised with a male gamete from a donor and 
the embryos will be put in the womb of her partner; or a male gamete from a donor is 
used to fertilise one of the lesbians’ civil union partners. In the former case, both 
lesbians are the biological parents of the resulting child and in the latter, only the 
birth mother is the biological mother of the resulting child. 
 
It is important to note that in one of the scenarios, a gamete from a donor can 
directly be used to fertilise one of the lesbians, who will by that fact become pregnant 
and give birth to a child. She is the biological mother of the child and has full parental 
responsibilities and rights in respect of the child. This may raise the question whether 
her partner automatically has the same responsibilities and rights in respect of the 
child. The answer is yes if the two civil union partners had consented to the artificial 
fertilisation.  
 
It is important to note that section 13(2) of the Civil Union Act equates civil unions to 
marriages. This would suggest that civil union partners are regarded as married to 
each other for the purposes of the Civil Union Act. In addition, section 40(1) (a) of the 
Children’s Act provides as follows: 
 
“Whenever the gametes or gametes of any person other than a married person or her 
spouse have been used with the consent of both spouses for the artificial fertilisation 
of one spouse, any child born of that spouse as a result of such artificial fertilisation 
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must for all purposes be regarded to be the child of the spouses as if the gamete or 
gametes of those spouses had been used for such artificial fertilisation”. 
 
Artificial fertilisation in this context is the introduction, by means other than natural 
means, of a male gamete into the internal reproductive organs of a female person for 
the purpose of human reproduction. Artificial fertilisation includes the bringing 
together of a male and female gamete outside the human body with the view of 
placing the product of a union of such gametes in the womb of the female person as 
well as the actual placing of such product in the woman’s womb (in vitro fertilisation). 
A gamete is either of the two generative cells essential for human reproduction.835  
 
In our above scenario, the spouse who did not provide the egg consented to the 
fertilisation of her partner. Logically, in line with provisions of section 40(1)(a) read 
together with section 13(2) of the Civil Union 17 of 2006, the resulting child will have 
both lesbian civil partners as parents and consequently both partners will have 
parental rights and responsibilities in respect of the child. 
 
5.7.2  Parental responsibilities and rights in life partnerships 
 
The case of gay life partners does not raise any problem. If a gay life partner has 
entered into a valid surrogate motherhood contract and has given his gamete for the 
fertilisation of a surrogate mother, the gay life partner who gave the gamete and his 
partner will have full parental responsibilities and rights in respect of the resulting 
child because the child will be handed over to them according to the provisions of the 
surrogate motherhood contract.  
 
In the case of lesbian life partnerships, if a lesbian life partner is fertilised with a 
gamete from a male donor, even if the egg used is from her life partner, the resulting 
child will be regarded as the child of the birth mother. In fact, section 40(2) of the 
Children’s Act provides as follows: 
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“Subject to section 296, whenever the gamete or gametes of any person have been 
used for the artificial fertilisation of a woman, any child born of that woman as a result 
of such artificial fertilisation must for all purposes be regarded to be the child of that 
woman.”  
 
This provision has the effect of excluding the gamete donor, male or female, from the 
parentage of the child born with his or her donated genetic material. It is therefore 
clear from the provisions of this section that a homosexual life partner who gives 
birth to the child is regarded as the child’s parent and only she acquires full parental 
responsibilities and rights in respect of the child in terms of section 19(1) of the 
Children’s Act. According to section 19(1), the biological mother of a child, whether 
married or unmarried, has full parental responsibilities and rights in respect of the 
child. Section 40(3) makes the parentage of the birth mother even clearer. In terms 
of this section no right, responsibility, duty or obligation arises between a child born 
of a woman as a result of artificial fertilisation and the gamete donor unless the 
donor is the child’s birth mother. This would suggest that it is only the birth mother 
who has to be regarded as the parent of the resulting child in this context and she 
inter alia has an obligation to maintain the child. In addition the child has a claim 
against her for maintenance. 
 
It is important to note that in line with section 40(3), if the woman who gives birth to 
the child merely offered her gestational function, in other words the egg from her life 
partner was fertilised with the male gamete from a male donor, the life partner of that 
woman may qualify as the biological mother, but she does not qualify as the child’s 
parent. The definition of parent in the Children’s Act excludes any person who is 
biologically related to a child by reason only of being a gamete donor for the 
purposes of artificial fertilisation.836   
 
In summary, in the context of this study, parental rights and responsibilities in 
homosexual families are acquired through artificial fertilisation and surrogate 
motherhood agreements. The Children’s Act makes a dinstinction between children 
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born in homosexual civil unions and life partnerships. In homosexual civil unions, the 
child is deemed born to married parents and consequently both parents have 
parental responsibilities and rights in respect of the child provided that they 
consented to the artificial fertilisation. However, in homosexual life partnerships, the 
child is regarded as born to unmarried parents, and consequently only the birth 
mother has parental rights and responsibilities on the child. This distinction raises an 
issue related to the best interests of the child that will be discussed in the next 
section. 
 
5.8  THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE 
 TECHNOLOGIES-BORN CHILD IN THE HOMOSEXUAL FAMILY 
 
Assisted reproductive technologies have made possible a variety of families and 
have enabled infertile couples and individuals as well as gay men and lesbians to 
have children. Children resulting from the use of ARTs are referred to in this section 
as ART-born children. The discussion of the best interests of ART-born children 
consists in the application of the best interests criterion to their situations. In other 
words, it is important to ask whether children born through ARTs and growing up in 
homosexual families in South Africa have their best interests adequately protected. 
 
5.8.1  The application of the best interests of the child criterion to ARTs-born 
 children 
 
As already stated above the application of the best interests of the child criterion will 
consist in the balancing of all the interests in presence rather than the triumph of the 
child’s interests over the interests of other individuals involve.837 
 
In the application of the best interests of the child criterion the process of balancing 
different interests in presence will take into consideration the harm that ARTs impose 
on children. As mentioned in chapter three,838 the harm can be either physical or 
psychological. 
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223 
 
5.8.1.1  Considering physical harm  
 
In South Africa, the best interests of the child criterion can be applied to ARTs-born 
children in order to establish if the best interests of those children are adequately 
protected. In fact as already stated above,839 in South Africa, every child has the 
right that his or her best interests are of paramount importance in every matter 
concerning him or her.840 If the child’s best interests is to be a criterion in ARTs, it is 
important to identify the relevant factors that need to be taken into consideration 
when applying this criterion. The Children’s Act provides a list of factors to be taken 
into consideration when applying the best interests of the child criterion. These 
include the need to protect the child from any physical or psychological harm that 
may be caused by subjecting the child to maltreatment, abuse, neglect, exploitation 
or degradation or exposing the child to violence or other harmful behaviour;841 or 
exposing the child to maltreatment, abuse, degradation, ill-treatment, violence, or 
harmful behaviour towards another person.842 These factors are relevant for the 
application of the best interests of the child criterion to ARTs-born children. 
 
Assisted reproductive technologies procedures have been proven to be harmful to 
children resulting from these techniques.843 It was proven that many embryo 
manipulations lead to the child being born with a number of health problems, 
including low birth weight which is in turn a cause of many other health problems. In 
most of ART births, it is common that twins, triplets or quadruplets are born with a 
very low weight and require extra care after birth.844 The question that arises is 
whether the protection of the child under section 7 of the Children’s Act could be 
extended to embryos. 
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The answer to this question can be controversial. In light of the South African 
Constitution, the life of every person, including the child, is protected.845 Although in 
Christian Lawyers Association of South Africa v The Minister of Health,846 the 
Transvaal Provincial Division (as it was then known) of the South African High Court 
held that there is no constitutional right to life before birth, it can be argued that there 
is judicial, legislative and even doctrinal protection of the unborn child’s life. Since 
the protection of life before birth is critical for the purpose of this thesis, it appears 
important to discuss briefly this protection. 
 
(a) The doctrinal protection of the unborn child 
 
Two major theories exist with regard to the inception of life. These are the theory of 
the beginning of life at conception and the theory of the beginning of life at live birth. 
The former theory is referred to as the “life begins at conception theory”, and the 
latter is referred to as the “live birth” theory.847 According to the life begins at birth 
theory, an embryo is viewed as an actual life rather than a potential life. For this 
reason, the theory forbids any non-therapeutic experimentation on a human embryo. 
However, this does not suggest that the advocates of this theory classify an embryo 
as a person; rather they deem it to be a human being.848 The live birth theory in 
contrast maintains that there is no life until the child is born alive.849 In line with the 
theory, Feldman points out that a living person should be for his or her life 
independent from another human person, and in the view of the fact that the foetus 
is part of its mother and not an independent entity; it should not be deemed a living 
person.850 
 
                                                          
845
 Section 11 of the Constitution. 
846
  1998 (11) BCLR 1434 (T) at 24-25. 
847
  Lupton “The legal status of the embryo” 1998 LM 204. 
848
  Lupton 1998 LM 204. 
849
  Ibid. 
850
  Feldman Marital Relations, Birth Control and Abortion in Jewish Law 253 (as quoted by 
Lupton 1998 AJ 204). 
225 
 
These two theories are extreme as to the moment of the beginning of the life as 
Lupton clearly points out.851 There is therefore a necessity for a theory that can draw 
from the two theories and constitute a theory of mediation. That theory is the 
nasciturus theory or fiction. This theory or fiction takes into account the fact that the 
unborn child is not a legal person and therefore does not have rights, duties and 
capacities; and the fact that the unborn child may eventually become a legal subject 
in situations that may arise before its birth provided that the child was already 
conceived at the time the situation arises and will subsequently be born alive.852 
According to Heaton, in such a situation the law provides protection of the interests 
of the unborn child by employing the fiction or theory that the child is regarded as 
being born at the time of his or her conception whenever this happens to be to his or 
her advantage. It is this fiction that is referred to as the nasciturus fiction.853 There 
are many situations that may cause the application of the nasciturus fiction or theory, 
however only two situations will be discussed as this stage while others will be 
discussed below. 
 
The nasciturus fiction can be used for the purpose of protecting the interests of the 
unborn child in case of intestate succession. According to the rules of intestate 
succession a person can inherit from another person if he or she is alive at the time 
that the estate falls open and generally speaking this is at the time of the death of the 
deceased. However, although a child was not born at the moment the testator dies, 
he or she can inherit when the nasciturus fiction is applied. This would suggest that 
the nasciturus fiction will postpone the distribution of the estate until it can be 
determined with certainty whether a live child was born or not. In this case, if the 
child is born alive, he or she will inherit as if his or her birth took place before the 
death of the deceased.854 It is important to note that in this case, a person has died 
without leaving a valid will and the person’s estate devolves in terms of the law of 
intestate succession. But if a person dies and leaves a valid will, this will lead us to 
the second application of the nasciturus fiction for the purpose of the protection of 
the unborn interests. 
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The other situation in which the nasciturus fiction can be applied to protect the 
interests of the unborn child is in the case of testate succession. It should be noted 
that different scenarios are possible here. It can happen that in his or her will, a 
person leaves a company to his son or grandson, who is to be born; the beneficiaries 
will inherit regardless of whether or not they had been conceived at the time the 
testator died. The intention must in this case be carried out and the unborn child will 
inherit provided that he or she is born alive.855 The other scenario is in the case a 
person did not specify the name of the beneficiaries in his will; rather he or she 
appointed the beneficiaries as a group. If in the group there is a child who was 
already conceived at the moment the testator died but was born after the testator’s 
death, such a child can inherit by the aid of the nasciturus fiction. It can similarly 
happen that a person leaves a farm property to persons who will be born decades 
after his death. This is for example the case of a person who leaves a company of 
cars manufacturing to his son, Enoch subject to the proviso that the company will 
devolve on Enoch’s son Ariel and that after Enoch and Ariel death, on Ariel’s son, 
Winner. This institution is commonly known as a fiduciaries or fiduciary and Ariel and 
Winner are the fideicommissarii or fideicommissaries.856  
 
It is clear from the above discussion that under certain circumstances, the interests 
of the unborn child are protected when the nasciturus fiction or theory is applied. It is 
important to note that through judicial activities, the application of the nasciturus 
fiction has also played an important role in the protection of the unborn child’s 
interests. 
 
(b) The judicial protection of the unborn child 
 
South African courts have in a number of cases held that the life of an unborn child is 
worthy of protection. The first case in which the South African court applied the 
nasciturus fiction in the field of the law of delict is Chisholm v East Rand Property 
Mines Ltd.857 In this case, the court reached a very important decision in line with the 
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protection of the unborn child. The court held that if a man or a woman is killed as a 
result of a third person’s delict prior to the birth of the child his wife or the woman 
who is expecting, such a child has a dependent’s action for damages for loss of 
support against the perpetrator of the delict. It must be noted in these cases that the 
child must be born alive.858 Such an action is known as the dependent’s action for 
loss of support and protects the unborn child’s interests of growing up in acceptable 
conditions with adequate financial, material and psychological support. 
 
In another case, Pinchin v Santam Insurance Co Ltd,859 the court had to determine 
whether a person has an action for injury that was inflicted on him or her while he or 
she was still an unborn child in the womb of his or her mother. The case involved a 
pregnant woman who was injured as a result of motor accident which resulted in the 
expected child being born with brain damage. The child’s father argued that the brain 
damage was caused by the negligent behavior of the driver of the other motor 
vehicle and claimed damages in respect of medical expenses regarding the child 
and satisfaction for the infringement of the child’s personality rights.860 On the behalf 
of the court, Hiemstra J admitted that the only starting point in South African 
common law sources for the protection of the interests of the foetus can be found in 
the nasciturus fiction. The court added that there were no good reasons for an 
unborn child to be regarded as a bearer of legal rights for the purposes of property 
but not for life and limb.  
 
In Pinchin the court was of the view that the nasciturus fiction could be applied in the 
law of delict, a view that proved to be controversial. Most authors hold the view that it 
the issue which arose in Pinchin could have been solved by using the ordinary 
principles of the law of delict, which would have given the child an action for pre-
natal injuries anyway. They argue that is was not necessary to use the nasciturus 
fiction to give a child an action for pre-natal injuries.861 
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In Road Accident Fund v Mtati862 the Supreme Court of Appeal settled the issue, 
deciding that it is unnecessary to use the nasciturus fiction to award a child an action 
for pre-natal injuries. The case involved a pregnant woman who was, as in the 
Pinchin case, injured as a result of a motor vehicle accident, allegedly causing her 
expected child to be born with brain damage and mental disability. The child’s father 
instituted a claim against the Road Fund Accident on behalf of his child because in 
his view the brain damage was a result of the accident. In opposition to this claim, 
the Road Accident Fund contended that the unborn child is not a person and as such 
has no right to compensation. The Road Accident Fund further contended that in 
view of the fact that an unborn child is not a person, the alleged negligent driver does 
not owe a duty of care to him or her. The court dismissed the plea of the Road 
Accident Fund, whereupon it appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal, which in turn 
rejected the appeal. 
 
Even though the court did not apply the nasciturus fiction in the Mtati case, the case 
is significant for this discussion as the court was prepared to protect the interests of 
an unborn child by awarding him or her an action for pre-natal injuries. The cases 
discussed here are evidence of how South African courts have worked towards the 
protection of the unborn child. However, this did not end the efforts of protecting the 
unborn child. Legislative activities also have played a role in this regard. 
 
(c)  The legislative protection of the unborn child 
 
In South Africa, a number of statutes seem to protect the rights of an unborn child. 
These include the the Prisons Act 8 of 1959, the Immovable Property (Removal or 
Modification of Restrictions) Act 94 of 1965, the General Law Amendment Act 62 of 
1955, and the Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965. In terms of the Prisons Act 2 
of 1975, female convicted who are in advanced stage of pregnancy are released 
unconditionally.863 Section 33(1) of the General Amendment Act 62 of 1955 and 
                                                          
862
 Road Accident Fund v Mtati 2005 (6) 215 (SCA). 
863
 Section 7 of the Prisons Act 2 of 1975. 
229 
 
sections 44 and 94 of the Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965 protect the 
interests of fideicommisaries and other hereditary interests of an unborn heir. 
 
It should be noted that from a medical perspective, life starts in the womb and any 
harm done to the child in the womb of his or her mother will certainly manifest when 
the child is born. It is important to note that some countries in the world, including 
Italy, are now expressly protecting the rights of the embryo. In Italy, Chapter IV of 
Law 40 is entitled “Measures for the protection of the embryo”. Article 13 of Law 40 
sets limits for scientific research on human embryos. The law prohibits 
experimentation on human embryos. Research is allowed only for therapeutic and 
diagnostic purposes for the embryo’s benefit. The production of human embryos for 
research or experimentation is prohibited, as well as any form of eugenic selection of 
embryos and gametes. Cloning and fertilisation of human gametes with gametes of a 
different species is also prohibited. Article 14 limits the use of the existing techniques 
for medically assisted procreation. The law prohibits cryopreservation, the production 
of a “number of embryos exceeding those necessary for a single, simultaneous 
transfer and in any case not more than three”. It permits short-term cryopreservation 
only when the transfer is impossible due to major health reasons. Lastly, it prohibits 
embryo reduction in twin pregnancies.864 This is a good starting point in the 
protection of life and a good inspiration for South Africa. 
 
This being said, it can be argued that ART procedures are not in the best interests of 
the child to the extent that they harm the child and violate his or her right to be 
protected from any physical harm as protected under section 7 of the Children’s Act. 
However, it is important to remember that it is only through these procedures that 
children are born to homosexuals. The situation of children born as a result of ARTs 
is complex. The child could be exposed to harmful behaviours while in the womb of 
his or her mother, which harmful behaviours cause the defects that may manifest at 
birth. 
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In summary, the above discussion has provided a controversial answer to the 
question whether ARTs can serve the best interests of the child. While some 
scholars argue that the procreative right extends to the use of ARTs irrespective of 
the harm it causes to the resulting children, others who have applied the best 
interests of the child criterion to ARTs have concluded that ARTs solely serve the 
interests of the prospective parents and not the interests of the child born through 
these procedures. 
 
Some children born as a result of ARTs are growing up in homosexual families. It 
appears therefore important to analyse whether being born of ARTs and growing up 
in homosexual families can serve the best interest of the child. 
 
5.8.1.2  Considering psychological harm 
 
The answer to the question whether being born of ARTs and growing up in 
homosexual families can serve the best interests of the child requires a close 
examination of the experience of the child born of ARTs to homosexual parent(s). 
 
Generally speaking, a child born of ARTs as already said in the second chapter of 
this study,865 is characterised by the absence of a genetic link with at least one of the 
parents. In some cases there is no genetic link at all between the couple parenting 
the child and the child who is legally their child. In addition, some prospective 
parents opting to use ARTs prefer to use gametes from unknown donors. The 
reasons behind this option include the stability of the couple and the avoidance of a 
third party in the child-rearing process.866 However, these situations might have 
some implications for the child’s right to preserve his or her identity and the right to 
know his or her genetic origins.867  
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In short, some authors are of the view that the identity of the donors should not be 
disclosed to ARTs-born children, others view the disclosure as advantageous for 
ARTs-born children while some others suggest that children should reach the age of 
majority before accessing to their genetic parents information. 
 
5.8.1.3 Considering laws regulating assisted reproductive technologies 
 
A close examination of the surrogacy agreements or contracts in South Africa 
reveals that, these contracts are concluded solely in the interests of the prospective 
parents to the detriment of resulting children. Furthermore, a close look at the validity 
of the surrogate motherhood agreement reveals no reference to the best interests of 
the child. The Act requires the drafting of a valid contract for the surrogate 
motherhood arrangement. The High Court must confirm the agreement if it meets 
certain requirements as set out in the Act.868 The contract reduces the risk of a 
breach of the surrogate motherhood arrangement and consequent litigation. An 
ordinary surrogate motherhood contract involves an agreement between the 
commissioning couple and the surrogate mother who undertakes to bear a child for 
them, handing it over after birth, thus terminating any parental responsibilities and 
rights she may have over the child.869 
 
Artificial fertilisation is regulated in South Africa under the National Health Act. A 
closer analysis of the provisions of this Act reveals that the South African approach 
to artificial fertilisation does not take into consideration the best interests of the child. 
One of the critical steps in the artificial fertilisation procedure is the transfer of the 
embryo from the test tube to the woman’s body. The number of children to be born 
and most importantly the quality of those children depend on the number of embryos 
transferred. As indicated in chapter 3,870 the larger the number of embryos 
transferred, the larger the number of children to be born who could potentially have 
health problems. However, at odds with this scientific reality, the National Health Act 
allows the transfer of not less than two embryos. In fact, in terms of the Act, no more 
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than three zygotes or embryos may be transferred to the recipient during an embryos 
transfer procedure, unless there is a specific medical indication to the contrary.871 
This would suggest that in every embryo transfer procedure, the maximum number 
of embryos to be transferred should be three embryos.  
 
It is important to note that when three embryos are transferred, there is a high 
probability for all three children to develop to maturity in the womb of the recipient, 
resulting in the birth of triplets. In other words, South African regulation of artificial 
fertilisation is likely to condemn children who are born as a result of ARTs to be born 
with several birth defects and health problems as discussed in chapter 3 of this 
study.872 
 
The impact of the non-disclosure of the identity of gamete donors has been 
discussed at length in this chapter.873 However, despite the psychological troubles 
associated with the anonymity of the donor, the National Health Act requires the 
identity of the donor to be kept secret. Section 18 of the Act reads as follows: 
 
“No person shall disclose the identity of any person who donated a gamete or 
received a gamete, or any mater related to artificial fertilisation of such gametes, or 
reproduction resulting from such artificial fertilisation except where a law provides 
otherwise or a court so orders.”874  
 
This would suggest that the South African regulation of artificial fertilisation does not 
take into consideration the rights of the child to know his or her origins. 
 
5.9  INTERIM CONCLUSION 
 
The overview of the recognition of homosexual families in South African law has 
revealed that although homosexuality was prohibited and severely punished under 
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the apartheid regime, it was a reality for many South Africans irrespective of their 
race and culture. The bar on homosexuality during the apartheid period led to a long 
struggle for the recognition of gay and lesbian rights, which in turn resulted in the 
recognition of homosexual relationships under the democratic constitutional 
dispensation. The legal recognition of homosexual relationships is one of the steps in 
the recognition of homosexual families in South Africa. 
 
Like in the USA and Australia, homosexual relationships are legally recognised in 
South Africa as civil unions or life partnerships. Different rights are conferred on 
homosexual people in terms of each of these models of recognition. The models of 
recognition of homosexual relationships as civil unions and life partnerships raised a 
number of issues, some of which were related to the emancipation of homosexuals’ 
rights and others to the solemnisation of marriages. The analysis of civil unions and 
life partnerships reveals that the law offers two different levels of protection 
respectively to homosexual couples who decided to marry and those who have 
chosen to cohabit. To the former, the law grants almost all the rights that 
heterosexual marriage bestows and in the case of the latter, there seems to be no 
protection either for the partners or for their children.  
 
The analysis of the process of building families through ARTs in South Africa reveals 
that although ARTs have been a solution to infertile couples by enabling them to 
have children, it has also created some problems related to the health of the 
resulting children. Children born as a result of ARTs are exposed to different harmful 
treatments resulting from different manipulations on the embryo. These treatments 
seem to be in the sole interests of the parents and could result in the child being 
born with several health challenges that will keep him or her from developing to the 
fullest of his potential like all other children. I am not arguing that all ART procedures 
result in a sick or disabled child; however, there seems to be no guarantee that the 
resulting child will not face such challenges.  
 
It can therefore be concluded that the family in South Africa has undergone changes 
to include homosexual families. The legal recognition of homosexual relationships in 
South Africa raised some questions related to the best interests of the child. The 
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establishment of parentage in life partnerships, for instance, is one of the examples 
of the differential treatment of children born to homosexual couples in South Africa. 
This leads to the conclusion that it is not always in the child’s best interests to grow 
up in a homosexual family. The application of the best interests of the child criterion 
to ARTs in South Africa and later in the USA and Australia reveals that for several 
reasons, including the harm that ARTs cause to children, the adult-centric focus of 
these procedures, the violation of the child’s right to preserve his or her identity and 
the child’s loss of her or his genetic origins; these procedures can be regarded as 
contrary to the best interests of the ARTs-born child. 
 
There thus appears to be a conflict between the right of parents to reproduce and the 
right of the child to have his or her best interests considered as paramount in every 
matter concerning him or her. The question that arises is how this conflict will be 
solved? The next chapter will provide a proposal of solution to this question. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
HOMOSEXUAL FAMILIES IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
As indicated earlier in this thesis, homosexual families are a result of the relationship 
or union between two men or two women.875 For many years, the unions between 
two men and two women were illegal throughout the world. In fact, before the dawn 
of the twenty-first century, no nation or state had ever legalised the union between 
man and man or woman and woman. But nowadays, these unions are a legal reality 
and the movement to legalise these unions is riding a wave of popularity that seems 
to be growing, especially among cultural elites in many affluent western nations. By 
1989, only a few north western European nations had created a separated, 
marriage-like legal status for homosexual people. By 2007 the union between two 
women or two men had been fully legalised in five nations in Europe, the USA and 
Africa. These include the Netherlands (2000), Belgium (2003), Spain (2005), South 
Africa (2005) and in the American state of Massachusetts.876 It is interesting to note 
that the list of countries that have legalised homosexual unions in the world has been 
recently expanded. Twenty one countries in the world, including the USA have now 
legalised homosexual marriage nationwide.877 
 
Efforts towards the legalisation of homosexual relations in the USA were aimed at 
seeking to obtain a change of the laws regulating marriage. Advocates of the 
legalisation of homosexual unions sought to achieve this mission by through litigation 
and legislation.878 The impact of the efforts of advocates of the legalisation of 
homosexual relationships was significant. Similar efforts were undertaken in other 
countries worldwide. Several other nations, especially in Europe and former 
European colonies, followed the path of the countries mentioned above and enacted 
                                                          
875
  See paras 1.1 and 2.2 above. 
876
  Wardle “A response to the ‘conservative case’ for same-sex marriage and the tragedy of the 
commons’ 2007 BYUJPL 443. 
877
  CNN “Map: Same-sex marriage in the Unites States” (26 June 2015), available at 
 http://edition.cnn.com/interactive/us/map-same-sex-marriage (date of use 21 July 2015). 
878
  Wardle “A critical analysis of constitutional claims for same-sex marriages” 1996 BYULR 8. 
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laws granting to homosexual couples limited economic protection similar to that 
given to heterosexual non-married couples.879 
 
In the USA, efforts of advocates of the legalisation of homosexual unions resulted in 
the creation of new legal domestic relations for homosexual couples, conferring on 
them the same or nearly equivalent legal status, rights and benefits as married 
couples. The evolution of the legalisation of homosexual relationships in the USA 
can be divided into two important periods. The first period is the period prior to the 
decision in Obergefell v Hodges.880 This period is essentially characterised by the 
wave of the legalisation of homosexual relationships only in few states. With the 
decision in Obergefell v Hodges, homosexual relationships were recognised in all the 
states in America. This wave of legalisation of homosexual relationships conferred to 
homosexual married couples the same rights and benefits that heterosexual married 
couples enjoy, including the right to be recognised on official documents such as 
birth and death certificates.881  
 
This chapter will analyse the legalisation of homosexual unions in the USA. It begins 
with a brief historical background of the legalisation of homosexual unions; it then 
discusses the legal position in the USA during the two periods of the evolution of the 
legalisation process before discussing the reasons for and against the legalisation of 
homosexual unions that were asserted by the proponents of the legalisation on one 
side and the opponents on the other side.  
 
The chapter will then discuss the legal status of homosexual unions, and the issues 
raised by the legalisation of homosexual unions. The chapter will further examine the 
establishment of parentage in the families created by gay men and lesbian women 
through ARTs in the USA. It will then analyse the implications of the legalisation of 
homosexual unions before ending with the discussion of the best interests of the 
child 
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6.2  THE LEGALISATION OF HOMOSEXUAL UNIONS IN THE UNITED 
 STATES OF AMERICA 
 
Before discussing the legalisation of homosexual unions in the United States of 
America it appears important to give a brief overview of the US legal system.  
 
The United States of America was founded as a union of thirteen colonies that 
claimed each its independence from the British Crown.882 However, it is now a 
federation made of fifty States.883 Like in Australia, the US system of government is 
divided into two levels, namely the federal and the state level.  
 
At the federal level, the US Constitution (the supreme law) establishes the federal 
system of government. It gives the powers to the federal government, establishes 
the judicial branch and specifies the authority of the federal courts.884 The Congress 
(federal parliament) has a limited legislative power. Section 9, article 1 of the 
Constitution for example forbids the Congress to pass ex post facto law (a law that 
applies retroactively) or law on levy tax on exports. Article I of section 8 of the 
Constitution lists areas where Congress may legislate. A proposal considered by the 
Congress is called “a Bill”. The Bill will become a law when it is voted by a two third 
majority of the Congress. The federal law is contained in a code which is a 
codification of the federal statutory law.885 
 
The federal judicial branch comprises the Supreme Court (the highest court), 
established by the US Constitution and the US distric courts as well as the US circuit 
courts of appeals established by the Congress. The US distric courts are courts of 
first instance in the federal system. There are 94 of them in the USA with at least one 
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in each state. The US circuit courts of appeals are regional courts on the next levels. 
Twelve of these courts are located in every region of the country.886 
 
Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction only on certain types of cases, such as 
cases involving federal laws, controversies between states, and cases involving 
foreign governments. In other areas federal courts share jurisdiction with state 
courts.887  
 
At state level, each state has its own state Constitution, which establishes the state 
government. Each state has also its own governmental structure, judiciary and legal 
code. The structure of the judicial branch varies from state to state. There is a 
highest court in each state (the State Supreme Court) that serves as an appeal 
court. In many states there are also intermediate appellate courts that hear appeals 
from the trial courts.888 
 
Each state has the power to legislate where the federal Constitution has not 
delegated the power to the Congress. However, the law adopted at the state level 
should not be inconsistent with the federal Constitution.889 
 
In addition to the Constitution, the other sources of law are the statutes passed by 
the congress, common law, a collection of judicial decisions, customs and general 
principles. It is important to note that all these sources of law can be used at federal 
and state level, and that the US Supreme Court’s precedents apply to all lower 
federal courts.890 
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Two important periods characterise the process of the legalisation of homosexual 
relationships in the USA as it was indicated in the introduction above. The discussion 
of the legalisation of homosexual relationships will therefore revolve around these 
two periods. 
 
6.2.1 The legalisation of homosexual unions prior to the decision in 
 Obergefell v Hodges 
 
The USA is a federation made up of 50 states. Prior to the decision in Obergefell v 
Hodges, homosexual marriage was recognised only in few states. The movement for 
the legalisation of homosexual unions focused on the extension of the definition of 
marriage for the purpose of including homosexual couples and the recognition of 
marriage benefits to homosexual couples. Advocates of the legalisation sought the 
recognition of the rights of homosexual couples through judicial and legislative 
activities.891 Their efforts were crowned by several judicial decisions and pieces of 
legislation that favoured their claims in many states. These efforts include at least 
eight major cases reported since 1980 involving claims for full or partial marital 
status or incidents for homosexual couples.892 Most of these cases were successful 
in that some courts had demonstrated increased sensitivity toward the claims made 
in favour of homosexual marriage. For example, in two cases respectively in 1989 
and 1991, homosexual partners successfully obtained some family status or benefits 
not specially limited to married couples but indicative of a domestic status similar to 
marriage.893 In 1993 the Hawaii Supreme Court in Behr v Lewin rendered a decision 
that contained sympathetic opinions in significant cases attacking heterosexual 
requirements for marriage.  
 
In this case, the Hawaii Court ruled that it is possible that heterosexuality 
requirements for marriage might violate the equal protection clause and the equal 
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892
  Wardle 2007 BYUJPL 445. 
893
  Brasch v Stahl Assocs. Co 543 NE 2d 49 (New York 1989). See also In re Guardianship of 
Kowalski 478 NW 2d 790 (Min CT 1991). 
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rights amendment of the state’s Constitution and remanded the case for trial on 
those issues.894  
 
This decision led to serious legislative consideration of partnerships in Hawaii. As a 
result of this judicial activity, the California legislature passed a Domestic Bill in 1994. 
The Bill provided official state registration of homosexual couples and limited marital 
rights and privileges relating to hospital visitation, wills and estates, and powers of 
attorney.895 Late in 1995, a Federal Appeal Court held that the right to participate in a 
religious homosexual marriage ceremony was entitled to special Constitutional 
protection as an “intimate association”.896   
 
It is important to note that these decisions were the precursor of some changes in 
the legislation of many states and counties in the USA. For example, the Lambda 
Legal Defense and Education Fund reported that by mid-1995, thirty-six 
municipalities, eight counties, three states, five state agencies, and two federal 
agencies extended some marital benefits to homosexual registered partnerships.897 
Following the decision of the Hawaii Court, the state of Hawaii legislature considered 
and introduced the Domestic Partnership Bill in 1996.898 A few years later, the courts 
of other states followed suit in granting the right to marry to homosexual couples. 
The decision of the Supreme Court in Vermont to grant homosexual couples the right 
to enter into civil unions in 2001, the decision to allow gay marriage in 
Massachusetts in 2004, and the performance of nearly 6000 homosexual marriages 
in San Francisco and in Multnomah County, Oregon, in 2004, are a few examples of 
that process.899 In other jurisdictions countrywide, local government officials briefly 
issued marriage certificates to homosexual partners until they were stopped by state 
courts or officials.  
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In 2004, that process resulted in the issuing of marriage certificates to 4037 couples 
in San Francisco, 3022 couples in Multnomah County, Oregon, 68 couples in 
Sandoval County, New Mexico, New York and New Jersey.900 
 
It is worth noting that efforts for the legalisation of homosexual unions were 
challenged in many other states and at the federal level. Counter-efforts were 
remarkably successful in several states and opponents of the legalisation of 
homosexual marriage succeeded to stop for a short period the running of the 
movement for the legalisation of gay and lesbian marriage in the USA. For example, 
in 1996 the United States’ Congress passed the Federal Defense of Marriage Act of 
1996 (“DOMA”).  
 
DOMA defines marriage as the union of one man and one woman, and exempts 
states from recognising marriages between two people of the same sex performed in 
another state.901 As a result of this federal legislation, several states enacted laws 
banning homosexual marriage within their jurisdictions.902 Despite the effect of these 
counter-efforts of the legalisation of homosexual unions, the success of the 
advocates of the legalisation of homosexual unions is somehow remarkable. In fact, 
as Herek points out, by early 2006 homosexual couples were first allowed to marry in 
Massachusetts. A few years later, six other states had enacted legislation granting 
various degrees of limited legal protections and benefits under the rubrics of civil 
unions (Vermont, Connecticut), domestic partnerships (California, New Jersey, 
Maine), and reciprocal beneficiary relationships (Hawaii).903 In addition, some states 
and local governmental entities offered limited benefits for the homosexual partners 
of their employees (eg access to group health insurance plans), as did many private 
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employers. Homosexual couples’ parental rights had statutory protection through 
second parent adoptions,904 in a handful of states, including California, Connecticut, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York and Vermont, as well as the District of 
Columbia.905  
 
In 2013, the evolution of the legalisation of homosexual relationships in the USA took 
a significant turn when the court struck down section 3 of DOMA in US v Windsor.906 
According to section 3 of DOMA, marriage is a union between a man and a woman 
for the purpose of federal laws.907 This decision marks a new era in the history of the 
legalisation of homosexual relationships in America, and was followed by legislative 
and judicial activities which ended up in the recognition of homosexual marriage in 
47 states.908 Although the decision in US v Windsor was a great victory in the 
process of legalising homosexual relationships in America, some homosexual 
couples were still suffering from the non-recognition of their relationships in some 
states. However, it can be argued that in spite of challenges that advocates of the 
legalisation of homosexual unions faced in some states, homosexual couples or 
families have been granted legal status. In fact, varying degrees of limited protection 
and benefits were granted to homosexual couples under different rubrics, including 
civil unions, domestic partnerships and to a certain extent marriage. The analysis of 
these rubrics is significant for the purpose of this thesis. Indeed, the legal status 
granted to homosexual relationships raises some issues that will be discussed 
further down in this section. 
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6.2.1.1  The legal status of homosexual unions  
 
Homosexual unions have been legally recognised in the USA as discussed above.909 
All states have enacted laws that give a legal status to homosexual unions within 
their jurisdictions. It is important to note that the legal status given to homosexual 
unions might differ from one state to another. Sometimes, a few states give the same 
legal status to homosexual unions within their jurisdictions. It is also important to 
note that rights conferred to homosexual couples by one jurisdiction might be 
different from those conferred by another jurisdiction. An analysis of some studies on 
the legalisation of homosexual unions reveals that homosexual unions in the USA 
have been recognised as civil unions, registered domestic partnerships and 
marriages.910 Each homosexual relationship status deserves to be analysed. 
 
6.2.1.1.1 Civil unions  
 
The first state in the USA to enact civil union laws was Vermont. The Civil Union Act 
passed by Vermont was all-encompassing in nature and offered comprehensive 
rights and benefits to same-sex couples.911 According to the Act, parties to a civil 
union shall have the same benefits, protections and responsibilities under the law, 
whether they derive from statute, administrative or court rule, policy, common law or 
any other sources of civil law, as granted to spouses in marriage.912 These rights and 
benefits include the ability to utilise the law of domestic relations in full, including 
annulment, separation, divorce, child support, child custody, division of property, and 
maintenance;913 the ability take advantage of the laws relating to title, ownership, 
                                                          
909
 See para 3.2 above. 
910
  Wardle “Who decides? The federal Architecture of DOMA and comparative marriage 
recognition” 2010 CWIJ 160-161; Sadler “Re-thinking civil unions and same-sex unions” 2008 
The Monist 578; Aloni “Incrementalism, civil unions, and the possibility of predicting legal 
recognition of same-sex marriage” 2010 DJGLP 110. 
911
  Bossin “Same-sex unions: The new civil rights struggle or assault on traditional marriage” 
2004 TLR 418. 
912
 Baehr v Miike 910 P.2d 112 (Haw. 1996). 
913
  American Bar Association Section of Family Law Working Group on Same-Sex Marriages and 
Non-Marital Unions An Analysis of the Law Regarding Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions, and 
Domestic Partnerships (a White Paper) 30-33, 59 fn 207-208 (2004), available at  
 http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/family/reports/WhitePaper.authcheckd
am.pdf (date of use 26 March 2015) (hereinafter “the White Paper”). The White Paper 
discusses the federal Defense of Marriage Act. 
244 
 
inheritance, decent, and distribution with respect to the ownership of real estate;914 
and the ability to utilise prohibitions against discrimination based on marital status.915 
The Act also states that the rights of parties to a civil union, with respect to a child of 
whom either becomes the natural parent during the term of the civil union, shall be 
the same as those of married couples.916  
 
Homosexual unions were legalised as civil unions in almost all states. States have 
created same-sex civil unions with all or most of the incidents and benefits of 
marriage.917 Although it can be argued that parties to civil unions have been offered 
all the rights offered to those entering marriage, some scholars argue that civil 
unions are different from marriage. Bossin, for example, argues that civil union is a 
legal status that is only available to homosexual people,918 and Isaac contends that 
even if civil unions provide full economic benefits, they fail to provide marriage’s 
intangible benefits, such as self-esteem, self-definition, and the stabilising influence 
of social expectations. Although these benefits may be less concrete than tax 
exemptions, they are no less constitutionally significant.919  
 
6.2.1.1.2 Registered domestic partnerships 
 
A registered domestic partnership is conceived of as a legal institution more or less 
analogous to marriage, essentially an intermediate level of recognition, sometimes 
referred to as “marriage lite”. A registered domestic partnership, like marriage, 
results in a number of legal rights and obligations between the couple and others, 
including the state, and contains actions that must be taken in order to terminate 
it.920  
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A registered domestic partnership takes different forms in different countries and 
states. For example, registered partnerships in Great Britain provide same-sex 
couples all the rights and benefits that are offered to opposite-sex couples. 
Conversely, in France, Finland, Ireland, and Austria, gay couples cannot jointly adopt 
even if their domestic partnerships are registered. In addition, couples in civil unions 
are often required to demonstrate more committed behaviour, such as living together 
for a number of years, while married couples are not required to behave similarly in 
order to register.921 
 
In the USA, some states have recognised homosexual unions as registered 
domestic partnerships. A number of American states enacted laws recognising 
homosexual unions as registered domestic partnerships. For example, early in 2005, 
the State of California passed a Domestic Partnership Registration Act.922 This Act 
became almost the equivalent of Vermont’s civil union laws in terms of the rights and 
benefits bestowed upon partners of civil unions.923 The California Domestic 
Partnership Registration Act provides as follows: 
 
“The rights of parties to a civil union, with respect to a child of whom either spouse 
becomes the natural parent during the term of the civil union, shall be the same as 
those of a married couple, with respect to a child of whom either spouse becomes the 
natural parent during the marriage”.924 
 
On 16 January 2004, New Jersey passed a Domestic Partners Act. While it grants 
many rights to domestic partners that are available to married couples, it is not as 
sweeping or all-encompassing as the laws in Vermont and California and does not 
purport to make domestic partners the equivalent of spouses.925 
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The situation in Massachusetts is a bit different. Massachusetts is the first American 
state to legalise homosexual marriage.926 In this process, Massachusetts started by 
decriminalising sodomy laws and adopted anti-discrimination laws protecting lesbian, 
gay and bisexual people in 1998, but only offered an extremely limited domestic 
partnership registry.927  
 
Usually, domestic partnership schemes provide substantial rights, including rights 
such as the right to remain in a rent-controlled apartment after the domestic partner 
and leaseholder dies, to visit the domestic partner in a city hospital, and (in the case 
of the partners of the city employees) to access subsidised health insurance.928  
 
However, several cities and towns in Massachusetts have offered a more expansive 
recognition of domestic partnership, including medical benefits. The Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled in 1999 that the city of Boston did not have the 
power to expand the reach of the state insurance laws by including domestic 
partners in the group health system.929 This would suggest that there was only 
minimal legal recognition of homosexual unions, and Massachusetts did not offer the 
option of civil union or domestic partnership registration when the court decision was 
handed down.930 
 
It must be noted that the rights granted by civil unions and domestic partnerships are 
limited compared to those granted by marital status. In this regard, Bossin points out 
as follows: 
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“Several other states have enacted legislation offering certain specific benefits to 
same-sex partners, such as health insurance for state employees, but these laws are 
extremely limited in scope. Many municipalities also offer limited benefits, such as 
health insurance for their employees.”931 
 
This would suggest that marital status is the only legal status that offers a full range 
of rights to parties, and this status was historically reserved to the union of a man 
and a woman. However, as of 2013, with the decision in US v Windsor as indicated 
above, some American states enacted laws allowing homosexual people to marry. 
 
6.2.1.1.3 Marriage 
 
Like in many other countries, marriage in the United States is registered as civil 
marriage. Civil marriage is a registered partnership between two persons that results 
in a number of legal rights and obligations between partners and others including the 
state. Family law regulates the numerous aspects of civil marriage, including its 
termination.932 Merin points out that marriage is and continues to be the privileged 
and preferred legal status in Europe and the USA and provides the most expansive 
recognition of rights by the state.933 
 
Although at the federal level marriage is allowed only between two persons of 
opposite sex, the position is different at state level, as some states have allowed 
homosexual couples to enter into marriage. In fact, according to the Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA) enacted by the United States Congress in 1996, marriage is a 
legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife.934 This would 
suggest that for purposes of interpreting federal laws, federal regulations, and rulings 
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made by federal agencies, the term marriage and spouse do not include homosexual 
unions.935  
 
However, in the USA, the approach to applicable law issues in the entire family area 
has been almost left completely to the individual states and there is no federal 
conflicts rule on the issues of marriage or divorce. As to the validity of marriage in 
the United States, it is state law that determines the applicable law, just as the direct 
regulation of substantive domestic relations has been left entirely to the individual 
state.936 In other words, in the USA, family law is the law of the individual states; 
marriage and its dissolution, support and inheritance rights, legitimation, adoption 
and custody are all matters of state law.937 As a result, all states in the United States 
legalised homosexual marriage.938 In these states, all benefits (except the federal 
benefits which are substantial) provided to heterosexual married couples by states 
are conferred upon homosexual couples.939 
 
This would suggest that the federal state and its agencies treated heterosexual 
married couples differently from homosexual couples. In fact, prior to the decision in 
US v Windsor and Obergefell v Hodges, at the federal level as argued above,940 
homosexual couples were not allowed to get married in terms of section 3 of DOMA, 
and according to DOMA no state within the USA is compelled to recognise 
homosexual marriage registered in another state. This raises issues that will be 
discussed in the following section. 
 
6.2.1.2 Issues raised by the legalisation of homosexual unions 
 
By legalising homosexual unions within its territory, the United States major 
problems related to the consequences of that legalisation arose. These include the 
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second class status or marital-like status given to homosexual unions, and the 
interstate recognition of homosexual unions within the USA. 
 
6.2.1.2.1 Second class status or marital-like status 
 
Scholars and commentators believe that by legalising homosexual unions under 
different statutes, as domestic partnerships, civil unions and marriage, and by 
awarding homosexual couples registered under domestic partnerships and civil 
unions less benefits than those who enter the marriage regime, civil unions and 
domestic partnerships are given a second class status. 
 
In fact, some scholars, including Badgett, share the belief that individuals have an 
incentive to marry because it is an efficient institution that provides economic 
benefits and that is a public good.941 The more marriage is associated with such 
benefits, the more individuals seeking to improve their economic situation will desire 
marriage. Therefore, individuals in homosexual relationships, especially those with 
property or children, would have the same economic incentive as individuals in 
heterosexual couples to desire access to the legal framework created by marriage, in 
addition to any other customary benefits of being married.942  
 
This would suggest that civil unions, domestic partnership and marriage as 
discussed above are the result of the efforts of homosexual peoples who seek all the 
benefits that marriage offers. It can therefore be argued that if civil unions and 
partnerships provided all the benefits associated with marriage, the homosexual 
community would not fight for marital status. However, the economic benefits 
accrued by marriage have consistently been one of the main engines of the battle for 
the legalisation of homosexual marriage. This means, as argued above, that civil 
unions and domestic partnerships grant only limited rights to homosexual couples 
who enter into these forms of legal relationships.  
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250 
 
In fact, it has been proven that there is a difference between civil unions, domestic 
partnerships and marriage.943 According to Eskridge, civil unions are actually a kind 
of “equality practice”, inter alia because they are a necessary temporary stage on the 
way to homosexual marriage. The theory of small change that was used by the 
courts and legislature in the process of legalising homosexual unions in the USA 
informs that civil unions and domestic partnerships are a necessary stage before 
homosexual marriage, because without it, the public is unprepared for homosexual 
marriage. The theory of small change thus situates marriage as the final stage.944 
 
Civil unions and domestic partnerships are different from marriage not only because 
of the limited rights conferred on parties but also because of their adverse effects on 
the parties. In this regard, it has been reported that civil unions and domestic 
partnerships have negative effects on the physical and mental health of homosexual 
couples and their children due to the stigma of living in a separate but equal regime. 
Some employers do not extend to couples in civil unions the rights and benefits that 
they grant to married couples.945 
 
However, other scholars and commentators reject this view and argue that civil 
unions and domestic partnerships are not the second class and that marriage is not 
the final stage in the process of legalisation of homosexual unions. They argue that it 
is the value that societies give to the institution of marriage that matters. According to 
Budgett, for example, in countries where the value of marriage has declined, the 
chances of achieving legal recognition of homosexual relationships are higher. Thus, 
civil unions usually take place in countries where marriage is less meaningful on a 
societal level. A large number of cohabiting unmarried opposite-sex couples has 
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proved to demonstrate the declining material importance of marriage in particular 
states or countries.946  
 
McCaffrey additionally confirms that in such countries and states, homosexuals who 
achieve all the benefits offered by marriage are probably less passionate about the 
fight for homosexual marriage.947 It is likely that in such circumstances, homosexuals 
feel less discriminated against and have less motivation to fight for homosexual 
marital status.948  
 
Some authors argue that the homosexual community is fighting for the recognition of 
marital status because to them, marriage is the final stage or the final goal of their 
struggle. Based on the experience of some European countries, Waaldijk argues that 
the fact that registered partnership laws were enacted in the Netherlands did not 
silence the call for opening up of marriage; rather it increased the social and political 
pressure on the issue. This would suggest that homosexual communities were 
fighting for nothing less than marriage. Waaldijk goes on to argue that the whole 
legislative process leading to the introduction of registered partnerships and joint 
custody served to highlight the remaining discrimination caused by the exclusion of 
homosexual couples from marriage.949 He adds that many homosexual couples 
choose not to register partnerships because of their commitment to homosexual 
marriage.950 
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Merin shares this view, contending that civil unions are still a necessary step on the 
way to homosexual marriage, because only then will the state be ready in terms of 
its socio-political and legal climate to move to the next stage.951 
 
Shipman and Smart reject the idea that marriage is the final goal of the homosexual 
community’s activism. They argue that the vision that marriage is the final goal of the 
efforts of the homosexual movement is not representative of the goals of the 
homosexual community in Europe. They go on to argue that the evidence 
demonstrated that many Europeans are most interested in securing partnership 
rights and not marriage. For example, Great Britain’s largest and most influential 
Lesbian Gay and Bisexual (“LGB”) organisation, Stonewall, does not advocate the 
goal of homosexual marriage. Rather, the organisation advances the idea that civil 
partnership is preferable to marriage because it should be seen a twenty-first century 
means of recognising modern relationships and that it is preferable to attempting to 
radicalise the traditional notion of marriage.952 
 
Similarly, the Lesbian and Gay Federation in Germany (“LSVD”), one of Germany’s 
largest LGB organisations, is proud of the achievement of lifetime partnership laws 
and regularly works for the improvement of the benefits accompanying it. The 
website of this organisation states as follows: 
 
“Only ten years after our foundation we were successful in obtaining a registered 
partnership law in Germany. This means that we convinced the German Parliament 
and society that equal rights for gay and lesbian couples are necessary for modern, 
democratic society. Nevertheless, we still have to struggle for equal rights in areas 
like taxation and pension laws, adoption and child custody.”953 
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In short, the issue of second class status of civil unions and domestic partnerships is 
controversial. Some scholars view civil union and domestic partnerships as having 
second class status because these unions and partnerships grant some of the rights 
granted to married couples. Other scholars in contrast view these statuses as equal 
to marriage as long as those who enter into these forms of homosexual unions are 
granted all the rights of married couples.  
 
Similarly, while some scholars view civil unions and domestic partnerships as a 
necessary step toward the legalisation of homosexual unions and thus consider 
marriage as the final goal of the LGB movement, some other scholars argue that the 
final goal of the LGB movement is rather the legal recognition of civil partnerships. 
 
In the USA, this discussion takes a different turn. Some American homosexual 
organisations, including the Lambda Legal Defense and Educational Fund, the 
largest LGB organisation in the country, are fighting for both civil union and marital 
status. For example, the New Jersey Civil Union Watch, one of the movements 
within the Lambda, is working toward the goal of marriage equality.954 Halley 
reported in justification of the Lambda position that there are good reasons for 
working on securing partnership rights rather than focusing solely on homosexual 
marriage as the final goal of the LGB movement. Marriage does not offer relief from 
discrimination against LGB individuals who do not seek life in marriage-like 
relationships. Moreover, LGB people who do not live in marriage-like relationships 
will be subjected to additional discrimination if married versus unmarried distinction 
gains cultural value.955 Similarly, some feminists view marriage as a harmful 
institution and thus urge the LGB community not to pursue it. Chambers, for 
example, based on a review of numerous feminist accounts of marriage, contends 
that marriage’s practical effects on women make them worse off because marriage 
reinforces the gendered division of labour and thus women earn less than men and 
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are less independent. Marriage also reinforces the notion that housework is primarily 
the domain of women, even if they work outside the home.956  
 
Another issue raised by the legalisation of homosexual unions is the recognition of a 
marriage registered in a state by another state within the territory of the USA. 
 
6.2.1.2.2 Interstate recognition of homosexual unions 
 
A survey of the legal position in the USA reveals confusion in respect of the legal 
status of homosexual unions. As discussed above, homosexual unions have been 
legally recognised as civil unions, registered domestic partnerships and civil 
marriages. While the US federal government did not recognise homosexual 
marriage, each state in the United States has enacted laws that regulate 
homosexual unions within its jurisdiction. However, not all the states recognise same 
rights to all homosexual individuals and couples. This would suggest that 
homosexual unions may receive different treatment in different states within the USA 
and at the federal level. 
 
At the federal level, The United States Congress passed the Defense of Marriage 
Act (“DOMA”) in 1996. This Act had two major implications on the institution of 
marriage in the USA. The Act contains two operative sections. Section two, the 
horizontal section, was designed to create federal protection against the growing 
threat that the legalisation of homosexual marriage in one state would open the door 
for, and encourage, judges to interpret federal law (particularly full faith and credit 
doctrine) in a manner that would force other states to recognise homosexual 
marriage over objections from the people and lawmakers in those states.957 Section 
2 of DOMA states as follows: 
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“No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be 
required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other 
State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the 
same sex that is treated as marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, 
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.958 
 
Section 3 of DOMA was intended to prevent judges and agency officials from using 
federal choice of law and interpretative principles to recognise homosexual 
marriages in federal laws, regulations and programs before congress decided such 
recognition was appropriate.959 In other words, this section creates the definition of 
marriage in determining the meaning of any act of the congress, or any ruling, 
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the 
United States. According to this section the word “marriage” means only a legal 
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word 
“spouse” refers only to the persons of the opposite sex who is a husband or a 
wife.960 
 
In summary, DOMA accomplished two purposes. First, the Act determined that no 
state would be required to give full faith and credit to a homosexual marriage 
performed in another state. Second, it defined marriage as a legal union between 
one man and one woman. 
 
Following DOMA, many states passed their own forms of DOMA with purposes 
similar to the federal one, each defining marriage as a union of a man and a woman 
and also providing that the state would not recognise a homosexual marriage 
concluded in another state. As of 2004 38 of the 50 states in the United States had 
passed such laws.961 
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Despite these laws in many states, the pressure of the LGB movement led the courts 
to take a different position. In 1998, an Alaska court held that denying homosexual 
couples the right to marry violated both the state constitutional right to privacy and 
the state constitutional right to be free from discrimination.962 In 1999, the Vermont 
Supreme Court also held that denying homosexual couples the same benefits and 
privileges granted to married couples, violated the common benefits clause of the 
Vermont Constitution.963 
 
The LGB movement also influenced the Supreme Court of the USA. The court in 
Lawrence v Texas964 ruled that the Texas statute that made it a crime for people of 
the same sex to engage in certain sexual conduct violated the due process clause of 
the Constitution, finding that the liberty protected by the Constitution allows 
homosexual adults to “choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their 
homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons”.965 
 
Similarly, in 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Goodridge v Department of 
Public Health,966 distinguished the federal Constitution from the Massachusetts 
Constitution and noted the following: 
 
“The Massachusetts Constitution is, if anything, more protective of individual liberty 
and equality than the federal Constitution; it may demand broader protection for 
fundamental rights; and it is less tolerant of government intrusion into the protected 
sphere of private life.” 
 
The court recognised the substantial benefits enjoyed by those in marriage and 
pointed out as follows:  
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“Because it fulfils yearnings for security, safe haven, and connection that express our 
common humanity, civil marriage is an esteemed institution and the decision whether 
and who to marry is among life’s momentous acts of self-definition”967  
 
The court then found that the marriage ban could not meet the rational basis test 
under either due process or equal protection analysis.968 As a result of this intensive 
judicial activity, many states reviewed their legislation and started enacting laws 
allowing homosexual couples to have a legal status in the USA. As discussed above, 
several states legalised homosexual relationships as civil unions, registered 
partnership and civil marriages. There are even states that did not pass any Act 
allowing or denying homosexual couples any of these legal statuses.969 
 
The issue is now that where in some states homosexual couples have a number of 
rights associated with their civil unions status, in others the rights are associated with 
the registered partnership status or marital status of other states. The question 
arises how a state that recognises only some of the rights associated with civil union 
status will treat a couple that moves to that state from a state where the couple 
concluded a registered domestic partnership or a marriage. It is important to note 
that, given the limited scope of this study, the intention is not to discuss this issue or 
to venture to answer the aforementioned question. Nevertheless, it seems 
reasonable to give the position of Wardle on this issue.  
 
Wardle believes the states that created the civil union status will likely recognise the 
civil union concluded in another state. This applies to registered domestic 
partnerships and marriage.970   
 
Homosexual couples in the USA are raising children that they had from their 
heterosexual unions or that they have through ARTs. This would suggest that 
homosexual couples are parenting their children. This is also the result of the 
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legalisation of homosexual unions. What then are the rights of homosexual couples 
as parents and how are these rights determined? The next section will try to answer 
these questions. 
 
6.2.2  Obergefell v Hodges and the legalisation of homosexual unions in 
 America 
 
The decision in Obergefell v Hodges971 marks the second important period in the 
process of legalising homosexual unions in the USA. This decision is viewed as a 
remedy to the problem of marriage equality that was prevailing in the USA. It makes 
it possible for all homosexual married couples to be treated the same under federal 
and states laws. It also grants a wide range of rights, responsibilities and obligations 
to homosexual couples.972 
 
6.2.2.1  The decision in Obergefell v Hogdes 
 
6.2.2.1.1  Summary of the facts 
 
The Obergefell v Hodges case involves two homosexual individuals, Mr James 
Obergerfell and Mr John Arthur James, residents of the state of Ohio in the USA. 
These two individuals were engaged in a homosexual marriage that was legally 
recognised in the state of Maryland in the USA. In the Ohio state, their home state, 
homosexual marriage is not legally recognised. Mr John Arthur James was 
diagnosed with a deadly disease and passed away few months before court 
proceedings began.  
 
Mr Obergefell and Mr James wanted Mr James to be recognised as married on his 
death certificate and by the same fact they wanted Mr Obergefell to be recognised 
as Mr James’ surviving spouse. They argued that the state of Ohio’s refusal to 
legally recognise marriages performed in other states and banning homosexual 
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marriage in Ohio violated the equal protection and due process clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. To this end they filed the case in 2013 in the US District 
Court for the Southern District of Ohio. 
 
On 22 July 2013, US District Judge Timothy Black granted a temporary restraining 
order that required the state to recognise the marriage of Mr Obergefell and Mr John 
Arthur James on Mr Arthur’s death certificate. 
 
On 16 January 2014, the Attorney General of the state of Ohio filed an appeal to 
reverse the decision of Black J and ordered the state of Ohio to recognise the 
marriage of homosexual individuals in terms of the issuing of death certificates. The 
matter was then transferred to the U.S. Supreme Court for decision. 
 
6.2.2.1.2  The decision 
 
In a majority judgement, the court rested its decision upon the fundamental right to 
marry. Referring to the decision in Washington v Glucksberg,973 where it was stated 
that in determining whether a right is fundamental, the Supreme Court looked into 
whether the right was historically and traditionally recognised, and whether failing to 
recognise the right would contravene liberty and justice. The court observed that the 
right to marry has long been found to be constitutionally protected. However, the 
court acknowledged that the precedents describing the right presumed a 
heterosexual union.974 The court further found that rights come not from ancient 
sources alone. They rise too from a better informed understanding of how 
constitutional imperatives define a liberty that remains urgent in our own era.975 The 
court therefore held that the fundamental right to marry includes homosexual 
couples’ right to marry.976  
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In a minority judgement, the court held that the majority should not have resolved the 
hotly contested issue of homosexual marriage for the entire country; such resolution 
should come from the people.977 They also held that the majority was looking beyond 
history and tradition to establish a fundamental right contrary to Supreme Court’s 
precedents.978 
 
In short, on 26 June 2015 the Supreme Court issued a decision in Obergefell v 
Hodges legalising homosexual marriage throughout the USA by requiring all the 
states to issue marriage licences to homosexual couples and recognise homosexual 
marriages that were legally formed in other states.979 
 
As indicated above, the decision in Obergefell v Hodges was viewed as a remedy to 
the issue of marriage equality in the USA.980 With this decision, all homosexual 
married couples are entitled to the benefits of state and federal laws that apply to 
heterosexual couples, including state inheritance and intestacy statutes.981 However, 
this decision has left unresolved many other issues, including the issue related to the 
pre-existing legal relationships that were never dissolved, the issue related to the 
reverse evasion statutes, the issue related to parental rights and inheritance rights, 
and the issue related to the intestate succession. 
 
6.2.2.1.3  Unresolved issues 
 
a The issue related to legal relationships that were never dissolved 
 
Homosexual couples in all the USA now have the option to marry, but before 
marriage become an option, a number of states allowed homosexual couples to 
enter into civil unions, domestic partnerships and some were even in committed 
relationships without paperwork. States providing that option to homosexual couples 
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granted to them specific legal rights under state laws. The question that arises is 
what will happen to those relationships that were not marriages and that were not 
dissolved before marriage become an option in all the USA.982 
 
In this regard, Salam and Lawery argue that the decision in Obergefell v Hodges 
does not change laws affecting domestic partnerships, civil unions or other formal 
relations that are not marriages under state law. Those relationships are not 
recognised as marriages and individuals (whether of the same sex or opposite sex) 
who have entered into these relationships are not treated as married under federal 
law.983 It can be argued that some states will automatically upgrade civil unions and 
domestic partnerships to marriage. This is the case of the state of Washington that 
automatically upgraded all existing state registered partnerships in 2014. However, 
there is no evidence that all other states will follow suit, and some couples choose to 
retain their civil union and registered domestic partnership status rather than getting 
married. As a consequence they face many legal challenges in family, estate 
planning, tax and property matters when relationships end. 
 
b The issue related to the reverse evasion statutes  
 
Reverse evasion laws are those state laws that prohibit non-residents from entering 
into a valid marriage if the couple’s home state will not recognise that marriage.984 
Before the decision in Obergefell, only a few states legally recognised homosexual 
marriage and states were not required to recognise such marriages concluded in 
other states. As a result, a marriage was valid only in the state where it was 
concluded and in states that recognised that marriage. In view of this situation, 
states had laws that did not allow non-residents to marry if their marriage is not valid 
in their state of origin. This would suggest that in terms of the reverse evasion laws, 
residents from state A, where homosexual marriage is not valid, could not engage in 
a valid marriage in another state B, where homosexual marriage is legally 
recognised.  
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Now, with the decision in Obergefell, homosexual marriage is legalised in all the 
states in the USA, and all the states are required to recognise marriages concluded 
in other states. In order to comply with this decision some states, including 
Massachusetts, have repealed their reverse evasion statutes to apply retroactively to 
the date when marriage equality became law.985 However, the state of Illinois has not 
yet repealed its reverse evasion law and does not seem to have planned to do so.986 
The question that arises is the following: In the view of the fact that homosexual 
marriage was invalid in the state of Illinois since the beginning, what shall be the 
status of marriages legally concluded in other states by the couples that have 
decided to settle in the state of Illinois after homosexual marriage was made legal in 
all the states? 
 
It is possible to argue that as long as the state of Illinois has not repealed its reverse 
evasion laws, homosexual couples legally married in other states might not be 
treated as married in the state of Illinois, and this situation might result in many 
challenges in terms of spousal benefits and the will.987 
 
c The issue related to the parentage of the assisted reproductive technologies-
born child 
 
Before the decision in the Obergefell case, in some states the marital presumption 
was guiding parentage for children born during marriage. In those states the marital 
presumption is rebuttable, while in other states this presumption is not even 
recognised.988 This would suggest that when a child is born to a married couple while 
they are married, and where the marital presumption is recognised, both parents will 
have parental rights and responsibilities. In the states where this presumption is not 
recognised, only the birth mother will have parental rights and responsibilities. Now, 
with the legalisation of homosexual marriages in all states through the decision in the 
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Obergefell case, the question that arises is whether all the states will apply the 
marital presumption to homosexual couples. 
 
It can be argued that if the presumption is applied to homosexual couples, different 
scenarios are possible. In the states where the principle is recognised and applied to 
homosexual couples, both parents will have parental rights and responsibilities, 
provided that both parents were married at the time of the birth of the child. However, 
in the states where the marital presumption is not recognised, only the birth mother 
will have parental rights and responsibilities.  
 
It is interesting to note that this situation raises other issues for the child born as a 
result of ARTs, including relating to intestate succession. 
 
d Intestate succession 
 
The marital status of the parents raises a problem for the eligibility of children born of 
ARTs to homosexual couples in the USA. Three scenarios can be envisaged: the 
first is, if a child is born in a state where the marital presumption is not recognised, 
he or she will have only one legal parent. As a consequence, he or she will inherit 
only from that parent.989 The second scenario is, if a child is born after the death of 
the legally recognised parent, that child might not be eligible for Social Security 
Administration Survivor Benefits as he or she is not included in the instate 
succession statute. This scenario is referred to as the posthumous heir. The court 
dealt with this scenario in Astrue v Capito.990 At issue in this case was the question 
whether a posthumously conceived child would qualify for the Social Security 
Administration Survivor Benefit. In an attempt to answer this question the court relied 
on the interpretation of the Social Security Administration Survivor Benefit, according 
to which a person would only qualify for those benefits if he or she were entitled to 
inherit from his or her father under the state’s intestacy statutes. The court also 
referred to the Social Security Act, which defines a legal dependent child who is 
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entitled to benefits after the death of his or her parent. The Act defines that child as a 
child who was under 18 years of age and who was dependent on a legally 
recognised parent, who was fully insured at the time of his or her death.991 The court 
then held that in view of the fact that the posthumously conceived child must 
demonstrate eligibility to inherit under state law or satisfy statutory alternatives to 
those requirements; the right of a posthumously conceived child to receive Social 
Security Administrative Survivor Benefits will be solely dependent on that child’s right 
to inherit under the state intestacy’s laws.992 
 
To conclude, the decision in Obergefell is an important step in the legalisation of 
homosexual unions in the USA. With this decision, marriage equality is now possible 
within all the states in America. Consequenty, married homosexual couples will now 
benefit from federal and state laws that protect the spouse’s right to inherit.993 It can 
be argued that this decision has the merit to have put heterosexual and homosexual 
couples on the same level of protection. However, the decision in Obergefell seems 
to serve the interests of individuals who decide to get married better than it serves 
the interests of those who choose not to marry and children who will result from 
those marriages, including those born to homosexual couples using ARTs. 
 
The legalisation of homosexual unions was the subject of extensive debate in the 
USA. Proponents and opponents of homosexual unions asserted various reasons for 
and against the legalisation of these unions. For the purpose of this research, it is 
important to discuss some of those reasons. 
 
The legalisation of homosexual unions is a social issue, a revolutionary law decision 
that will impact society as a whole. The family, the most important institution and the 
fundamental unit of society will be seriously affected with many consequences on 
men and women as well as on children. The decision of legally recognising 
homosexual unions will also affect the state’s instutions; law makers must adjust the 
law to accommodate new families resulting from the legalization of homosexual 
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unions, courts of law must prepare themselves to hear new cases from gays and 
lesbians, and political and administrative authorities must make themselves ready to 
ensure adequate protection to members of these new families. Parenting styles will 
be affected and the social environment in wich children will develop will not be 
spared by the revolutionary decision of legalising homosexual unions. In view of all 
these implications of the legalization of homosexual unions, it is therefore necessary 
to discuss the reasons asserted for and against the legalisation of homosexual 
unions for a better understanding of the consequences that legalisation can have on 
the community, the family in general and on children in particular.      
 
6.3 THE DEBATE OVER THE LEGALISATION OF HOMOSEXUAL UNIONS  
 
6.3.1  Arguments for the legalisation of homosexual unions 
 
The legalisation of homosexual unions is one of the most significant issues in 
contemporary American family law. The proposal of this revolutionary decision 
generated a debate about its numerous positive or negative potential consequences 
on parents, children, public health, homosexual couples, families and the status of 
women.994  
 
Advocates of the legalisation of homosexual unions asserted a number of arguments 
or reasons in support of their claims. Discussing all those arguments is a huge task 
that cannot be fulfilled in this research. Nevertheless, the major arguments for the 
legalisation of homosexual arguments will be discussed. The discussion of these 
arguments is important for this study as it highlights the potential implications of the 
legalisation of homosexual unions for the parents and the children. For instance, if 
homosexual unions were legalised based on the assimulation argument, 
homosexual partners would benefit from a public higher acceptance which would to 
a certain extent reduce the homophobic behaviours perpetrated on homosexual 
parents and their children. This in turn would increase the self-esteem and feeling of 
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equality among lesbians and gays within the heterosexual majoritarian population. 
Those arguments include the following.  
 
6.3.1.1 Constitutional arguments 
 
The constitutional arguments assert that the Constitution of the United States 
mandates or should be interpreted to mandate legalising homosexual unions. In 
other words, proponents of the legalisation of homosexual unions claim that 
homosexual unions are protected by a fundamental constitutional right which entitles 
them to special protection. This claim is referred to as “the constitutional right claim 
or the constitutional right argument”.995 Proponents of the legalisation of homosexual 
unions also claim that the equal protection doctrine dictates legalising homosexual 
unions to avoid discrimination against a class entitled to special protection. This 
claim is called “the equality claim”.996   
 
It can hence be argued that the constitutional arguments can be divided into two 
variants, namely the constitutional right argument and the equality claim. For the 
purpose of this research each of these variants deserves to be discussed. 
 
6.3.1.1.1 The constitutional right argument 
 
The constitutional right argument for the legalisation of homosexual unions asserts 
that there is a fundamental constitutional right to marry, or a broader right of privacy 
or intimate association; that the core of this right is the private, intimate association 
of consenting adults who want to share their lives and commitment with each other; 
that homosexual couples have just as much intimacy and need for marital privacy as 
heterosexual couples; and that laws allowing heterosexual, but not homosexual 
couples to marry infringe upon and discriminate against this, or any related 
fundamental right.997  
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Advocates of the legalisation of homosexual unions relied on the family privacy 
cases,998 particularly Loving v Virginia,999 to support their claim. They argue that 
courts should compel states to allow homosexual marriage, just as the Supreme 
Court compelled states to allow interracial marriage, by recognising the claimed right 
as part of the fundamental constitutional right to marry, or to privacy or intimate 
association. 
 
The constitutional right argument can therefore be summarised as follows: 
homosexual couples should be legally allowed to marry because by doing so, states 
would recognise their rights as part of the right to marry, or to privacy, or to intimate 
association that are protected by the Constitution of the United States. 
 
6.3.1.1.2 The equality argument 
 
The equality argument for the legalisation of homosexual unions is based on the 
principle of equality. This argument asserts that legal discrimination on the basis of 
homosexuality is essentially indistinguishable from legal discrimination on the basis 
of race or gender, and it is as indefensible for government to prohibit homosexual 
couples from marrying as it is to prohibit interracial couples from marrying, raising 
the Loving analogy.1000 In other words, the government of the United States should 
not deny homosexual couples the right to marry; doing so would discriminate against 
them based on their sexual orientation; and this would be in contrast with the 
principle of equality. The United States government allowes people of different races 
to marry; similarly it should also allow homosexual couples to marry and thus avoid 
discriminating against them based on their sexual orientation. 
 
Other arguments were asserted in support of the legalisation of homosexual unions. 
These include the assimilation argument, conservative arguments, the equal 
protection argument and the public policy argument. 
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6.3.1.2 The assimilation argument 
 
This argument is based on the assimilation theory, which implies that the outsider is 
brought into the mainstream. The purpose of the theory is to recognise homosexual 
people and couples as “normal” and allow them to enjoy the substantive and 
symbolic benefits that convoy marriage. According to the assimilation argument, 
marriage is a social and public recognition of a private commitment, the highest 
public recognition of personal integrity. Denying it to homosexuals is the most public 
insult possible to their equality.1001   
 
For proponents of the assimilation argument, legalising homosexual marriage is 
about civil rights, equality, and public recognition. The assimilation argument appeals 
the state to extend marriage rights to homosexual couples. The tenants of the 
assimilation argument maintain that the institution of marriage is not only the symbol 
of equality for homosexual people, but also a substantive necessity for them to 
participate, and be benefited equally in society.1002 Being married brings homosexual 
partners the right to health care benefits, pensions, and other benefits that are 
available to heterosexual couples.1003  
 
In short, the assimilation argument asserts that homosexual couples should be 
allowed to marry because by doing so they will have access to the benefits granted 
to heterosexual married couples. Being married is the only means for them to access 
those benefits and to proudly feel themselves as part of the society. 
 
6.3.1.3 Conservative arguments 
 
The tenants of the conservative arguments for the legalisation of homosexual unions 
asserted five claims that can be summarised as (1) We exist, (2) Stabilisation, (3) 
Sexual taming, (4) Society gain and (5) No harm.1004  
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6.3.1.3.1 The “we exist” argument 
 
The “we exist” argument argument asserts that homosexual couples should be 
allowed to marry because they exist in large numbers in society; they love each 
other, and need the benefits of marriage for themselves, and for their children.1005 
 
6.3.1.3.2 The stabilisation argument 
 
According to the stabilisation argument, homosexual couples should be allowed to 
marry because their marriage will bring them stability and will alleviate much of the 
suffering and disadvantages of the children they are raising.1006 
 
6.3.1.3.3 The sexual taming argument 
 
Supporters of legalising homosexual unions argue that legalising homosexual unions 
will tame and civilise the irresponsible behaviours of homosexual couples (especially 
gay men).1007 
 
6.3.1.3.4 The society gain argument 
 
Proponents of the legalisation of homosexual unions make a social benefit claim that 
society as a whole will benefit from homosexual couples entering homosexual 
marriages.1008 
 
6.3.1.3.5 The no harm argument 
 
Advocates of the legalisation of homosexual unions claim that no harm to the 
institution of marriage or to conjugal marriage will result from the legalisation of 
homosexual marriage.1009 
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6.3.1.4 The equal protection argument 
 
The equal protection argument is based on the equal protection theory. The 
argument asserts that the law shall be applied equally to persons in similar situations 
regardless of one’s race, sexual orientation or gender.1010 The equal protection 
argument was used in different cases, including the Goodridge case,1011 as well as in 
Romer v Evans,1012 to abolish unlawful treatments and classifications based on 
sexual orientation.  
 
The other major arguments for the legalisation of homosexual unions include the 
public policy arguments, the marriage equality argument, and the basic civil rights 
arguments. 
 
6.3.1.5 The public policy arguments 
 
The public policy arguments assert inter alia, that (1) the state should not enforce 
prejudicial social stigma against parents who engage in homosexual behaviour, (2) 
same-sex parents can and do provide parenting that is just as good and valuable for 
children as that provided by heterosexual married couples and individuals, (3) public 
policy should encourage the formation of families, even non-traditional homosexual 
parenting families, because two parents (even of the same gender) are better than 
one, and (4) homosexual couples should be allowed to marry because parenting by 
an adult who is engaged in homosexual relationship may be the best option for a 
particular child.1013  
 
6.3.1.6 The marriage equality argument 
 
This argument briefly asserts that homosexual parents are as capable as their 
heterosexual counterparts and that the well-being of children is not contingent on the 
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parents’ sexual orientation.1014 Therefore laws allowing heterosexual couples and not 
homosexual couples to marry are at odds with the principle of equality. 
 
6.3.1.7 The basic civil right argument 
 
The basic civil right argument is the result of the Hawaii Supreme Court decision in 
the Baehr v Lewin case.1015 In this case the Hawaii Supreme Court vacated the 
circuit court dismissal and remanded the case to trial, finding the denial of marriage 
to same-sex couples a potential violation of the Hawaiian Constitution. The High 
Court then ruled that the marriage ban might deny members of homosexual couples 
a basic civil right because of their gender and thus might represent state sanctioned 
sex discrimination, violating the equal rights amendment of the Hawaiian 
Constitution. The immediate impact of this decision was that, within a year, the 
Hawaiian legislature passed a law to assert that Hawaii’s law of marriage applied 
only to homosexual couples.1016 
 
It is important to note that the above list of arguments for the legalisation of 
homosexual unions is not exhaustive; there are many other arguments that were 
asserted in support of the claim for the legalisation of homosexual unions or 
marriage. The above enumerated arguments were deemed major and more relevant 
for the purpose of the research undertaken. Most of these arguments were criticised 
and challenged by the opponents of the legalisation of homosexual unions.  
 
6.3.2  Arguments against the legalisation of homosexual unions 
 
As stated above, in the debate about the legalisation of homosexual unions, the 
proponents of homosexual marriage sought the extension of the definition of 
marriage to include homosexual couples’ unions. This would have as a consequence 
the extension to homosexual couples of the rights of heterosexual married couples. 
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In support of their claim, they asserted many arguments, including the arguments 
enumerated above. However, in opposition to their claim, opponents of homosexual 
marriage sought to maintain the status quo, by claiming that marriage should be 
exclusive to heterosexual couples. In support of this claim, they asserted many 
arguments, some of which directly or indirectly challenge or criticise the arguments 
asserted in support of the legalisation claim.  
 
It is worth noting that Wardle has asserted many arguments against the legalisation 
of homosexual unions. This research will refer to the most relevant of his arguments. 
 
6.3.2.1 The argument against the constitutional rights claim argument 
 
According to Wardle, all constitutional rights claimed for homosexual marriage are 
substantive due process claims that fail to pass the test for their legitimacy. Wardle 
argues that homosexual marriage constitutional rights claims were asserted based 
on the constitutional right to marry, the right to privacy, and the right to intimate 
association. However, none of these rights encompasses homosexual marriage.1017 
 
In several cases the US Supreme Court has recognised and protected the right to 
marry as a fundamental liberty interest.1018 Although the Constitution does not 
mention the word marriage, Wardle argues that marriage is undeniably deeply 
embedded in the traditions of our nation and essential to the ordered liberty of 
nations. Marriage status is the ultimate example of long-established, highly preferred 
public status. It is official, formal, publicly endorsed, and powerfully protected. In 
Wardle’s view, the right to marry is a fundamental right protected by the Constitution, 
but this right does not encompass homosexual marriage.1019 According to Wardle, 
the assertion of advocates of homosexual marriage that marriage includes 
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homosexual marriage just as it includes heterosexual marriage disregards history, 
precedents and the very nature of marriage.1020 
 
With regard to history, precedents and the nature of marriage, the court in Bowers v 
Hardwick,1021 concluded that whether homosexual marriage is a fundamental right or 
protected by some other strand of fundamental rights depends largely upon whether 
the practice is deeply rooted in the traditions of the nation that are essential to the 
preservation of our system of ordered liberty. Based on this conclusion, Wardle 
argues that American history has never allowed homosexual marriage; likewise, 
none of the established criteria for identifying special constitutional rights is satisfied 
by homosexual marriage claims.1022 
 
Wardle goes on to argue that precedents deny the constitutional right and all the 
rights arguments for homosexual marriage.1023 He relied on a number of cases, 
including Poe v William.1024 In this case Justice Harlan explicitly linked the 
confinement of sexual activity to marriage to the prohibition of homosexual activity, 
and concluded that both confinements of sexual activity behaviour were so deeply 
embedded in the values and consciousness of the nation that both were integral to 
any constitutional doctrine in the era. In another case, the Supreme Court suggested 
that restrictions on marriage, such as a prohibition on homosexual marriage, do not 
violate fundamental constitutional rights.1025 In Bowers v Hardwick, the court rejected 
any claim that homosexual behaviour is constitutionally protected as part of a 
general category of constitutional privacy, as part of intimate sexual conduct among 
consenting adults, or as part of a right to be free from governmental intrusion within a 
certain zone, namely the home.1026 In another case, the court explicitly concluded 
that no connection between family, marriage or procreation on the one hand and 
homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated.1027 In many other cases, 
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state and federal courts have consistently held that marriage does not encompass 
homosexual relations.1028 
 
In short, all these cases showed that none of the precedents ever allowed 
homosexual marriage; likewise American history and the very nature of marriage 
never included homosexual marriage. 
 
With regard to the right to privacy, Wardle argues that the constitutional zone of 
privacy does not extend to homosexual marriage. He goes on arguing that American 
laws go to great lengths to protect against governmental intrusion into areas where 
there is a legitimate expectation of privacy.1029  
 
In fact, certain testimony of private spousal conversations may not be compelled in 
court. Likewise, most ordinary domestic decisions in on-going functioning families 
are private matters beyond the jurisdiction of a court to decide. However, this does 
not include homosexual marriage.1030 
 
Many constitutional rights arguments to legalise homosexual marriage assert zonal 
privacy claims. According to Wardle these arguments fail to distinguish non-
regulation from public approval of private sexual behaviour. This means that 
proponents of homosexual marriage fail to recognise the difference between public 
non-interference with private homosexual behaviour and public approval or 
endorsement of homosexual behaviour. In fact, the notion of a right to homosexual 
marriage, or public approval recognition of homosexual marriage, is unsupported by 
the principles of a zone of family or sexual privacy. Thus the zone of privacy doctrine 
does not justify legalisation of homosexual marriage. It is important to note that for 
the same historical and structural reasons identified and discussed above, the 
homosexual structural privacy claim fails.1031 
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Concerning the constitutional right to intimate association, Wardle argues that the 
right to homosexual marriage, if any, is not part of any constitutional right of intimate 
association. Proponents of homosexual marriage claim that homosexual marriage is 
a right to intimate association. The basic argument underlying this claim is that the 
Constitution shelters an unwritten right of persons to form and maintain intimate 
human relationships, that the relationship between homosexuals who are committed 
to each other is among the intimate human relationships so protected, and that the 
laws denying homosexual couples the right to marry unconstitutionally infringes upon 
this fundamental right. According to Wardle, this claim falls short as a matter of 
constitutional theory, doctrine and precedents. Wardle argues that, first, the notion 
that what a particular individual or couple subjectively believes to be equivalent to a 
constitutionally protected relationship is not a sound basis for creating a new 
constitutional right. Social order, as well as constitutional integrity, requires a more 
objective test. Second, cases in which the Supreme Court has mentioned a possible 
right of intimate association reveals the narrowness of the associations that this right 
might protect. For example, the court has emphasised that the associations that 
might be protected involve traditional personal bonds, a description that does not, 
from any historical approach, apply to homosexual marriage. Third, the 
underpinnings of the claim that homosexual marriage is part of a fundamental 
constitutional right of intimate association were completely undercut in the Bowers 
case.1032 In this case, the 11th circuit ruled that the Georgia sodomy statute violated 
the respondent’s fundamental rights because his homosexual activity is a private and 
intimate association that is beyond the reach of state regulation.1033  
 
In short, if the basic interactions that define a relationship fail to gain protection as an 
intimate association, the relationship itself certainly cannot claim preferred 
constitutional status as a marriage under already repudiated theory. Moreover the 
court in Bowers concluded as follows: 
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“No connection between family, marriage or procreation on the one hand and 
homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated”.1034  
 
If there is no such connection between the constitutionally protected relationships 
that are the model for those protected by the right of intimate association on the one 
hand and the defining characteristic of some homosexual relations on the other, the 
claim that the right of intimate association includes same-sex marriage is 
meritless.1035 
 
6.3.2.2 The arguments against the conservative arguments 
 
The conservative arguments have been exposed above and summarised in five 
points.1036 The critique of these arguments will follow suit. First, there is no doubt that 
homosexual couples and families exist in the world and in America. However, it is 
argued that the sole existence of lesbians and gays around the world in general and 
in the USA in particular does not necessarily support the claim for radically redefining 
the institution of marriage to include homosexual marriage.1037  
 
Second, there is no convincing evidence to support the claim that the legalisation of 
homosexual marriage will bring stability to gay and lesbian couples and will alleviate 
much of the suffering and disadvantage of the children they are raising.1038 In fact, 
many studies in contrast show that in many countries where homosexual couples 
were allowed to marry or to enter into marriage-equivalent civil unions, this had little 
effect upon the stability of those relationships. For example, the 2003 report on a 
Dutch study of gay men in Amsterdam found that the average duration of gay-steady 
partner relations was only 1.5 years in the most gay-affirming, gay-supportive nation 
on earth, when marriage-equivalent same-sex domestic partnerships were legal, and 
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the full status of same-sex marriage was being implemented.1039 In 2006, a 
Scandinavian study of the demographics of marriage-equivalent same-sex registered 
partnerships in Norway and Sweden noted significant problems with the stability of 
such relationships, and showed significantly higher rates of breakup.1040 Despite the 
fact that same-sex couples were considerably older than male-female couples (a 
factor that generally correlates with greater stability in marriage), and the ratio of 
partners from higher socio-economic status was up to 50% higher for gay and 
lesbian couples (another factor that may be associated with greater stability), the 
divorce-risk levels for registered gay men partnerships were about 50% higher for 
comparable heterosexual couples. Controlling for variables, the risk of divorce was 
twice as high for lesbian couples as it was for gay men couples.1041  
 
Another study of Swedish registered partnerships found that gay male couples were 
50% more likely to divorce than married heterosexual couples, while lesbian couples 
were over 150% more likely to divorce than heterosexual couples.1042 Controlling for 
variables, gay couples were 35% and lesbian couples 200% more likely to divorce 
than heterosexual couples in that very gay-supportive nation.1043  
 
These studies are from countries where same-sex formal unions have been 
legalised, destigmatised, dignified, encouraged, socially supported, and given full 
legal equality for a decade longer than anywhere in the USA. These studies raise 
serious challenges to the claim that legalising same-sex marriage will produce 
significant stability for same-sex couples.1044  
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Third, there is no evidence that legalising homosexual marriage will tame and civilise 
the irresponsible sexual behaviours of homosexual couples, especially gay male 
couples. The claim that legalising homosexual marriage will tame the behaviours of 
homosexual couples is counter-factual. It does not appear that giving marital or 
marriage-like status to homosexual couples significantly alters their troubling 
behaviour.1045 For example, a Vermont study published in 2005 compared the 
characteristics, including sexual practices, of homosexual couples in civil unions with 
those not in civil unions and with heterosexual married couples.1046 The difference in 
infidelity rates between gay men in civil unions and those not in civil unions was 
2.8% and the authors concluded that homosexual couples registered were similar to 
each other on demographic and relationship factors when compared with married 
heterosexual couples.1047 In other words, the legalisation of homosexual marriage 
has no impact on the high rate of troubling sexual behaviour or the high rate of 
infidelity of gay men. 
 
Fourth, although conservative advocates of homosexual marriage argue that there is 
a social benefit in allowing homosexual couples to enter into marriages, there is no 
supporting evidence for this social benefit claim. Wardle argues that, to the contrary, 
it has been proved that the sexual relations of gay men and, to a lesser degree, 
lesbians, are disproportionately unsafe in terms of social responsibility and public 
health. In the USA, gay male homosexual sex activity remains the primary means of 
transmission of AIDS. 55% of cumulative AIDS cases reported in 2004 involve the 
single mode of exposure of men who have sex with men and the number continues 
to rise. From 2001 to 2005, the estimated number of persons in the 50 states and 
District of Columbia living with AIDS increased from 331 482 to 421 873 – an 
increase of 27%. Furthermore, the number of persons with AIDS diagnoses in the 
USA in 2005 was 40 608; the number of such diagnoses from 1981 – 2005 was 952 
629, of whom 530 756 have died.1048  
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It is important to note that AIDS is not the only disease risked by homosexual 
couples. The list of diseases found frequently among homosexual practitioners as a 
result of anal sex is long and alarming: Cryptosporidium, giardia lamblia, anal 
cancer, chlamydia trachomatis, herpes simplex virus, human immunodeficiency 
virus, human papilloma virus, isospora belli, microsporidia, gonorrhoea, viral 
hepatitis types B and C and syphilis.1049 Lesbian sex practitioners are also exposed 
to a higher risk of transmission of sexual infections than in heterosexual couples. 
These include bacterial vaginosis, hepatitis B, and Hepatitis C. Lesbians also have 
high levels of cigarette smoking, alcohol abuse, intravenous drug use, and 
prostitution.1050 Cases of mental health problems, including psychiatric illness such 
as depression, drug abuse and suicide attempts were also abundantly reported.1051  
 
It is important to note that the high rate of AIDS and some other diseases among 
homosexual couples is not due to the lack of legal marriage or marriage-like 
status.1052 
 
Fifth, conservative advocates of homosexual marriage argue that legalising 
homosexual marriage will bring no harm to the institution of marriage.1053 Wardle has 
identified many detrimental consequences of legalising homosexual marriage, 
including consequences relating to the institution of marriage. For instance, Wardle 
argues as follows: 
 
“Including same-sex couples within the institution of marriage will transform the 
institution of marriage to the detriment of all. The characteristics of same-sex 
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relationships will set a new and devastating minimum standard for marital relations. 
The moral and behavioral norms of marriage will be distorted by the inclusion of the 
behavioral and moral norms of gay and lesbian lifestyles within the institution of 
marriage.”1054 
 
Opponents of the legalisation of homosexual marriage have asserted many other 
arguments in support of their claim. Among those arguments some are supporting 
the status quo (marriage should be exclusive to heterosexual couples). This means 
that all those arguments point in one direction - the institution of marriage should be 
exclusive to heterosexual couples. Marriage should not be redefined to include 
homosexual couples. These include the following arguments. 
 
6.3.2.3 Homosexual marriage is not justified in terms of the compelling social 
  interests 
  
It has been argued that the interests of the society in marriage and the family justify 
some substantial regulation of intimate interpersonal relations.1055 According to 
Aristotle, the first duty of legislators was to establish rules regulating entrance into 
marriage.1056 Historically, societies have given unique and special preference to 
heterosexual marriage because of the benefits the institution provides for society in 
general and for individual women, men and children in particular.1057  
 
The social interests that societies throughout history have sought to protect through 
the regulation of marriage have been commented on through the ages by 
philosophers and legal analysts. These interests include, among other interests, 
procreation, and the health of the future generation, child-rearing, channelling sexual 
behaviour and economic stability.1058 For the purpose of this research, the first two 
interests will be discussed in length in the next sections. However, it is important to 
note for now that proponents of the maintenance of the status quo argue that from 
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the perspective of the social interests and public purposes that underlie the legal 
status of marriage, the claim that homosexual unions are equivalent to heterosexual 
marriages fails. They go on to argue that marriage laws are enacted to secure public, 
not private interests.1059 In this context, legal marriage can be understood as a public 
institution, created by law to promote public policy and to further societal interests. 
Thus marriage law is not or should not be enacted simply to promote private or 
personal interests; rather, marriage law should protect and promote only those 
individual interests that are shared in common with society as a whole.1060 
 
In short, in terms of this argument, there is no evidence of any benefits that 
homosexual unions can provide to society. Therefore, there is no need to include 
homosexual unions to the institution of marriage or to extend any marital rights to 
homosexual couples. 
 
6.3.2.3.1 Homosexual marriage is not justified in terms of responsible   
  procreation 
 
According to Wardle, responsible procreation is one of society’s interests in marriage 
and is conceived as having four elements, namely (1) perpetuation and survival of 
the species, (2) public health and child welfare, (3) linking procreation with child-
rearing and connecting parents to offspring, and (4) protecting the social order and 
social institution that best fosters responsible procreation.1061  
 
It has been asserted that a committed union between a man and a woman provides 
the most advantageous environment in which children can be born and reared, 
providing profound benefits of dual gender parenting to model intergender relations 
and show children how to relate to persons of their own and the opposite gender. 
Heterosexual marriage is believed to provide the strongest and most stable 
companionate unit of society and the most secure setting for the intergenerational 
transmission of social knowledge and skills, and reflects the understanding of 
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marriage that has been constant across cultures.1062 Many opponents of homosexual 
marriage believe that homosexual marriage is not and cannot provide all the above 
mentioned advantages. For example, they argue that allowing homosexual couples 
to marry will result in irresponsible procreative behaviour by persons afflicted with 
some serious diseases or genetic conditions. This will also result in the birth of 
children afflicted with severe health problems, including diseases that can cause 
death and blindness. As a result they argue that the future of the entire society will 
be put at risk.1063  
 
6.3.2.3.2 Homosexual marriage is not justified in terms of the health of the future 
  generation 
 
According to American history, American lawmakers have long regulated marriage in 
the interest of the health of the future generation. In this regard marriage regulation 
has been the principal tool to prevent dysgenic reproduction. For example, marriage 
laws have forbidden marriages of persons who are closely related (because, inter 
alia, the risk of hereditary birth defects is deemed unacceptable).1064 Medical testing 
for “loathsome diseases” has often been required for marriage licenses, in order to 
protect the health of the future generation as well as of spouses.1065 This would 
suggest that the heath of the future generation was a concern for the lawmakers who 
wanted to protect children from being afflicted with diseases inherited from their 
parents. Diseases such as HIV-AIDS and cystic fribrosis1066 can be transmitted from 
parents to their children.  
 
  
                                                          
1062
  Wardle 2000 HJLPP 779. 
1063
 Wardle 2000 HJLPP 783. See also Gutman and Wilfert “Gonococcal diseases in infants and 
children” in Holmes et al (eds) Sexually Transmitted Diseases 806, who report that there is an 
epidemic of gonococcal diseases in infants and children which inter alia causes blindness, 
and that parents are responsible for this epidemy. See also Kanigel (“Gonorrhea, syphylis on 
rise in NC: Experts concerned that increase passages a surge AIDS cases” News and 
Observer November 1991), who noted that syphylis can cause blindness, hearing problems 
and death; Sisson “Numbers tell story: AIDS in’t going away” The Columbian 13 February 
1997 at B1, who report that 15-20% of babies born to HIV-infected mothers are also infected.  
1064
  Wardle 2000 HJLPP 788. 
1065
 Wardle 2000 HJLPP 788 
1066
 Robertson 2004 AJLM 7. 
283 
 
6.3.3  Conclusion 
 
It is important to recall that this study does not focus on whether homosexual unions 
should or should not be legalised; rather, the study focuses on the welfare of the 
child that would result from homosexual unions and who would grow up in a 
homosexual family built up through ARTs. However, reasons for and against the 
legalisation of homosexual unions shed a light on particular issues that are important 
for this study. Today, homosexual unions are legally recognised in the USA. For the 
purpose of this thesis, it is important to discuss the legal status of homosexual 
unions in the USA. 
 
6.4 FAMILIES CREATED THROUGH ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE 
 TECHNOLOGIES IN THE USA 
 
6.4.1  Introduction 
 
In the USA, homosexual families are now a legal reality. A legal status has been 
accorded to homosexual people who live together as couples. While in some states 
homosexual couples can enter into civil unions and registered domestic partnerships 
and are granted all or some of the rights granted to those in marriage, in other states 
homosexuals can legally marry. This situation, coupled with the advances in 
reproductive technologies, has allowed homosexual couples to have children and 
create families. Since gay and lesbian persons have children and will continue to 
procreate, raise children and exercise their parental rights and responsibilities in 
respect of their children, it seems important to ask how those rights are established 
in the American legal system. This section is intended to discuss the gay and lesbian 
right to procreate and the parental rights of gay and lesbian persons in American 
law. 
 
6.4.2 Homosexuals’ right to use assisted reproductive technologies and 
 procreate 
 
The legal battle over same-sex marriage and the technological development in the 
area of ARTs has placed the question of the right of gays and lesbians to procreate 
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in the public agenda.1067 Whether or not homosexual persons and couples have the 
right to use ARTs and reproduce will depend on the interpretation of laws granting 
this right to heterosexual persons and couples. 
 
The right to decide on whether to have or not to have children is an important 
personal liberty. Consequently, the state cannot restrict decisions about reproduction 
except in cases of serious harm.1068 This would suggest that, like other rights, the 
right to reproduce is granted to every person but is not absolute; it can be limited or 
restricted for good causes by the state. However, there is a debate about what will 
count as a sufficient justification for state restriction on reproduction.1069 The right to 
reproduce has been stressed in a number of cases where the court broadly 
interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause to consider the right to 
reproduce as a fundamental right. The Fourteenth Amendment has often been used 
as a talisman in the battle over reproduction freedom and choice.1070 The Fourteenth 
Amendment states that “[n]o state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law”.1071 
 
It is important to note that the courts have not articulated the positive right to 
reproduce, but some cases exist in which the courts have protected a certain level of 
reproductive freedom, particularly freedom from unwanted intervention by the state 
in the realm of family and child bearing.1072 In Skinner v Oklahoma for example the 
court endorsed the right to reproduce as one of the basic civil rights of a person. The 
court held that there is a due process right to reproduce which is basic to the 
perpetuation of race.1073 In 1972, the court held as follows in another case: 
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“[If] the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or 
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so 
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”1074  
 
This would suggest that the right to engage in procreation and sex, regardless of 
marital status, was protected under the due process clause and that notions of 
sexual intercourse for reproductive purposes began to move away from notions of 
sexual intercourse for other reasons.1075 However, it can be argued that the court 
system has framed the right to procreate as a negative right. This means that it is a 
right to be free from governmental intervention into the individual procreative 
activities.1076  
 
This is distinguishable from a positive right to procreate, where the government 
would be obligated to provide one with the means necessary to do so.1077 
Reproductive freedom is viewed more narrowly as a negative right with lesser 
government protection. This would suggest that the court is reluctant to extend the 
right to procreate to the realm of positive right. This reluctance was demonstrated in 
the court’s decision in Harris v McRae. In this case the court held that “[w]omen had 
no positive right to financial assistance from the government in order to procure an 
abortion despite having a negative right to abortion”.1078 
 
It is therefore clear that all persons, single or married, have the right to procreate. 
Whether or not they have the right to use ARTs is left to the power of an individual 
state’s legislation and judicial discretion. In fact, Blake points out that federal laws 
provide little guidance on the practice or provision of ARTs to the public, including 
whether or not insurance providers are required to cover these procedures. The duty 
of regulating who can access ARTs and whether it should be paid for by insurance 
companies has mainly fallen to individual states and, in some instances, infertility 
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treatment centres and providers.1079 An analysis of the statutes of states that provide 
insurance cover for ARTs reveals that in many states infertile persons have the right 
to access these procedures. However, a close look at these statutes also reveals 
that the access to ART coverage is unequal because the coverage is based on 
marital status, sexual orientation and/or medical disability. For example, states such 
as Arkansas, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New 
Jersey, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island and West Virginia provide coverage only for 
fertility treatment.1080 
 
Some states place limits that depend on the specific treatment in question. For 
instance, California and New York explicitly exclude IVF from the fertility treatments 
covered.1081 
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The states’ insurance mandates contain one or more of the following preconditions: 
(1) requirements that a person engage in unprotected sexual intercourse for a 
particular number of years without pregnancy (California, Illinois, and New Jersey), 
(2) requirements that the experience of infertility lasts a particular number of years 
(Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode island), (3) use of spousal language 
(Hawaii, Maryland, Rhode Island, and Texas), (4) requirements that the cause of 
infertility be either medically caused or unexplained (Hawaii, Maryland, and Texas), 
and (5) requirements that the infertility treatment be medically necessary 
(Connecticut, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Rhode Island).1082 
 
This would suggest that there is access to ARTs, but that access to ARTs is limited 
to heterosexual married people who experience infertility. The remaining question is 
whether the right to use ARTs can be extended to homosexual married couples and 
single homosexual people. 
 
It appears that the right to use ARTs extends to persons engaged in homosexual 
relationships. As stated above, the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right of gay 
and lesbian persons to procreate. The use of ARTs is the only means of reproducing 
in the context of their homosexual relationships. According to the Fourteenth 
Amendment, all persons have the right to liberty, including the liberty of using ART 
procedures in order to have children.  
 
Some scholars, including Robertson, share this view. Robertson emphasises the 
interest that homosexual couples and single people have in having and rearing 
children. He also makes it clear that despite the adverse effects the use of ARTs can 
have on children,1083 homosexual people and couples still decide to use these 
techniques for reproducing purposes. Robertson argues as follows:  
 
“People who reproduce have a strong interest in having healthy children, as do the 
ART providers who help make such births possible. In some cases, however, it may 
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not be possible to guarantee a safe outcome. The techniques necessary to 
reproduce may carry inherent risks of physical defects or the social situation of the 
users may be less than ideal. In those situations, there may be no practical way to 
eliminate the risks of an unfavourable outcome and still enable the child to be born. 
The parents, however, may still wish to reproduce because it is the only way for them 
to have genetically related offspring whom they will rear or provide for”.1084  
 
In another study Robertson insisted that procreative liberty and the use of ARTs be 
extended to people engaged in homosexual relationships. In Robertson’s words:  
 
“Our developing conceptions of procreative liberty should extend protection to gay 
and lesbian individuals and couples. Gays and lesbians have the same interests in 
having children that heterosexuals do, and can use ARTs to achieve that goal. Most 
of the societal conflict about recognizing gay and lesbian families has centred on 
same-sex marriage, not on direct prohibition of gay and lesbian reproduction itself.1085  
 
The judicial activities also confirmed the right of homosexual people to use ARTs 
and reproduce. In Goodridge v Department of Public Health, the court acknowledged 
that children will continue to be brought into this world by gay and lesbian persons 
using ARTs. The court held the following:  
 
“Gay and lesbian reproduction, either coital or assisted, will continue to occur, 
whatever the status of same-sex marriage and civil unions. As more children are born 
to gays and lesbians, the need to treat their children equally with other children will 
fuel equal protection arguments for recognition of same-sex marriage or civil union 
protections for their children.”1086  
 
Robertson, interpreting the decision reached by the court in Goodridge v Department 
of Public Health, pointed out that the court is expected to extend the right to use non-
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coital techniques in order to reproduce to infertile couples because they do have the 
same desire to have children as heterosexual couples do. In his words:  
 
“Although the Court has talked about the right to reproduce mainly in dicta, there is 
ample reason to think that that dicta would become holding if states attempted to limit 
coital reproduction, for example, by mandatory sterilization or contraception, limits on 
the number of children, or restrictions based on marital status and sexual orientation. 
If coital reproduction is protected, then we might reasonably expect the courts to 
protect the right of infertile persons to use non coital means of reproduction to 
combine their gametes, such as artificial insemination (AI), in vitro fertilization (IVF), 
and related techniques. Infertile couples who use those techniques are trying to 
achieve the same goal of having and rearing offspring that fertile couples achieve 
through coitus. There is no good reason not to grant them the same presumptive 
freedom to achieve that goal, which fertile persons have, subject to limitation, of 
course, if use of those techniques impaired important state interests.”1087 
 
He goes to argue that once it is recognised that both married and unmarried persons 
have a liberty right to reproduce, including the right to use different ARTs 
combinations when infertile or when necessary to ensure a healthy offspring, there is 
no compelling reason for denying that right to persons because of their sexual 
orientation. Gay males and lesbians ordinarily are not sexually attracted to members 
of the opposite sex, but they may nevertheless have strong desires to have or care 
for offspring.1088 
 
This would suggest that although there is no law that expressly grants the right to 
use ARTs to persons engaged in homosexual relationships, the fact is they do have 
this right and are using this means to reproduce in the USA. With few state laws 
directly limiting access to ARTs, a more important factor in regulating gay and 
lesbian reproduction is the willingness of physicians and ART clinics to treat them. 
Currently, about 80% of ART clinics in the United States provide AI and related 
services to single women and lesbian couples, while only about 20% provide 
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services to male individuals or couples. While most gay males and lesbians who 
have sought ART services probably have been able to receive them, some have not, 
and others have had more difficulties in doing so than heterosexual married couples 
or single women.1089 
 
Now that it has been demonstrated that persons engaged in homosexual 
relationships have the right to have children and raise them, it is important to analyse 
how the USA have established the relation between the parents and the child. 
 
6.4.3 Parentage created through assisted reproductive technologies in 
 homosexual families  
 
Parentage created through ARTs in homosexual families is about determining or 
establishing the parental status of each member of the couple or any other persons 
having a relationship with a child born to gay men or lesbian mothers. In other words, 
it is about establishing the relationship existing between children born to homosexual 
persons and their parents or persons who can be considered their parents. To 
establish that relationships two approaches are important, namely the theoretical 
approach and the legal approach. While the former approach focuses on different 
theories that have been proposed to establish parentage, the latter focuses on the 
laws that were applied to cases involving the establishment of parentage. 
 
6.4.3.1 The theoretical approach to parentage 
 
A number of theories provide an analytic basis for defining parenthood to 
accommodate non-biological mothers and fathers. These include the inclusive 
parenthood, the non-exclusive parenthood, and the intent-based parenthood 
theories. These theories confer parental rights based on non-biological parents’ 
actions, status or intent.1090 
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6.4.3.1.1 The inclusive parenthood theory 
 
The inclusive parenthood theory was proposed by Polikoff. Under this theory, 
parental rights are determined by an individual’s status as a partner to a lesbian 
biological parent or husband to a heterosexual mother, and by acts in the form of 
care given to the child.1091 This theory requires that the non-biological mother 
demonstrates that she has acted as a parent before being recognised as one.1092 
 
Although this theory has the advantage of establishing parental status for a non-
biological mother, it has a problem. The defect of this theory is that it is the biological 
mother’s acts and intent that confer the parental rights to the non-biological mother. 
The non-biological mother’s parental rights are thus vested in the biological mother, 
rather than conferred to the non-biological mother by virtue of her relationship to the 
child and to the biological mother. This theory further calls for a proof of parent-child 
relationship that has developed through the cooperation and consent of someone 
already possessing the status of legal parent.1093 The burden of proof denies the 
lesbian non-biological mother the presumption of parental status. This would suggest 
that the parental status of the non-biological mother is proven and not presumed as 
is the case in heterosexual couples or persons. 
 
6.4.3.1.2 Nonexclusive parenthood 
 
Under the nonexclusive parenthood theory of Bartlett, a care-giver gains parental 
rights by virtue of his or her actions, though not necessary because of his or her 
status.1094 This theory extends the parental rights to more than one set of parents. 
Stepparents, foster parents, and related or unrelated care-givers who have formed a 
parent-child relationship with the child would be considered parents in addition to, 
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rather than as a substitute for a child’s legal parents.1095 The problem with this theory 
is that Bartlett limits the expansion of parenthood to circumstances in which the 
child’s relationship with his or her legal or natural parent is interrupted.1096 This 
means that the parental status for any care-giver other than the legal or natural or 
biological parent is established only when the legal or biological parent has 
interrupted his or her relationship with the child. 
 
6.4.3.1.3 Intent-based parenthood 
 
The intent-based parenthood approach was developed by Schultz. The theory of 
intent-based parenthood is premised on recognition that non-traditional methods of 
reproduction require, and are susceptible to, a new vision of parenthood.1097 
According to Schultz, when conception occurs through alternative insemination or 
contract birthing, “intentions that are voluntarily chosen, deliberate, expressed and 
bargained for ought presumptively to determine legal parenthood”.1098  
 
Parental status in this circumstance is derived from recognising and accommodating 
the distinct features of non-traditional modes of conception and parenthood. As such, 
it avoids manipulating presently existing parenthood doctrines, premised as they are 
on traditional reproductive techniques.1099 Intent-based parenthood gives weight to 
the deliberateness of the parenthood choice required in conception through 
alternative insemination and contract birthing.1100 Under this theory the status of the 
non-biological mother would be established by a showing of her intent to serve as 
her child’s parent rather than by proving her status as a biological parent. Intent 
could be demonstrated by such factors as participating in the birth of the child, 
providing financial support, and assuming full care-giving responsibilities.1101 This 
theory has the advantage of eliminating the power imbalance between the biological 
and non-biological mother by not basing parental status on a biological relationship 
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between a parent and child or on a marital relationship between a non-biological and 
biological parent.  Instead, regardless of biology, the two mothers would be equally 
recognised as parents based on their intent to share in parenthood.1102 It might be 
for this reason that this theory was used in the legal approach. 
 
6.4.3.2 The legal approach to parentage 
 
The legal approach to parentage requires an analysis of parentage under common 
law, the defect of the common law and the remedy proposed under the Uniform 
Parentage Act. 
 
6.4.3.2.1 Parentage under common law 
 
Under common law, the child’s legal status was defined based on the marital status 
of the parents. A child born to married parents was recognised as legitimate and the 
child born to unmarried parents was referred to as illegitimate.1103 The direct 
implication of this common-law principle was that the illegitimate child had limited 
rights compared to the legitimate child. For instance, he or she could not inherit from 
his or her father and could not take his name.1104 Moreover, the common law 
recognised unwed mothers as the legal guardians of their illegitimate children and 
denied fathers custody, visitation, and adoption rights.1105 As a result, the common 
law treated legitimate and illegitimate children differently because of their parents’ 
marital status. Illegitimate children were less privileged than legitimate children with 
regard to their inheritance rights and their fathers could not exercise their parental 
rights. In other words, fathers of illegitimate children could not establish any father-
child relationship after breaking up with the mother of the child.  
 
Because of this unequal treatment of children under common law, another legal 
system that could remedy this situation had to be put in place. In this regard, in the 
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late 1960s, the United States Supreme Court began to strike down laws that based a 
child’s legal status on his or her parents’ marital relationships.1106  
 
In response to the Supreme Court rulings, the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL”) approved the Uniform 
Parentage Act (“UPA”) to eliminate distinction between legitimate and illegitimate 
children and to promote equal treatment of all children regardless of their parents’ 
marital status.1107 From this period a new era of parentage began in the USA. 
 
6.4.3.2.2 Parentage under the Uniform Parentage Act 
 
The purpose of the Uniform Parentage Act was to correct the defect of the common 
law in the USA. It was codified as family law first in California and thereafter in many 
other states. The California Family Code sets forth a framework for establishing 
parentage based on the parent-child relationship rather than the marital status of the 
parents. The Uniform Parentage Act defines parentage as the legal relationship that 
exists between a child and the child’s natural or adoptive parents in terms of which 
the law confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties and obligations. The parent-child 
relationship includes both the mother-child and the father-child relationship.1108 
Under the UPA a woman can establish a mother-child relationship by showing that 
she gave birth to the child.1109 Section 7611 sets forth the presumption of fatherhood. 
A man is presumed to be a father of a child if he is married to the mother at the time 
of the child’s birth or if he receives the child into his home and openly holds out the 
child as his natural child.1110 
 
It is important to note that the Uniform Parentage Act was applied to many cases 
involving children born through ARTs. Claims involving heterosexual couples and 
homosexual couples were brought before the California Supreme Court. The court 
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used an intent-based analysis and applied a gender neutral interpretation of the UPA 
in order to determine maternity and paternity. In Johnson v Calvert, for example, a 
married couple entered into a surrogacy contract with Johnson, who agreed to be 
implanted with the wife’s egg, carry the child, and relinquish her parental rights to the 
couple after the child’s birth. The two women, the genetic mother and the gestational 
mother, both claimed rights as a legal mother because of their biological ties to the 
child.1111 In this case the California Supreme Court ruled as follows: 
 
“She who intended to procreate the child, that is she who intended to bring about the 
child that she intended to raise as her own is the natural mother”1112  
 
By this ruling, the California Court recognised only one legal mother in cases 
involving heterosexual couples. In Buzzanca v Buzzanca,1113 the couple agreed to 
implant an embryo created by anonymously donated sperm and egg into a 
gestational surrogate and planned to raise the child.1114 In order to establish the 
mother-child relationship, the court relied on the finding in the Johnson case that the 
statutes setting forth presumptions of fatherhood applied equally to claims of 
maternity. Therefore, the court held that California’s artificial insemination statutes 
used to establish fatherhood also applied to a mother who was neither genetically 
related to the child nor had given birth to the child. In fact, section 7613 of 
California’s Family Code provides that a man who consents to the artificial 
insemination of his wife is the child’s legal father.1115 The court thus broadly 
interpreted the statute in ignoring the gender-specific language of the statute and 
awarded legal mother status to the woman who just consented to the insemination 
process but was never biologically related or gave birth to the child.1116 In this 
respect the court held as follows:  
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“There is no reason to distinguish between husbands and wives. Both are equally 
situated from the point of view of consenting to an act which brings a child into 
being."1117  
 
The court also noted the similarity between artificial insemination and surrogacy 
procedures: 
 
“The intended mother and father could establish legal parentage under this statute 
through their consent to Artificial Insemination of another woman in order to produce 
a child that the couple would raise”.1118  
 
The court also held: 
 
“The wife, although not biologically related to the child was the child’s legal mother 
because she initiated the surrogacy arrangement that caused the birth of the child 
and clearly intended to be the mother of the child.”1119 
 
With regard to fatherhood, the court held that “[t]he husband was also the child’s 
legal parent because of his consent to the artificial insemination and surrogacy 
arrangement”.1120 
 
In short, the reasoning of the California Supreme Court in these cases reveals the 
intention of the court to recognise parental legal status to the two members of the 
couple based on their intention to the ART procedures and their intention to raise the 
child resulting from these procedures as their own. Thus in cases involving 
heterosexual couples, the husband and the wife are both the legal parents of the 
resulting child regardless of their biological ties to the child. 
 
                                                          
1117
  Buzzanca v Buzzanca 61 Cal. App. 4th 1420. 
1118
   Buzzanca v Buzzanca 61 Cal. App. 4th 1421. 
1119
  Buzzanca v Buzzanca 61 Cal. App. 4th 1420-25. 
1120
 Buzzanca v Buzzanca 61 Cal. App. 4th 1420-25. 
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It is important to note that, given the purpose of the Uniform Parentage Act, which is 
the equal treatment of all children regardless of the marital status of their parents, 
the application of the UPA was extended the homosexual couples. 
 
In 2005, the Registered Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act of 2003 
became effective.1121 The Act recognises registered domestic partners as legal 
parents and provided their children with the same rights as children of married 
couples.1122  
 
The California Supreme Court has applied the UPA to many cases involving lesbian 
and gay couples. For example, in Elisa B v Superior Court,1123 Elisa and Emily, two 
women in a homosexual relationship, each used the same anonymous sperm donor 
to give birth to children who were biologically related to one another. Elisa gave birth 
to a son, and two years later Emily gave birth to twins. The women gave each child a 
hyphenated surname consisting of both of their surnames and both women breast-
fed the three children. The couple raised the children together. Emily stayed home to 
care for the children, and Elisa worked outside the home in order to provide financial 
support for the family. After the couple separated and Elisa stopped providing Emily 
with support, Emily applied for public assistance and the state sought child support 
from Elisa.  
 
In this case, the court held that a child could have two legal parents of the same 
sex.1124 The court noted the recent enactment of the Domestic Partner Rights and 
Responsibilities Act recognising the rights of registered domestic partners and its 
prior decision upholding a woman’s right to adopt her lesbian partner’s child, and 
concluded that there was no reason to preclude a child from having two parents of 
the same sex.1125 Furthermore, the court ruled that the statutory presumption of 
paternity permitting a non-biological father to establish fatherhood by presenting 
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  Cal. Fam. Code § 297.5 (West 2005). 
1122
  Cal. Fam. Code § 297.5(d). 5 (West 2005). 
1123
  Elisa B v Superior Ct 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005). 
1124
 Elisa B v. Superior Ct 117 P.3d  670 (Cal. 2005). 
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evidence that he received the child into his home and openly held the child out as his 
natural child also applied to non-biological mothers.1126  
 
In another case involving a lesbian couple, KM v EG,1127 KM donated her ova to her 
lesbian partner, EG. Although biologically related to the child, KM agreed not to 
reveal to others that she was the ova donor. KM and EG raised the child together 
until the couple separated. After their separation, KM sought a determination of her 
parental rights. In this case, considering the intent of the parties, the court reasoned 
that KM did not intend simply to be a donor; rather, both KM and EG lived together 
and intended to produce a child that would be raised in their own home. The court 
held that section 7613(b), which provides that a man who donates semen to be 
inseminated in a woman other than his wife is not a father, does not apply when a 
couple intends to raise the child together in their joint home. Both KM and EG could 
establish evidence of a mother-and-child-relationship and their claims were not 
mutually exclusive; therefore, the court found that both KM and EG were legal 
mothers.1128 
 
The third case in which the court applied UPA to homosexual couples is Kristine H v 
Lisa R.1129 In this case a lesbian couple decided to have a child together and Kristine 
was artificially inseminated. Before the child’s birth, the couple sought and received a 
judgment declaring both Kristine and Lisa legal parents of the child. Kristine and Lisa 
raised the child together until they separated two years after the child’s birth. Kristine 
filed an action to set aside the judgment declaring both her and Lisa parents while 
Lisa filed an action seeking custody of the child.1130 In this case the court ruled that 
Kristine was estopped from denying that Lisa was the child’s parent and noted that 
public policy favoured a finding that a child has two parents rather than one.1131 
 
                                                          
1126
  Elisa B v Superior Ct 117 P.3d 667 (Cal. 2005). 
1127
  KM v EG 117 P.3d 673, 675 (Cal. 2005). 
1128
  KM v EG 117 P.3d 673, 678-680 (Cal. 2005). 
1129
  Kristine H v Lisa R 117 P.3d 690, 692 (Cal. 2005). 
1130
  Kristine H v Lisa R 117 P.3d 690, 692 (Cal. 2005). 
1131
  Kristine H v Lisa R 117 P.3d 690, 696 (Cal. 2005). 
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In short, in these cases, the California Supreme Court confirmed that a person’s 
status as a presumed parent may be established regardless of biology, gender, 
sexual orientation, or marital status.  
 
Although the above cases refer to lesbian couples, the reasoning of the court may 
also apply to gay couples. The case of gay couples is a bit different in that, in order 
to have a child, gay couples typically recruit a surrogate who is artificially 
inseminated with one of the men’s sperm. Surrogacy is an expensive process; 
therefore, the children are planned for and very much wanted. Upon the child’s birth, 
the surrogate relinquishes her parental rights and gives the child to the biological 
father and his partner.1132  
 
In the cases involving gay couples, conflicts can occur when the surrogate mother 
claims motherhood or when the two fathers claim paternity. However, in both cases 
a gender neutral application of the UPA would be the solution. In this regard, 
Hawkins points out the following: 
 
“The purpose of the UPA and the courts’ application of the UPA in assisted 
reproduction cases support recognizing the parental rights of gay fathers. The 
Section 7613 grants parental rights to a husband who consents to the artificial 
insemination of his wife with the semen donated by another man. Reading this 
statute in a gender-neutral manner without regard to the marriage-specific language, 
a gay partner who consents to an artificial insemination and surrogacy arrangement 
can be recognized as the legal parent of the child.”1133  
 
Hawkins goes on to emphasise the following: 
 
                                                          
1132
  Robertson 2004 Case WRLR 323, 359. See also Spitko “From queer to paternity: How 
primary gay fathers are changing fatherhood and gay identity” 2005 St Louis U Pub LR 195, 
209-10; Doskow “The second parent trap: Parenting for same-sex couples in a brave new 
world” 1999 JJuvL 1, 3. 
1133
  Hawkins “My two dads: Challenging gender stereotypes in applying California’s recent 
Supreme Court cases to gay couples” 2007 FLQ 633. 
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“The purpose of the UPA and existing case law support interpreting section 7613 to 
apply to gay couples despite the use of the terms ‘husband’ and ‘wife’. By adopting 
the UPA, the legislature intended to eliminate legal distinctions between children 
based on the circumstances of their birth.1134 Refusing to apply the UPA to gay 
couples creates a new class of stigmatized children by distinguishing children solely 
because their parents are both men. This clearly undermines the intent of the UPA to 
promote equal treatment of all children regardless of their parents’ marital status.”1135 
 
Hawkins further concludes that it is in the interest of the child and the state that 
children resulting from ARTs like all other children have two parents. In her words: 
 
“Applying Section 7613 to gay couples also supports the state’s interests in the 
welfare of children and the integrity of the family. The California courts have 
expressed a preference for children having two parents rather than one. The state 
also has an interest in determining parentage in order to hold parents, rather than 
taxpayers, responsible for the care of children. An early determination of parentage 
through the UPA prevents the harm a child may experience from losing the bond he 
has formed with the non-biological parent.”1136 
 
It should be noted that, despite the efforts of the UPA to treat all children in the 
United States equally, some children in homosexual families still suffer unequal 
treatment due to the effects of the legalisation of homosexual unions. The next and 
last section of this chapter is consecrated to the discussion of that inequality. 
 
6.5 IMPLICATIONS OF THE LEGALISATION OF HOMOSEXUAL UNIONS IN 
 THE USA 
 
The legalisation of homosexual unions in the USA has conferred to homosexual 
unions the legal status of registered domestic partnerships, civil unions or marriages. 
Many states have enacted laws recognising one of these statuses. In fact, as 
Graham pointed out, in the USA, most states do not recognise the rights of same-
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  Hawkins 2007 FLQ 633. 
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 Hawkins 2007 FLQ 633. 
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sex partners as analogous to marriage, but all states have enacted laws providing 
some protection to same-sex partners. For instance, Vermont’s legislature enacted a 
law that recognises “civil unions” as identical to marriage, although the institution is 
not described as marriage. Connecticut followed suit; California and New Jersey 
have also enacted laws that create a legal status for same-sex partners that are 
virtually identical to marriage, but is not labelled as such.1137 
 
This situation challenges homosexual couples who choose to have children in 
establishing the legal connection between the child and both parents, especially in 
the states where their union has not been given a civil union or marriage status. In 
fact, Graham makes it clear that in the states where homosexual unions have been 
granted a legal status, be it marriage, civil unions, or registered domestic 
partnerships, the legal connection between a partner and a child will follow from the 
rights that arise from creating the legal relationship as it does with heterosexual 
marriage.1138 In other words, in the states where a homosexual union has a legal 
status, the parent-child relationship will be established following the procedure of the 
application of the Uniform Parentage Act to children born as a result of ARTs as 
discussed above. 
 
In states where second-parent adoption is allowed for a homosexual partner, the 
parent bond is legally created. But this process is not always available and even 
where it is available, it can be a cumbersome process. Otherwise a partner (mostly a 
non-biological parent) can rely on the loco parentis doctrine to secure rights to a 
child.1139 The loco parentis doctrine awards parental rights and responsibilities to an 
individual who voluntarily provides child support or assumes custodial duties of a 
child. The loco parentis status is satisfied when an individual assumes the 
obligations incident to the parental relationship. This feature is relevant when a non-
biological parent wishes to continue her relationship with her child upon the 
                                                          
1137
  Graham “Same-sex couples: Their rights as parents, and their children’s rights as children” 
2008 SClLR 1005. 
1138
  Graham 2008 SClLR 1036. 
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  Graham 2008 SClLR 1036. 
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dissolution of a relationship between the two mothers.1140 However, this doctrine 
does not insure a partner’s legal connection to a child, and often the rights of the 
biological partner will trump the rights of the other partner.1141 
 
It is unfortunate that, in the states that do not afford homosexual relationships the 
status of marriage or civil union, there is no protection for the parent who does not 
give birth to or adopt a child resulting from a relation between partners. This situation 
results in cases where many children born from homosexual couples are without 
protection – these children are likely to have only one legally recognised parent, 
which triggers ensuing problems for the child.1142 
 
In other words, in those states, the situation of the child is vulnerable in that, with 
regard to inheritance, the child will inherit only from one parent and with regard to the 
child’s origin, the child will lose the relationship that he or she has formed with one of 
his parents, in particular the non-biological parent. 
 
The vulnerability of the child with regard to his or her origins raises concerns for his 
or her identity. In fact, each child needs to develop a sense of identity in combination 
with other prerequisites for personal security and stability. The quest for identity is 
the process by which offspring become aware of who and what they are and where 
they belong both socially and culturally.1143 The need for identity may become a right 
that can be claimed against parents, the medical profession and the state, but this is 
rarely seen in practice as it has not been expressed as an enforceable right in 
domestic laws.1144 The need for identity in many countries depends on who the 
government recognises as parent. In the USA, most states have statutes or court 
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decisions upholding the exclusion of the donor from any rearing rights and duties.1145 
This causes children to lose one branch of their genealogy. The need for an identity 
requires that the child know his or her origins from both biological parents. In this 
regard, Daniels pointed out the following: 
 
“[B]eing the child of a sole parent, or of divorced parents, or to be born ‘out of 
wedlock,’ was the exception and could make a child feel ‘different’ or ‘second 
class.’”1146  
 
This would suggest that any child who by law loses one of his or her genitors, like 
the child born as a result of the donation of gametes or eggs, or surrogacy in 
general, and children of gay and lesbian parents in particular, would feel inferior to 
other children a second class child. This child will permanently have an identity 
crisis. Why this should be the case? 
 
The vulnerability of the child with regard to his or her inheritance raises the concern 
that the child will inherit only from one parent, namely the biological parent, the only 
legal parent who is recognised as such in states that do not recognise homosexual 
unions as civil unions or marriage in the USA. Because of this rule, many children 
inherit only from their legal parents who are their biological parents. When an 
individual dies without leaving a will in the USA, the state usually requires that the 
estate be distributed to the decedent’s spouse, and then to other blood relatives. 
Unless there is a formal adoption, the other partner is a legal stranger to the child 
and the child has no right to inherit from the non-biological parent.1147 In most cases 
children are entitled to inherit intestate from their natural or biological parents or their 
adoptive parents. While the general rule is that children can have only two legal 
                                                          
1145
 § 26-17-21 of Ala. Code (2004); § 7613 of Cal. Fam. Code (West 2004); § 19-4-106 of Colo. 
Rev Stat. (West 2004); § 8-703 of Del. Code Ann. Tit. 13  (2004); 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 
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126.061  of Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Michie 2004); § 9:17-44 of N.J. Stat. Ann. (West 2004); § 
40-11-6 of N.M. Stat. Ann (Michie 2004); § 14-18-02.1, 14-17-04 of N.D. Cent Code (2004); § 
3111.95 of Ohio Rev Code (Anderson 2004); § 26.26.710 of Wash Admin Code (2004); Wyo. 
§ 14-2-903 Stat Ann (Michie 2004).  
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parents, determining who can recover intestate from a decedent is a power 
delegated to the states, and the procedure followed differs from state to state.1148 
However, states are reluctant to grant inheritance rights to a child of someone who is 
not a legal parent. And, as the law stands, the ability to become a legal parent is 
limited to biological and adoptive parents.1149  
 
Children raised by parents of the same sex are entitled to the same inheritance 
rights to which children raised by heterosexual parents are entitled. However, 
because these children lack the two bloodlines from which most children inherit, they 
cannot prove parental relationships with science and genetics.1150 
 
The legalisation of homosexual unions has resulted in homosexual persons and 
couples being granted the right to procreate. Homosexual couples who choose to 
procreate in the context of their homosexual relationship will have to use ARTs 
procedures in order to bring children into this world. However, ARTs raises concerns 
about the welfare of the resulting children. As John Robertson pointed out: 
 
“Concerns about the welfare of offspring resulting from ARTs cover a wide range of 
procedures and potential risks. In addition to physical risks from the techniques 
themselves, they include the risk of providing ART services to persons who could 
transmit infectious or genetic disease to offspring, such as persons with HIV or 
carriers of cystic fibrosis. Risks to offspring from inadequate parenting may arise if 
ARTs are provided to persons with mental illness or serious disability. Questions of 
offspring welfare also arise from the use of ARTs in novel family settings, such as 
surrogacy, the posthumous use of gametes and embryos, or with single parents or a 
same sex couples. Finally, both physical and psychological risks may result from 
alteration or manipulation of genes, gametes, and embryos.”1151 
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6.6  THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE 
 TECHNOLOGIES-BORN CHILD IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
6.6.1   Introduction  
 
This section discusses the best interests of the child born or to be born using ARTs 
in the USA. To this end the best interests of the child criterion will be analysed in the 
cases involving custody and adoption. It is important to note that this analysis will 
help understand whether the criterion was properly applied to the cases of children 
born or to be born as a result of ARTs. 
 
6.6.2 The best interests of the child criterion in custody and adoption cases 
 
A survey of Roman and English Law which prevailed in the USA during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries reveals a strong trend towards paternal 
presumption in custody disputes.1152 The reasons for the preference of the father to 
the mother in these disputes include the fact that during that time, women under 
common law were considered not capable of entering into contracts or gaining 
employment. For this reason, women were lacking the ability in the court’s eyes to 
secure a financial future for themselves and for their children. Women were also 
presumed to lack the ability to make rational decisions.1153 
 
During the early part of the nineteenth century, the French Napoleonic code brought 
a shift of the custody standard from the paternal presumption to the dual 
presumption referred to as the “tender years doctrine”, according to which the age of 
the child determines which parent would have the child custody.1154 The doctrine 
accordingly stipulated that a very young child will be placed in the care of the 
mother,1155 because the mother is presumed as more capable nurturer of a child in 
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his or her formative years.1156 However, the custody of older children will be granted 
to the father.1157 
 
Between 1840 and 1870, there was a tendency to determine the custody of a child in 
a gender neutral way. This tendency was referred to as the best interests of child.1158 
According to this tendency, factors that must be taken into account when deciding 
which parent will have the child’s custody include: 
 
(a) The wishes of the child; 
(b) The determination of the most suitable care-giver; 
(c) The maintaining of a healthy relationship with the non-custodian parent; 
(d) The parents’ wishes as to custody; 
(e) The child’s adjustment to his or her home, school and community; 
(f) The mental and psychological health of individuals involved.1159 
 
In the Unites States of America, it is admitted that the best interests of the child is the 
criterion that is widely applied by courts in custody and adoption cases.1160 In these 
cases, the interests of the child have priority over those of the competing adults 
based on the assumption that when a family breaks up, children are usually the most 
vulnerable parties and thus most in need of the law’s protection.1161 Many factors 
have to be taken into account when analysing the best interests of the child. When 
engaging in a best interests analysis, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act 
(“UMDA”) provides that a court shall consider all relevant factors, including the 
wishes of the child and the child’s parents, and the interrelationship between the 
child, his or her parents, his or her siblings and other individuals who may 
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significantly affect the child’s best interests.1162 Similarly, the American Law Institute 
(“ALl”) principles governing family dissolution state that a best interests analysis 
necessitates consideration of a wide range of factors, including emotional 
attachments between the child and parents, the ability of each parent to care for the 
child, the mature and reasonable preference of the child, and all other factors 
relevant to the welfare of the child.1163 All these principles were incorporated in the 
statutes of many states in the USA. 
 
In California, for example, the Family Code requires courts to consider all relevant 
factors that impact upon the child, including “health, safety, and welfare” and whether 
there is a history of domestic violence in determining a best interests analysis in 
custody matters.1164  
 
In New York, courts engaging in a best interests analysis must consider numerous 
factors related to the circumstances of the particular case, including the quality of the 
home environment, fitness of the custodial parent, and ability to provide for the 
child’s physical, emotional and intellectual development.1165 Similarly, in 
Pennsylvania, best interests of the child determinations are based on a consideration 
of all factors that legitimately affect the child’s physical, intellectual, moral and 
spiritual well-being.1166 This would suggest that no decision can be taken concerning 
the child that may ignore the best interests of that child. 
 
Many custody disputes were brought before USA courts, and the courts’ decisions in 
those cases illustrate how courts have protected the best interests of the child within 
the USA jurisdictions. In Roche v Roche,1167 for example, the trial court, in the 
principal case, awarded physical custody of the child to the paternal grand parents. 
Joint control and privileges of visitation were given to both parents, neither of whom 
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 See § 402 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 402 (ALI 1982) (hereinafter “UMDA”).  
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was found to be unfit or to have forfeited in any manner their claim to custody. In 
making its award, the court stated that “[t]he best interests of the said minor child will 
be served ....”1168 The district court of appeal affirmed the judgment of the superior 
court, but judgment was reversed on appeal. Thus, despite the wording of section 
138 of the Civil Code, the court manifestly declares that regardless of the interests 
and well-being of the minor child, the parent must be found unfit before an award of 
custody may be made to a third person. Section 138 reads in part as follows: 
 
“In awarding the custody the court is to be guided by the following considerations: (1) 
By what appears to be for the best interest of the child in respect to its temporal and 
its mental and moral welfare; and if the child is of a sufficient age to form an 
intelligent preference, the court may consider that preference in determining the 
question; (2) As between parents adversely claiming the custody, neither parent is 
entitled to it as of right ....” 
 
In another case, Cummins v. Bird,1169 an action was brought by the father to obtain 
the custody of his child, a girl of twelve. His petition was denied due to the fact that 
the child had been living with her maternal grandparents for almost eleven years, 
during which time the father was apparently indifferent as to her existence. Even 
though he was now in a position to care for the child adequately, and his reputation 
was not impeached in any manner, the court stated that “[i]t is obvious, however, that 
a man may be of good character and financially secure, and yet not suited to the 
trust of rearing and educating a 12 year old girl, with whom he has had no previous 
acquaintance or contact, even though it be his own child.”1170 Upon a finding that the 
father would not be able to offer the child as good a home as the one with her 
grandparents, and that his occupation would necessitate his being away from home 
while travelling, and that the future home of the child would be with his parents, the 
court stated “[h]e is unmarried, and his future domestic relations are unsettled and 
uncertain. He is not prepared to provide the child with the home, the surroundings, 
the companionship, or the training she now enjoys. Her welfare would not be 
                                                          
1168
   1944 25 A.C. 127, 152 P. (2d) at 999. 
1169
  Cummins v. Bird (1929) 230 KY 296, 19 S.W. (2d) 959. 
1170
   Cummins v. Bird (1929) 230 KY 299, 19 S.W. (2d) at 961. 
309 
 
enhanced, but well might be endangered, by disturbing her present happy relations 
with those who have loved and cared for her from infancy, and who possess her 
confidence and affection.1171 
 
In State v. Anderson,1172 the Minnesota court found that the father was financially 
unable to give the children the physical or medical care they needed and that the 
grandparents had been supplying their needs and desired to continue doing so. The 
court held that the right of the parent had to yield to the child’s welfare. 
 
In a similar case, Perry v. Perry,1173 the Massachusetts court came to the same 
conclusion, namely that the “parental-right” should give way to the paramount 
consideration of the child’s well-being. The child, also now nine years of age, had 
practically always lived with its grandparents, and the court stated as follows  
 
“The words of the governing statute1174 in the case at bar are broad in scope. They 
are not bounded by limiting restrictions. There is no express or implied requirement 
that the parent must be found unequivocally to be unfit before the custody of the child 
can be awarded to some suitable third person ....There well may be cases where the 
welfare of the child will be promoted by placing it in the custody of another, and yet 
where the court cannot say that the parents are actually unfit. The present appears to 
be a case of that nature.”1175 
 
These cases among many others stress how American courts were seriously 
engaged to protect the child’s best interests in cases involving custody disputes. 
Where the parents were not found or were declared unfit, courts awarded custody to 
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the third persons against the wording of the civil codes only in order to protect the 
best interests of the child. It is important now to turn to ARTs and analyse how the 
best interests of the child were also protected. 
 
It can be argued that the best interests of the child criterion as applied in custody and 
adoption cases can be extended to a child born as a result of ARTs to heterosexual 
as well as homosexual couples. In the case of ARTs, the best interests of the child 
that need to be discussed concern not only a child born as a result of ARTs but also 
a child expected to be born using these procedures. With regard to the best interests 
of an unborn child, the question that may arise is: Can the best interests of the child 
criterion as applied in the cases discussed above be applied to the unborn child who 
is expected to be born through ARTs? This question raises another important 
question, which is: Are the rights of an unborn child protected in the USA? It appears 
that the answer to the first question totally depends on the answer to the second. 
Therefore, it is important to discuss the protection of an unborn child before 
attempting to say whether the best interests of the child criterion can apply to it. 
 
6.6.2.1  The protection of an unborn child in the USA 
 
The protection of the unborn child is a controversial subject in the USA. Although for 
some Americans life in utero is not worthy of protection, there is a tendency to 
protect life in utero that started with the movement pursuing prenatal personhood. 
According to the Center for Reproductive Rights, this movement aimed at 
establishing that fertilised eggs, embryos, and foetuses should be treated as full 
persons under the law with rights equal to, and in some cases superior to the rights 
of women.1176 Advocates of prenatal personhood proposed measures attempting to 
protect the legal rights of fertilised eggs, embryos, and foetuses by defining life as 
beginning at the moment of fertilisation or conception.1177 
 
                                                          
1176
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Prenatal personhood measures had been proposed in different states; in the state of 
Mississippi, for instance, it was proposed as constitutional amendments that would 
provide that “a person means every human being from the moment of fertilisation, 
cloning, or the functional equivalent thereof”.1178 Other prenatal measures have been 
proposed as laws that would insert a similar definition of “person” into a state’s 
criminal code.1179 In short, prenatal personhood measures had been proposed in the 
form of ballot initiatives and legislative bills and as both statutes and state 
constitutional amendments. It is important to note that the state of Mississippi had 
enacted a personhood policy statement declaring that the state of Mississipi 
considers “unborn children” to have the same rights as all other persons in the 
state.1180 
 
Prenatal personhood measures were not the only form of protecting the rights of 
unborn children in the USA. Almost forty-five states enacted laws protecting the 
rights of an unborn child. All those laws tend to recognise foetuses as potential 
victims of violent crimes.1181 These laws are referred to as Foetal Homicide Laws, 
and some of them define a person as including the unborn for the purpose of the 
state’s murder, manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide, and assault statutes.1182 
 
In the USA, 36 states have enacted statutes recognising embryos or foetuses as 
potential victims of homicide and other violent crimes. Twenty-five of those states 
prohibit harming foetuses or embryos at any stage of development, some other 
states only apply their foetal homicide statutes to foetuses that have reached a 
certain gestational age.1183 
 
The rights of unborn children seem to be also protected through judicial activities in 
the USA. In many cases, American courts protected the rights of unborn children by 
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convicting pregnant women for abuse, negligence, assaults and many other charges 
due to her behaviour during the pregnancy. Although this court’s position was 
subjected to criticism, many pregnant women in the USA were convicted of different 
crimes that they committed on their own unborn children. The Whitner v State case, 
for instance, involved a woman who pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of criminal 
child neglect for causing her baby to be born with cocaine metabolites in its system 
because she took crack cocaine during the last trimester of her pregnancy. In that 
case the court held as follows: 
 
“If as Whitner suggests we should, we read home only as a vindication of the 
mother’s interests in the life of her unborn child, there would be no basis for 
prosecuting a mother who kills her viable foetus by stabbing it, by shooting it, or by 
such other means, yet a third party could be prosecuted for the very same act. We 
decline to read home in a way that insulates the mother from all culpability for harm 
to her unborn child”.1184  
 
In a similar case, the court held the following: 
 
“It is inconceivable that the legislature would intend a foetus to have property rights 
and causes of action sounding in tort, but not be protected against threats to its 
safety or life, from its own mother, while in utero… It defies logical reasoning that our 
law and society would preclude a mother from illegally introducing narcotics and 
other illegal drugs into her child and yet not protect the unborn child from those same 
dangers while the child is still in the womb”1185 
 
In 2003 the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the twenty-years prison 
sentence imposed on Regina Mcknight after she was convicted of homicide by child 
abuse in connection with a stillbirth that was attributed to her use of crack cocaine 
during her pregnancy.1186 In 2013, in another case involving the protection of an 
unborn child’s rights, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed a decision by the 
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Alabama Criminal Appeals Court, holding that a viable foetus is a child for purposes 
of the state’s criminal statute prohibiting the chemical endangerment of a child.1187 
 
Although it is reported that the prenatal personhood measures proposed in many 
states had so far been rejected by the voters in all the states in which the initiative 
have appeared on the ballot,1188 it is important to note that Foetal Homicide Laws 
and their application in the abovementioned cases are the evidence of the legislative 
and judicial protection of unborn children’s interests in the USA.  
 
Now that it is established that the unborn child is protected under USA law, the 
question that was asked above, whether the best interests of the child criterion as 
applied in custody and adoption cases can also apply to the unborn child, can be 
answered in the affirmative. In the USA, as demonstrated in the discussion above, 
an unborn child is a person or a child and therefore protected by the law. This being 
said, another question can be asked: Are the best interests of the unborn child 
protected in the USA when such a child is conceived through assisted reproductive 
procedures? 
 
6.6.2.2  The application of the best interests of the child criterion to assisted 
  reproductive technologies in the USA 
 
In the USA, like in other countries, most if not all the cases involving ARTs revolve 
around the transfer of the child custody or parental rights. The following cases 
illustrate how courts in the USA have dealt with this issue. In In re Baby M,1189 
Richard and Mary Beth Whitehead and William and Elizabeth Stern developed a 
strong relationship.1190 The two couples agreed that Mary Beth be artificially 
inseminated with William’s sperm provided that if the procedure was successful and 
she fell pregnant, she would give the baby to the Sterns to raise it as theirs. In 
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counterpart, the Sterns agreed to pay Mary Beth $10,000. The deal was arranged by 
the Infertility Center of New York (“ICNY”).1191 
 
After six months and eleven inseminations, Mary Beth fell pregnant, and on 27 
March 1986 she gave birth to a child that was known as Baby M. A few days after 
the child’s birth, Mary Beth changed her mind and refused to honour the terms of the 
agreement.1192 The Sterns negotiated with Mary and implored her to hand over the 
child to them as per their agreement.1193 In early May, the Sterns decided to sue 
Mary in order to have the agreement enforced. The court held that the parties agreed 
to a permanent change in custody of a child, not only before the child is born but 
prior to conception of the child.1194 On behalf of the court, Judge Harvey Sorkow of 
the Bergen County Court ordered that the child be handed over to the Sterns.1195 
 
It is clear here that what interests the parties in this case is the change of the child’s 
custody. There is no interest in safety or health of the child whose custody will be 
changed at birth. In addition, Barbour stated as follows: 
 
“While parties to preconception arrangements may seek legal advice and other 
counsel to protect their interests, typically, no one represents the interests of the 
child. Even if a guardian ‘ad litem’ is appointed to protect the interest of the child at 
the inception of the preconception agreement, it is practically impossible to determine 
what is in the best interest of a particular child before that child is conceived. While 
these arrangements may benefit the interests of the parties and brokers involved, 
preconception arrangements cannot be based upon a true best interest 
determination.”1196  
 
Barbour argues that preconception agreements are merely baby selling devices that 
serve the interests of the parties, brokers, or other facilitators. There is no 
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determination of the individual needs of a particular child. Therefore these 
agreements, even if pre-approved by a court, cannot be based upon a true best 
interest analysis.1197  
 
In another case, Johnson v. Calvert,1198 Mark and Crispina Calvert agreed with Anna 
Johnson that she will be a gestational surrogate for their child.1199 Gametes from the 
Calverts were fertilised through IVF and the embryo was implanted in Anna.1200 In 
terms of the surrogate motherhood agreement, an amount of $10,000 in addition to 
the associated medical expenses would be paid to Anna provided that she gives 
birth and hand the baby over to the Calverts.1201 The implantation was successful 
and Anna conceived, but before the child’s birth Anna demanded that the balance of 
fees in respect of the agreement be paid or she would keep the child.1202 The 
Calverts sought for an order declaring them the legal parents and Anna also sought 
an order declaring her the legal mother.1203 Upon the child’s birth, the blood tests 
comfirmed the Calverts as the genetic parents; however, the court still needed to 
decide who would be the legal parents of the child.1204 
 
At issue before the California Supreme Court was the determination of the legal 
mother of a child who shared both a genetic mother and a birth mother. First, the 
court concluded that under the Uniform Parentage Act, either circumstance was 
enough to establish a mother-child relationship;1205 However, California law only 
recognises one legal mother per child, “despite advances in reproductive technology 
rendering a different outcome biologically possible.”1206 To resolve the issue, the 
court examined the intent of the parties because the California Civil Code did not 
place a preference on proof of blood testing over proof of having given birth as being 
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dispositive of legal motherhood.1207 The court held that the principle of the bargain is 
the conception, gestation, birth, and transfer of a child. Preconception arrangements, 
even if characterised as the mere sale of gestational services, constitute baby selling 
and should be prohibited. States must not renounce their inherent role as parens 
patriae to protect children’s welfare. To the extent that state laws governing 
preconception arrangements conflict with federal laws prohibiting the sale of 
humans, state laws must yield to federal law.1208 The court contended that Crispina 
was the natural and legal mother of the child because it was the actions of Mark and 
Crispina which caused the child’s existence.1209 They had intended the birth of the 
child.1210 They had pursued in vitro fertilisation to ensure the child’s existence.1211 
Further, the aim of the parties to the contract was to bring about the birth of Mark 
and Crispina’s child, not to donate a zygote to Anna.1212 Therefore, the court 
concluded that because the Uniform Parentage Act recognised both giving birth and 
genetic consanguinity as means of establishing a mother and child relationship, and 
when one woman is not both the birth mother and the genetic mother, she will be the 
natural mother as she intends to bring about the birth of the child and to raise it as 
her own.1213 In this regard Barbour sumited the following: 
 
“Since preconception agreements invariably affect substantive rights of children 
produced through such agreements, with no meaningful, or at best, an incomplete 
best interest determination, preconception agreements should be banned. For 
numerous legal, religious, ethical, moral, medical, and public policy reasons, we, as a 
civilized society, should determine that certain things are not for sale including babies 
and the use of women’s reproductive organs. Consequently, all preconception 
arrangements should be proscribed”.1214 
 
It follows from the above discussion that the best interests of the unborn child do not 
seem to be a priority when assisted reproductive procedures are concerned. The 
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analysis of those procedures reveals that the state and the ARTs providers solely 
seek to satisfy the need of the intended parents to have children and build families to 
the detriment of the resulting children’s interests. Courts and ART providers seem to 
be concerned only with the satisfaction of the need of the intended parents to have 
children.  
 
In sum, it can be argued that in the USA, preconception agreements and all other 
means of reproducing using ARTs are centred on the interests of the prospective 
parents.  
 
From the comparison of the application of the best interests of the child criterion in 
custody disputes and ARTs procedures, it can be argued that the child’s best 
interests seem to be better protected in custody cases than in ART cases, in 
particular cases involving the preconception agreements. 
 
In the former cases, statutes and court decisions state that the child’s best interests 
have priority over the competing interests of the adults because children are 
vulnerable and in need of protection. The Californian Family Code, for instance, 
requires that when applying the best interests of the child criterion courts must 
consider factors such as health, safety and welfare because of their impact on the 
child.1215 The child’s physical, emotional and intellectual development is factors that 
the New York courts must consider when applying the best interests of the child 
criterion to adoption and custody cases.1216  
 
In short, when the courts determine the best interests of the child, factors such as 
the child’s physical, emotional and spiritual development as well as the child’s health, 
safety and welfare are factors that are vested with the utmost importance and 
deserve serious consideration. 
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However, the analysis of the court’s approach to ART cases, in particular 
preconception agreements, reveals that the courts are not seriously considering 
factors such as these mentioned above. In In re Baby M and Johnson v Calvert, 
respectively in New Jersey and California, the courts were merely interested in the 
transfer of the custody of the child born as a result of the surrogacy agreement.  
 
To summarise, the courts are interested in the satisfaction of the adults to have 
children and not in the interests of the resulting child. This approach seems similar to 
the Australian one, with one exception. 
 
6.7  INTERIM CONCLUSION 
 
There is an on-going debate on the merit of the legalisation of homosexual unions in 
the world in general and in the USA in particular. Several reasons were asserted for 
and against this legal procedure that bears many implications on the state as a 
society, the family and also on children. 
 
The legalisation of homosexual families has resulted in the legal recognition of 
relationships that already existed. This caused homosexual unions to have a legal 
status either as registered domestic partnerships, civil unions, or as marriage. The 
legalisation of homosexual unions also raised some issues. While some scholars 
view the status of marriage as a final stage in the struggle for the recognition of 
homosexual rights, other scholars pointed out that registered domestic partnerships 
and civil unions are necessary steps towards marriage.  
 
Another issue was the interstate recognition of homosexual unions legally 
recognised in a sister state. All US states have now given legal status to these 
homosexual unions, some as civil unions, some as domestic partnerships, and 
others as marriage.1217 The issue of interstate recognition arises when partners to 
civil marriage for instance move to a state that recognises homosexual unions as 
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domestic partnerships. Which rights will be recognised to these partners to civil 
marriage in the new state where they have relocated?  
 
The legalisation of homosexual unions also raised concerns relating to the 
establishment of parental rights in homosexual families, and the rights of 
homosexual persons and couples to use ARTs to procreate and form families. 
 
The legalisation of homosexual unions has some implications on the child resulting 
from the use of ART technologies. These include the fact that children in the USA 
receive different treatment according to the states where they live. While in some 
states children born as a result of ARTs in heterosexual as well as in homosexual 
families have the right to have the benefit of having two parents respectively of 
opposite sexes and of the same sex, in other states children are condemned to have 
only one parent, namely the biological parent. The partner of the biological parent 
has no parental rights in respect of his or her child. As a result, the child will not only 
loose financial, psychological and emotional support from the non-biological parent 
in case of the separation between the two parents, but the child will also be denied 
the right to inherit from the non-biological parent and will lose his or her blood line if 
he or she is the result of the use of the genetic materials of a donor. In many states, 
donors of gametes and eggs and surrogate mothers are required by law to have no 
contact to or other parental rights in respect of the child resulting from the use of 
their genetic materials. This will cause the child to lose the root of his or her origins. 
This situation will cause the child to have an identity crisis. The identity in this context 
is linked to the child’s genetic origins. It will be a challenge for a child born in these 
states and whose parents are separated to understand that he or she has only one 
parent. 
 
The legalisation of homosexual unions has resulted in homosexual couples and 
individuals being allowed to use ARTs in order to reproduce. ARTs are thus their 
only means to reproduce when they choose to do so in the context of their 
homosexual relationships. 
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Having recourse to this way may put children resulting from the procedures at an 
increasing risk of being born with birth defects and other congenital health problems. 
This situation raises concerns about the welfare of those children and the question 
whether it is in the best interests of a child to be forced to be born with health 
challenges. A further question that can be asked is whether those children have 
rights that can protect them against the choice of their parents.  
 
The next chapter, which deals with homosexual families in Australia, will give some 
guidance on how to attempt to respond to these questions. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
HOMOSEXUAL FAMILIES IN AUSTRALIA 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
It is admitted that in modern times the term family covers a wide range of 
relationships that are recognised by the law. For instance “spouses” may mean 
people who are legally married (de jure spouses) or not legally married but living 
together in a committed relationships (de facto spouses).1218 
 
Spouses can be parents of children with whom they have biological relationships. In 
addition to parents and their biological children, there are also many other parent-
child relationships that may be legally recognised. These include adopted parents 
and their children as well as parents and children born as a result of ARTs involving 
sperm and/or ova donation.1219 In Australia, the term “spouses” covers people 
engaged in heterosexual relationships as well as people who are in homosexual 
unions.1220 
 
Australia is a federation made up of six states (New South Wales, Queensland, 
Victoria, Western Australia, South Australia and Tasmania), and two territories 
(Northern Territory and Australian Capital Territory).1221 
 
In Australia, on one side, each state and territory has its own governing laws 
created, defined and enforced by the state and each of these laws is binding within 
the state, but can be ultimately overridden by federal laws; on the other side the 
federal laws as stated in the Constitution are those that the parliament of Australia 
has the power to make.  
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These laws include trade and commerce, taxation, immigration, marriage, divorce 
and matrimonial causes, parental rights, the custody and guardianship of infants, 
and others.1222 In other words, Australian federalism involves both independent 
action by states and territories with oversight by the federal government, and action 
at the federal level. It is worth noting that Australia is a common-law country, which 
means that laws and precedents can also be created in a courtroom. There are 
many laws that are ruled on by a judge in a particular case because of a precedent 
set down in another decision made in a similar case. The laws are based on judicial 
decisions rather than legislative action. These rulings are known as common law.1223 
 
In Australia, a wide range of state and federal laws recognise and regulate intimate 
and familial relationships and superannuation,1224 as well as the areas that are 
traditionally thought of as “family law”: Property division and disputes over children 
following relationship breakdown.1225 
 
Prior to 1998 homosexual couples were excluded from virtually every law in Australia 
that accorded rights and responsibilities to people based upon their relationship.1226 
This exclusion was a concern for gay and lesbian families that existed in Australia at 
that time and according to Milbank, it led to the conclusion that homosexual people 
as members of families of choice, in which they form partnerships and raise children, 
were almost universally ignored.1227 
 
However, from 1999, Australian relationship laws underwent changes which were 
aimed at affording legal recognition to homosexual couples. These changes were 
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effected mostly through absorbing homosexual cohabiting couples into the pre-
existing category of the de facto relationship.1228 
 
While little has been done at federal level in terms of relationship law reform, major 
changes occurred at state and territory level. For instance, New South Wales was 
the first state to introduce major changes by passing laws including homosexual 
cohabiting couples in de facto relationships across a wide range of state laws.1229 
New South Wales was followed by other Australian states and territories. 
 
Some states “tested the water” with one or two small changes followed by more 
comprehensive reform, while others, particularly in more recent years, have passed 
laws that achieved reform all at once.1230 
 
This chapter deals with the recognition of homosexual families in Australian law. The 
chapter will therefore review the laws recognising homosexual families at 
commonwealth or federal level as well as state and territory level. This two-level 
recognition of homosexual families in Australia raises the issue of the constitutional 
power of the federal parliament to legislate on homosexual relationships. The 
chapter will address this issue as well as laws introducing homosexual families in 
Australia. The chapter will then analyse laws regulating ARTs in Australia, parentage 
in Australian homosexual families and some of the disputes that may arise at the 
relationship breakdown. 
 
7.2 THE LEGAL RECOGNITION OF HOMOSEXUAL UNIONS IN AUSTRALIA 
 
7.2.1 Introduction  
 
Homosexual relationships have been recognised in Australian Law since 1999. As 
already stated, the recognition of homosexual relationships occurred at federal level 
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as well as at state and territory level. It is important to understand how Australia has 
proceeded to recognise homosexual relationships within its jurisdictions. 
 
7.2.2 The Australian approach to the recognition of homosexual relationships  
 
During the last decade, the law relating to homosexual couples has changed beyond 
recognition in many parts of the Western world. In Australia, laws relating to 
homosexual couples have undergone dramatic change. Australian law now provides 
largely equal protection to all couples, regardless of marriage or gender.1231 This 
would suggest that homosexual couples can benefit from legal protection under 
Australian law regardless of their marital status. In other words, homosexual people 
are not required to be legally married before receiving legal protection under 
Australian federal law as well as the laws of states and territories. 
 
Witzleb refers to this approach as the inclusive approach. According to him, this 
approach has the advantage of diminishing the legal significance of marriage as a 
vehicle for achieving protection under Australian law.1232 
 
In Australia, it is worth noting that marriage is allowed only between a man and a 
woman. Marriage as defined in the federal Constitution was the only relationship that 
received a full range of protection under Australian law. It was then important to 
decouple protection of other relationships from marriage status for such relationships 
to benefit from Australian law protection. 
 
In the recognition of homosexual relationships most states proceeded by reforms 
that were limited in areas they covered. For instance, some legislation inserted a 
definition of a relationship that would omit all reference to the sex of spouses to 
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define the relationship in a gender-neutral way. In other words, where the 
relationships referred to “spouses” it was changed to refer to “partners”.1233 
 
By adopting an inclusive approach as defined above, Australia was testing the 
acceptance of homosexual unions within its jurisdictions with the intention of bringing 
more comprehensive reforms which would broaden the areas of benefits for 
homosexual couples at a later stage.1234 This process has resulted in the recognition 
of heterosexual as well as homosexual de facto relationships of varying description 
and definition in Australian states and territories.1235 
 
7.2.3 Federal recognition of homosexual relationships 
 
Until 2004 there had been very limited reforms to recognise homosexual partners in 
federal law. Homosexual partners were not considered as spouses or families in 
Australia. The federal government opposed any form of recognition of homosexual 
relationships. In 2004, this view was put into effect by amending the Marriage Act 
1961 (Cth) to explicitly include the common-law definition of marriage as a “[u]nion of 
a man and a woman to the exclusion of all others, voluntarily entered into for life”. 
This was intended to ensure that Australian courts could not in the future redefine 
marriage to include homosexual couples.1236 
 
However, in late 2004, the federal parliament passed two laws which accorded some 
limited rights to homosexual couples. The first was the Superannuation Legislation 
Amendment (Choice of Superannuation Funds) Act 2004, which amended the 
superannuation laws to expand the category of dependents entitled to inherit assets 
if a member of a fund dies. This law does not specifically include homosexual 
couples; rather they may be able to use the “catch-all” category of dependent.1237 
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The second law passed at the federal level was the Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2004. 
This Act amended the definition of close family member to specifically include 
homosexual partners. Close family members are protected from the strict liability 
offence of association with terrorism.1238 
 
It is important to note that these reforms did not cover all the rights of homosexual 
couples. In many areas they were denied equal treatment with heterosexual couples. 
In 2007, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission (now the Australian 
Human Rights Commission) conducted a comprehensive inquiry to identify those 
federal laws in which homosexual couples and their children suffered discrimination 
and to devise appropriate mechanisms for reform. In response to this pressure, the 
government enacted two more laws: The Same-sex Relationships (Equal Treatment 
in Commonwealth Laws – General Reforms) Act 2008 (Cth) and the Same-sex 
(Equal Treatment in Commonwealth Laws-Superannuation) Act 2008 (Cth). These 
reforms removed discrimination against homosexual couples and children from a 
wide range of commonwealth laws and programs. As a result, federal law caught up 
with the position that has been achieved at state level for some time. This was 
generally achieved by expanding the definition of the de facto parent, child and 
relationship so that homosexual couples and their families have equal recognition to, 
and the same entitlement as heterosexual de facto couples.1239 These reforms 
amended all together eighty commonwealth laws, including the following areas: 
 
(a) social security; 
(b) family assistance and aged care; 
(c) taxation; 
(d) superannuation; 
(e) citizenship; 
(f) veterans affairs; 
(g) workers’ compensation; and 
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   Milbank 2005 LIAC 9. 
1239
   Witzleb 2011 IJLPF 145. 
327 
 
(h)  immigration.1240 
 
It is notable that little has been done at federal level in respect of recognising 
homosexual unions compared to what happened at state and territory level. 
 
7.2.4 State and territory recognition of homosexual relationships 
 
7.2.4.1 Overview of state and territory recognition of homosexual relationships 
 
States and territories have largely completed the move towards equal treatment to 
de facto relationship, regardless of the partners’ gender. Notwithstanding many 
differences in details, the areas in which homosexual couples are enjoying 
equivalent protection include: 
 
(a) property division and maintenance where couples split up; 
(b) succession rights; 
(c) recognition as next of kin; 
(d) accident and workers’ compensation; 
(e) partner’s state superannuation; and  
(f) protection from discrimination on the basis of marital status.1241  
 
Although states in general have offered homosexual couples legal protection in 
Australia, and despite some similarity in areas where homosexual couples enjoy 
protection or the same treatment as heterosexuals in some states, each state has its 
particular degree of protection that is offered to homosexual couples within its 
jurisdiction. It is important to examine legislations that have included homosexual 
couples in Australian laws. 
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7.2.4.2 State and territory legislations 
 
7.2.4.2.1  New South Wales 
 
In 1996, New South Wales amended two laws that concerned the rights of victims of 
crimes and their families to include a homosexual partner within the definition of 
immediate family. These laws were the Victims Support and Rehabilitation Act 1996 
(NSW), and the Criminal Procedure Act 1996 (NSW).1242 
 
In 1999, New South Wales passed the Property (Relationships) Legislation 
Amendment Act 1999 (NSW) and became the first state to pass legislation amending 
a wide range of laws simultaneously to include homosexual couples. The Act 
inserted a new definition for the term “de facto relationship”, turned it into the De 
Facto Relationship Act 1984 (NSW) and applied the definition to twenty other pieces 
of legislation concerning matters such as guardianship, inheritance, accident 
compensation, stamp duty and decision-making in illness and after death.1243  
 
The Act defined a de facto relationship as two adult persons who live together as a 
couple and are not married to one another or related by family.1244 Section 4(2) of 
the Act lists factors that can be taken into account when deciding whether a couple is 
in a de facto relationship. These include: 
(a) The duration of the relationship; 
(b) The nature and extent of the common residence; 
(c) Whether or not a sexual relationship exists; 
(d) The degree of financial dependence or interdependence; 
(e) Any arrangements for financial support between the parties; 
(f) The ownership, use and acquisition of property; 
(g) The degree of mutual commitment to a shared life; 
(h) The care and support of children; 
                                                          
1242
  Section 9 and Section 23 A respectively. Milbank 2006 FLR 9.  
1243
   Milbank 2006 FLR 10. 
1244
  Section 4(1) of the Property (Relationship) Act 1984 (NSW). 
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(i) The performance of household duties; and  
(j) The reputation and public aspects of the relationship. 
 
It is notable that under this Act cohabitation is required, but a specific period of 
cohabitation is only required for a small number of laws relating to property division 
and inheritance.1245  
 
The Act dropped the term “spouse” and replaced it with “partner” or “relationship” to 
emphasise that there remains a difference between marriage and homosexual 
partnerships or relationships.1246 The Act created a new category of “close 
relationship” intended to cover close cohabitating relationship of interdependence 
across a small number of laws. According to section 5(1)b of the property 
(Relationships) Legislation Amendment Act 1999 (NSW), a close personal 
relationship is defined as a personal relationship (other than marriage or de facto 
relationship) between two adult persons, whether or not related by family, who are 
living together, one or each of whom provides the other with domestic support and 
personal care. 
 
In 2000, another amendment was passed in New South Wales: The Superannuation 
Legislation Amendment (Same-sex Partners) Act 2000 (NSW). This Act included 
homosexual partners of employers in state government superannuation schemes. 
The Act also amended a number of previous Acts to include some rights for partners 
living in homosexual unions. These include the Parliamentary Contribution 
Superannuation Act 1971 (NSW); the Police Association Employees 
(Superannuation) Act 1996 (NSW), the Police Regulation (Superannuation) Act 1906 
(NSW); the State Authorities Non-Contributory Superannuation Act 1987 (NSW), the 
State Authorities Superannuation Act 1987 (NSW), and the Superannuation Act 
1916 (NSW).1247 
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  Section 17 of the Property (Relationship) Act 1984 (NSW). 
1246
  Section 62 of the Property (Relationship) Act 1984 (NSW). 
1247
  Milbank 2005 LIAC 13. 
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Two years later, the Miscellaneous Acts Amending (Relationships) Act 2002 (NSW) 
was passed and amended a further 27 New South Wales Laws to include 
homosexual couples as de facto partners principally in the areas of surviving partner 
entitlements to inheritance of interests such as residential leases and employments 
benefits (eg the rights to a deceased partner’s unpaid leave).1248 
 
7.2.4.2.2 Western Australia 
 
In 2002 and 2003 two laws were passed in Western Australia respectively: The Acts 
Amendment (Lesbian and Gay Law Reform) Act 2002 and the Acts Amendment 
(Equality of Status) Act 2003. These two laws together amended over seventy 
statutes to recognise homosexual relationships as de facto relationships.1249  
 
A de facto relationship is defined as a relationship (other than a legal marriage 
between two persons who live together in a marriage-like relationship).1250 This 
definition adds that it does not matter whether the parties are heterosexual or 
homosexual, or whether they are legally married or in a de facto relationship with 
another person. 
 
Western Australia included adoption law in these reforms, so that homosexual 
couples who have cohabited for three years or more are eligible to apply to adopt 
unrelated children.1251 A homosexual partner is also eligible under step-parent 
provisions to apply to adopt their de facto partner’s children.1252 
 
More sweeping changes to parental rights for homosexual couples occurred with the 
amendments to the Artificial Conception Act 1985 (WA) that granted presumed 
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 Milbank 2005 LIAC 13. 
1249
  Milbank 2005 LIAC 23. 
1250
  Section 13 A (1) of the Interpretation Act 1984 (WA). 
1251
  Subsection 38 and 39(1) (e) (i) of the Adoption Act 1994 (WA).  
1252
  Section 4(b) of the Adoption Act 1994 (WA). 
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parental status to a consenting female de facto partner of a woman who has a child 
through ARTs.1253 
 
It should be noted that Western Australia was the first state to extend this recognition 
to a female partner, and to amend laws to allow her to be listed as the second parent 
on the child’s birth certificate. The Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 
1998 (WA) was amended by the Acts Amendment (Lesbian and Gay Law Reform) 
Act 2002 (WA) so that a female partner can be registered alongside the birth mother 
as parent. This reform makes parental status automatic and applying at birth. There 
is no need for the step-parent to apply for step-parent adoption. This reform is 
retrospective in operation, thus applying to children born prior to, as well as following 
the 2002 reforms.1254 
 
This reform regulates access to fertility services and allows lesbians to access 
fertility services to receive donor insemination and access in vitro fertilisation if 
medically necessary. The reform also introduced laws that removed marital status 
and sexuality discrimination. The previous requirements applicable to heterosexual 
de facto couples that couples be in a relationship for five out of the past six years in 
order to be eligible for in vitro fertilisation were removed by this reform. Reforms in 
Western Australia covered every area of law in the state that concern 
relationships.1255 
 
7.2.4.2.3 The Northern Territory 
 
In 2003 the Law Reform (Gender Sexuality and De Facto Relationships) Act 2003 
(NT) was passed. The Act amended fifty four pieces of territory legislation to include 
homosexual couples as de facto relationships.1256 These reforms maintained the 
New South Wales list of factors for the determination of the existence of a de facto 
relationship. These reforms excluded homosexual couples from eligibility to apply for 
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  Section 6A of the Artificial Conception Act 1985. 
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   Milbank 2005 LIAC 23. 
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  Milbank 2005 LIAC 23-4. 
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   Milbank 2005 LIAC 24. 
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adoption of children. However, individuals are eligible under the relevant statute in 
exceptional circumstances.1257 
 
This raft of reforms amended the status of Children Act 1975 (NT) to recognise the 
non-biological parent in lesbian couples who have children through ARTs, and to 
allow both mothers to be listed on the child’s birth certificate.1258 
 
A further change was introduced to modify parental rights and redefine the child born 
to one party in the de facto relationships as a step-child in the same way that the 
child of a party to a legal marriage would be.1259 These reforms have affected a 
significant range of Acts, including in the areas of guardianship and inheritance.1260 
 
7.2.4.2.4 Tasmania 
 
Tasmania simultaneously introduced the de facto relationship category and a 
registration system. Tasmania does not require cohabitation for recognition of a de 
facto relationship. This demarked Tasmania from other states.1261 
 
In 2003, Tasmania passed into law the Relationships Act 2003 (Tas) and the 
Relationships (Consequential Amendments) Act 2003 (Tas). These laws amended 
seventy three statutes.1262 
 
These reforms introduced the term “personal relationship” of which there are two 
subcategories: A significant relationship and a caring relationship that replaced the 
term “de facto”. Section 4(1) of the Relationships Act 2003 (Tas) defines a significant 
relationship as a relationship between two adult persons who have a relationship as 
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  Section 14(1) of the Adoption Act 1994 (NT) 
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  Section 5B of the Status of Children Act 1975 (NT) and s 4 of the Artificial Conception Act 
1985 (WA). 
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  Section 19A (4) of the Interpretation Act 1978. 
1260
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a couple and who are not married to one another or related by family. Tasmania 
does not require the couple to live together. However, to determine whether a 
significant relationship exists, cohabitation is a relevant consideration. Tasmania also 
maintained the New South Wales list of factors for determining the existence of the 
personal relationship.1263 If the relationship is registered, the registration is proof of 
the existence of the relationship.1264 The registration of a caring relationship is also 
proof of the existence of the relationship with the difference that the legal status 
granted to caring relationships is considerable compared to the legal status granted 
to a significant relationship registration.1265 
 
7.2.4.2.5 Victoria 
 
In 2002 the Statute Law Amendment (Relationships) Act 2001(Vic) and the Statute 
Law Further Amendment (Relationships) Act 2001 (Vic) together changed over sixty 
pieces of law in Victoria to include cohabiting homosexual couples as domestic 
partners on the same basis as unmarried heterosexual couples. Victoria’s reforms 
dropped the use of de facto spouses in order to emphasise that marriage remains 
unaltered. The Act recognises homosexual relationships in a non-discriminatory way. 
This means that homosexual relationships are not treated based on the gender or 
sexual orientation of the people involved. Cohabitation for two years is only required 
in the case of property division and inheritance legislation. It is possible under these 
reforms that parties under eighteen years of age may qualify as domestic partners in 
Victoria.1266  
 
Victoria did not include adoption laws in the amendments.1267 Although individuals 
may apply to adopt in Victoria, the law provides that they will only be considered in 
exceptional circumstances.1268 
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  Section 4(3) of the Relationship Act 2003 (Tas). 
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  Section 4(2) of the Relationship Act 2003 (Tas). 
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  Section 13(1) Relationship Act 2003 (Tas). 
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   Milbank 2005 LIAC 16. 
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In Victoria, access to donor insemination and in vitro fertilisation was limited by 
legislation to married couples and heterosexual de facto couples prior to the McBain 
challenge,1269 and has been effectively limited to them through a restrictive definition 
of infertility.1270 
 
7.2.4.2.6 Queensland 
 
In 1998 and 1999 the property division regimes were enacted in Queensland and 
were opened to all unmarried couples.1271 In 1999 Queensland introduced a gender 
neutral definition of the de facto relationship in individual law concerning access to 
parental leave and in legislation concerning domestic violence protection orders.1272 
 
Queensland enacted these apparently unrelated pieces of legislation to test public 
reaction before passing more comprehensive reform some years later. These 
statutes defined homosexual couples as spouses in various ways.1273 “Spouse” was 
defined to mean either one or two persons, whether of the same or opposite sex, 
who are living or have lived together as a couple.1274 Two persons are a couple if 
they live together on a genuine domestic basis in a relationship based on intimacy, 
trust and personal commitment to each other.1275 
 
In the first raft of reforms, Queensland introduced limited parental rights. Three years 
later, comprehensive reform followed: The Discrimination Law Amendment Act 2002 
(Qld), which amended forty five Acts to include homosexual couples as de facto 
                                                          
1269
 The McBain challenge was brought in McBain v Victoria [2000] FCA 1009, a case in which 
Mcbain, a single heterosexual woman, and her doctor challenged the Infertility Act 1995 (Vic). 
They argued that the federal prohibitions on marital status cover the fact of being single or 
married; therefore the requirement of the spousal relationship in the Infertility Act 1995 is 
inconsistent with the federal prohibitions on marital status. 
1270
  Section 8 of the Infertility Act 1995 (Vic). 
1271
  Section 260 of the Property Law Amendment Act 1999 (Qld). 
1272
  Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld) pt 2 Div 3; S 7 of the Domestic Violence Family Protection 
Amendment Act 1999 amending s 12 of the Domestic Violence Family Protection Act 1999 
(Qld). 
1273
 Milbank 2005 LIAC18. 
1274
  S 260(1) of the Property Law 1974 (Qld).  
1275
  Section 260(2) of the Property Law 1974 (Qld). 
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partners.1276 Queensland reform included a genuine domestic basis as an aspect of 
the definition of the de facto relationship. The list of factors for determining the 
existence of a de facto relationship adopted in New South Wales was also adopted 
in Queensland.1277 The requirement of a two-year cohabitation period for de facto 
couples in the property division regime was also considered in Queensland and this 
requirement was extended to several other Acts that confer large financial benefits or 
obligations.1278 
 
7.2.4.2.7 The Australian Capital Territory 
 
The Australian Capital Territory introduced the Domestic Relationships Act 1994 
(ACT) in 1994. This Act was the first in Australia to formulate a property division 
regime that was not limited to couples or those who cohabit, but was not open to 
anyone who had a domestic relationship.1279  
 
A domestic relationship was defined as a personal relationship other than a legal 
marriage between two adults in which one provides personal or financial 
commitment and support of a domestic nature for the material benefit of the other, 
and includes a de facto marriage.1280 
 
In 2003 and 2004, two laws were passed in the Australian Capital Territory 
respectively: The Amendment Act 2003 (ACT) and the Sexuality Discrimination 
Legislation Amendment Act 2004 (ACT). Together these laws amended forty one 
pieces of territory laws to include homosexual partnerships as domestic 
partnerships. The reforms replaced the term “spouses” and “de facto” in Australian 
Capital Territory law with “domestic partners” for all married and unmarried couples. 
In the 2003 and 2004 Acts “domestic partnership” is defined as a relationship 
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  Section 32 DA (2) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1999 (Qld). 
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  Milbank 2005 LIAC 21. 
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between two people, whether homosexual or heterosexual, living together as a 
couple on a genuine basis.1281 
 
The Australian Capital Territory also introduced adoption law to render homosexual 
couples eligible to adopt related and unrelated children.1282 Further changes were 
introduced to recognise the non-biological parent in lesbian couples who have 
children through ARTs. This was achieved by replacing the Artificial Conception Act 
1985 (ACT) and the Birth (Equality of Status) Act 1998 (ACT) with the Parentage Act 
2004 (ACT).1283 This Act applies to children born before the amendments as well as 
afterwards.1284 
 
7.2.4.2.8 South Australia 
 
In 2003, the Statutes Amendment (Equal Superannuation Entitlement for Same-sex 
Couples) Act 2003 (SA) amended four statutes to grant homosexual couples access 
to death benefits under superannuation schemes for state employees (for example 
those for police and public servants).1285 The Act introduces the term “putative 
spouses”, which it defines as including homosexual couples if they are cohabiting 
with each other in a relationship that has the distinguishing characteristics of the 
relationship between a married couple (except for the one of the different sex) and 
legally recognised marriage and other features arising from either of those 
characteristics.1286 This change only covers couples who lived together for five 
years.1287 
 
In 2004, South Australia passed the Statutes Amendments (Relationships) Bill 2004 
(SA) (“the 2004 Bill”). Although the Bill was expected to be replaced by another one 
in 2006 when the labour party won the elections and gained control of the upper 
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house, it is interesting to note that it brought significant changes. The Bill proposed 
to amend eighty two state laws to include homosexual couples. The Bill dropped the 
terminology of “putative spouse” and replaced it with “de facto” partner. A “de facto 
partner” is defined as person who is (irrespective of the sex of the other) cohabiting 
with that person in a genuine domestic basis (other than married couple).1288 
 
The de facto partnership recognised in South Australia would cover only couples 
who have lived together for three years (or three of the last four years) unless the 
couples had a child together, in which case there is no time requirement. These 
reforms required a three-year cohabitation period for every area of law (rather than 
just those that concern major property entitlements).1289  
 
It is important to note that each state has recognised homosexual relationships 
under a specific name. Though the terminology could change from one state to 
another, the content seems to be similar. In order to understand the content of these 
terminologies it is important to analyse the models of recognition of relationships. 
 
7.2.5  Models of recognition of relationships 
 
The survey of the different reforms that affected Australian law as discussed above 
reveals that in Australia, relationships have received three basic models of 
recognition in Australia law: The de facto relationship, the registered partnership and 
marriage. Each of these models came with a number of possible variations, such as 
being open to heterosexual as well as homosexual couples, or being open to non-
couples. Furthermore each model can be combined with one or more others. A 
major difference between them is that the de facto recognition is a system that is 
presumptive. This would suggest it presumes that couples, once they have satisfied 
certain criteria, will be recognised regardless of whether they have taken any formal 
steps to certify their relationships. In contrast, registration and marriage are “opt in” 
systems; they apply to those who have undertaken a formal process. Another factor 
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to be considered in the context of Australia is whether recognition is granted at a 
state or federal level.1290 The understanding of similarities and differences requires 
the examination of each model. 
 
7.2.5.1  The de facto relationship 
 
A de facto relationship is one in which the couple is not married, but the 
circumstances of their relationship are otherwise identical or at least very similar to 
marriage.1291  
 
This model covers couples living together in a committed relationship. It does not 
require any formal registration of the relationship, but may for instance require that 
the couple has lived together for a set of period. This model of recognition has the 
advantage of including breadth coverage, accessibility and ease of use.1292 
 
In 1999 New South Wales was the first Australian state to include homosexual 
couples in the definition of de facto relationships by passing the Property 
(Relationships) Legislation Amendment Act 1999. Two further laws allowed 
homosexual couples to enjoy more rights. The Same-sex Relationships (Equal 
Treatment Commonwealth Laws – Superannuation) Act 2008 and the Same-sex 
Relationships (Equal Treatment in Commonwealth Law – General Law Reform) Act 
2008, which provided entitlements for homosexual couples in areas such as a joint 
social security and veteran’s entitlements, employment entitlements, 
superannuation, workers compensation, joint access to Medicare safety, hospital 
visitation, immigration, inheritance rights and the ability to file a joint tax return.1293 
This would suggest that in addition to the Family Law Act 1975 that principally deals 
with de facto relationships at federal level, the two abovementioned laws also grant 
rights to homosexual couples. 
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7.2.5.2  Registered partnerships/civil unions 
 
The model of registered partnerships has been in place in Australia since 2004. At 
that time, it was the city of Sydney Relations Declaration Program which applied to 
both homosexual and heterosexual couples. It has operated also in New South 
Wales under the Relationships Register Act 2010 (NSW).1294 
 
This model allows couples to register their relationships with the government in order 
to be recognised across most laws. This model grants most, but usually not all of the 
same rights as marriage.1295 This model has advantages as well as disadvantages. 
The main advantage of this model is that it allows couples a choice, as well as the 
symbolic value of going through a process to have their relationships recognised. It 
may also provide valuable proof of the relationship if there is a later dispute.1296 
 
The disadvantage of this model is that it may mean limited coverage as only those 
who register are granted legal protection, and as with any other “opt in” system, 
many people may not use it, or it may be disproportionally used by those who are 
economically and socially advantaged compared to those who are not.1297 Another 
disadvantage of this model is that it creates a separated category for homosexual 
relationships, a kind of relationship that is not yet marriage and is still a lesser status 
than marriage, and so perpetuates exclusion and inequality at both a legal and 
symbolic level.1298 
 
It is important to note that, if not for all purposes, for practical and legal purposes, 
recognition can be equivalent to a civil union, the main difference being that civil 
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unions tend to permit a greater level of formal ceremonial and symbolic 
recognition.1299 
 
7.2.5.3  Marriage 
 
Marriage is governed by the commonwealth Marriage Act 1961, which defines 
marriage as the union of a man and a woman to the exclusion of all others, 
voluntarily entered into for life.1300 
 
A valid marriage ceremony requires an exchange of words or vows or participation in 
a recognised religious rite before an authorised celebrant and in the presence of 
witnesses.1301 The parties to the marriage must also sign a marriage certificate in the 
approved form.1302  
 
Being married also means that in order to be divorced, parties must go through a 
regulated process which attracts formal rules for the dissolution of the 
relationship.1303  
 
As stated in the introduction, the double level recognition of homosexual 
relationships in Australia has raised the issue of the constitutionality of the 
commonwealth government’s power to make laws that can allow or forbid the 
recognition of these relationships within Australia. This issue is discussed in length in 
the next section.  
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7.3 THE ISSUE OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF HOMOSEXUAL 
 MARRIAGE  IN AUSTRALIA 
 
7.3.1  Overview of the issue 
 
The issue involving the constitutionality of homosexual marriage in Australia is about 
which level of government can legislate on the subject of homosexual marriage 
under the distribution of power provided in the Constitution: The commonwealth 
government on one side or states and territories on the other side?1304 
 
Some scholars argue that homosexual marriage is a matter for the commonwealth 
government and that, therefore, any attempt to legislate for homosexual marriage 
should be left to the federal parliament. In opposition to this view, others argue that 
the commonwealth only has power to legislate in relation to heterosexual 
marriage.1305  
 
The marriage power is found in section 51 (XXI) of the Constitution. This section 
confers on federal parliament or the commonwealth the power to make law for the 
peace, order and good governance of the commonwealth with respect to 
marriage.1306 
 
Relying on this power, the commonwealth parliament amended the Marriage Act 
1961 (Cth) in 2004. The Marriage Amendment Act 2004 defines marriage as the 
union between a man and a woman to the exclusion of all others, voluntarily entered 
into for life. 
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It is notable that the power to legislate for marriage is concurrent between the 
commonwealth parliament and states and territories.1307 However, Australia’s 
express constitutional provisions indicate that the Marriage Amendment Act is legally 
valid, thus precluding any state or territory from introducing other homosexual 
Marriage Acts.1308 This raises the issue whether the commonwealth parliament can 
rely on its power to make laws with respect to marriage to make Australian uniform 
law which would recognise homosexual marriages as marriages in Australia within 
the meaning of the terms in section 51 (XXI) of the Constitution.1309 
 
In order to properly address this issue, one needs to consider constitutional 
interpretation principles and how courts interpret the meaning of the Constitutional 
terms.1310 
 
To this end, it should be noted that the constitutional meaning of “marriage” in 
section 51(XXI) of the Constitution is critical to the analysis of the extent of the 
constitutional power. Whether the term includes both homosexual and heterosexual 
marriage determines whether the commonwealth can legislate for homosexual 
marriage, but importantly it does not necessarily determine whether the 
commonwealth can prevent homosexual marriage.1311 
 
If the constitutional meaning of “marriage” includes homosexual unions, the 
commonwealth parliament can create legislation which allows as well as forbids 
homosexual marriage. In contrast, if the constitutional meaning of “marriage” does 
not include homosexual unions, the commonwealth government cannot create 
legislation which allows homosexual marriage. However, this may not necessarily 
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prevent the commonwealth government from legislating to forbid homosexual 
marriage.1312 
 
7.3.2   Interpretation of the constitutional meaning of marriage 
 
It is important to note that, generally speaking, few words are defined in the 
Constitution. In most cases, the meaning of words or phrases is authoritatively 
established only by a determination of a court.1313 The interpretation of law or terms 
varies from one judge to another, according to his or her own jurisprudential 
approach. In other words, how a judge decides a case depends greatly on the way in 
which he or she interprets the law that must be applied to the case.1314 
 
Though the commonwealth defines marriage as a union between a man and a 
woman to the exclusion of others, voluntarily entered into for life, this has no bearing 
upon how the word is to be understood in the Constitution; consequently its meaning 
remains uncertain.1315  
 
7.3.2.1 Methods of constitutional interpretation 
 
The courts have developed a number of competing methods of constitutional 
interpretation. These include the originalism approach, the connotation/denotation 
approach, the living-tree method, the term of art approach, and the structure and 
function approach.1316 Each of these methods deserves a short comment. 
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7.3.2.1.1 The originalism approach 
 
a  Definition 
 
This method of constitutional interpretation aims at the search for legislative purpose. 
It provides the historical evidence of what was, in actual fact, the real intention of the 
legislator.1317 In Re Wakim: Exparte McNally (cross-vesting case),1318 Justice 
McHugh, favouring this method, commented that “[t]he starting point for a principled 
interpretation of the Constitution is the search for the intention of the legislator”.1319 
 
According to Zimmerman, originalism may be described as a method of 
constitutional interpretation which aims at discovering the original meaning of the 
legal text. Originalism thus rests on the general assumption that the intention of the 
legislator is a fundamental tool to legal interpretation. Such method looks to the 
historical evidence of what was in actual fact the intention of the legislator and not 
merely to the letter of the law.1320 
 
b Application to the meaning of marriage 
 
According to Lindel, traditional principles of legal interpretation in Australia rest on a 
literal-originalist approach that concentrates on the essential meaning that the term 
possessed as at the date the law was enacted.1321 
 
Garran and Quick approve this view, pointing out that the intention of the framers 
was to prevent the federal parliament from expanding its limited and specific powers 
                                                          
1317
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at its own convenience by simply changing the meaning of the words of the 
Constitution. In their own words Quick and Garran asserted as follows: 
 
“Every power alleged to be vested in the national government, or any organ thereof, 
must be affirmatively shown to have been granted. There is no presumption in favour 
of the existence of a power; on the contrary, the burden of proof lies on those who 
assert its existence, to point out something in the Constitution which, either expressly 
or by necessary implication, confers it. Just as an agent claiming to act on behalf of 
his principal, must make out by positive evidence that his principal gave him the 
authority he relies on, so congress, or those who rely on one of its statutes, are 
bound to show that people have authorised the legislature to pass the statute. The 
search for the power will be conducted in a spirit of strict exactitude, and if there be 
found in the Constitution nothing which directly or impliedly conveys it, then whatever 
the executive or legislature of the National government, or both of them together, 
may have done in persuasion of its existence, must be deemed null and void, like the 
act of any other unauthorised agent”.1322 
 
The definition of marriage in line with the originalism approach supported by Quick 
and Garran is given in their definition of the term as understood by the framers of the 
Constitution: 
 
“Marriage is a relationship originating in contract, but is something more than a 
contract. It is what is technically called a status, involving a complex bundle of rights, 
privileges, obligations and responsibilities which are determined and annexed to it by 
law independent of contract. According to the law of England, a marriage is a union 
between a man and a woman on the same basis as that on which the institution is 
recognised through Christendom, and its essence is that it is a voluntary union, for 
life, of one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all others.”1323 
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This would suggest that for the framers of the Australian Constitution, marriage is a 
union of one man and one woman for life to the exclusion of all other unions. If the 
originalism approach is applied to this definition of marriage, it is unlikely that 
homosexual marriage is included in the term marriage. In other words, when defining 
the word marriage, the intention of the framers of the Constitution was to confine 
marriage to unions between persons of different sexes.1324 Accordingly, the federal 
government cannot have a constitutional power to legislate for homosexual marriage 
as the definition of marriage does not encompass homosexual unions. 
 
However, some scholars contend that supporting this view would amount to a narrow 
reading of the originalism approach. Goldsworthy, for example, asserts that an 
originalism approach may embrace a non-literal approach that as such could regard 
any future developments as being “unanticipated by the founders of the 
Constitution”.1325 In this case the term marriage would be wide enough to 
encompass homosexual marriage. According to Goldsworthy, some words in the 
Constitution fail to give effect to their intended purpose so that such words could be 
expanded or contracted in a simple and obvious way in order to remedy the 
failure.1326 This would result in the court justifying the expansion of the meaning of a 
legal term so as to encompass unpredictable situations that were not envisaged by 
the drafters of the legislation.1327 
 
This non-literal interpretation of the originalism approach if applied to the definition of 
marriage will result in the meaning of marriage being expanded to include 
homosexual marriage. Consequently, this will empower the commonwealth 
government to make laws allowing homosexual marriage. 
 
It is important to note that the originalism approach as discussed above does not 
settle the problem at hand. While the literal originalist approach prevents the 
                                                          
1324
 Lindel 2008 SLR 42. 
1325
  Goldsworthy “Constitutional law: Interpreting the Constitution in its second century” 2000 
MULR 683. 
1326
  Goldsworthy 2000 MULR 699. 
1327
  Zimmerman 2013 BYUJPL 466 477-8.   
347 
 
commonwealth form legislating for homosexual marriage on one side, the non-literal 
originalist approach on the other side expands the meaning of marriage to include 
homosexual marriage and consequently gives power to the commonwealth 
government to legislate for homosexual marriage. 
 
7.3.2.1.2 The connotation/denotation approach 
 
a Definition 
 
This model of constitutional interpretation is an evolution of the originalism approach. 
It involves an initial analysis of the meaning of the word at the time the Constitution 
was written, and then considers the “essential features” a thing must possess in 
order to fit within the definition. While the original meaning remains constant, the 
group of things which are found to possess the required features can change and 
expand according to social, cultural and technical developments.1328 
 
The connotation/denotation approach recognises that an understanding of what a 
word meant at the common-law time of the federation is important, but considers 
also the fact that it is important to allow for flexibility and adaptability with the 
Constitution.1329 
 
This model recognises that inevitably, social, cultural, and technological changes will 
require the Constitution to be interpreted to accommodate new things. The attributes 
which the words signify are referred to as the “essential features”, that is the really 
essential characteristics, or the fundamental conception of a word.1330 Those 
essential features form the connotation of the word, which has a fixed meaning. The 
denotation is a set of all the things which possess those essentials features, so they 
fall within the connotation. New things which have all the required essential features 
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can become part of the denotation. Therefore the group of things which are denoted 
by the term can change. This may be especially so in relation to new 
technologies.1331 
 
b Application to the term marriage 
 
An application of this model to homosexual marriage legislation would require the 
court to consider whether the word “marriage” in section 51 (XXI) also denotes the 
union of homosexual couples. The definition of marriage as stated above was the 
prevailing legal definition at the time the Constitution was written, so it may also have 
been the definition the drafters of the Constitution intended to capture. Moreover, 
homosexual practices between men remained criminal offences until much later in 
the 20th century, and female homosexuality was not overtly acknowledged by either 
the criminal law or wider society. These considerations support the contention that 
same-sex marriage would not have been contemplated by the framers of the 
Constitution.1332 As a result the constitutional term marriage does not include 
homosexual marriage and therefore the commonwealth government cannot legislate 
for homosexual marriage. This view was challenged by a number of scholars and 
commentators. 
 
Walker challenges this view and suggests that an application of the 
connotation/denotation approach would result in a finding that the meaning of 
marriage does extend to homosexual marriage. She points out that homosexual 
marriage is not something which framers considered and deliberately rejected, as 
the concept was not even thought of in 1900. Rather Walker contends that the 
development of homosexual unions and the desire to have these unions recognised 
as marriage is similar to technological advances. Walker argues that the Constitution 
contains a provision relating to “foreign power”. At the time of the federation, the 
United Kingdom was not considered as foreign power because the colonies still 
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relied heavily on the United Kingdom parliament for governance. Furthermore, the 
framers of the Constitution intended that the British Sovereign would remain the 
Australian Sovereign after the federation. However, as Australia gradually became 
more independent, it was appropriate to begin treating the United Kingdom as a 
foreign power under the relevant provision for constitutional purposes.1333  
 
This would suggest that the flexibility and adaptability within the Constitution would 
require the court to adopt a broad definition of marriage and include homosexual 
marriage. As a consequence, the commonwealth government would have power to 
legislate for homosexual marriage. 
 
It is important to note that the connotation/denotation approach may hold little 
significance for the issue at hand as many aspects of marriage have changed since 
the time of the federation. For example, there are a number of situations in which 
extramarital relationships or polygamous marriages will be recognised despite the 
stipulation that marriage is between one man and one woman to the exclusion of all 
others. Consequently, an examination of traditional factors remains relevant, or has 
become less relevant in contemporary understanding of marriage.1334  
 
7.3.2.1.3 The living-tree approach 
 
a Definition 
 
The living-tree approach starts by considering the meaning of words as they were 
understood at the time of the federation but treats the Constitution as a living, 
evolving document, thereby recognising that the meaning of words can change over 
time. For the living-tree method, the words or phrases in the Constitution do not have 
a meaning which is fixed at the time of the federation. Rather, the Constitution is 
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viewed as a continuously evolving and living document which should be interpreted 
in light of modern understanding and meaning.1335 
 
b Application to the term marriage 
 
When applying this method, Nicholson CJ, Ellis JJ and Brown JJ in Attorney General 
for the Commonwealth v Kevin and Jennifer and Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission1336 stated the following: 
 
“It seems to be inconsistent with the approach of the High Court to the interpretation 
of other heads of Commonwealth power to place marriage in a special category, 
frozen in the time to 1901”. 
This would suggest that just as other powers enumerated in section 51 have been 
interpreted in accordance with changing needs and understandings, there is no 
impediment to treating the marriage power in the same way.1337  As a result marriage 
should be defined as including homosexual marriage and consequently the 
commonwealth government should be given the power to legislate for homosexual 
marriage. 
 
However, it is worth noting that this method was criticised on the ground that it is 
somewhat inconsistent and unclear,1338 particularly because it does not provide any 
certainty or a set of principles by which similar issues can be determined in 
future.1339 
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7.3.2.1.4 The legal term of art approach 
 
a Definition 
 
This approach suggests that the word marriage is a legal term of art which the 
drafters of the Constitution would have understood as a constantly evolving 
concept.1340 This method of interpretation achieves a similar outcome to the living-
tree approach, but hinges on the idea that the meaning of the word marriage was 
never a fixed concept, rather than claiming, as the living-tree approach does, that a 
new meaning can be grafted on to old words.1341  
 
b Application to the term marriage 
 
According to Meagher, the word marriage in section 51(XXI) is a legal term of art 
possessed of a rich pre-federation heritage.1342 Legal terms of art are words which 
describe social or cultural constructs and activities, such as corporations, bankruptcy 
and insolvency, copy rights, patents of inventions and design, and trademarks.1343 
This would suggest that “marriage” in section 51 (XXI) should be interpreted as 
though it does not have a fixed meaning and therefore should not be interpreted as 
restricted to opposite-sex marriage. As a consequence the commonwealth 
government can legislate for it. 
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7.3.2.1.5 The structure and function method 
 
a Definition 
 
This method suggests that the court in its interpretation has always taken into 
account the need to maintain the structure of the Constitution (eg a responsible and 
democratic system of government). Geegeler explains this method as follows: 
 
“The Constitution sets up a system to enlarge the powers of self-government of the 
people of Australia through institutions of government that are structured to be 
politically accountable to the people of Australia”.1344 
 
Cultural, social and technological developments will mean that the demands on and 
priorities of the system established by the Constitution will change over time. In order 
for the commonwealth government to function effectively, it must have broad and 
flexible powers that enable it to adapt to these changes. This means that the court 
must interpret the text of the Constitution with all the generality which the word 
admits.1345 
 
b Application 
 
The consequence of this method is that, taking into account the need to honour the 
structure and function of the Constitution, the court would give a broad interpretation 
of the marriage power with the effect that it includes homosexual marriage.1346 
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7.3.2.1.6 Conclusion 
 
In short, it is important to bear in mind that the Australian High Court has yet to 
decide on this issue. Scholars have tried to anticipate how the court would settle this 
issue. Some believe that the High Court may be more likely to take an expansive 
view of the meaning of marriage.1347 This would result in the court understanding 
marriage as including homosexual marriage and consequently giving the power to 
the commonwealth government to pass laws allowing or forbidding homosexual 
marriage. Others believe that the court will be likely to stick to the intention of the 
framers of the Constitution and exclude homosexual marriage from the interpretation 
of marriage. Consequently the commonwealth government would not have the 
power to legislate on it. 
 
This having been said, the remaining question of the issue of the constitutionality of 
homosexual marriage is whether states and territories can legislate for same-sex 
marriage. 
 
7.3.3 The power of states and territories to legislate for homosexual marriage 
 
7.3.3.1 Overview 
 
Although the federal law on marriage, the Marriage Act 1961, clearly defined 
marriage as the union of a man and a woman to the exclusion of all others, in 2004 
the Same-sex Marriage Bill (Tas) was introduced into Tasmanian Parliament. The 
Bill provided for homosexual marriage in Tasmania. Although this Bill was never 
passed, it nonetheless revealed the possibility that a state or territory might legislate 
for state or territory recognition of homosexual marriage. As a result a number of 
Australian states and the Australian Capital Territory considered Bills to recognise 
state homosexual marriage.1348 This gave rise to the issue whether states or 
territories have the power to make laws allowing homosexual marriage in the way 
that these laws would not be inconsistent with the federal law on marriage. 
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While there is no doubt as to the power of state and territory legislatures to enact 
such laws, there is nonetheless doubt as to its constitutional validity if enacted. As 
the commonwealth has used its power under section 51(21) to enact the Marriage 
Act, the question is then whether there is consistency between state and territory law 
and commonwealth law.1349 
 
In order to give an acceptable answer to this question, there is a necessity to shortly 
explain the concept of inconsistency in the context of Australian law. 
 
7.3.3.2 Inconsistency in Australia 
 
Inconsistency is a mechanism by which the Constitution ensures the supremacy of 
the commonwealth law over state and territory law. Because the commonwealth and 
states share the powers enumerated in section 51 of the Constitution, section 109 
provides the means for resolving clashes between state and commonwealth laws. 
There are two well-established categories of inconsistency under section 109 of the 
Constitution, namely direct inconsistency and indirect inconsistency.1350 According to 
the High Court, an inconsistency can be described as follows: 
 
“When a state law, if valid, would alter, impair or detract from the operation of a law of 
the Commonwealth parliament, then to that extent it is invalid. Moreover, if it appears 
from the terms, the nature or the subject matter of a federal enactment that it was 
intended as a complete statement of law governing a particular matter or set of rights 
and duties, then for a state law to regulate or apply to the same matter or relation is 
regarded as a detraction from the full operation of the Commonwealth law and so is 
inconsistent”.1351 
 
A state law which alters, impairs or detracts from the operation of a commonwealth 
law is directly inconsistent. A state law which regulates or applies to a matter over 
which the commonwealth has shown an intention to give a complete statement of the 
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law is indirectly inconsistent.1352 The meaning of direct and indirect inconsistency 
was further given in Tasmanian law. The Tasmania Law Reform Institute explains 
the direct and indirect inconsistency as follows: Direct inconsistency arises when a 
state law alters, impairs or detracts from the operation of a commonwealth law. It 
may in that case be impossible to obey both laws at the same time. For example, if a 
commonwealth law provides that all cars should drive on the left side of the road and 
a state law provides that cars should drive on the right side; these two laws are 
directly inconsistent. For indirect inconsistency, the commonwealth must have shown 
an intention in the legislation to cover the field. This means the commonwealth law 
should be the only law on the topic in question.1353 
 
The issue of whether a state or territory can legislate to legalise homosexual 
marriage has received scholarly attention. In the context of the Tasmanian Same-sex 
Marriage Bill 2004, for example, many scholars have provided extensive 
opinions.1354 
 
Lindel suggests that direct inconsistency is likely to arise between a Tasmanian law 
and the Marriage Act enacted by the commonwealth. He argues that a Tasmanian 
same-sex marriage law would be a direct inconsistency and would be in direct 
contradiction to the Commonwealth Marriage Act because it recognises a 
relationship which the Commonwealth Act explicitly refuses to recognise.1355 The 
Commonwealth Marriage Act can be read as refusing to recognise homosexual 
marriage in Australia, while Tasmanian law would allow homosexual marriage. This 
argument suggests that the Marriage Act intended to be not only a statement of the 
commonwealth attitude towards homosexual marriage, but is also a proclamation of 
what marriage means for the purpose of all laws in Australia including state laws.1356 
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For Williams, there would not be inconsistency in the Tasmania case. He suggests 
that direct inconsistency would not arise as long as Tasmanian law is narrowly 
drafted and does not attempt to force recognition of homosexual marriage outside 
Tasmania.1357 
 
According to Meagher and Brock, a state-based law which provides for homosexual 
unions (which are the fundamental equivalent of marriage) may be inconsistent with 
the Marriage Act.1358 By creating a new type of relationship which adopts the word 
marriage, state homosexual marriage laws may alter, impair or detract from the 
operation of the commonwealth laws.1359 
 
Walker contends that direct inconsistency would only arise if the commonwealth 
specifically and explicitly legislates to prevent states from recognising homosexual 
marriage, and states did so.1360 
 
In short, there is no way to predict which way the High Court would decide the issue 
of inconsistency in this case. However, it is important to note that the discussion 
about the constitutionality of homosexual marriage gave light on legal issues that can 
arise around homosexual unions in Australia. The different views expressed in the 
above discussion paved a way to the legalisation of homosexual unions in Australia 
where they have built their families through ARTs. 
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7.4 ARTS AND RELATED ISSUES IN AUSTRALIA 
 
7.4.1 Introduction 
 
The use of ARTs in Australia raises concerns about its regulation and issues related 
to the practice itself. This section discusses the regulation of ARTs and related 
issues including the child’s identity, the child’s interests and welfare. 
 
7.4.2 The regulation of assisted reproductive technologies in Australia 
 
7.4.2.1 Introduction 
 
It is not within the legislative power of the Commonwealth of Australia to legislate on 
the subject of ARTs. Each state and territory is responsible for designing and 
implementing its own regulatory regime. Some states have done so, whereas other 
states and territories have adhered to ethical guidelines formulated by bodies such 
as the National Health and Medical Research Council (“NHMRC”) and the Fertility 
Society of Australia.1361 
 
Australia is formally decentralised with respect to ART policy. All the major levels 
relevant to reproductive technology policy, such as health regulation, parentage law 
and criminal prohibition, fall within the jurisdiction of states and territories.1362  
 
Although each state and territory in Australia has enacted laws regulating ARTs 
within their jurisdiction, there is harmonisation of ART policy in Australia. This was 
possible through a competitive federation process according to which states 
modelled and copied each other’s legislation. This process started with Victoria. In 
1984, Victoria passed the Infertility (Medical Procedure) Act 1984 and became the 
first Australian jurisdiction and one of the first in the world to produce legislation 
governing ARTs. The Act officially came into force in 1988. It included regulations 
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with respect to artificial insemination, in vitro fertilisation, counselling, and 
reimbursement of expenses. Ten years later, on 4 December 2008, the Victorian 
parliament passed the Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic) (ART Act), 
based on the recommendations of the Victorian Law Reform Commission in its 2007 
Report on ART, adoption and surrogacy.1363  
 
The Act, which came into operation on 1 January 2010, gives general guidelines for 
surrogacy in Victoria. The Act stipulates as follows: 
 
 Commercial surrogacy continues to be banned and altruistic surrogacy is 
carefully regulated. 
 Eligibility requirements for treatment in a clinic apply to the commissioning 
parents rather than the surrogate mother. 
 There will be a presumption against treatment where surrogate mothers or 
commissioning parents have a record of sexual or violent offences or if they 
have had child protection orders made against them.  
 If a presumption against treatment applies, a newly established Patient 
Review Panel will determine whether there is a barrier to treatment. 
 Parties must undergo extensive counselling before being treated by a 
registered Victorian ART provider in relation to the risks and issues 
associated with a surrogacy arrangement.  
 Surrogacy agreements will be unenforceable but prescribed payments (eg 
medical and legal expenses) will be allowed.  
 The Patient Review Panel may only approve a surrogacy arrangement where 
the surrogate mother is at least 25 years old, has given birth to a live child and 
if her egg is not used to conceive the child. 
 All surrogacy arrangements carried out by a registered Victorian ART provider 
must be approved by the newly established expert Patient Review Panel. 
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 The County and Supreme Courts of Victoria will be empowered to make 
substitute parentage orders in favour of a person or couple who have 
commissioned a surrogacy arrangement subject to various conditions, 
including that the Court is satisfied that the order would be in the best 
interests of the child; the surrogate mother freely consents to the order and 
the parties have received additional counselling if the surrogacy has been 
arranged without the assistance of a registered Victorian ART provider.1364 
 
Other states introduced similar laws. Although they did not always adopt the 
Victorian provisions and approaches, the content of their laws was modelled on the 
Victorian ART Act. 
 
At federal level, two more formal devices of intergovernmental negotiation and 
agreement have supplemented competitive federalism as a route to some level of 
policy harmonisation. These devices are the Council of Australian Governments 
(“COAG”) and the Standing Committee of Attorneys General (“SCAG”).1365 
Through these two devices, the commonwealth played a part in governmental 
agreements on ART policy. This led the commonwealth to pass the Prohibition of the 
Human Cloning for Reproduction Act and the Research Involving Human Embryos 
Act in 2002.1366 
 
SCAG has worked towards achieving consensus and harmony in state-based 
Australian criminal law. In 1992, SCAG drafted a model criminal code. It has worked 
towards a consensus on certain aspects of reproductive technology. It has in 
particular contributed to the trend to liberalise surrogacy law.1367 
 
The regulation of ARTs is about the regulation of access to ARTs and the legislation 
activity across the country in respect of the ARTs. 
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7.4.2.2 Access to assisted reproductive technologies 
 
The regulation of access to ARTs in Australia ranges from permissive to restrictive. 
Some people, such as lesbian and single heterosexual women, experience relative 
ease of access in some states and territories. These include Western Australia, 
Tasmania, New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory.1368 
 
Lesbians and single women have more limited access in South Australia, 
Queensland and the Northern Territory. The access is more difficult in Victoria where 
the Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (Vic) allows a woman to undergo assisted 
reproductive treatment only if she is married and living with her husband on a 
genuine basis or is living with a man in a de facto relationship.1369 Similarly, section 3 
of the same Act requires a doctor to be satisfied that a woman is otherwise unlikely 
to become pregnant by her husband or that if she did, a genetic abnormality or 
disease might be transmitted to the child. A treatment procedure is defined as the 
artificial insemination of a woman with the sperm of a man who is not the husband of 
the woman or a fertilisation procedure.1370 This would suggest that only infertile 
married women can access the treatment procedure in Victoria. However, in 
Western Australia access to artificial insemination is open to anyone with the 
exception that more invasive ARTs are restricted to women who are clinically infertile 
for reasons other than age.1371 
 
7.4.2.3 State and territory assisted reproductive technologies laws 
 
7.4.2.3.1 Western Australia 
 
The Human Reproductive Technology Act 1991 (WA) established the Western 
Australian Reproductive Technology Council. Normally, no artificial fertilisation 
                                                          
1368
 Dempsey “Active fathers, natural families and children’s origins: Dominant themes in the 
Australian political debate over eligibility for assisted reproductive technology” 2006 AJETS 
35. 
1369
  Section 8 of the Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (Vic). 
1370
  Section 3 of the Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (Vic). 
1371
  Karina and Drabsch “Legal recognition of same-sex relationships” 2006 NSW PLS 38. 
361 
 
procedure may be carried out except pursuant to a license. Under the Act, the 
Commissioner of Health may issue practice licenses. Before a practice license (or 
exemption) is granted, the commissioner must refer an application to the Council. 
The Council also publishes a Code of Practice, which sets out guidelines, and 
establishes ethical standards required of licensees. No such code has yet been 
drafted; instead, some guidelines are contained in directions formulated by the 
commissioner. The use of directions allows greater flexibility than would be possible 
under a code.1372 
 
Access to ARTs is subjected to a number of conditions and the Act includes a 
number of provisions regarding access to ART. The Act seeks to ensure that:  
 
 artificial fertilisation procedures are carried out only for the benefit of persons 
eligible under the Act;  
 the participants are adequately assessed and counselled; 
 the welfare of the participants is properly promoted; 
 the prospective welfare of any child to be born as a result of the procedure is 
properly taken into consideration; and  
 equity, welfare and general standards prevailing in the community are taken 
into account in the practice of reproductive technology.1373  
 
Section 23 of the Act, which deals with access to in vitro fertilisation, provides that an 
in vitro fertilisation procedure may be carried out where it would be likely to benefit: 
 persons who, as a couple, are unable to conceive a child due to medical 
reasons; 
 a woman who is unable to conceive a child due to medical reasons;  or  
 a couple or a woman whose child would otherwise be likely to be affected by a 
genetic abnormality or disease.  
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  Seymour & Magri 2004 VLRC 18. 
1373
  Section 4 of the Human Reproductive Technology Act 1991 (WA). 
362 
 
In addition: 
 
 effective consent must be given;  
 persons seeking to be treated as a couple must be married or in a de facto 
relationship and must be of the opposite sex to each other;  
 the reason for infertility must not be age or some other prescribed cause; and 
 consideration must be given to the welfare and interests of the participants 
and of any child likely to be born as a result of the procedure.  
 
It is important to note that the Act gives the power to the medical practitioner to 
decide on the eligibility of the patient. In fact, the directions issued under the Act 
state that “the Licensee must ensure that the medical practitioner treating the patient 
makes the final decision as to the eligibility of any participant on both legal and 
medical grounds”.1374 
 
7.4.2.3.2 South Australia 
 
The South Australian Council on Reproductive Technology is established under the 
Reproductive Technology (Clinical Practices) Act 1988 (SA). The Act empowers the 
Council to formulate a code of ethical practice to govern the use of artificial 
fertilisation procedures. This code is set out as a schedule to the Reproductive 
Technology (Code of Ethical Clinical Practice) Regulations 1995. Generally 
speaking, a person may not carry out an artificial fertilisation procedure except under 
a license granted by the Minister. A license is not required in respect of artificial 
insemination if a registered medical practitioner who has given an undertaking to 
observe the code of ethical practice carries it out, or if it is carried out 
gratuitously.1375 
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   Section 7 of the Human Reproductive Technology Act Directions (WA). 
1375
  Seymour and Magri 2004 VLRC 18. 
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Once more it is the medical practitioner who decides who can undergo the 
procedures. The legislation indicates that licensees may provide artificial fertilisation 
procedures only for the benefit of married couples in the following circumstances: 
The husband or wife (or both) appear to be infertile, or there appears to be a risk that 
a genetic defect would be transmitted to a child conceived naturally.1376  
 
This would suggest that in South Australia under this law the patient’s eligibility was 
based on her marital status, and this amounted to discrimination against non-married 
women and couples. In 1996 the Supreme Court of South Australia found that the 
restriction of access to treatment on the basis of marital status contravened the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth).1377 As a result, single women and couples who do not 
meet the Act’s criterion as to marital status may now access treatment. Such people 
must meet all other eligibility criteria – they therefore must be infertile, or there must 
appear to be a risk that a genetic defect would be transmitted to a child conceived 
naturally.1378 
 
The need for lesbian women to use ARTs was addressed in South Australia. In this 
regard the South Australian Council of Reproductive Technology states: 
 
“If a lesbian woman is medically infertile, she would be eligible for treatment the same 
as any other infertile woman. Lesbian women who are fertile [do not] require invasive 
treatments like In Vitro Fertilisation. They need only donor conception treatment 
using donated sperm. They can organise this in their own homes or through a 
medical practitioner registered to provide such services”.1379  
 
Further ethical requirements are needed for a patient undergoing ARTs as well as 
the providers of those procedures in Australia. For example, when an artificial 
fertilisation procedure is carried out by a licensed medical practitioner, the code of 
                                                          
1376
  Section 13 (1), (2), and (7) of the Reproductive Technology (Clinical Practices) Act 1988 (SA). 
1377
  Pearce v South Australian Health Commission (1996) 66 SASR 486. 
1378
  Section 13 (2) of the Reproductive Technology (Clinical Practices) Act 1988 (SA). 
1379
 South Australia Council on Reproductive Technology “Eligibility fact sheet: Reproductive 
technology legislation and regulation in SA”, available at  
 www.dh.sa.gov.au/reproductivetechnology/fact%20sheets.asp (date of use 11 August 2014).  
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ethical practice requires the patient to provide the medical practitioner with important 
information pertaining to her eligibility. The code of ethical practice stipulates that the 
licensee must be furnished with a statutory declaration from the patient and partner 
(if any) that neither has been found guilty of a sexual offence involving a child or of a 
violent offence, and that neither has had a child permanently removed from their 
guardianship. Information must also be provided by a medical practitioner indicating 
that neither the patient nor her partner (if any) is suffering from any illness, disease 
or disability that might interfere with their ability to care for the child. In deciding 
whether to make infertility treatment available, a licensee must also “treat the welfare 
of any child that may be born in consequence of the treatment as the paramount 
consideration”. The code also makes it clear that the licensee is free to refuse to give 
infertility treatment to a person on “any reasonable ground”.1380 
 
7.4.2.3.3 The Northern Territory 
 
Although no specific reproductive technology legislation exists in the Northern 
Territory, reproductive medicine services in the territory are provided by South 
Australian clinicians operating under guidelines consistent with the South Australian 
legislation.1381 
  
The Department of Health requires its clinics to adhere to South Australian 
legislation but with some minor changes. For example, the South Australian 
legislation complies with the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) and allows access to 
infertility treatments for all infertile women, but the Northern Territory Anti-
Discrimination Act 1992 provisions preventing discrimination in relation to services 
does not apply to the carrying out of an artificial fertilisation procedure.1382 Thus, only 
married or heterosexual de facto couples can access infertility treatments.1383 
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 Reproductive Technology (Code of Ethical Clinical Practice) Regulations 1995 cl 11 (b), (c), 
clauses 13 and 14.  
1381
  Seymour and Magri 2004 VLRC18. 
1382
  Section 4(8) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1992 (NT).  
1383
 Seymour and Magri 2004VLRC18. 
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7.4.2.3.4 The Australian Capital Territory 
 
There is no explicit regulation of access to ARTs in the Australian Capital Territory 
(ACT). 
 
7.4.2.3.5 New South Wales, Tasmania and Queensland  
 
None of these states or territories has legislation on ARTs. Instead, health 
professionals, clinics, and those generally practicing in the area of reproductive 
therapy follow the NHMRC Ethical Guidelines on Assisted Reproductive Technology 
1996116 and the Fertility Society of Australia’s Reproductive Technology 
Accreditation Committee’s Code of Practice.1384 The guidelines encompass all 
aspects of the technologies, including accreditation and approval processes, 
counselling, research requirements, storage of human tissue, record keeping, 
complaints and appeals processes, and prohibited and unacceptable practices.1385 
 
Although these states have no specific legislation regulating ARTs within their 
jurisdiction, there are circumstances in which the courts will scrutinise the way in 
which eligibility is determined. Jennifer Morgan v GK,1386 is one of the examples that 
provide an illustration of a medical practitioner denying access on the basis of marital 
status or sexual orientation. In this case, a medical practitioner had refused to 
provide ARTs to a lesbian. After proceedings before the Queensland Anti-
Discrimination Tribunal, the Queensland Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeal, 
the matter was remitted to the Anti-Discrimination Tribunal. There it was held that the 
doctor had acted reasonably in dealing with the woman and did not discriminate 
against her on the basis of her lesbian relationship.1387 It was held that in the 
tribunal’s opinion, the doctor was engaged in the treatment of infertility and had 
denied the woman treatment, not because she was a lesbian, but because she was 
fertile. Commenting on this outcome, the Queensland Anti-Discrimination 
                                                          
1384
  Code of Practice for Centres Using Assisted Reproductive Technology (April 2002). 
1385
   Seymour and Magri 2004 VLRC 18. 
1386
 [2001] QADT 10; (2001) EOC 93–154.  
1387
  QFG v JM (1997) EOC 92–902; BC9705768; JM v QFG [1998] QCA 228; [2000] 1 Qd R 373; 
(2000) EOC 93–047; BC9804065. 
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Commission stated that the decision was based on a very technical point and left the 
door open to lesbian women to challenge the various bodies that define and 
implement policies and guidelines restricting these types of services. Evidence on 
doctors’ practices in other states is anecdotal. The New South Wales Government 
website notes as follows in this regard: 
 
“While donor insemination is legally available to all women through fertility clinics  in 
NSW, not all fertility services provide access to lesbians or ‘single’ women. Such 
discrimination may be unlawful under NSW  antidiscrimination law”.1388 
 
Like in the USA, ARTs in Australia raise a number of issues that deserve to be 
addressed in this study.  
 
7.4.3 Assisted reproductive technologies and related issues 
 
7.4.3.1 Introduction 
 
In Australia many issues are related to the use of ARTs. However, the major issues 
include the identity of the child born through ARTs and the welfare and the interests 
of the child resulting from the use of ARTs. 
 
7.4.3.2 The child’s identity 
 
The child’s identity issue is discussed with consideration of the child’s adoption 
experience and the child born from gametes donation. 
 
7.4.3.2.1 The adopted child’s experience 
 
In Australia the adoption experience reveals that regardless of the strength of the 
connection with the non-biological parents (adopted parents), many children base 
their identity formation on knowledge of the identity of their biological parents.1389 
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Two issues may interfere with the child’s identity development. The first is being told 
of being adopted late in life, and the second is not being able to discover the identity 
of the biological parents.1390 In their study conducted in 2003, MacCallum et al 
reported that adoptive children who are not told early in life about being adopted are 
more likely to develop behavioural and emotional problems.1391 Golombok confirmed 
this finding in another study. She argued that adoptive children are found to have an 
interest in their biological origins from around puberty, and this is when they can 
develop increased emotional and behavioural problems if not told.1392 
 
McNair approves this view and asserts that the non-disclosure does not prevent 
children from noticing a range of clues as to their adoptive status, including lack of 
physical resemblance to their parents.1393 This view is also defended by Grotevant, 
who emphasises that adoptive children experience significant grief and loss if not 
being able to discover the identity of their biological parents, resulting in a less 
complete identity development.1394 
 
This issue led to calls from adoptive adults for the encouragement of openness from 
an early age. The open adoption encourages birth mothers to play some role in the 
selection of adoptive parents and maintain contact with their children.1395 Advocates 
of this approach find that it helps children to have more fully formed identities while 
others suggest that openness can lead to confusion for children if they have 
conflicting parental values and could create identity conflict.1396  
 
In short, in respect of the adoption experience, the debate is ongoing as some 
believe that openness is necessary for forming a full identity and others believe that 
it will lead to an identity conflict. Does this suggest that in the case of donor-
conceived child the result will be the same? 
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 McNair 2004 VLRC 28. 
1391
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   McNair 2004 VLRC 40. 
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7.4.3.2.2 The donor-conceived child’s experience 
 
Shenfield argues that because donor-conceived children have not been subjected to 
family breakdown or being given away after birth, they are assumed less likely to 
require knowledge of the donor of materials that helps for their existence.1397 
Kirkman in contrast argues that donor-conceived children still exist within a culture 
that valorises genes, and may feel cheated of their heritage and suffer a crisis of 
identity.1398 
 
Surrogacy has been advocated within the ARTs field since it began and non-
disclosure remains the policy in many states including Norway, Denmark, France 
and Spain. In most cases, arguments supporting secrecy largely revolve around 
protection of the privacy of the non-biological parent regarding his or her infertility 
and others have claimed that disclosure to the child would damage the child’s 
identity and relationship with her or his family.1399 
 
Some donor-conceived children describe the feeling that their conception was 
impersonal, and that the donor is a deliberate stranger who has chosen to avoid 
parenting responsibility. The feeling like a “freak” or the product of an experiment is 
described. Others have the feeling that they don’t belong to their families.1400 
 
In short, it is important to note that genes are significant to many donor-conceived 
adults and they suffered severe disruption and a fractured sense of identity as a 
result of not being able to know their biological origins.1401 
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7.5  PARENTAGE RECOGNITION AND RELATION BREAKDOWN IN 
 AUSTRALIAN HOMOSEXUAL FAMILIES 
 
7.5.1  Parentage recognition in homosexual families 
 
Parentage is about determining the person(s) who can be considered the parent(s) 
of the child in different forms of families. However, for the purpose of this section, the 
focus will be on person(s) who can be considered the parent(s) of children born 
through ARTs in homosexual families within Australian jurisdictions. 
 
In Australia there are laws governing parentage in homosexual families at federal as 
well as state and territory level. Across Australia, the position until 2007 was that if a 
woman who gave birth had a male partner, he could be recognised on the birth 
certificate as the child’s legal parent, whether or not he was the child’s biological 
parent. In some parts of Australia, the law was amended to allow a birth mother’s 
female partner who is in the same position to be recognised and registered as the 
child’s legal parent, but in other parts, this process has not yet taken place.1402  
 
Governments in the Australian Capital Territory, the Northern Territory and Western 
Australia have amended their status of children laws. According to these 
amendments, children born in these parts of Australia into a family or to a couple, 
whether the couple is comprised of a woman and a man or a woman and a woman, 
are able to have both parents recognised, and recognised as such in their birth 
certificates.1403 
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  Short “’It makes the world difference’: Benefits for children of lesbian parents having their 
parents legally recognised as their parents” 2007 GLIPR 5. 
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  See Artificial Conception Act 1985 (WA) s 6A; Status of Children Act 1998 (NT) s 5DA; and 
Parentage Act 2004 (ACT) s 8(4). In terms of state and territory laws, all children born to 
lesbian couples through assisted conception now have a second parent if they are living in 
Western Australia or the Northern Territory and laws in each state and territory presume that 
the person listed as parent on the register of another jurisdiction is indeed a parent. 
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7.5.1.1 Federal laws on parentage 
 
According to Sifiris, the Australian laws that govern the parentage of children born as 
a result of ARTs and the status of sperm donors is an “unsatisfactory patchwork of 
legislation”.1404 Sifiris argues that there is a complexity of relationship between 
federal and state legislation. While states have power in relation to adoption, child 
protection, ARTs and the parentage of children conceived through ARTs, federal 
jurisdiction is concerned with parental responsibility, maintenance, child support, 
residence and contact of children.1405 
 
While this complexity will be made clear with the analysis of state and territory laws 
on parentage, it is important to note that under the Australian federal law, it is section 
60H of the Family Law Act 1975 which is relevant in determining who counts as a 
parent for the purpose of the Act when the child is born following the use of 
ARTs.1406 
 
According to the Act, a child born as a result of ARTs is the child of its birth mother 
and her consenting partner (if any) provided that the latter qualifies as a partner 
under Part VII of the Act, and hence has parental responsibility.1407 
 
Section 60H (1) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) was amended in 2008 to allocate 
parental responsibility in cases of homosexual parenting.1408 This relevant provision 
of this section reads as follows: 
“(1) If: 
(a) a child is born to a woman as a result of the carrying out of an artiﬁcial 
conception procedure while the woman was married to, or a de facto partner 
of, another person (the other intended parent); and 
(b) either: 
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(i) the woman and the other intended parent consented to the carrying 
out of the procedure, and any other person who provided genetic 
material used in the procedure consented to the use of the material in 
an artiﬁcial conception procedure; or 
(ii)  under a prescribed law of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory, 
the child is a child of the woman and of the other intended parent; 
then, whether or not the child is biologically a child of the woman and 
of the other intended parent, for the purposes of this Act: 
(c)  the child is the child of the woman and of the other intended parent; and  
(d)  if a person other than the woman and the other intended parent provided 
genetic material – the child is not the child of that person. 
.... 
(3) If: 
(a) a child is born to a woman as a result of the carrying out of an artiﬁcial 
conception procedure; and 
(b) under a prescribed law of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory, the 
child is a child of a man; then, whether or not the child is biologically a child of 
the man, the child is his child for the purposes of this Act. The Section 60 H 
(1) as amended can apply to lesbian as well as gay couples.” 
 
7.5.1.1.1  Lesbian couples 
 
The application of section 60H (1) of the Family Law Act 1975, as amended, to 
lesbian couples results in parentage being determined as follows:  
 
“In a lesbian Couple, the child born as a result of ARTs is the child of both 
women, regardless of biological connection, if they both have consented to 
the carrying out of the procedure; and as parents of the child, both women will 
also automatically have parental responsibility for it”.1409  
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However, it is notable that the sperm donor, although having consented to the use of 
his genetic materials, will not according to section 60H(1) of the Family Law Act 1975 
as amended be regarded as the child’s parent.1410 
 
In her comment on this section, Milbank contends that lesbian-led families built 
through assisted conception are families of intention in which biology is not 
determinative of individual relationships with each other. She goes on confirming that 
parental status in these families follows the family form rather than the genetic link. 
Therefore the birth mother and non-birth mothers are equally mothers.1411 
 
Although in the case of lesbian couples, a sperm donor is not regarded as a parent, 
the sperm donor will be regarded as a parent and hence has parental responsibility 
for a child born following the use of his genetic materials, when under a prescribed 
state and territory law, he qualifies as such, or when the child is born to a single 
mother.1412 This can result in a child born to a lesbian couple following the use of 
ARTs having two or more parents. 
 
7.5.1.1.2  Gay couples 
 
When gay men wish to build their own families in Australia, they make use of 
altruistic surrogacy. Altruistic surrogacy is a procedure in which a woman (the 
surrogate mother) carries a child on behalf of a couple or a single gay person 
(commissioning parents) without receiving a payment, and relinquishes all parental 
rights when the child is born.1413  
 
In Australia, only altruistic surrogacy as defined above is legal. It is important to note 
that surrogacy may or may not require the use of assisted reproductive technolgies. 
Some surrogacy arrangements involve the surrogate mother carrying a child that is 
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her own genetic offspring. Such a child may be conceived by sexual intercourse, by 
the woman inseminating herself, or by medically supervised artificial insemination. In 
either case, the sperm of the commissioning father is usually used. Alternatively, the 
child may be the genetic offspring of other persons. In this case, assisted 
reproductive technolgies must be employed – an embryo created in vitro, is 
transferred to the surrogate mother’s uterus. This embryo will be created using eggs 
and sperm of the commissioning couple, or eggs provided by an egg donor, fertilised 
by the commissioning father.1414 
 
Section 60HB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) provides that a person is a parent of 
a child born under a surrogacy arrangement and hence has parental responsibility 
for such child if, under state and territory law, a court has made an order to the effect 
that he or she is the child’s parent. 
 
This would suggest that in Australia the intended parents are not automatically 
presumed the parents of the child born following altruistic surrogacy. For the parental 
status to be transferred to them, they must apply and obtain a surrogacy parental 
order. Intended parents who want to apply for parental orders must satisfy many 
requirements of which many are mandatory. The criteria for surrogacy order 
applications are beyond the scope of this study and will not be discussed. Laws 
governing parentage in the states and territories of Australia deserve some 
comments. 
 
7.5.1.2  State and territory laws on parentage 
 
7.5.1.2.1 Introduction 
 
The survey of state and territory parentage laws in Australia reveals a lack of 
uniformity in laws governing parentage in each state and territory. For example, 
while the Australian Capital Territory does not cater for a single gay man to father a 
child through surrogacy, it does cover gay couples where one of them is a sperm 
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donor.1415 The Victorian law on the other hand accommodates both single gay men 
and couples as potential commissioning parents and does not require that one of 
them be the sperm donor.1416 Therefore a good understanding of parentage in 
Australia also requires an analysis of each state and territory’s laws on parentage. 
State and territory laws relating to parentage vary in terms of lesbian and gay 
couples. 
 
7.5.1.2.2  Victoria 
 
In Victoria, the Status of Children Act 1974 (Vic) determines who the parents of a 
child born as a result of a medical procedure are. The Act defines the situations in 
which parentage can be recognised. Section 10C of the Act states that when a 
married woman has undergone artificial insemination using donor sperm, the 
husband of that woman is presumed to be the father of the resulting child and the 
sperm donor is presumed not to be the father.  
 
Similarly, when the procedure involves an ovum or embryo transfer (whether or not 
the woman’s ovum or husband’s sperm is used) the woman’s husband is presumed 
to be the father.1417 
 
It is notable that this law does not include the sperm or egg donor in the list of the 
child’s presumed parents and more importantly the law does not cover gay and 
lesbian’s parentage. 
 
7.5.1.2.3  Western Australia 
 
In Western Australia, parentage of children born as a result of ARTs is determined 
under the Artificial Conception Act 1985 (WA). This Act provides as follows: 
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(a) When a woman uses a donated ovum, she is the mother of any child born as 
a result of the pregnancy; 
(b) When a married woman undergoes an artificial fertilisation procedure with the 
consent of her husband, the husband of that woman is presumed the father of 
the resulting child; 
(c) When a woman who is in a de facto relationship with another woman 
undergoes an artificial fertilisation procedure with the consent of her de facto 
partner, the de facto partner of the pregnant woman is conclusively presumed 
to be a parent of the child born as a result of the pregnancy.1418  
 
It should be noted that, like in Victoria, the sperm or ovum donor is not the presumed 
parent of the child born using his or her genetic materials. 
 
7.5.1.2.4 South Australia 
 
The Family Relationship Act 1975 (SA) regulates parentage of children born 
following ARTs. This Act provides as follows: 
 
(a) A woman who gives birth to a child is the mother of the child notwithstanding 
the fact that the child was conceived by the fertilisation of an ovum taken from 
some other woman; 
 
(b) When a married woman undergoes an artificial fertilisation procedure with the 
consent of her husband, the husband is the father of any child born.1419 
 
In South Australia the ovum and sperm donor are not parents of children born using 
their sperm or ovum. South Australian laws regulating parentage do not have 
provisions applying to homosexual couples. 
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7.5.1.2.5 New South Wales, Tasmania and Queensland 
 
The laws governing parentage in these states are the Status of Children Act 1996 
(NSW), the Status of Children Act 1978 (Qld) and the Status of Children Act 1974 
(Tas). These three Acts have similar provisions relating to parentage within the 
jurisdictions of these states. The Acts provide as follows: 
 
 Where a married woman or a woman in a de facto relationship becomes 
pregnant as a result of a fertilisation procedure she is presumed to be the 
mother and her husband, provided he consented to the procedure, is 
presumed to be the father;  
 Where a woman becomes pregnant by means of a fertilisation procedure 
using sperm obtained from a man who is not her husband, the donor is 
presumed not to be the father; or 
 Where a woman becomes pregnant by means of a fertilisation procedure 
using another woman’s ovum, the donor is presumed not to be the mother.1420 
 
7.5.1.2.6 The Northern Territory 
 
The Northern Territory has not enacted clear laws governing parentage of children 
born following the use of ARTs. 
 
7.5.1.2.7 The Australian Capital Territory 
 
The parentage Act 2004 (ACT) regulates parentage of a child born using ARTs in the 
Australian Capital Territory. The Act provides as follows:  
 
 If a woman undergoes a procedure as a result of which she becomes 
pregnant, the woman is conclusively presumed to be the mother of the 
resulting child.  
                                                          
1420
  Section 14 of the Status of Children Act 1996 (NSW); subsection 15–17 of the Status of 
Children Act 1978 (Qld); section 10C the Status of Children Act 1974 (Tas). 
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 If another woman produced the ovum used in the procedure, the other woman 
is conclusively presumed not to be the child’s mother.  
 If the woman undergoes the procedure with the consent of her domestic 
partner, the partner is conclusively presumed to be a parent of the child.  
 If a man other than the woman’s domestic partner produced semen used in 
the procedure, the man who produced the semen is conclusively presumed 
not to be the father of the child. 
 
It should be noted that under section 169 of the Legislation Act 2001 (ACT) a 
reference to a person’s “domestic partner” is a reference to someone who lives with 
a person in a domestic partnership and includes a reference to a person’s spouse. 
The significance of this is that, when two women are in a same-sex relationship, and 
one of them gives birth as a result of ART, her partner is presumed to be a parent of 
the child.1421  
 
7.5.2 The breakdown of homosexual relationships 
 
Every human relationship has a beginning and an end. By the breakdown of 
homosexual relationships, reference is made to the end of a homosexual union. A 
homosexual relationship may end for various reasons which are beyond the scope of 
this study. Rather, the study is more interested to disputes that may arise when the 
relationship ends. 
 
7.5.2.1  Disputes arising at the relationships breakdown 
 
Many disputes may arise when a homosexual relationships ends. These include 
parenting disputes, disputes relating to child support, disputes relating to 
maintenance, et cetera. For the purpose of this study, attention is given only to 
parenting disputes and child support which directly affect children born and raised by 
the two partners who are now separating. 
                                                          
1421
 Section 11 of Parentage Act 2004 (ACT).  
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While the de facto and registered relationships receive much the same recognition 
as marriages in relation to other laws, a significant difference between the two lies in 
the mechanisms for ending the relationship. To obtain a divorce, married couples 
must first prove that their marriage has broken down irretrievably. The law deems a 
marriage to have irretrievably broken down if the parties have been separated for a 
period of twelve months. Where there are children of the marriage, the court must 
also be satisfied that proper arrangements have been made for the care, welfare and 
development of those children before a divorce order will take effect.1422 
 
In contrast, legally ending a registered relationship is achieved simply upon the 
application of one or both parties to the registrar. Alternatively, a registered 
relationship will automatically end upon either the marriage or death of one or both of 
the parties. When an application to end a registered relationship is made, there is no 
requirement for the court to consider the welfare of any children of the relationship. 
Thus, it is a much simpler process to dissolve a registered relationship than it is to 
dissolve a marriage. De facto relationships that are not registered can come to an 
end without the need to take any steps to legally dissolve the relationship.1423 
 
7.5.2.1.1 Parenting disputes 
 
The Family Court deals with all disputes arising in relation to children following the 
breakdown of a relationship. This includes where the child will live and who the child 
will spend time with. The primary consideration in any application before the court is 
what is in the best interests of the child. 
 
Whilst the court can hear applications from anyone concerned in the care, welfare or 
development of a child, legal parents are also entitled to certain additional 
                                                          
1422
  Tasmania Law Reform Institute www.http//law.utas.edu.au/reform (date of use 20 January 
2015) 12. 
1423
  Tasmania Law Reform Institute www.http//law.utas.edu.au/reform (date of use 20 January 
2015) 12. 
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considerations (such as whether it is possible to grant each parent equal time, or 
substantial and signiﬁcant time with the child).1424 
 
Legal parents include:  
 
 adoptive parents (or the partner of an adoptive parent who consented to the 
adoption) 
 lesbian mothers with children born through assisted conception 
 parents recognised under surrogacy parentage orders.1425  
 
Legal parents have responsibilities toward their child.  
 
7.5.2.1.2 Child support 
 
Persons who are recognised as the legal parents of a child are liable to pay child 
support. Following reforms in 2008 to the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 
(Cth), the Child Support Scheme has been the main avenue for pursuing child 
support from a same-sex partner after separation since 1 July 2009. Where parents 
cannot agree on their own, a parent can approach the Child Support Agency for an 
administrative determination of the liability of each parent for child support in 
accordance with a set formula.1426 
 
Because sperm donors are not legal parents, they are not liable for child support 
under the Child Support (Assessment) Act.1427 However, the Act lists people who are 
liable for child support and defines the legal parents in some circumstances. Section 
5 of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) stipulates as follows: 
 
                                                          
1424
  Kassasieh “Same-sex couples and their families” in Sheridan (ed) The Law Handbook: Your 
Practical Guide to the Law in New South Wales 1034. 
1425
  Kassasieh in Sheridan (ed) 1034. 
1426
 Kassasieh in Sheridan (ed) 1034. 
1427
   Kassasieh in Sheridan (ed) 1034. 
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 Persons eligible to receive child support are the carers of a child, who may be 
a parent.  
 Persons liable to pay child support are the parents of the child. 
 For the purpose of a child conceived artificially, a parent is a person who is 
deemed to be a parent for the purposes of section 60H of the Family Law Act, 
and where the child is conceived in an altruistic surrogacy arrangement and a 
parentage order has been made and section 60HB of the Family Law Act 
applies to deem the intended parents to be legal parents (s 5 of the Child 
Support (Assessment) Act (CSAA))  
 Child support liability arises in the following circumstances where child is 
conceived artificially:  
o In the case of a lesbian couple where one of them conceives artificially, 
either may be liable to pay, depending who has the primary care.  
o In the case of a gay male couple having a child via an altruistic 
surrogacy arrangement and who obtained a parentage order under the 
SCA, both are parents for the purposes of section 60HB of the Family 
Law Act and come within the definition of “parent” for the purposes of 
the CSAA, so either can be assessed to pay child support. However, if 
it was a commercial surrogacy arrangement, then neither is a parent 
and neither can be assessed to pay child support. 
o In the case of a lesbian couple having a child via an altruistic surrogacy 
arrangement, both are parents for the purposes of section 60HB of the 
Family Law Act, and therefore both is a parent within the definition of 
“parent” for the purposes of the CSAA, and either can be be assessed 
to pay child support. However, if it was a commercial surrogacy 
arrangement neither can be a parent for the purposes of section 60HB 
of the Family Law Act and neither can be assessed to pay child 
support.  
o A transgender person having a child via an altruistic surrogacy 
arrangement and who obtains a parentage order is a parent for the 
purposes of section 60HB of the Family law Act, and therefore is a 
parent for the purposes of the CSAA, and therefore can be assessed to 
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pay child support. However, if it was a commercial surrogacy 
arrangement, the person is not a parent for the purposes of section 
60HB of the Family Law Act and cannot be assessed to pay child 
support. 
o In the case of a co-parenting arrangement involving a single gay man 
or couple and a lesbian couple, neither of the men can be liable to pay 
child support to the lesbian couple, and if the lesbian couple separate, 
either of them may be liable to pay the other. 
 
It is clear that the provisions of this section are intended to protect the child when the 
relationship of its parents comes to an end. This would suggest that irrespective of 
the form of the family in which the child is born and whether or not the child is born 
naturally or by means of ARTs; the interests of the child even beyond the 
relationship of its parents are a concern for the law in Australia. 
 
7.6  THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD IN AUSTRALIA 
  
7.6.1  Introduction 
 
Australia is one of the countries in the world in which the best interests had been 
directly applied to children to be born as a result of ART technologies. The 
discussion of the best interests of the child will therefore begin by analysing how the 
unborn child is protected in Australia before analysing the application of the best 
interests of the child’s criterion. 
 
7.6.2 The protection of the unborn child in Australia 
 
7.6.2.1 The judicial protection of the unborn child 
 
Like in the USA where children are protected through Foetal Homicide Laws, It is 
well established law in Australia that a third party, who is not the mother of an unborn 
child, can be found to have owed a duty of care to that child for injuries caused to the 
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child while still in the womb of the mother.1428 Any violent act of a third party on a 
pregnant woman that causes the unborn child in her womb to suffer injuries will 
cause that third party to owe a duty of care to the unborn child. In other words, an 
unborn child is protected from the injuries caused to it by a third party while this 
unborn child is still in the womb of its mother. The following case shows how the 
court applied this law. In 2011 through her tutor, Tamara sued the Western Sydney 
local health Network, claiming that when her mother attended the hospital and told 
the doctor that her first-born daughter had been diagnosed with chicken pox that 
very morning, she ought to have been given an injection of Varicella-zoster 
Immunoglubin (VZIG). The court held that the defendant owed to the plaintiff a duty 
to take care and was in breach of that duty.1429 
 
This case clearly shows the court’s concern for the protection the interests of unborn 
children by protecting them from the injuries that they may suffer from the negligence 
of a third person. In several other cases, Australian courts were faced with the 
question whether a duty of care should be extended to the mother of an unborn child 
for prenatal injuries sustained by the unborn child while in utero. 
 
The courts answered this question in the affirmative, as it is demonstrated in the 
following cases. In Lynch v Lynch, for instance, the Court of Appeal of the New 
South Wales was required to consider whether a mother could be liable to her child, 
who was born with disabilities, in respect of injury caused to that child, while a 
foetus, by the mother’s negligent driving of a motor vehicle. The court unanimously 
answered in the affirmative. Clarke JA held that the question before the court was 
very narrow and related specifically to a given situation; road accidents. Therefore 
the circumstances of the case did not require examination of the significant policy 
consideration.1430 
 
Eleven years later, in another case involving negligent driving by a pregnant woman 
that resulted in injuries suffered by her unborn child, the Queensland Court of 
                                                          
1428
  Watt v Rama [1972] VR 235. 
1429
  King v Western Sydney local Health Network [2011] NSWSC 1025. 
1430
  Lynch v Lynch (by her tutor Lynch) (1991) 25 NSLR 411, 415 (Clarke JA) 
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Appeals held that the fact that the negligent driver was the mother of the foetus was 
really incidental. The driver owes a duty of care to others within the vehicle, including 
any foetus within a passenger seat. The fact that the foetus is within the driver 
herself is only incidentally relevant.1431  
 
All these cases are evidence of the judicial protection of the unborn child in Australia. 
However, it is interesting to note that as established in Watt v Rama, in Australia, a 
woman does not owe her unborn child a duty of care other than in the limited 
circumstance of car accidents. 
 
7.6.2.2 The legislative protection of the unborn child 
 
A survey of Australian criminal law reveals that some provisions protect unborn 
children from injuries they can suffer either from their mothers or third persons. The 
Crimes Act 1900 in New South Wales for instance contains provisions aimed at the 
protection of the unborn child. 
 
Section 82 of this Act clearly prohibits a woman to procure her miscarriage by 
administrating to herself any drug or any other noxious thing. The section reads as 
follows: 
 
“Whosoever, being a woman with child, unlawfully administer to herself any drug or 
noxious thing, or unlawfully uses any instrument or other means, with intent in any 
such case to procure her miscarriage, shall be liable to imprisonment for ten years”. 
 
Section 83 deals with a third person administering drugs to a pregnant woman with 
the intent of procuring her miscarriage. The section stipulates as follows: 
 
“Whosoever, unlawfully administers to, or causes to be taken by, any woman, 
whether with a child or not, any drug or noxious thing, or unlawfully uses any 
                                                          
1431
  Bowditch v McEwan [2002] QCA 172 (12) (De Jersey CJ). 
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instrument or other means, with intent in any such case to procure her miscarriage 
shall be liable to imprisonment for ten years”. 
 
Lastly the section 84 of the Act concerns the supplying of the means of procuring 
miscarriage. The section states that: 
 
“Whosoever unlawfully supplies or procure any drugs or noxious things or any 
instrument or thing whatsoever, knowing that the same is intended to be unlawfully 
used with intent to procure the miscarriage of any woman, whether with a child or not, 
shall be liable to imprisonment for five years”. 
These provisions clearly reveal the intention of the legislature to protect the unborn 
child’s life. However, this protection does not seem to be unconditional. In other 
words, a close analysis of these provisions reveals that in some circumstances, a 
woman or a third party would be by the law authorised to procure a miscarriage and 
by that means end the life of unborn child in utero. Those circumstances are referred 
to as a lawful abortion. An abortion is lawful if it is necessary to protect the woman 
from serious danger to her life or her physical or mental health, provided that it is not 
out of proportion to the danger to be averted.1432 This would suggest that in the 
circumstances that the life of the unborn child will put the life or the health of the 
mother at risk, the life of the unborn child may be legally ended by legally procuring 
an abortion. This would also suggest that it is possible that the rights of the unborn 
child may conflict with the rights of his or her mother. 
 
Throughout the world the use of ARTs to have children and build families sometimes 
results in conflicts between the rights of the unborn child and the rights of its 
intended parents. It is in this context that we address the issue of the application of 
the best interests of the child criterion in Australia.  
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  R v Davidson [1969] VR 667. 
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7.6.3 Application of the best interests of the child criterion in Australia 
 
The application of the best interests of the child criterion in Australia will be assessed 
in analysing the regulation of ART technologies in Australia and discussing a few 
cases in which the child’s best interests criterion was applied. Assisted reproductive 
technologies are regulated in Australia through different combinations of professional 
and ethical guidelines and specific ART statutes in some states. In view of the fact 
that this study is a critical legal analysis, a particular focus will be placed only on the 
specific statutes regulating ARTs in Australia. 
 
The survey of Australian statutes regulating ARTs reveals that the best interests of 
the child is one of the main principles underpinning the legislative framework. For 
example, section 5 of the Assisted Reproductive Technologies Act (ARTA 2008) in 
Victoria, section 4 (ARTA 1998) in South Australia and section 3 (ARTA 2007) in 
New South Wales embody the principles that the best interests of the unborn child 
are the primary consideration in ART procedures in Australia. The best interests of 
the unborn child in Australia are interpreted as to mean among other interests, the 
well-being of the child. This approach is made clear in Victorian Infertility Treatment 
Act 1995. In terms of the Infertility Treatment Act 1995, the welfare and interests of 
any person born or to be born as a result of a treatment procedure are 
paramount.1433 What is interesting in this provision is that the Infertility Act 1995 
protects not only the welfare of the ART-born child but also the welfare of the ART 
child to be born. This would suggest that the life and the welfare of the developing 
embryo are protected by the Victorian law. 
 
A closer look at the ART statutes reveals that some measures taken in terms of the 
regulation of ARTs are common to many of the states, although their content might 
vary from one state to another. These measures include the establishment of donor 
registers, the restriction of access to ART treatment, and the imposition of eligibility 
criteria. All these measures are claimed to be taken for the purpose of ensuring the 
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 Infertility Treatment Act 1995. 
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well-being of the child to be born using ART procedures.1434 It is interesting for the 
purpose of this thesis to understand how these measures protect the best interests 
of the child. 
 
7.6.3.1 Donor registers 
 
In Victoria and South Australia, ART legislations were introduced since 1980. Since 
that time donor anonymity was seen as being in the interest of the infertile couple, 
the donor and even the child. Considering that infertility is a private matter and a 
potential source of stigma for the infertile male and the entire family, clinicians used 
to advise the parents of the donor conceived child not to tell their offspring of their 
origins.1435 In short, from 1980 to the end of 2009, anonymity of the donor was a rule 
in ART procedures. There is now a shift in the public’s perception of infertility – this, 
coupled with the growing importance of genetic information in medical decision-
making and individual life choice has resulted in a reconsideration of the ideal of 
secrecy surrounding the donor identity.1436 It is reported that donor-conceived 
children have experienced ongoing negative effects because they were denied this 
information. According to Mahlstedt et al most of them wanted to be told of their 
conception when they were young and wanted to meet with their donors and half 
siblings.1437 
 
In response to this shift, the State of Victoria established donor registers. Victoria is 
the first Australian state to have established these registers under the Infertility 
(Medical Procedures) Act 1984 (VIC), and the Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (VIC). 
These statutes provide that information about the donors can be accessed on 
request by interested children assisted by their parents or guardians when they turn 
eighteen. In terms of new legislation1438 it is now possible for donor conceived 
                                                          
1434
  Thorpe et al “In the best interests of the child? Regulating assisted reproductive technologies 
and the well-being of the offspring in three Australian states” 2012 IJLPF 260. 
1435
  Thorpe et al 2012 IJLPF 262-3. 
1436
   Thorpe et al 2012 IJLPF 261. 
1437
  Mahlstedt, Labounty and Kennedy “The view of adult offspring of sperm donation: Essential 
feedback for the development of ethical guidelines within the practice of assisted reproductive 
technology” 2010 FS 2239. 
1438
 ARTA 2008 (VIC). 
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children born in Victoria after 1 January 2010 to find out the method of their 
conception from their birth certificate.1439 
 
Similarly, under ARTA 2007 (NSW), a central donor register maintained by the 
Department of Health has been established. Donor-conceived children born after 1 
January 2010 may apply to the Department for identifying information about their 
genetic genitors when they turn eighteen.1440 
 
7.6.3.2 Imposition of the eligibility criteria 
 
Since 1989, only heterosexual married couples in Australia had access to infertility 
treatment. This position was strongly challenged in two cases, MW v Royal Women’s 
Hospital,1441 and McBain v Victoria.1442 The outcome of these cases was that 
heterosexual couples in de facto relationships, single and lesbian women were also 
granted access to fertility treatment provided that they satisfy the requirement of 
clinical infertility.1443  
 
In Victoria, the new legislation ARTA 2008 (VIC) introduced a new requirement.1444 
This requirement provides as follows: All women or couples seeking treatment must 
undergo compulsory criminal record and child protection order checks, even if they 
were using their own sperm and eggs or already had children through ARTs. In other 
words, there is a presumption against all women and couples seeking infertility 
treatment who have criminal records for sexual or violent offences, or if a child 
protection order had been made removing a child from custody or guardianship of 
the woman or her partner.1445 
 
                                                          
1439
  Blyth and Frith “Donor-conceived people’s access to genetic and biographical history: An 
analysis of provisions in different jurisdictions permitting disclosure of donor identity” 2009 
IJLPF 181. 
1440
  Thorpe et al 2012 IJPF 262. 
1441
  MW v Royal Women’s Hospital (1997) EOC 92-886. 
1442
  McBain v Victoria (2000) 99 FCR 116. 
1443
  Thorpe et al “New assisted reproductive technology laws in Victoria: A genuine overhaul or 
just a cut and paste?” 2011 Journal of LM 845. 
1444
 Sections 11, 12 and 14. 
1445
  Thorpe et al 2012 IJPF 264. 
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In South Australia, ARTA 1988 introduces a similar requirement referred to as a 
“medical need condition” for accessing fertility treatment. This requirement was 
introduced in addition to the criminal record check and the removal from custody 
requirement. This would suggest that all women and couples seeking infertility 
treatment must prove that they are in need of the treatment and are not likely to pass 
serious illnesses to the resulting children. They further have to prove that they have 
not been convicted for a sexual offence involving a child or a violent offence. They 
also have to prove that a child have not been removed from their custody or 
guardianship.1446 If they satisfy these requirements they then qualify for infertility 
treatment. 
 
It is important to note that all these measures were introduced with the aim of 
protecting the best interests of the child, in particular the well-being of the child. 
Researchers, including Tobin, have attempted to assess this claim. 
Tobin assessed the test for eligibility for ARTs from the perspective of a child’s rights 
and best interests.1447 In other words, Tobin wanted to know whether parental 
eligibility for ART was in the best interests of the child in Australia. Tobin argued as 
follows in this regard: 
 
“In its current format, the test appears to be inconsistent with the guiding principles of 
the Infertility Treatment Act 1995 which, as noted above, require that the welfare and 
interests of any person born or to be born as a result of a treatment procedure are 
paramount. Despite this overriding requirement, eligibility is determined solely by 
reference to issues concerning a woman’s fertility. This creates an adult-centric test 
that involves no assessment of the rights and interests of the child who may be born 
as a result of such a procedure, let alone making such concerns the paramount 
consideration. Moreover, the current interpretation of the test effectively makes it 
discriminatory and adult-centric by introducing factors, namely the sexuality of a 
woman and/or her marital status, which have no necessary bearing on the ability of a 
woman to care for a child…. If the test for eligibility for assisted reproductive 
technolgies were truly to be consistent with the rights of children under the 
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  Thorpe et al 2012 IJPF 264. 
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 Tobin 2004 VLRC 19. 
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Convention (and reflect the principle under the Infertility Treatment Act that the 
welfare and interests of a child must be paramount), fertility must be an irrelevant 
consideration as it has no bearing on the ability of a person to care for a child”.1448  
 
This would suggest that in the test for eligibility for ARTs the major concern is the 
interests of the intended parent(s) to have a child; no reference is made to the 
interests of the child to be born from ARTs. Does this mean that ARTs are not in the 
best interests of the child? The answer to this question is provided in the next 
chapter. 
 
The analysis of the judicial activities in Australia reveals that Australia did not seem 
concerned with the child’s best interests when deciding cases of children born as a 
result of ARTs. Australia is recognised as the country with the most complete and 
child-focused model of the best interests standard.1449 The Australian legal system is 
known to be too much concerned with the child, almost to the point of being 
unethically against the weights of parents’ rights.1450 This is accomplished through 
the concept known as the “paramountcy provision”, which was introduced in 2006, 
and which states as follows:  
 
“In deciding whether to make a particular order in relation to child, a court must 
regard the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration.”1451 
 
This would suggest that the child’s best interests are absolutely placed above the 
interests of other parties involved.1452 In practice, this provision aims to reduce the 
amount of conflict between parents, which alleviates the amount of harm suffered by 
children as a byproduct of divorce.1453 
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 Tobin 2004 VLRC 19-20. 
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  Elrod and Dale “Paradigm shifts and pendulum swings in child custody: The interests of 
children in the balance” 2008 FLQ 404–405.   
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  Crowe and Toohey “From good intentions to ethical outcomes: The paramountcy of children’s 
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 Crowe and Toohey 2009 MULR 392. 
1452
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Although this sounds child protective, in practice there is a case in which the 
Queensland court has reached a confusing decision. In Dudley and Anor & 
Chedi,1454 an opposite sex couple from Queensland entered into a commercial 
surrogacy arrangement with a Thai woman. The application for parenting orders 
related to two children who were artificially conceived using the intended father’s 
sperm donation with donated eggs from a Thai woman other than the surrogate 
mother. After the children were born they were taken into the care of the intended 
parents. The application for parenting orders was made with the consent of the 
surrogate mother. The court raised as a general policy the question whether or not 
the requested parenting orders should be made, “… which could be perceived in 
some sense to sanction acts which were illegal in Queensland at the relevant time 
and which were against public policy…”1455 The court stated that the paramount 
consideration about the orders sought is the best interests of the children.1456 The 
court decided that it was in the best interests of the children that the intended 
parents have equal shared responsibility for the children.1457 However, the court 
stated that it would direct the Registrar to send a copy of the reasons for the 
judgement to the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions for consideration of 
whether a prosecution should be instituted against the applicants.1458 
 
It is difficult to reconcile the court’s finding that it is in the best interests of the 
children in this case to make the orders sought granting equal shared parental 
responsibility to the intended parents, whilst at the same time referring these people 
to the Director of Public Prosecutions for consideration of prosecution. How a 
criminal prosecution of people seeking to become parents is going to promote the 
best interests of the child is difficult to understand. 
 
Although the application of the best interests of the child criterion in Australia seems 
to have some similarities with the application in USA, Australian statutes clearly state 
that factors to be considered when engaging in the analysis of the best interests of 
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the child include the welfare and interests of any person born or to be born as a 
result of ARTs. The Victorian Infertility Act 1995, for instance, emphasises that these 
factors are paramount in the process. 
 
However, courts have proven to only consider the interests of adults, like in the USA, 
when confirming the preconception agreements. 
 
7.7 INTERIM CONCLUSION 
 
Homosexual families are recognised in Australia at federal level as well as at state 
and territory level. Although at federal level little has been done in this regard, state 
and territory laws underwent major changes to include homosexual unions in many 
areas covered by those laws. 
 
The debate on the constitutionality of the authority of the commonwealth parliament 
to legislate on homosexual marriage is an ongoing one. Scholars anticipated the way 
the High Court of Australia will deal with this issue. Until the court decides on the 
issue it is difficult to predict which interpretation the court will give to the term 
marriage in the Constitution. 
 
Homosexual people can have access to ARTs in Australia. Each state and territory 
has enacted laws enabling or denying access to some procedures.  
 
Parentage in homosexual families within the jurisdiction of Australia has been 
established based on family law at federal level and various Acts at state and 
territory level. Efforts had been made through several law amendments to ensure 
that a child born as a result of ARTs has two parents. 
 
Australian law also protects children in homosexual families when the parents can no 
longer live together. Mechanisms have been put in place to ensure that disputes that 
arise at the parents’ relationship breakdown are settled in the best interests of the 
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child and that people liable for child support will not fail to fulfil their obligations in this 
regard. 
 
The best interests of the child are an important criterion that was used in introducing 
new legislation regulating ART procedures in Australia. The same criterion was also 
used in the assessment of the eligibility to access fertility treatment in some 
Australian states. It can be argued that the measures introduced in Australia in 
respect of the protection of the best interests of the unborn child are adequate and 
enough for the purpose of the effective protection of the best interests of children to 
be born using ARTs. 
 
It is important for that purpose to consider the adverse effects of being born as a 
result of ARTs in general, and those of growing up in homosexual families in 
particular as discussed in chapters three and four of this thesis and recommend 
some measures that would eliminate or alleviate those effects on unborn children 
expected to be born as a result of ARTs. This aspect will be discussed in more detail 
in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION 
 
8.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The starting point of this chapter is a discussion of the South African approach to 
ARTs and homosexual families created through these new medical reproductive 
technologies. Such a discussion is of the highest importance for this study in that the 
appropriate approach to ARTs and families built as a result of ARTs will be 
determinant of the adequate protection of the best interests of the child. Such 
approach will be a guideline for legislators, judges and policy makers in their 
decisions. 
 
The chapter will address the following question: What is the South African approach 
to ARTs and homosexual families created as a result of the use of ARTs? The 
importance of the answer to this question can be summarised in the two following 
points: 
 
(a) The answer to the above question will first help us determine whether the 
South African approach to assisted reproductive technolgies is parent-
focused, child-focused or a nuanced approach. This will in turn require a 
description and analysis of each of these approaches with reference to the 
law regulating assisted reproductive technolgies in South Africa. The answer 
to the abovementioned question will also be of assistance in determining 
whether South Africa uses an equality approach or a more realistic approach 
to homosexual families built through assisted reproductive technolgies. 
 
(b) The answer to the above question will secondly be of assistance in efforts to 
determine whether the provisions relating to the regulation of ARTs in South 
Africa are appropriate and afford the expected protection to the best interests 
of the child. 
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The discussion on the South African approach to ARTs and homosexual families 
created through ARTs is followed by the comparative conclusions. Those 
conclusions are drawn from the analysis of the best interests of the child criterion in 
the compared countries. The chapter will then address concluding remarks followed 
by some proposals of law reform. 
 
8.2 THE SOUTH AFRICAN APPROACH TO ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE 
 TECHNOLOGIES AND FAMILIES CREATED THROUGH ASSISTED 
 REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 
 
8.2.1  The South African Approach to assisted reproductive technologies 
 
In order to better understand the South African approach to assisted reproductive 
technologies, I have developed three approaches which in my view are relevant 
when analysing ARTs. These are the following: the parent-focused approach, the 
child-focused approach and a nuanced approach. It is important for the purpose of 
this thesis to briefly discuss each of these approaches and to determine which one 
South Africa has adopted. 
 
8.2.1.1  Different approaches 
 
(a)  The parent-focused approach 
 
The parent-focused approach gives more weight to the right of the prospective 
parents to reproduce. This would suggest that ART providers and the state are 
mostly concerned by the desire of the parents to have a child. All the efforts are 
made to make the parents’ desire a reality. The application of this approach imposes 
on the state the obligation of making available ART institutions within the country for 
infertile parents to have children. In this context, surrogate motherhood agreements 
or contracts were conceived and regulated in such a way to ensure that the 
prospective parents will have the resulting child handed over to the intended parents 
after birth. Similarily, the regulation of artificial fertilisation focuses on the success of 
the procedure, which is a live birth. In short, the parents’ focused approach to 
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assisted reproductive technolgies requires that all the means be made available for 
adults who desire to have a child to use them and have the child they have desired. 
 
(b) The child-focused approach 
 
The child-focused approach is the approach that gives more weight to the interests 
of the ARTs-born child. All the efforts are focused on the well-being of the child born 
as a result of ARTs. The state’s obligation in this context is not merely to make 
available ART institutions, but also to make sure that appropriate medical and social 
measures are taken into consideration for the well-being of the child born in those 
institutions. This approach requires ART providers to make sure that the child 
resulting from the use of their expertise is healthy and free from any birth defects. 
This requirement also applies on the state and on the parents. 
 
I am aware of the issues the two first approaches raise. It is clear from the 
description of the first approach that there is no room for the interests of the child. All 
arrangements are made solely with the purpose of helping the parents to have a 
child. Given the harm ARTs may cause to the resulting child it is difficult to apply the 
second approach. This approach would require zero harm tolerance, which cannot 
be guaranteed by ART providers as some harm that ARTs cause to the resulting 
child are even inherent to the procedures. There is therefore a necessity for another 
approach that would require a proper consideration of the interests of the 
prospective parents and the interests of the resulting child. 
 
(c) The nuanced approach 
 
The nuanced approach takes into consideration the interests of the parents who 
desire to have a child and the interests of the child who is born as a result of the use 
of ARTs. This approach calls for “minimum harm tolerance” when dealing with ART 
procedures. This would suggest that only a minimum harm to the child resulting from 
ARTs can be reasonably accepted. In other words, the state, ART providers and the 
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prospective parents must make sure that the ARTs-born child is either completely 
healthy or has minor birth defects or other health challenges. 
 
8.2.1.2  The approach adopted in South Africa 
 
A closer analysis of the statutes regulating ARTs in South Africa reveals that the 
parent-focused approach is prevailing in South Africa. Section 1 and 294 of 
Children’s Act, and section 12 of the National Health Act provide some insights of the 
South African approach to ARTs. While section 1 of the Children’s Act defines the 
surrogate motherhood agreement, section 294 provides the conditions for the validity 
of the contract. Section 12 of the National Health Act determines the number of 
zygotes or embryos that may be transferred to the recipient.  
 
Sections 1 and 294 were commented in length in chapter three.1459 It is clear from 
the discussion of these two sections that the definition of the surrogate motherhood 
agreement and the conditions for its validity are entirely in the interests of the 
parents. The prospective parents’ desire to have a child was the major concern that 
motivated the drafters of these sections. They focused on the fact that a child must 
be born and handed over to those who desired to have it. Although the interests of 
the child to be born, including the general welfare of the child, a stable environment, 
and precautions to be taken if one or both commissioning parents die, are mentioned 
in section 295(d) and (e) of the Children’s Act; it is important to note that the parent-
focused approach still prevails in South Africa. The critical time for the child to be 
born as a result of ARTs is when he or she is still is the mother’s womb. It is at that 
moment that she or he is still a foetus that his or her best interests must be 
protected. If he or she is born with genetic defects, being born in a stable home 
environment will not help reverse this unfortunate condition which can be prevented 
rather than cured. The drafters of the Children’s Act seem to be concerned about 
curing the condition of that child rather than preventing it. They viewed ARTs mainly 
as a means of enabling those couples or individuals who could not naturally 
reproduce to have children irrespective of the effects on the health conditions of the 
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child. This approach was adopted in a relatively recent case heard in the Pretoria 
High Court. In Ex parte matter between WH, UVS, LG, BJS,1460 a case in which two 
male partners, respectively Dutch and Danish citizens, domiciled in South Africa, 
who had been in a relationship for eight years and who concluded a marriage in 
South Africa in 2010, approached the court for the confirmation of a surrogate 
motherhood agreement. The court confirmed the agreement and held as follows: 
 
“Surrogacy was not recognised in South Africa before the enactment of the Act even 
though there have been many reported instances of informal surrogacy being 
practiced. The Act now provides a mechanism for many who desire a child and for 
whom informal surrogacy is not an option. This has understandably resulted in a 
growing number of applications in the division seeking the confirmation of the court of 
surrogacy arrangement.”1461 
 
This view of the court is consistent with the parent-focused approach; it confirms that 
the surrogacy agreement is a mere mechanism for infertile heterosexual individuals 
and couples as well as homosexual partners, irrespective of their fertility status, to 
have children if that is their desire. 
 
In addition, the provisions of section 12 of the National Health Act reveal the 
carelessness of the drafters of the Act with regard to the health of the child resulting 
from the artificial fertilisation. Section 12 of the National Health Act reads as follows: 
 
“No more than three zygotes or embryos may be transferred to the recipient during 
an embryo transfer procedure, unless there is a specific medical indication to the 
contrary”  
 
In other words, in the absence of any medical indication to the contrary, the 
maximum of three embryos be transferred to the woman who is artificially fertilised 
during an embryo transfer. This would suggest that the National Health Act allows 
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the transfer of more than one embryo. As already pointed out in chapter four, the 
transfer of more than one embryo often results in multiple pregnancies.1462 Multiple 
pregnancies as discussed in length in chapter four is associated with a long list of 
birth defects and illnesses that usually increase the rate of infant morbidity.1463  
 
In the efforts of increasing the chances for the prospective parents to have a child, 
the National Health Act has proven itself to be parent-focused by failing to address 
the health of the child that will result from ART procedures. 
 
From the above discussion, it is clear that South Africa has adopted a parent-
focused approach to ARTs. It is worth remembering that the parent-focused 
approach to ARTs is essentially characterised by the failure to consider the interests 
of the resulting child. This approach encourages individuals and couples, in 
particular those of the same sex, to reproduce even though the child could be born 
with illnesses or disabilities. This approach is inconsistent with the best interests of 
the child. It is interesting to ask why South Africa has adopted such an approach to 
ARTs. The answer to this question is simple; it is probably in an effort to correct the 
mistakes committed during the apartheid regime that the South African Constitution 
sought to treat all persons equally and to avoid any unfair discrimination, inter alia 
based on sexual orientation. This may also explain the South African approach to 
homosexual families created through ARTs. 
 
8.2.2 The South African approach to homosexual families built through 
 assisted reproductive technologies 
 
There are two possible approaches to homosexual families built as a result of ARTs, 
namely the equality approach and the realistic approach. 
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8.2.2.1  Description of the two approaches 
 
(a)  The equality approach 
 
This approach is based on the constitutional equality clause, which reads as follows: 
 
“The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one 
or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or 
social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, 
culture, language and birth”.1464 
 
This approach calls for the equal treatment of all who live in South Africa. As argued 
in chapter five, the gay and lesbian struggle in South Africa was motivated by the 
desire of homosexual individuals and couples to have their relationships and families 
legally recognised and have the same rights that marriage bestows on heterosexual 
individuals and couples.1465 In other words, advocates of the legalisation of 
homosexual unions sought equality of treatment between heterosexual and 
homosexual people. This would suggest that the purpose of the struggle of 
homosexual advocates was for homosexual individuals and couples to enjoy the 
same rights that heterosexual individuals and couples enjoy in terms of their 
relationships.  
 
Motivated inter alia by the need to satisfy the demands of homosexual lobby groups, 
the framers of the Constitution included the equality clause in the final Constitution. 
The Constitution hence enshrined the right of homosexual people not to be unfairly 
discriminated against based on their sexual orientation. The equality approach can 
be summarised as follows: In the name of the equality of all who live in South Africa, 
homosexual people must also be allowed to marry, reproduce and build families. 
Scholars and commentators and even the courts have made efforts to view 
homosexual families as an appropriate environment for the development of children. 
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Some writers even went an extra mile to assume that homosexual parents are better 
parents than heterosexuals.1466 As one can see, this approach encourages the 
building of families consisting of two fathers or two mothers, where as pointed out in 
chapter two, either a mother or a father is absent from the start of these families.1467 
As one can understand, this is the approach South Africa has adopted in legalising 
homosexual relationships. 
  
However, as the discussions in chapter two and chapter five reveal, the 
characteristics of homosexual families are problematic with regard to the best 
interests of the child. This is against the background of scholars who claim that there 
is no difference between children growing up in homosexual families and those 
growing up in heterosexual families. Regarding the role played by the father or the 
mother in the children’s development, Lubbe argues for instance that children do not 
need a mother or a father as such for their development; rather they just need 
parents.1468 It was also reported that the role played by the parents in the sexual 
orientation of their child is minor.1469  
 
These views support an equality approach to homosexual families and are less 
realistic. Evidence discussed in chapter two support the view that there is a 
significant difference in the development of children raised by homosexual 
individuals or couples and those growing up in heterosexual families. Lamb and 
Lewis observed emotional problems in children growing up in lesbian families; 
Knoesen et al’s findings support the view that fathers play a very important role in 
the development of the sexual development of boys’ the findings of the studies 
undertaken by Park et al on the one hand and Lamb and Lewis on the other support 
the views that respectively the father has an important role to play in a girl’s 
psychological development and that mothers and fathers have different roles to play 
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in the child’s development.1470 In addition to these findings, Golombok is of the view 
that lesbian behaviours influence the sexual orientation of the children they raise. 
 
I agree with these findings and argue that the equality approach to homosexual 
families adopted by South Africa is inconsistent with the best interests of the child. 
Section 18 of the National Health Act emphasises the inconsistency of this approach 
with the child’s best interests. Section 18 of the Act states as follows: 
 
“No person shall disclose the identity of any person who donated a gamete or 
received a gamete, or any matter related to the artificial fertilisation of such gametes, 
or reproduction resulting from such artificial fertilisation”. 
 
This would suggest that the section encourages the non-disclosure of the identity of 
the donor. As I pointed out in chapter three above, the non-disclosure of the identity 
of the gamete donor causes the child resulting from ARTs to lose his or her genetic 
link and this is inconsistent with the child’s right to preserve his or her identity and to 
know the identity of his or her genitor enshrined in the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child that South Africa has ratified and hence has to give effect. 
 
Given that the equality approach is inconsistent with the best interests of the child as 
discussed above; there is therefore a necessity to adopt an approach to homosexual 
families that can appropriately balance the interests of the parents and the interests 
of the child in homosexual families. I refer to this approach as a more realistic 
approach. This approach is grounded on the realistic analysis of the child growing up 
in homosexual families built through ARTs. The more realistic approach to 
homosexual families created through ARTs requires taking into consideration the 
fact that a child needs a father and a mother for its development. As pointed out 
above, there is ample evidence to support the view that children do not need just 
parents to develop to the fullest of their potential, but that they need the presence of 
a father and a mother. This approach goes beyond the equality approach to include 
the need of the child born as a result of ARTs to grow up in an environment that will 
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favour his or her adequate development and adequately protect the best interests of 
the child. The more realist approach requires that provisions of statutes regulating 
ARTs be amended to include the best interests of the child.  
 
In sum, South Africa has adopted an approach to ARTs and homosexual families 
built through ARTs that is inconsistent with the best interests of the child. The 
question that arises now is what should be the appropriate approach to ARTs and to 
homosexual families created through ARTs? The answer to this question is provided 
in the comparative conclusions drawn from the analysis of the application of the 
child’s best interests criterion in USA, Australia, and South Africa.  
 
8.3  COMPARATIVE CONCLUSIONS 
 
This section is essentially about the conclusions that can be drawn from the 
discussion of the legal positions in the USA, Australia and South Africa regarding the 
application of the best interests of the child criterion, which is the test to be done in 
order to determine whether these jurisdictions have given any weigh to the best 
interests of Art-born children. The section considers also the conclusions that can be 
drawn from the discussion of the child’s experience in the USA and Australia in order 
to better understand the child’s experience in South Africa and find a way forward. 
 
8.3.1  The USA 
 
Although in the USA the unborn child is directly protected through Foetal Homicide 
Laws which consider it as a potential victim of violent crimes,1471 like in South Africa, 
the parent-focused approach to ARTs used in the USA did not allow American courts 
to protect the best interests of ART-born children.The survey of the cases in which 
USA courts applied the best interests of the child criterion reveals a difference in the 
interpretation of the best interests of the child. 
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In custody litigation, courts seem to be concerned by the child’s best interests, which 
has determined most if not all the decisions reached. In those litigations, courts have 
particularly focused on the child’s best interests in giving a particular consideration to 
factors such as the child’s physical, emotional, and spiritual development as well as 
the child’s health, safety and welfare.  
 
However, in litigation involving ARTs, although courts seem to be guided by the best 
interests of the child, they do not appear to give the same consideration to the 
factors enumerated above. In In re Baby M and Johnson v Calvert, respectively in 
New Jersey and California, the courts were merely interested in the transfer of the 
custody of the child born as a result of the surrogacy agreement. 
 
Art-born children in the USA have experienced hardship in part as a result of the 
legalisation of homosexual relationships. Although homosexual relationships have 
been legalised in all the states, not all of them recognise homosexual unions as 
marriages or civil unions. Consequently, in states where those unions are not 
recognised as marriages or civil unions, children born to those unions have only one 
legally recognised parent. The partner of this parent has no parental rights or duties. 
As a result, in case of separation, the child will inherit only from its legal parent and 
will lose not only the financial support from the non-legal parent, but also the 
relationship it created with him or her.1472  
 
The exclusion of the gamete-donor from any rearing duties in most states results in 
the child losing one branch of its genealogy and this can ultimately result in an 
idetenty crisis.1473  
 
The experience of ART-born children in this regard is not a good example for South 
Africa. In fact this situation is similar to the South African one in respect of the 
exclusion of the gamete-donor in child-rearing. Unlike the USA and South Africa, 
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Australia offers a good example that can hep find a way of improving the situation of 
ART-born children in South Africa.   
 
8.3.2  Australia 
 
Like in the USA, Australian state laws directly protect the unborn child, with the 
difference that in Australia most statutes expressly include the welfare and interests 
of any person born or to be born as a result ARTs in the factors that must be 
considered when engaging in an analysis of the best interests of the child. The 
Victorian Infertility Act 1995, for instance, emphasises that these factors are 
paramount in the process. 
 
Australia is characterised by the meaning given to the paramountcy provision in the 
Constitution. The best interests of the child are interpreted as being above the 
interests of all other parties involved, including parents. However this approach is not 
adopted in cases involving ARTs as demonstrated above.1474 In many cases 
involving ARTs courts have proven to be mostly concerned by the transfer of the 
custody of the ARTs-born child. This parent-focused approach to ARTs did assist 
Australian courts in providing adequate protection of ART-born childrenʼs best 
interests, like it did in the USA. 
 
Australian ART-born children bor to homosexual people have the same protection as 
children born to heterosexual families in respect of parentage. Children in 
homosexual families are regarded as born to both parents and consequently can 
inherit and enjoy love from both parents, even after parents’ separation. Legal 
mechanisms have been established to ensure that ART-born children in homosexual 
family continue to receive the necessary support from both parents after their 
separation.1475   
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Unlike in the USA, the legal protection offered to ART-born children in Australia is a 
good example for South Africa. The experience of ART-born children in Australian 
homosexual families has inspired the recommendations made below with regard to 
ART-born children in South African homosexual families.  
 
8.3.3  South Africa 
 
Like in the USA, the analysis of the application of the best interests of the child 
criterion in custody litigation and litigation involving ARTs seems to support the view 
that the child’s best interests are better protected in custody cases than in cases 
involving ARTs. Although the best interests of the child are interpreted as being 
interlinked with the rights and interests of the other parties involved, they are not 
viewed as trumping the interests of other parties like in Australian statutes. The 
psychological well-being of the child was the only factor that the court considered in 
its balancing process in the case discussed above.1476 Therefore there are areas 
where the interests of the child might suffer. These include the fact that some 
children are born to grow up in homosexual families; the fact that because of the 
technologies used to bring them in to the world they may be condemned to have a 
less than healthy life; and the fact that because of the status of their parental union, 
they are treated differently from children are born as a result of coital intercourse. 
 
8.3.3.1 The fact of growing up in homosexual families 
 
Children growing up in homosexual families have been reported to experience 
several problems that affect their best interests. In their family environment for 
instance, they are often exposed to rejection and unpleasant comments from 
heterosexual stepparents and siblings.1477 They are often characterised by gender 
identity disorder, girls growing up with gay parents behave like boys and boys 
growing up with lesbian parents are effeminate. Those boys like to be involved in 
sports, games and activities usually chosen by girls, and they also are more 
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attracted to girl’s toys.1478 Children growing up in homosexual families are also 
reported to end up becoming gay and lesbian.1479 
 
Outside the family environment, children growing up in homosexual families have 
been reported to be less likely to rely on teachers’, nurses’ and counselors’ 
support;1480 to be weak in mathematics and social studies; to often find it difficult to 
socialise;1481 to be often timid, not interested to talk about their family life or holidays; 
and to feel uncomfortable when having to work with children from heterosexual 
couples. In addition they were characterised as loners and introverts.1482 Some of 
these children often end up being bullied and teased. They also usually experience 
peer rejection.1483  
 
It is clear that children growing up in homosexual families do not have their interests 
protected because they are exposed to these experiences. It is likely that they will 
not develop to their full potential. They are permanently condemned to feel different 
from other children by the very fact of growing up in homosexual families. 
 
8.3.3.2  The physical and psychological harm of assisted reproductive  
  technologies 
 
When children are physically and psychologically harmed by the method of their 
conception or birth, their best interests might suffer. Evidence has shown that 
multiple pregnancies or multiple gestations has resulted in children being born with a 
number of physical problems, including low birth weight, birth defects or congenital 
malformation, and a number of congenital diseases.1484 This evidence raises 
questions such as whether it is in the best interests of the child to be born with a 
condemnation to suffer from physical health problems due to the techniques that 
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were used for his or her birth. The harm to children resulting from the use of ARTs 
was subjected to a contradictory debate. While some critics maintain that there is no 
harm on a child born of ARTs because the child sought to be protected would not 
have been born if the techniques that brought him or her to life were not used,1485 
other confirm that the harm to a child resulting from the use of ARTs is a reality that 
cannot be denied.1486  
 
In this regard, the first step in providing an accurate answer to the abovementioned 
question would be to understand the meaning of the harm to children and the scope 
of reproductive rights. With regard to the meaning of the harm to children born as a 
result of ARTs, Robertson is of the view that this situation leads to a paradox.1487 He 
argues that there are situations in which children are harmed by the method of their 
conception, gestation, or the social setting of their birth. If in those situations, the 
welfare of the child must be the primary consideration, there must be a way of 
preventing the harm that the child will suffer, and the only way of doing so is to give 
up the use of ARTs that result in that harm.1488 According to David Heyd, if ARTs 
were not used, children born as a result of the use of these technologies would not 
have been born, but because their lives will not be so miserable as to be wronged, it 
would seem that once born they have benefited rather than been harmed by being 
born.1489 This would suggest that no harm occurred in those or other situations in 
which the child is knowingly brought into the world in unavoidably less than healthy 
condition.1490 If so, then using ARTs to enable their birth does not harm them and 
does not justify restriction on those grounds.1491 Robertson also suggests that, 
considering that the child could not have been born without the condition of being 
less than healthy, refusing the act or omission that causes the child to be born with 
that condition cannot harm the child.1492   
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It is clear that this reasoning cannot apply to the situation under examination. The 
harm in our situation is often caused by the greater number of embryos that are 
transferred, which results in multiple gestations. This is a situation that can be 
avoided. In this regard, Roberts observed that cases of multiple gestations present 
situations in which some children who are born as twins or triplets would be born 
with much fewer health problems if born alone.1493 In the situation under 
examination, the harm can be avoided by reducing to one the number of embryos 
transferred. However, in view of the fact that not all embryos transferred may 
develop to maturity and live birth, the reduction of the transferred embryos to one 
may also cause failure to fall pregnant in case that transferred embryos did not 
develop to a birth child. In this case, the embryo transfer procedure can be restarted 
until it becomes possible for a pregnancy to develop to a child live birth. 
 
In short, there is no way to deny the harm that may occur if many embryos are 
transferred and it is reasonable for those who exercise their reproductive rights to 
repeat one embryo transfer procedure to a successful pregnancy. It is thus clear that 
in such a case the best interests of those children will not suffer. 
 
8.3.3.3  The effect of the legal status of the union of the children’s parents 
 
In South Africa, the Civil Union Act has legalised homosexual unions as civil unions 
and life partnerships. It is clear that the Civil Union Act distinguishes between civil 
union partners and life partners. This distinction is important in the analysis of the 
best interests of children born to partners in these unions. In that respect it is 
important to note that in homosexual families, parental rights and responsibilities are 
acquired either by means of artificial fertilisation or by means of surrogacy. With 
regard to artificial fertilisation, The Children’s Act makes a clear distinction between 
children in homosexual civil unions and children in homosexual life partnerships. In 
homosexual civil unions, children are deemed born to married parents and as a 
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consequence, both parents have parental responsibilities and rights in respect of the 
child provided that they consented to the artificial fertilisation.    
 
Gay civil union partners become parents by means of surrogacy. The surrogate 
mother relinquishes the parental rights and responsibilities to both commissioning 
parents after the child’s birth. 
 
However, in homosexual life partnerships1494 the child is deemed born to unmarried 
parents and as a consequence only the legal parents will have parental rights and 
responsibilities on the child. In this case, the child will for instance inherit only from 
the one legal parent that he or she has. The child’s interests to inherit from both 
parents as for children in civil unions will suffer. 
 
8.4  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This study was aimed at emphasising the debate over the suitability or not of 
homosexual families as an environment for the child’s development by advocating a 
more objective approach to these families. The study also aimed at investigating 
ways of improving the welfare of children born of ARTs and growing up in 
homosexual families by ensuring that the children’s best interests are considered as 
paramount in the decision of bringing them into the world through ARTs and raising 
them in homosexual families. 
 
Hopefully the aims of this study have been achieved. This study departs significantly 
from other studies in the field and uses a new approach to homosexual families. The 
study proceeds from the perspective of the best interests of the child in order to 
analyse homosexual families. The study has critically analysed the process of 
building families through new medical techniques focusing on challenges that face 
children born of ARTs and growing up in homosexual families. This issue was 
chosen because it received less attention by scholars who used to focus on the 
rights of adults to marry, reproduce and form families even to the detriment of 
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children they will have to raise. The study ultimately sought to provide an objective or 
more nuanced approach to homosexual families that is aimed not at accommodating 
adults who wanted their relationships with persons of the same sex to be legally 
recognised; but rather an approach that is aimed at examining the facts as they are 
and objectively drawing consequences from the reality. The study also sought to 
provide a meaningful engagement in the protection of the child’s rights in ensuring 
that their best interests do not give way to the procreative rights of adults who decide 
to bring them in the world. 
 
The nucleus of organised human society is the family and it is within the family unit 
that man has reproduced himself.1495 Family all over the world has undergone many 
changes. The socio-cultural picture of the family indicates that the nuclear family, 
which is monogamous and heterosexual, has embarked on a declining process. The 
genetic link between children and their parents and the presence of a father and a 
mother are no longer deemed important for the social, physical and psychological 
development of the child. From the decline of the nuclear family and the 
development of new techniques in ARTs, homosexual families have emerged. 
 
South Africa was not spared from family changes that occurred around the world. 
The democratic Constitution with the Bill of Rights and specifically the equality 
clause not only ended the apartheid regime of discrimination and injustice, but was 
also a new departure point for the legal recognition of other forms of families, 
including homosexual families. Following the Constitutional Court decisions on the 
definition of the family and other related issues, the legislature was given time to 
come up with a solution to the discrimination against homosexual people in South 
Africa. The long political and judicial struggle for the recognition of the rights of 
homosexual people ended up in the promulgation of the Civil Union Act, which 
legally recognised homosexual relationships as civil unions and life partnerships. On 
this occasion this law extended some of the rights of heterosexual couples to 
homosexual couples who could enter into a heterosexual marriage-like relationship. 
                                                          
1495
 Lupton 1985 TSAR 277. 
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From that point, homosexual people within South Africa can freely marry and build 
families. 
 
The South African Constitution on the one hand guarantees the right of every person 
to reproduce and where necessary to use the new reproductive technologies to 
achieve this goal.1496 It is a fact that not everyone is fertile and hence can reproduce 
naturally. The curse of infertility has always posed severe medical and social 
problems for which the only solution until recently has been acquiescence or 
adoption. Medical technology has now developed a solution to both male and female 
sterility in the form of ARTs.1497 As a result, heterosexual infertile and homosexual 
individuals have extensively used ARTs to reproduce and form their families. On the 
other hand, the Children’s Act requires that the best interests of the child should be 
considered paramount in every matter concerning him or her. This would suggest 
that any decision concerning the child should be motivated by the best interests of 
the child, including even the decision of prospective parents to have children.  
 
It is clear that in the context of families built through ARTs in South Africa, the 
parents’ right to reproduce using ARTs conflict with the right of the child to have his 
or her best interests considered paramount in every matter concerning him or her. 
This study was carried out with the view of providing answers to two or even three 
questions. 
 
The first question is whether ARTs could serve the best interests of the child. With 
regard to this question, it was indicated in chapter two of this study that reproduction 
within homosexual families and the best interests of resulting children are one of the 
issues homosexual families raise. As indicated in chapter three, the legalisation of 
homosexual unions has resulted in homosexual couples and individuals being 
allowed to use ARTs in order to reproduce, and that ARTs are their only means of 
reproduction if they choose to do so in the context of their homosexual relationships, 
irrespective of whether they are infertile or not. It was further indicated in that chapter 
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  Section 40 of the Children Act. 
1497
  Lupton 1985 TSAR 277. 
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that having recourse to ART procedures as a means of reproduction might put 
children resulting from these procedures to an increasing risk of being born with 
several problems, including physical, mental and psychological problems.  
 
It was concluded in chapter five of this study that for several reasons, including the 
physical and mental harm that ART procedures cause to children, as well as the 
adult-centric focus of these procedures, they cannot reasonably be in the best 
interests of the resulting child. In that chapter, I argued that although the South 
African approach to ARTs encourages the prospective parents’ decision to choose to 
reproduce using ARTs with the full knowledge of the harm ART procedures can 
cause to the resulting child, and other related procedures such as genetic selection 
of offspring which to some extent allow prospective parents to choose the desired 
physical traits of the resulting child irrespective of the adverse consequences on the 
child, could not reasonably fall within their procreative liberty.  
 
I further argued that the protection of the child’s interests provided in the 
preconception agreement is important but not enough as it applies after the birth of 
the child. This protection would be more effective if it is associated with other 
measures taken while the child is still in the mother’s womb. In other words, in order 
to protect the interests of the ARTs-born child, it is a necessity to apply best interests 
of the child criterion to the child while the child is still at the stage of foetus in the 
womb of his or her mother and after birth. Having a child whose interests are 
protected after birth seems to be the priority rather than a decent and healthy child 
whose interests are protected before birth by preventing him or her from being born 
with health problems such as celebral palsy or mental disability; and after birth by 
making sure that he or she will grow up in a stable home environment. Taken in this 
context, ARTs can serve the best interests of the child only to some extent as the 
major focus is to have a child rather than a healthy child. 
 
The second question is whether being born as a result of ARTs and growing up in a 
homosexual family could be in the best interests of the child. It was indicated in 
chapter two regarding this question that several arguments were offered in defense 
of homosexual families. These arguments indicate that gay and lesbian families are 
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as good an environment for proper children’s development as heterosexual families. 
The social opposition that these families encounter in many countries is seen as 
discrimination against gays and lesbians and the denial of their right to marry and 
form families as is an option for heterosexual people, and their right to equality. The 
difficult experience of children growing up in these families is viewed as a result of 
intolerance from a hostile heterosexual environment that is still dominant all over the 
world. It was also indicated that the justifications offered in opposing these families 
may indicate that children growing up in these families are at risk of not developing 
to their full potential, and that their best interests might be not properly protected.  
 
In chapter six, it was indicated that the legalisation of homosexual unions has some 
implications for the child resulting from the use of ARTs technologies. These include 
the fact that children in some countries, including the USA, receive different 
treatment according to the states where they live. While in some states children born 
as a result of ARTs in heterosexual as well as in homosexual families have the right 
to have the benefit of having two parents respectively of opposite sexes and of the 
same sex, in other states children are condemned to have only one parent, namely 
the biological parent. It is worth remembering that the Obergefell decision legalised 
homosexual unions in all USA states. However, this decision did not impose on 
states the obligation to register homosexual unions as civil unions or mariages. As a 
result, in some states, homosexual unions are registered as domestic partnerships in 
which case children may inherit only from the biological parent. Similarly in South 
Africa, children born as a result of ARTs to life partners will have only one parent.1498 
The partner of the biological parent has no parental right in respect of his or her 
child. As a result, the child will lose not only financial, psychological and emotional 
support from the non-biological parent in case of the separation between the two 
parents, but the child will also be denied the right to inherit from the non-biological 
parent and will lose his or her blood line if he or she is the result of the use of the 
genetic materials of a donor.  
 
                                                          
1498
 With the exception of surrogacy, in which case the partner is deemed to be the child’s parent. 
414 
 
In many states, donors of gametes and eggs and surrogate mothers are required by 
law to have no contact to or other parental rights in respect of the child resulting from 
the use of their genetic materials. This will cause the child to lose the root of his or 
her genetic origins. This situation will cause the child to have an identity crisis. The 
identity is this context is linked to the child’s genetic origins. It will be a challenge for 
a child born in these states and whose parents are separated to understand that he 
or she has only one parent. This may be detrimental to such a child. 
 
It was further indicated in chapter five that the analysis of the process of building 
families through ARTs in South Africa reveals that although ARTs have been a 
solution to infertile couples by enabling them to have children, it has also created 
another problem related to the health of the resulting children. Children born as a 
result of ARTs are exposed to different harmful treatments while they are still in the 
womb of their mother. These treatments seem to be in the sole interests of the 
parents and could result in the child being born with several health challenges that 
will keep him or her from developing to the fullest of his or her potential like all other 
children. It was also indicated that not all ART procedures result in a sick or disabled 
child. However, there seems to be no guarantee that the resulting child will not face 
such challenges. It was further indicated that the secrecy that surrounds ART 
procedures and the anonymity of gamete donors are not in the best interests of the 
child. For all these reasons, it is not reasonable to think that being born of ARTs and 
growing up in homosexual family can be in the best interests of the child.  
 
It was then concluded in chapter five that because ART procedures as indicated 
above are neither in the best interests of ARTs-born children nor in the best interests 
of those growing up in homosexual families, there is thus a conflict between the right 
of parents to reproduce on the one side and the right of the child to have his or her 
best interests considered as paramount in every matter concerning him or her. The 
question that arises is how this conflict will be solved. The answer to this question 
requires a consideration of the facts surrounding the use of ARTs procedures by 
homosexual parents. 
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On the one hand, in view of the fact that ARTs as used and regulated in South Africa 
may result in children affected by a number of health challenges, including birth 
defects for twins and triplets as a result of multiple gestations, neurological problems 
in particular cerebral palsy, sex chromosome and imprinting disorder et 
cetera,1499and on the other hand the fact that ARTs are the only option for 
homosexual couples and individuals to reproduce in the context of their homosexual 
relationships, I am of the view that a balanced approach is needed. This balanced 
approach will still allow homosexual parents to have the children they desire but also 
guarantee that the resulting child will not be exposed to health challenges associated 
with ARTs. The more nuanced approach to ARTs or the minimum harm approach is 
to my mind the only adequate way of resolving the conflicts of rights between 
parents and their children. 
 
8.5  PROPOSALS FOR LAW REFORM 
 
I have analysed the legal recognition process of homosexual families and the current 
law regulating ARTs in South Africa. The main weaknesses are the fact that the 
parent-focused approach to ARTs and the equality approach to homosexual families 
that South Africa has adopted cannot adequately protect the interests of children 
born as a result of ARTs. Further, there is no provision made for the protection of 
children born to and growing up in homosexual families. To me, these weaknesses 
would best be addressed by the measures that follow. 
 
In view of the fact that the transfer of more than one embryo could result in multiple 
gestations, which in turn result in many health challenges for the child born as a 
result of ARTs, I am of the view that only one embryo should be transferred to the 
womb of the recipient during the embryo transfer process. 
 
I propose that a provision limiting the number of embryos to be transferred to the 
womb of the recipient during the embryo transfer be included in the National Health 
Act. This provision should explicitly indicate that no more than one embryo can be 
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transferred to a recipient. This provision will have the effect of reducing the chances 
of having multiple gestations and hence reducing the probability of having a child 
who is harmed to the minimum. This provision will further by that fact increase the 
chances of the child to physically develop to his or her fullest potential as required by 
the Constitution. 
 
In view of the fact that genetic manipulation done to determine the quality of make-
up of gametes or embryos, or to modify, transfer, or remove genetic material; such 
as Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PDG) to screen embryos and Flow Cytometry 
to select the sperm that bears female or male genetic materials for preconception 
sex selection, are likely to result in embryo biopsy and many other health challenges 
that affect the physical well-being of the resulting child; I propose that a provision 
that explicitly prohibit genetic manipulation for any purpose other than isolating 
genes that are likely to transfer diseases to the child be included in the National 
Health Act. This provision should further prohibit any manipulation of the genetic 
materials for the purpose of creating a tissue that matches with the tissue of the sick 
sibling or trying to give the child a particular look on the parents’ request. 
 
In view of the fact that the secrecy surrounding ARTs have negative psycho social 
consequences on the child born as a result of ARTs and the fact that the non-
disclosure of the identity of the gamete donor results in the gamete donor child being 
denied the right to preserve his or her identity and to know the identity of his or her 
genitor as protected in the Convention on the Rights of the Child that South Africa 
has ratified in 1995; I propose that two provisions be included in the National Health 
Act. The first provision should impose on the parents of an ARTs-born child the 
obligation of informing him or her as early as possible in his or her childhood about 
the means and the circumstances of his or her birth. The second provision would 
impose on the parents of an ARTs-born child the obligation of assisting him or her in 
the process of identifying and establishing physical contact with the person who 
donated his or her genetic materials for the birth of that child. For this purpose, the 
gamete donation should be accompanied by consent by the donor to be identified 
and establish physical contact with the child resulting from the use of his or her 
genetic materials. However, it should be made clear to the donor that he or she will 
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not have any parental rights. In this case the role of the donor will be to help alleviate 
the child’s psychological problems caused by the loss of origins.  
 
In view of the fact that surrogate motherhood agreements are concluded for the main 
purpose of allowing perspective parents to have a desired genetically related child 
without making some efforts to prevent the child from being born with health 
problems; I propose that a provision that explicitly adds the protection of best 
interests of the child while still in the mother’s womb as one of the validity 
requirements of the surrogate motherhood agreement be included in the Children’s 
Act. This provision will impose an obligation on the courts to approve only surrogate 
motherhood agreements where prospective parents and ART providers are 
committed to the protection of the best interests of the child by making sure that they 
approach ARTs with a minimum harm perspective which will result in increasing the 
chances of the child to be born with the maximum chances of developing to the 
fullest of his or her potential. 
 
In view of the fact that children born as a result of ARTs to life partners are viewed 
as children born to unmarried parents,1500 and that as a consequence only the birth 
mother of those children has parental responsibilities and rights in respect of those 
children,1501 children in homosexual life partnerships lose the support of the non-birth 
mother and are accordingly treated differently from children born to homosexual civil 
union partners as a result of ARTs. Given that this situation amounts to 
discrimination agains ART children born to homosexual life partners, I propose that a 
provision that harmonises the situation of all children born as a result of ARTs to 
homosexual couples and individuals be included in the Children’s Act 38 of 2005. 
This provision will impose an obligation on the state to ensure that children resulting 
from the use of ARTs have same and equal treatment irrespective of their parents’ 
marital status. The provision will further impose on the non-birth mother the 
obligation to provide her support to the child to whose birth she consented.  
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  Heaton South African Law of Persons (2008) 3
rd
 ed 49. 
 
1501
  Section 40 (3) (a) of the Children’s Act. 
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The adoption of the proposals set out above should ensure that the best interests of 
the child born to homosexual partners, married or unmarried, growing up in 
homosexual family environments are adequately protected and that those interests 
do not give a way to those of the adults desiring to have genetically related children 
and build families of their own 
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